R 191614Z MAR 02
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2223
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000673 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL RW
SUBJECT: THE KABILA GOVERNMENT:  THESE ARE TOUGH TIMES 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR AUBREY HOOKS FOR REASONS 1/5 B/D. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C)  THE GOVERNMENT OF JOSEPH KABILA FEELS MUCH PUT UPON 
THESE DAYS AND FRUSTRATED THAT IT HAS FEW OPTIONS TO EXERCISE 
IN TERMS OF SHAPING THE WORLD AROUND IT.  IT IS FEELING THE 
PRESSURE OF OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOG 
(ICD) FOR WHICH IT WAS ILL PREPARED, IT HAS BEEN HUMILIATED 
IN MOLIRO, ITS ALLIES ARE GIVING TEPID SUPPORT AS THEY PURSUE 
THEIR OWN INTERESTS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REMAINS 
RESERVED.  KABILA VALUES USG APPROVAL AND ENCOURAGEMENT, AND 
THAT GIVES US SOME LIMITED LEVERAGE TO INFLUENCE HIM TO 
CONTINUE REFORMS TO TO GRAPPLE WITH TOUGH DECISIONS HE NEEDS 
TO MAKE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  THE FRACTURED OPPOSITION -- ARMED REBEL GROUPS, 
POLITICAL PARTIES, AND CIVIL SOCIETY -- ARE UNITED ON ONE 
BASIC POINT:  THEY WANT A SLICE OF THE PIE IN KINSHASA.  THE 
ARMED GROUPS CONTROL AROUND FIFTY PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY, BUT 
THEY DO NOT CONTROL KINSHASA AND THEY DO NOT HAVE THE THIN 
VENEER OF LEGITIMACY THAT THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION 
ACCORDS TO KABILA.  THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND CIVIC GROUPS 
ARE HUNGRY AND JUST WANT IN. 
 
¶3.  (C)  UNFORTUNATELY, THE KABILA GOVERNMENT HAS ILL 
PREPARED ITSELF FOR THE ICD IN SUN CITY.  THE GOVERNMENT, TO 
ITS CREDIT, DID MAKE SOME OVERTURES TO JEAN-PIERRE BEMBA OF 
THE MLC.  THE FACT THAT THESE OVERTURES HAVE NOT BORNE MUCH 
FRUIT IS AS MUCH DUE TO THE UNBRIDLED AMBITIONS OF BEMBA AS 
IT IS TO THE HALF-HEARTED NATURE OF KABILA'S EFFORTS. 
ONUSUMBA OF THE RCD, VERY MUCH UNDER RWANDA'S THUMB, IS 
BASICALLY BEYOND THE PALE AND WOULD ONLY BE COURTED AS AN 
ALLY BY KABILA AS A VERY LAST RESORT.  HOWEVER, THE 
GOVERNMENT MADE ONLY SPORADIC EFFORTS TO REACH OUT TO CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND POLITICAL PARTIES.  THE GOVERNMENT DID MANAGE TO 
PERSUADE MASIRE TO ENLARGE THE POLITICAL PARTY CONTINGENT TO 
INCLUDE SOME POLITICAL FIGURES COOPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, BUT 
ONLY AT THE COST OF ANTAGONIZING WHAT PASSES AS THE POLITICAL 
CLASS IN KINSHASA. 
 
¶4.  (C) THE KABILA GOVERNMENT IS HAVING TROUBLE COMING TO 
GRIPS WITH THE IDEA OF SHARING POWER.  CERTAINLY, LAURENT 
KABILA NEVER CAME TO GRIPS WITH THAT CONCEPT.  JOSEPH HAS 
COME TO THAT CONCLUSION ONLY RELUCTANTLY AND AT GREAT 
RESISTANCE WITHIN HIS OWN CAMP, BUT SEEMS TO HAVE GIVEN 
LITTLE THOUGHT AS TO HOW TO APPROACH THE NEGOTIATIONS OTHER 
THAN TRYING TO PUT HIS OWN POSITION AS PRESIDENT OFF LIMITS. 
CONVERSATIONS WITH KABILA AND FOREIGN MINISTER OKITUNDU (THE 
HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT DELEGATION IN SUN CITY) INDICATE THAT 
THE GOVERNMENT CAME UP WITH HARD-LINE OPENING POSITIONS AND, 
DEPENDING ON THE REACTIONS, WILL THEN ADJUST THOSE POSITIONS. 
 IT HAS GIVEN LITTLE THOUGHT TO FALLBACK POSITIONS, LET ALONE 
DEVELOPING AN ACTIVE STRATEGY TO GUIDE THE INEVITABLE 
COMPROMISES THAT MUST EMERGE AT THE ICD. 
 
¶5.  (C)  THE GOVERNMENT MADE TACTICAL ERRORS IN WALKING OUT 
OF THE ICD BOTH IN ADDIS ABABA AND IN SUN CITY. KABILA AND 
OKITUNDU ARE AWARE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS 
QUESTIONING THE GOVERNNENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE DIALOG. 
 
