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Viewing cable 02KATHMANDU496, LIVING IN TERROR IN WESTERN NEPAL'S PLAINS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02KATHMANDU496 2002-03-08 11:47 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kathmandu
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000496 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR NP
SUBJECT: LIVING IN TERROR IN WESTERN NEPAL'S PLAINS 
 
REFS: A) 377 KATHMANDU, B) 01 KATHMANDU 2383, C) 01 
KATHMANDU 2292 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Violence increased in two western Nepal 
districts bordering India following the end of the Maoist- 
government cease-fire in late November, 2001, but western 
Nepal's largest city remained calm.  Ambassador had 
visited the area February 22 to 24 and Poloff revisited 
the region in early March.  Maoists usually operated when 
and where security forces were absent, but villagers also 
reported fearing the sweeps and sometimes heavy-handed 
tactics used against the Maoists.  Authorities complained 
of a paucity of resources to fight the insurgency, and 
expressed concern over a remote area of their district 
where Maoists have reportedly been most active.  The 
insurgents seem to prey on the low social and economic 
status of the minorities in the region more than on ethnic 
or caste resentment.  Officials and locals alike agreed on 
the imperative of development.  A member of the Tharu 
ethnic elite doubted equally the ability of the government 
or the Maoists to gain the upper hand.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) During a February 28-March 3 mission to Banke and 
Bardiya districts, Poloff revisited areas he had traveled 
to in October, 2001 (Ref B).  Ambassador had visited 
Banke, Accham and Bardiya district February 22 to 24. 
Banke and Bardiya are situated in the plains region 
bordering India known as the Terai. 
 
Violence in Rural Villages, but Situation "Normal" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3. (SBU) Assistant Chief District Officer (ACDO) for 
Banke, Laxman Sharan Ghimire, told Poloff that beatings 
and murders - especially of Village Development Committee 
(VDC) chairmen and Nepali Congress supporters - had become 
commonplace in the villages outside Nepalgunj, the 
district headquarters.  The CDO's office received reports 
of occasional Maoist incursions into Banke from the thick 
forests in neighboring districts, but believed nonetheless 
that conditions in their jurisdiction were much better 
than in neighboring Bardiya district, where Maoist-related 
incidents occurred nearly every day.  Ghimire insisted 
that the situation in his district was "normal."  A 
Nepalese UN staffer also related that security in outlying 
villages was increasingly a problem, although little had 
changed in Nepalgunj proper.  [Note:  During the 
Ambassador's recent visit to Nepalgunj, a member of the 
area's most prominent family related that his relatives 
had discouraged him from visiting his orchards - only five 
miles outside Nepalgunj - on account of the security risk. 
End Note.] 
 
4. (SBU) NGOs working in both Banke and Bardiya reported 
that although built-up areas had become safer following 
the end of the Maoist-government cease-fire and subsequent 
government declaration of a state of emergency in late 
November, 2001, the Maoists continued to terrorize 
residents - beating and even killing people - in villages 
where security personnel were not deployed or had only a 
passing presence.  Both the Maoists and security forces 
were moving from village to village conducting search 
operations, and as a result villagers feared both sides. 
The UN staffer related that his brother, who works as a 
teacher in a village about fifty minutes by motorcycle 
outside Nepalgunj, had been confronted by Maoists on 
several occasions.  The men - strangers he did not 
recognize - had ordered him to close the school.  He 
disobeyed, fearing that security forces would accuse him 
of supporting the Maoists if he shut down. 
 
5. (SBU) One NGO representative declared that many 
villagers were confused about the state of emergency 
because they did not know that it was directed against the 
Maoists, and not them.  A few felt terrorized by the 
police or alienated by the sometimes heavy-handed tactics 
used against the Maoists. 
 
