This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001068 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
RIYADH FOR RUSS HANKS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2027 
TAGS: PINS PGOV KDEM PHUM PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA,S OBASANJO IN TROUBLE IN THE NORTH 
 
 
REF: ABUJA 829 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reason: 1.5(b) 
 
 
¶1.      (U) Summary:  President Olusegun Obasanjo's probable 
re-election bid faces deep opposition in the North, but 
he seems to have a strategy for recovery.  Nigeria's 
leader benefits from a lack of credible opponents and 
the apparent readiness of some Northern elites to join 
his government, if the enticement is right.  All the 
same, growing numbers of Northerners are praying for new 
blood.  A recent pronouncement by Sokoto Governor 
Bafarawa highlighted northern unhappiness.  End summary. 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) During a recent trip to Kano and Kaduna, DCM spoke 
with 15 northern political and business figures, only one of 
whom holds a remunerative position in the GON.  Just one (not 
the one receiving GON money) felt President Obasanjo's 
popularity had grown during the preceding six months.  The 
other 14 saw varying degrees of decline. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Recurring themes in the conversations included 
interlocutors' strongly-expressed hopes that the U.S. would 
"do something" to convince Obasanjo that he was on the wrong 
path and to discourage him from seeking a second term.  Fear 
of violence associated with campaigning was pervasive.  More 
general concerns about insecurity were also often expressed. 
(One businessman commented that the area where he resides had 
experienced four armed robberies in 11 years, three of them 
in the past two years.)  GON failure to address corruption 
effectively was also a key theme.   VP Atiku Abubakar's 
reported interest in Kabo Air came up several times; Kabo 
once again won the largest share of the Hajj airlift contract 
and once again stranded some pilgrims in Saudi Arabia for 
nearly a month after Eid el-Adha. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Those who had never liked Obasanjo unsurprisingly 
were the most critical.  The Obasanjo Administration's lack 
of support for agriculture was a particular sore point in 
this agriculture-dependent part of the country.  However, 
even Obasanjo's supporters were showing doubts.  Dr. Liman 
Ciroma, a highly influential northern elder, said he found 
himself increasingly isolated when expressing the view that 
the North should accept another four years with Obasanjo at 
the helm.  Indeed, the bill of particulars against the Head 
of State was powerful, Ciroma conceded, particularly when 
measured against the hopes and aspirations of Northerners. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Ciroma is holding his fire in public, while erstwhile 
Obasanjo supporter Sokoto Governor Attahiru Bafarawa 
delivered a blistering indictment of the Obasanjo 
Administration on the closing day of a seminar on peace and 
harmony in the North.  Ambassador heard from the Chairman of 
the Northern Governors' Conference that Bafarawa's speech was 
formulated at a Conference meeting and had the endorsement of 
all Northern Governors.  Held in Kaduna March 27-28, under 
the auspices of the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), the 
seminar brought together many of the best-known Northern 
elites.  Bafawara blasted Obasanjo and the GON for alleged 
anti-Northern biases and failure to deliver on even his most 
basic campaign promises.  In an effort to blunt the expected 
attack and to cast doubt on ACF's claim to speak for the 
entire North (not just Hausas, Fulanis and assimilated ethnic 
groups), Obasanjo loyalists arranged for pro-OO political 
figures from the Middle Belt to announce their support for 
the President almost simultaneously.  Few of these 
individuals pack much political punch, and press play has 
focused on interpreting and dissecting Bafarawa's attack to 
the near exclusion of reporting the Middle Belters' 
encomiums. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Ciroma said he and some other northern leaders were 
now actively searching for alternatives to Obasanjo.  One 
option under consideration was former Head of State Yakubu 
Gowon; another was former Commonwealth Secretary-General 
Emeka Anyaoku.  Ciroma admitted that Gowon was past his prime 
and that his accomplishments as Head of State were less than 
stellar.  However, he would likely bring most of the Middle 
Belt along, as well as a measure of stability.  Anyaoku would 
rally Igbo votes while being acceptable to most Northerners, 
Ciroma thought.  In our view, neither Gowon nor Anyaoku would 
inspire many voters; it would take tremendous resources to 
make them viable alternatives to current contenders. 
 
 
¶7.  (C) While Ciroma and many others look to tried and true 
political players, younger Northerners (and some of their 
elders) grow restless and seek generational change.  They 
dislike the choices they see before them now:  Obasanjo, 
Babangida or Atiku.  Few have any name to offer; most say 
they are praying for divine intervention and express hope 
that the USG will "do something" to convince Obasanjo to 
"adopt the Mandela option." 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Though some believe Obasanjo ultimately will not run, 
all indications today point to him seeking a second term. 
The parade of sycophants calling on him to stay thickens 
daily, a sure sign of his own current thinking.  Moreover, 
some around him (notably Works and Housing Minister Anenih) 
are recruiting for the Cabinet, not just for the final year 
of this term, but for the next as well.  According to one 
young Northerner, Anenih's plan is to bring a few old 
Northern warhorses, such as Lawal Kaita and Umaru Shinkafi, 
out of the stables for the run-up to the 2003 elections in 
the belief that their presence will foil efforts to bring 
forth a unified Northern challenge.  Additional credence is 
given to this story by recent generally positive comments on 
GON performance and Obasanjo from Kaita ("Tell") and Shinkafi 
("Trust").  After the election, Obasanjo would replace the 
old warhorses with younger steeds, Anenih is said to be 
telling potential younger steeds (in order to keep them from 
bucking this strategy).  Meanwhile, Obasanjo himself 
reportedly told media on April 1 that he was beginning a 
14-day fast, in order to obtain proper guidance from God and 
the Nigerian people.  At the fast's end, he would announce 
his intentions for 2003.  Thirteen days and counting. 
Jeter