 
MOLIRO HUMILIATION 
 
¶6.  (C)  THE FALL OF MOLIRO, A SMALL BUT STRATEGIC PORT ON 
LAKE TANGANYIKA, ON MARCH 16 TO RCD FORCES HAS BEEN A PAINFUL 
HUMILIATION TO THE GOVERNMENT. BUT EVEN IN THE CASE OF 
MOLIRO, THE GOVERNMENT GARNERS LITTLE SYMPATHY AS THE WRONGED 
PARTY.  THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT DECLARE MOLIRO AS A NEW 
DEFENSIVE POSITION IN THE HARARE SUB-ACCORDS AND THUS WAS IN 
VIOLATION OF THE LUSAKA ACCORDS.  FURTHERMORE, THE GOVERNMENT 
HAD BEEN GUILTY OF USING MOLIRO AS A BASE FOR SUPPLYING 
MAI-MAI AND HUTU MILITIAMEN AND FOR HARRASSING RCD AND 
RWANDAN FORCES NORTH ALONG THE LAKE SHORE, SOMETHING WHICH 
THE GOVERNMENT CONSISTENTLY DENIED. 
 
 
NO MILITARY OPTION 
 
¶7.  (C)  THE HUMILIATION DOES NOT STOP WITH THE FALL OF 
MOLIRO.  GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE FOND OF REPEATING THAT 
GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE NOT DEFEATED ON THE BATTLE FIELD, 
ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE MANAGED TO LOSE FIFTY PERCENT OF THE 
COUNTY.  THAT IS DUE IN PART TO THE FACT THAT THE CONGOLESE 
ARMED FORCES (FAC) IS BY AND LARGE A RAGTAG ARMY MORE GIVEN 
TO FLIGHT THAN TO FIGHT. ALLIES ZIMBABWE AND ANGOLA SEEM 
LITTLE INCLINED TO GET MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN CONGO EXCEPT 
TO PROTECT THEIR OWN INTERESTS.  THE GOVERNMENT REALIZES THAT 
TODAY IT HAS LITTLE TO NO MILITARY OPTION TO EXERCISE, SHOULD 
POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS FAIL. 
 
 
UNDER APPRECIATED 
 
¶8.  (C)  JOSEPH KABILA IS PUZZLED THAT HIS EFFORTS ARE NOT 
FULLY APPRECIATED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  HIS 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS HAVE BEEN MET WITH MILD 
ENCOURAGEMENT, BUT HE HAS NOT BEEN EMBRACED BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE SENSE OF DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO 
THE GOVERNMENT.  THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK ARE THE MOST 
RESPONSIVE, BUT EVEN THERE HE IS HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY 
MEETING THEIR MINIMAL STANDARDS THAT WILL LEAD TO ASSISTANCE 
IN THE SHORT TERM.  KABILA'S EFFORTS AT DDRRR HAVE EARNED HIM 
AS MUCH CRITICISM AS THEY HAVE CREDIT.  NO DOUBT IT TOOK 
GREAT EFFORT ON HIS PART TO OVERCOME THE OBJECTIONS OF 
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY KONGOLO AND OTHERS IN CANTONING 
1,800 (AND NOT THE 3,000 HE FIRST ANNOUNCED) IN KAMINA, BUT 
THE DELAYING TACTICS OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND THE FLIRTING WITH 
THE RWANDAN OPPOSITION GROUP FDLR PRECLUDED A POSITIVE 
REACTION FROM RWANDA.  EVEN HIS PROPOSAL TO THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL TO FORM A COMMISSION TO MOVE DDRRR FORWARD AROUSED 
LITTLE INTEREST. 
 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USG 
 
¶9.  (C)  THE KABILA GOVERNMENT APPEARS BUFFETED BY EVENTS 
WITH NO COHERENT STRATEGIC VISION OF HOW TO SHAPE THE 
POLITICAL TRANSITION IN CONGO.  KABILA NEEDS AND WANTS USG 
APPROVAL AND ENCOURAGEMENT, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD PREFER THAT 
BOTH TAKE ON MORE CONCRETE FORM IN TERMS OF ASSISTANCE AND 
COOPERATION.  WE THEREFORE HAVE SOME (ALBEIT LIMITED) 
LEVERAGE TO INFLUENCE HIM TO CONTINUE REFORMS AND TO GRAPPLE 
WITH AT LEAST SOME OF THE TOUGH DECISIONS FACING HIM, HELPING 
HIM TO UNDERSTAND THAT, WHILE THE ICD MAY NOT BE A VERY 
COMFORTABLE FIT, LIKE CINDERELLA, HE HAS TO SQUEEZE HIS FOOT 
INTO THE DIALOG SHOE IF HE IS GOING TO GET CONGO BACK ON 
TRACK. 
 
HOOKS