This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001323 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2012 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS POSTPONED 
 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 1159 
     ¶B. ABUJA 1232 
     ¶C. ABUJA 1029 
 
 
Classified by DCM Andrews; Reason 1.5 (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Demonstrating a degree of pragmatism in the 
face of an incipient political emergency, President Obasanjo, 
the 36 governors, speakers of the state houses of assembly, 
leadership of the three registered political parties and INEC 
agreed to hold local government elections on August 10 
instead of May 18, 2002.  It was agreed that state houses of 
assembly would pass enabling laws to allow the naming of 
caretaker local councils for the period between May 29 to 
August 10.  This political solution allows INEC time to 
update the 1998 voter rolls and register new political 
parties.  While pragmatic, the decision to allow appointed 
local government councils or the extension of present local 
councils' tenure is likely to be contested in court, and it 
is uncertain whether it can withstand judicial scrutiny. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
¶2. (U) President Obasanjo hosted a meeting at the Villa on 
April 24 to seek a political solution in the wake of the 
Supreme Court's March 28 decision invalidating the National 
Assembly's attempt to extend local government officials' 
tenure to 2003 (Ref C).  After that decision, state governors 
had set the local government elections for May 18, 2002. 
However, it was clear the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) could neither register new parties nor 
update the 1998 voter rolls by that date.  May 18 elections 
would have disenfranchised millions who had turned 18 since 
¶1998. 
 
 
¶3. (U) The 36 governors, speakers of the state houses of 
assembly, leadership of the three registered political 
parties and INEC attended the April 24 meeting.  The day 
before, the President had hosted the speakers discuss the 
same issue, but that meeting was rolled over to the following 
day after the Speakers' Association dug in their heels, 
demanding the local government polls hold on May 18. 
 
 
¶4. (U) With the wider group of attendees at the meeting, 
particularly the governors, the participants agreed to hold 
local government elections nationwide on August 10, giving 
INEC time to update voter rolls and register new parties. 
Still, present local government officials must vacate their 
posts by May 29.  According to Enugu State Governor Chimaroke 
Nnamani, who spoke after the conclusion of the meeting, state 
houses of assembly must now enact enabling legislation for 
the appointment of the caretaker bodies. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) The Kano State House of Assembly, viewing May 18 
elections as unrealistic (and apparently in anticipation of 
the agreement at the Villa), had on April 23 passed a bill 
authorizing the State government to appoint five-person 
caretaker committees for each local government area for a 
three month tenure.  The same week, the Kwara House of 
Assembly extended until September 1 the tenure of the local 
government councils in the state at the request of the 
Governor.  (COMMENT:  The provision to empower states to 
appoint caretaker local governments must have been an 
attractive enticement for the governors and state speakers to 
delay the elections to August.  Now the state officials can 
appoint their followers in the local governments for that 
important period immediately before elections.  This probably 
buoys their hopes that they will be better placed than they 
were before to dictate the outcome of the local elections. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
 
¶6. (C) PolOff spoke April 25 with Dr. Musa Musa, a Bauchi 
State Commissioner.  Musa confirmed press reporting of the 
agreement.  Bauchi planned to abide by it; the State 
Government had not considered itself able to hold the polls 
in May anyway, he stated.  Musa opined that lawsuits against 
the agreement were possible, as was the prospect that some 
states might not abide by the pact (i.e., might seek to hold 
elections on May 18 despite not having an updated voter 
register). 
 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
 
¶7. (C) On the face of it, aside from the present local 
government councilors and the National Assembly (who had 
hoped to reduce the electoral base of the governors), there 
are few losers as a result of this agreement.  The state 
houses of assembly stood in objection to the delay until the 
agreement gave them the power to define the caretaker 
councils.  The Governors will get their new local government 
councilors long before they must run the gauntlet themselves. 
 The political actors who made this agreement hope to use 
both the caretaker councils and the new local governments as 
political machines to protect incumbents at the state level. 
Given the close ties between political power and wealth in 
Nigeria, and an absence of differing political ideologies, 
"gentlemen,s agreements" that promote mutual protection for 
incumbents are likely to be a recurring theme of the 2002-03 
election season. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Because the fulcrum of the agreement appears to be the 
provision giving the states the easement to appoint 
caretakers at the local level, the agreement could unravel if 
that portion is successfully challenged in court.  While 
current incumbents in the local government positions would 
have an interest in making such a challenge, their term ends 
May 29, and they do not appear to have a case.  However, the 
federal constitution states that the people's right to 
democratically elected local government is "guaranteed."  A 
plausible argument could be made that appointment of 
caretakers and even the extension of serving local 
councilors' tenure abrogates that constitutional assurance. 
Therefore, while it is not clear who might make a legal 
challenge or even which court would have jurisdiction, 
someone will likely sue, and the agreement could unravel. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Moreover, some state governments could choose to 
abrogate the agreement and attempt polls on May 18.  Such an 
act might be within the bounds of the constitution, but would 
rekindle the controversy regarding registration of voters and 
parties, which carries with it the specter of disorganized 
elections and potential violence by those voters and 
political partisans who feel disenfranchised. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Aside from the state governors and state assemblies, 
the other winners from this agreement are the young potential 
voters who would have been disenfranchised by a vote using 
the old rolls.  The decision was also a victory for the new 
political parties.  They could not have been registered in 
time.  The threat of lawsuits from these quarters will likely 
recede.  In the meantime, the primary burden has shifted to 
INEC.  It must update voter registration, certify new 
parties, and issue millions of voter ID cards, all within 
less than four months.  This is technically feasible, but 
INEC cannot tarry in its assignment, and the Federal 
Government must provide the necessary resources.  If INEC can 
do its job, and the courts do not scotch the deal, this 
agreement will probably minimize chances for disorder and 
enhance the quality of elections over what would have 
occurred May 18.  However, if INEC falls asleep at the 
switch, the deal would have served only to delay the 
confusion and lawsuits. 
JETER