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Viewing cable 02HARARE565, SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON ZIMBABWE FROM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02HARARE565 2002-03-04 15:04 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

041504Z Mar 02


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1189

PAGE 01        HARARE  00565  01 OF 02  041515Z 
ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   USNW-00  DODE-00  
      DS-00    EUR-00   FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    
      LAB-01   VCE-00   M-00     NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   SSO-00   
      SS-00    EPAE-00  DSCC-00  DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /005W
                  ------------------6F0F35  041517Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1086
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY
OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR A/S KANSTEINER 
NSC FOR AFRICA SR ADVISER FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ZI SF
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON ZIMBABWE FROM 
HARARE: SIMILAR ANALYSIS, UNCLEAR COURSE OF ACTION 
 
REF: (A)FBIS RESTON AFP20020304000023, (B)FBIS RESTON 
 
AFP200203040069, (C)FBIS RESTON AFP20020303000105 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  00565  01 OF 02  041515Z 
 
CLASSIFIED BY JOSEPH G. SULLIVAN FOR REASONS 1.5B/D 
 
1.(C) SUMMARY:  THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH SOUTH AFRICAN 
HIGH COMMISSIONER JEREMY NDOU ON MARCH 4 TO COMPARE 
NOTES ON THE ZIMBABWEAN ELECTION PROCESS, LIKELY 
SCENARIOS AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES.  THE OFFICIAL SOUTH 
AFRICAN OBSERVER DELEGATION HAS BEEN ACTIVE, BUT 
DISCREET IN THEIR PUBLIC COMMENTS, WHILE SEEKING TO GET 
THE GOZ TO ADDRESS THEIR CONCERNS WITH MIXED RESULTS. 
ACCORDING TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN HC, SOUTH AFRICA BELIEVES 
PRIVATELY THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS IN 
ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT DUE MOSTLY TO THE GOVERNMENT'S 
DELIBERATE USE OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION AS WELL AS 
CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN FAIRNESS OF RULES AND PROCEDURES. 
NDOU SAW THE LIKELY OUTCOMES AS A NARROW MDC VICTORY OR 
A NARROW ZANU-PF VICTORY AND FORESAW PROBLEMS WITH 
EITHER LOSER ACCEPTING THE RESULTS.  HE HOPED THAT A 
VICTORIOUS MDC WOULD AGREE TO A SORT OF NATIONAL UNITY 
GOVERNMENT, BUT FEARED THAT A VICTORIOUS ZANU WOULD SEEK 
TO DESTROY THE TSVANGIRAI AND THE MDC AS A CREDIBLE 
OPPOSITION.  HE HAD NO ANSWER FOR HOW SOUTH AFRICA WOULD 
REACT TO A ZANU-PF VICTORY WHOSE RESULT APPEARED TO BE 
SECURED BY FRAUD OTHER THAN TO QUESTION WHETHER SOUTH 
AFRICA WOULD SEEK TO INSIST ON NEW ELECTIONS WHICH ZANU- 
PF WOULD REJECT.  HE AGREED THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS 
NEED TO COORDINATE VERY CLOSELY IN COMING DAYS, BOTH IN 
HARARE AND IN PRETORIA/CAPETOWN. END SUMMARY 
 
2. (U) THE SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIAL OBSERVER DELEGATION 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  00565  01 OF 02  041515Z 
(SAOM) INCREASED TO OVER 50 MEMBERS IN RECENT DAYS AND 
WILL BE HEADED BY THE MINISTERS OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND 
TRANSPORTATION WHO ARRIVED MARCH 4 TO STAY UNTIL ABOUT 
MARCH 14.  AS INDICATED REFTELS, THE SAOM HAS BEEN VERY 
DISCREET IN PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS, SUGGESTING THERE WERE 
PROBLEMS WITH POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND ELECTION 
PROCEDURES, BUT SEEKING TO RESOLVE THESE PRIVATELY.  THE 
DELEGATION HAD ALSO RAISED THE POSSIBLE CHARGE OF 
TREASON AGAINST OPPOSITION CANDIDATE TSVANGIRAI FOR 
TREASON WITH THE GOZ IN ORDER TO FORCE THE GOZ TO 
CLARIFY WHICH OF THE TWO VERSIONS IT HAD PUT OUT WAS 
CORRECT. (IN THE END, THE GOZ STATED THAT TSVANGIRAI WAS 
ONLY WARNED THAT HE MIGHT BE CHARGED, BUT WOULD NOT BE 
CHARGED OR ARRESTED PRIOR TO ELECTIONS.) IN ADDITION TO 
THE SAOM, SOUTH AFRICANS ARE PARTICIPATING IN SEPARATE 
ANC, SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENTARY AND SADC-PF 
DELEGATIONS. 
 
