This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000939 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/S, AF/EX, HR/OE 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JFRAZER 
TREASURY FOR ED BARBER AND C WILKINSON 
USDOC FOR 2037 DIEMOND 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
RIO FOR WEISSMAN 
PRETORIA PASS AG ATTACHE HELM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/07 
TAGS: EAGR ECON PGOV PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: COMMERCIAL FARMERS PESSIMISTIC RE: BOTH SHORT 
AND LONG TERM PROSPECTS 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY ECONOFF K BEL FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND(D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: DCM and Laboff met with three 
representatives of the Commercial Farmers' Union (CMF) 
- David Hasluck, Director, Malcolm Voles, Deputy 
Director, and Colin Cloete, President, on April 11, 
¶2002.  The CFU had requested the meeting as a "reality 
check" on the post-election situation of the 
commercial farmers (CFs) in Zimbabwe.  The CFs were 
pessimistic regarding their ability to "sit out" the 
situation in hopes of improved post-election 
prospects.  They were similarly dismissive of GOZ 
projections that winter crops, grown with or without 
the participation of the CFs, could yield enough to 
meaningfully address Zimbabwe's critical food 
shortfall.  End summary. 
 
Situation Regarding the Commercial Farmers (CFs) 
 
¶2. (C) The CFU reps were very downbeat regarding the 
GOZ land resettlement program.  Although the farmers 
had hoped for some easing of the situation post- 
election, they have seen "more of the same" in the 
form of farm occupations, acquisitions, and the 
targeting of white commercial farmers.  In fact, the 
CFs have seen an increase in A-2 settlers (A-2 is the 
GOZ's indigenous, small-scale commercial farmer 
program) who receive entire farms rather than pared- 
down sustenance plots.  The CFU's assessment is that 
white commercial farmers are no longer viewed by the 
leadership as a key component of the Zimbabwean 
economy, with attendant rights. 
 
¶3. (C) The CFU does not believe that the majority of 
its members will be able, on an economic basis, to 
"sit it out" much longer.  In addition to loss of 
income and the shrinking value of any savings, the 
farmers are facing their routine obligations - debt 
payments, tuition payments, and living costs, the net 
result being forced migration. 
 
Future Economic Projections for CFs in Zimbabwe 
 
¶4. (C) Of 4,500 paid members in the CFU prior to the 
land acquisition scheme, the number has dwindled to 
approximately 3,200 members - a decline of more than 
one quarter.  Further, about 50% of the remaining 
farmers are having major operating or viability 
problems.  The CFU stated that this year had seen 
approximately $250 million in forex income, of which 
the producers were the main beneficiaries.  This 
amount is down from the $350 million which was 
expected. 
 
¶5. (C) When asked whether the CFs would be able to put 
crops in next year if they "rode it out" for this 
year, the CFU responded that there were both political 
and social elements to the question.  The CFs believe 
that surviving for six to eight months without being 
on the farm would be extremely difficult, noting that 
the equipment and assets of the farms would certainly 
be stolen/looted during the farmers' absence.  They 
noted as well that the figures coming out from the 
Central Bank were increasingly unbelievable.  They 
feared that the economy would become de-monetized to 
the point that people would refuse to accept money for 
goods and services. 
 
¶6. (C) The CFU complained that Agriculture Minister 
Made's projections regarding the capacity of the 
government to grow winter crops were outrageous.  They 
noted that Minister of State Security Goche, rather 
than the Minister of Agriculture, was ostensibly in 
control of this project.  Although the government has 
reportedly already placed an order for fertilizer for 
the winter wheat crop, the official estimate of the 
amount of wheat which could be grown was far out of 
balance with reality.  While the GOZ publicly stated 
plans to plant 45,000 hectares of wheat by October 
2002, the CFs believed the GOZ would barely be able to 
sow 4,000 hectares.  (UNDP projects a maximum 
hectarage of 10,000, if all goes ideally.) 
 
¶7. (C) Additionally, the GOZ did not even know who 
would be growing the wheat.  Most of the settlers - 
and particularly the A-2 settlers - had little or no 
farming experience.  There had been some suggestion to 
the CFs that they remain on their homestead and teach 
the new settlers how to farm, a proposition which they 
received with incredulity and disinterest. 
 
¶8. (C) As far as the participation of CFs in the 
winter growth cycle, they stated that while it might 
be possible for them  to plant 20,000 hectares, 
yielding 120,000 tonnes, there were legal constraints 
to contend with as well.  For instance, the issue of 
whether they would be allowed to remain on the farms 
through harvest time is a key, but as yet unanswered, 
question. 
 
CFU Assistance 
 
¶9. (C) When the CFs asked how they could assist the 
mission, the DCM requested that they keep the Embassy 
informed of the situation and new developments.  In 
addition, the CFs agreed to provide the names of A-2 
settlers who were being allocated or grabbing large 
chunks of CF assets.  Further, the CFs agreed to keep 
us informed of dialogue or approaches from the GOZ 
that might point to normalization of the situation. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment: Zimbabwe's white commercial farmers 
are clearly at the end of their rope, and even their 
previously affixed veneer of optimism about "riding it 
out" is now cracking.  An already destructive solution 
is made worse by the Agriculture Minister's recent 
statement that farmers are henceforth not allowed to 
remove equipment - including irrigation systems, 
farming tools, and tractors - from their farms. 
Though such an edict is in clear violation of the law, 
it reflects the GOZ's attitude that property rights 
are no longer enjoyed by the commercial farmers.  As 
the realization of their fate becomes clear, more and 
more will be forced to consider options elsewhere, 
with varying but shrinking amounts of movable assets. 
Zimbabwe's economic foundation is being dangerously 
eroded as we watch, with parallel damage being 
simultaneously inflicted on its civic foundation.  End 
comment. 
 
Whitehead