This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001169 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: 18/03/02 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AO ZI CF NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NSA GENERAL MOHAMMED ON ANGOLA, CONGO AND 
ZIMBABWE 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5(B) 
AND (D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During an April 3 meeting with National 
Security Advisor, General (Rtd.) Aliyu Mohammed, to discuss 
security assistance programs (SEPTEL), Ambassador Jeter 
used the opportunity to engage the NSA on Angola, Congo and 
Zimbabwe. END SUMMARY 
 
 
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ANGOLA 
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¶2. (C) The Ambassador initiated the discussion by asking 
the NSA whether the GON was involved behind the scenes in 
the Angolan cease-fire agreement. Mohammed replied that the 
GON was not involved; in fact explained that he was in 
Saudi Arabia for the Hajj when Savimbi was killed. None the 
less, said that President Obasanjo had spoken with Dos 
Santos and told him that Savimbi's death was a great 
opportunity to rebuild the country. Mohammed noted that 
UNITA would always be symbolic of Savimbi's resistance to 
Dos Santos and the rebels needed a face saving way out so 
that they could appear to remain true to Savimbi's legacy 
while also ending the war. 
 
 
¶3. (C) The NSA also revealed that President Obasanjo had 
sent Special Representative on Conflict Resolution, 
Ambassador Raph Uwechue, to Angola. Mohammed said he was 
pleased with the cease-fire and that amnesty had been given 
to the rebels. He concluded, the situation looked hopeful. 
 
 
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Congo: 
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¶4. (C) The NSA was not optimistic about the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue (ICD), contending that nothing good would come of 
it. He explained, there are too many players involved in 
the ICD and it is impossible to get everyone to put their 
selfish interests aside and work for peace. Mohammed 
suggested that the solution requires key players to sit 
down and hammer out a solution and that has not happened 
yet. Until Museveni, Kabila, Mbeki and Mugabe reach a 
consensus on peace, there will continue to be chaos in the 
Congo. 
 
 
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Zimbabwe: 
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¶5. (C) Mohammed summarized his thoughts on Zimbabwe by 
saying that unlike the U.S. and Britain points of view, 
Nigeria saw the Zimbabwe crisis as one over land ownership 
and not politics. He insisted the Britain was biased which 
opened their version of events to question. The NSA said 
that the real problem was not Mugabe but lack of land 
ownership by the Zimbabwean majority.  Meanwhile, Britain 
was protecting the interests of the elite like the 
publisher of the Financial Times and a former British 
Foreign Minister Rifkind, both of whom had massive land 
holdings in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Everyone agrees that greater land equity was 
fundamental, the Ambassador replied, but the contest for 
land did not legitimize election fraud and intimidation. 
The NSA disagreed, asserting that the elections were 
credible. Ambassador Jeter offered to provide reports to 
substantiate his statement; the NSA rebutted by saying that 
credibility depends on whose reports you read. 
 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador told Mohammed that the US appreciated 
what Nigeria was doing in Zimbabwe but did not recognize 
the legitimacy of the elections. Moreover, given what had 
happened during the recent poll it would be difficult to 
have normal relations with the Mugabe government. 
 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador suggested that Mugabe gracefully step 
aside for a transitional government since he had proven 
that he can win an election by capitalizing on the land 
issue. The NSA agreed that Mugabe should step down but 
argued, if you pushed him too hard he would only enlarge 
his following. Sanctions will not punish Mugabe only the 
people of Zimbabwe. 
 
 
¶9. (C) The NSA argued that Tsvangirai was not a viable 
successor to Mugabe. Tsvangirai could not replace Mugabe 
because he did not have the support of the National 
institutions, including the civil service and the army. 
Asked if he believed the charges of treason against 
Tsvangirai, Mohammed said that he was uncertain but had 
 
SIPDIS 
requested a copy of the alleged tape implicating the MDC 
leader to see if it was authentic. Ambassador said that 
from our perspective the charges against Tsvangirai are not 
credible. 
 
 
¶10. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that the land issue was 
bigger than Zimbabwe; there was a real fear that violence 
over land redistribution could spread to South Africa and 
Namibia and influence racial tensions throughout the 
region. He said killings and seizures were not the answer, 
citing Namibia's calling of a National conference on the 
land problem as an example of addressing the issue 
responsibly. 
 
 
¶11. (C) Ambassador said that Nigeria's position on Zimbabwe 
could have influence much beyond its borders, including 
questions of Africa's commitment to the goals of NEPAD. 
Mohammed exclaimed that these statements made African 
countries feel they were being blackmailed. 
 
 
¶12. (C) The NSA said it seemed unfair for the U.S. to 
criticize Zimbabwe's election when its own National 
election had been irregular. In defense of the legitimacy 
of the elections, the NSA said that Mugabe promised to have 
more polling stations and he did. The Ambassador countered 
that although there were more polling stations, they were 
strategically placed in Mugabe rural strongholds. 
 
 
¶13. (C) The NSA digressed by reinforcing Nigeria's concern 
about Zimbabwe. He said that President Obasanjo had 
dedicated a tremendous amount of time and energy to the 
issue, traveling to Zimbabwe six times and twice to London 
before and after the elections. 
 
 
¶14. (C) The NSA concluded by conditioning his remarks 
saying that they were his personal view, and not those of 
GON. 
ANDREWS