3.(C) SAOM FINDINGS AND ACTIONS 
------------------------------- 
 
HC NDOU SAID THAT THE SAOM HAD FOUND A DELIBERATE GOZ 
PRACTICE OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION UTILIZING YOUTH 
BRIGADES AND OTHERS.  THIS VIOLENCE WAS MUCH MORE 
ORGANIZED AND TARGETED THAN VIOLENCE IN THE 2000 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION.  THE SAOM HAD RAISED THEIR 
CONCERNS WITH THE GOZ, INCLUDING OVER VIOLENCE AFFECTING 
OBSERVERS AND HAD SOME OF THEIR CONCERNS ADDRESSED; E.G. 
PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER MNANGAGWA FLEW TO KWEKWE TO 
CONTROL THE SITUATION AFTER AN MDC OFFICE WAS ATTACKED 
WHILE THE SAOM TEAM WAS MEETING THERE.  NDOU EXPRESSED 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  00565  01 OF 02  041515Z 
IRRITATION THAT NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT OBSERVER MBUENDE HAD 
STATED THAT REPORTS OF VIOLENCE WERE OVERBLOWN WHEN ONLY 
IN THE COUNTRY SEVERAL DAYS AND WITHOUT HAVING CHECKED 
WITH OTHER OBSERVER MISSIONS.  THE HC WAS ALSO DISMAYED 
BY COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER HEAD ABU BAKAR'S PUBLIC 
COMMENTS THAT THE PRESS WAS EXAGGERATING THE DEGREE OF 
ELECTION VIOLENCE.  HE ASCRIBING THIS TO INSUFFICIENT 
CARE IN REMARKS THAT ZIMBABWEAN MEDIA WOULD EDIT TO 
SERVE THEIR INTERESTS, AND TO THE FACT THAT ABU BAKAR 
WAS THE GOZ'S OWN RECOMMENDATION TO HEAD THE 
COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER MISSION.   NDOU ALSO SAID THAT THE 
SAOM HAD COMPLAINED OVER THE FREQUENT BLOCKING OR 
CANCELLATION OF MDC RALLIES, WHILE NOT ONE ZANU-PF RALLY 
HAD BEEN STOPPED, AND OVER PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS 
THE CONTINUED FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE FINAL LIST OF 
POLLING PLACES TO THE PUBLIC OR OPPOSITION PARTIES.  THE 
HC SAID THAT DEPUTY PRESIDENT ZUMA'S VISIT LAST WEEK WAS 
INTENDED TO COORDINATE SAG AND GOZ POSITIONS IN ADVANCE 
OF CHOGM AND WAS NOT DECISIVE ON BROADER ISSUES. 
 
4.(C) LIKELY ELECTION OUTCOMES 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1190 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  00565  02 OF 02  041515Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00  DS-00 
      EUR-00   FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01 
      VCE-00   M-00     NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   SSO-00   SS-00 
      DSCC-00  DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------6F0F41  041517Z /38 
O 041504Z MAR 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1087 
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY 
OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HARARE 000565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR A/S KANSTEINER 
NSC FOR AFRICA SR ADVISER FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ZI SF
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON ZIMBABWE FROM 
HARARE: SIMILAR ANALYSIS, UNCLEAR COURSE OF ACTION 
 
------------------------------ 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  00565  02 OF 02  041515Z 
NDOU BELIEVED THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOMES WERE EITHER A 
NARROW MDC VICTORY OR A NARROW ZANU-PF VICTORY.  HE 
BELIEVED THE MDC WAS PREPARED, IN THE EVENT OF VICTORY, 
TO SHARE POWER, NOT IN A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT IN 
WHICH THE ZANU-PF LEADERSHIP WOULD CHOOSE ITS 
REPRESENTATIVES, BUT IN A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN WHICH 
THE MDC WOULD DESIGNATE ZANU-PF MEMBERS TO SERVE IN ITS 
CABINET.  HE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT ZANU-PF, WHILE 
SAYING IT WAS PREPARED TO LIVE WITH A LOSS, DID NOT 
APPEAR READY TO DO SO.  INSTEAD, ZANU-PF APPEARED READY 
TO USE DEMONSTRATIONS AND PUBLIC PRESSURE BY 
ORCHESTRATED ZANU-PF GROUPS TO PREVENT AN MDC ASSUMPTION 
OF POWER AND MIGHT ALSO CALL UPON THE MILITARY TO 
PREVENT AN MDC ASSUMPTION OF POWER.  NDOU DID NOT THINK 
THAT THE GOZ COULD CREDIBLY ARREST AND CHARGE TSVANGIRAI 
FOR TREASON OR ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION IN THE WAKE OF AN 
MDC VICTORY.  HE BELIEVED THAT SUCH A TACTIC WOULD BE 
TOO TRANSPARENT TO BE ACCEPTABLE.  NDOU ALSO SAID THAT 
THE WHOLE ASSASSINATION PLOT ALLEGATION WAS NOT 
CREDIBLE, ALTHOUGH HE EXPRESSED DISMAY THAT TSVANGIRAI 
COULD HAVE ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE SET UP IN THIS FASHION. 
 
5. (C) IN THE EVENT OF A NARROW ZANU-PF VICTORY, TAINTED 
BY ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND FRAUD, NDOU FEARED PUBLIC 
DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE MDC AND ITS SUPPORTERS.  HE DID 
NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS COULD BE SUCCESSFUL 
AND ANTICIPATED THAT THE GOZ WOULD DO WHATEVER IT TOOK 
TO BRING THEM UNDER CONTROL. 
 
6.(C) SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSES 
----------------------------- 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  00565  02 OF 02  041515Z 
 
NDOU SAID THAT THE SAG WAS PREPARED TO ACT TO PREVENT 
ZANU-PF FRUSTRATION OF AN MDC VICTORY.  HE SAID THAT 
PRESIDENT MBEKI WOULD BE FOLLOWING EVENTS CLOSELY AND 
WOULD BE READY TO MAKE CONTACTS.  HE ALSO SAID THAT SADF 
LEADERS HAD GOOD ACCESS AND RELATIONS WITH ZDF 
COMMANDERS AND COULD ALSO COUNSEL AGAINST ANTI- 
DEMOCRATIC OR VIOLENT ACTIONS.  NDOU WAS LESS CERTAIN 
WHAT THE SAG WOULD DO IN THE EVENT OF A ZANU-PF VICTORY 
BY FRAUD OR MANIPULATION, NOTING THAT THE ZANU-PF WOULD 
BE UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT ANY CALL FOR A NEW ELECTION. 
 
SULLIVAN 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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