Western Nepal's Largest Town Quiet 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Following the government's declaration of a state 
of emergency in late November, 2001, Maoists had not 
engaged in violent activities in Nepalgunj, the largest 
city in western Nepal, the Banke CDO's office insisted. 
However, Maoist extortion of the city's businessmen and 
industrialists had continued.  The ACDO emphasized that 
the overall crime rate in Nepalgunj had gone down since 
the imposition of the state of emergency.  [Note:  Post 
records confirm that no Maoist-related incidents occurred 
in Nepalgunj following the emergency declaration.  The 
last violent incident in Nepalgunj occurred February 13, 
2000, when a bomb went off on the roof of the Banke Land 
Revenue Office, though a much-publicized incident occurred 
in August, 2001, when Maoists firebombed a distillery 
about twenty miles to the west of the city.  Nepalgunj is 
also the headquarters of the Royal Nepal Army and the 
police in western Nepal.  Both institutions maintain a 
number of institutions in town.  Several sources claimed 
that the vast majority of people in Nepalgunj opposed the 
Maoists, and Post has seen no evidence to suggest that the 
Maoists have garnered support from urban Nepalese.  End 
Note.] 
 
Resource Scarcity Greatest Problem 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) ACDO Ghimire complained that the lack of 
resources for security operations presented the greatest 
challenge to authorities in his district.  His office 
maintained daily contact with the RNA Divisional HQ in 
Nepalgunj to discuss this and other issues.  He judged 
that the RNA lacked resources to counter the Maoists, and 
helicopters were especially needed, as without them it was 
hard to respond when people were hurt or killed.  [Note: 
The RNA echoed this judgement in recent briefings for 
visiting DOD staff (Septel).]  Ghimire also said the 
recent upgrade of the RNA base in Nepalgunj to a 
divisional-level headquarters suggested to him that 
resources were slowly arriving.  The upgrade helped 
psychologically, and locals had begun to feel a change for 
the better.  Ghimire also commented that the recent deaths 
of two CDOs at the hands of the Maoists in Solukhumbu and 
Accham districts (Refs A and C) had had a demoralizing 
effect on civil service personnel. 
 
Maoists Flourish in Remote Areas 
-------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Of particular concern to Ghimire were nine Maoist- 
affected villages in eastern Banke, cut off from the rest 
of the district by the Rapti river.  The Chairman of 
Banke's District Development Committee (DDC) also 
expressed worries about Maoist activity in the Kamaiya- 
affected VDCs across the Rapti, and the head of the Land 
Reform Office labeled the areas "dangerous" due to ongoing 
Maoist activity.  Access is difficult, and the government 
has never had a firm presence there.  During the dry 
season the Rapti is fordable in places; otherwise the trip 
requires a detour through India.  Plans have been made for 
a bridge over the Rapti, but the road department has yet 
to settle the financing.  Authorities shut down a 
permanent police post deep in the area, but opened two 
temporary police posts in more hospitable locations. 
[Note: During the Ambassador's late February visit to 
Nepalgunj, RNA top brass claimed to have information about 
400 potential Maoists gathered east of the Rapti, but due 
in part to a lack of good intelligence had decided not to 
act against them.  End Note.] 
 
Maoists Keeping Clear Route to India? 
------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Ghimire mentioned rumors that the Maoists 
maintain a hands-off policy in Banke in order to preserve 
it as a route for supplies from India, but confessed that 
he had no evidence that the insurgents conducted supply 
operations through his district.  At present, he went on, 
Indians and Nepalese crossed the India-Nepal border 
without showing identification, and that needed to change 
to prevent terrorists from crossing back and forth. 
 
Ethnic Relations a Symptom, But Not a Cause 
------------------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Ghimire judged that the Maoists had been able to 
draw support from minorities in remote areas primarily on 
account of their poverty, but also due to widespread 
illiteracy and the lack of employment opportunities. 
Furthermore, the Maoists seemed to be increasing their 
numbers by force alone.  Ghimire, who, like ninety-six 
percent of Chief District Officers, is a high-caste 
Brahman, stated that Tharus in the region have been 
traditionally dominated by higher castes.  [Comment: 
Ghimire's clearly meant to suggest that the Tharus were 
thus easily subjugated by the Maoists as well.]  Banke's 
DDC Chairman noted that the Maoists had exploited not only 
the caste issue, but also divisions between haves and have- 
nots; their strategy was to "divide and rule" by dividing 
people along either caste or tribal lines or socio- 
economic divides.  At the Land Reform Office, Poloff heard 
that the Maoists had set up a front organization, the 
Tharu Liberation Front, and through it had begun to gain 
support from a few Tharus.  In that instance, the Maoists 
were exploiting the Tharu's poverty, but not necessarily 
ethnic or caste resentment, the Land Office head judged. 
 
Desperately Seeking Development 
------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Ghimire felt that the government he himself 
represented had not addressed the concerns of the poor and 
unemployed.  Poverty alleviation and employment generation 
projects were still essential.  Development should be 
suited to local conditions, focussed on eliminating high- 
level corruption and nepotism, and aimed at improving the 
socio-economic sector, prescribed Ghimire. 
 
12. (SBU) Fatte Singh Tharu, former MP and Communications 
Minister and currently head of the rightist RPP party in 
Banke, noted that his district hosts no large factories, 
only small-scale enterprises, and its economy was 
operating "day by day."  Banke could support a sugar cane 
or paper factory, either of which would give a boost to 
the economy by providing employment and import 
substitution opportunities.  Irrigation, electrification 
and roads were also needed, Singh told us. 
 
13. (SBU) Other NGOs working in the region report that 
before the declaration of the state of emergency they used 
to meet with Maoists in order to find out what they were 
thinking, inform them of their activities, and assure them 
that they were working solely on projects to uplift the 
most socially and economically disadvantage.  After the 
emergency, all such contacts ceased as the Maoists went 
deeper underground and security forces kept a closer watch 
on what was going on. 
 
Panchayat-Era Tharu Leader's Reactions 
-------------------------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) Fatte Singh Tharu concluded that because the 
Maoists lacked public support they would be unable to win 
the war.  Unfortunately, the government could not win 
either, because it too did not have the public's backing. 
This was partly due to the fact that justice only served 
the interests of the strong and powerful in Nepal.  [Note: 
Tharu was once prosecuted for corruption.]  Moreover, the 
government still had not developed a strategy to encourage 
public participation in its efforts.  Tharu added that 
Nepalese appreciated USG support, but that it was late in 
coming.  [Comment:  Fatte Singh Tharu, an accomplished 
senior politician with rightist views, is living proof of 
the diversity within the ethnic Tharu community.  Although 
widely viewed as backwards, uneducated peasants, in fact 
the Tharus are a diverse community.  End Comment 
 
15. (SBU) Reflecting on the origins of the insurgency, 
Tharu blamed the rise of the Maoists on misguided and 
intrusive central government policies that undercut the 
economies of the most heavily Maoist-affected hill 
districts and gave the Maoists "room to develop."  After 
the government banned marijuana cultivation in the 1970s, 
it never delivered on promised crop-substitution programs. 
Small iron mines were closed due to the ecological harm 
they caused.  Finally, the Forest Department banned the 
collection and export of wild herbs from public land, 
cutting off a major source of income for many villagers. 
Three decades ago Nepal exported agricultural products, 
but as a result of these and similar policies that was no 
longer the case.  Tharu then went on to describe his plans 
to save Nepal through a "green revolution," adding that 
members of the current administration had thwarted his 
plans. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
16. (SBU) Nepalgunj proper has not seen a violent Maoist- 
related incident in nearly two years, so it is not 
surprising that authorities have managed to keep the city 
under wraps in recent months.  That area villages have 
become less secure since the emergency declaration is a 
cause for concern, however, and underlines Nepal's 
desperate need for resources both to combat the Maoists 
and to improve conditions in its villages.  The visits to 
Banke and Bardiya confirmed our suspicions that the 
insurgency does not enjoy broad-based public support in 
these districts, and highlighted the Maoists' use of 
coercion and violence to obtain the limited support that 
they do have. 
 
MALINOWSKI