This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000852 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NI
SUBJECT: A SNAPSHOT OF OBASANJO'S ELECTORAL PROSPECTS 
 
REF: ABUJA 829 
 
 
Classified by CDA Andrews for reason 1.5 (d). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Three years ago, Obasanjo rode into office 
on a wave of optimism: Gone was the military; democratic rule 
had returned. Now, with a year until the elections, 
Obasanjo's prospects are uncertain.  His abrupt manner, 
callous public remarks, and unwillingness to listen have 
alienated key opinion-makers and former supporters.  If 
elections were today, he might lose regions and votes won in 
1999 and could well lose the entire contest if faced with 
credible opposition. In fact, the PDP nomination is not a 
sure bet, as House Speaker Ghali Na'Abba and others are 
fomenting rebellion within the party to spoil Obasanjo's bid. 
 On the positive side for Obasanjo, the power of incumbency 
is very formidable in Nigeria. Also, Obasanjo probably can 
count on support in the Northeast as long as Vice President 
Atiku remains on the ticket and might be able to finesse the 
Southwest if he can reach a modus vivendi with Alliance for 
Democracy (AD) Governors and moderates within the most 
influential Yoruba organization, Afenifere.  Ultimately, one 
of his biggest electoral asset may be a negative one -- the 
lack of an alternative around whom his various opponents can 
easily rally.  End Summary. 
 
 
------------------------ 
WHERE ARE ALL MY FRIENDS 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶2.  (C) In 1999, President Obasanjo won a landslide victory, 
with widespread support in the North and Southeast. Obasanjo 
could not replicate that feat today, and he need not look 
beyond the closest mirror to identify the main cause of his 
diminished prospects. He came to office because others lent 
their power bases and constituencies.  However, as with any 
loan, there was interest to be paid. Obasanjo owed his 
powerful supporters access and the legitimate political 
fruits that come with backing a winner in any democratic 
system. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Instead, Obasanjo increasingly has been a one-man 
show. To many Nigerian political figures, Obasanjo is an 
arrogant know-it-all who eschews dialogue, siphons 
independent minds from the Administration and upbraids those 
bold enough to express different points of view.  When a 
situation beckons suasion or cajolery, Obasanjo wields either 
mace or mallet.  He behaves like a general in civilian 
President's clothing. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) A born again Christian, Obasanjo also has a 
self-righteous, almost messianic streak.  Part of him 
believes he has been divinely anointed; thus, he need not 
listen to the counsel of most mortals, especially given that 
he has steered the Nigerian ship of State before.  Since he 
gives no ear to the counsel of others, they are unforgiving 
in their evaluation of his performance.  Unfortunately, the 
Government's performance has earned it and him many demerits; 
because he mostly has gone it alone, he must shoulder the 
blame alone. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
The Election Map Does Not Lie 
----------------------------- 
 
 
¶5.  (C) If hired by Obasanjo, a conscientious campaign 
manager would suffer an acute migraine gazing at the 
electoral map.  Regions and groups Obasanjo carried by wide 
margins in 1999 are tilting against him in the run-up to 
¶2003.  Regaining positive balance in these areas will take 
guile, money and luck. 
 
 
A) Where He is Weak: 
 
 
-- Northwest: This is the political heart of the North.  No 
one has become Head of State without the support or 
acquiescence of this region.  Here, unfortunately, Obasanjo 
has lost the most ground.  He has alienated key figures like 
former Heads of State Babangida, Abubakar, and Buhari.  The 
revered Emir of Kano has publicly criticized Obasanjo's 
performance.  The Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), the 
region's preeminent association of luminaries, is a house 
divided regarding Obasanjo.  However, the anti-Obasanjo camp 
is more numerous, vocal and active.  The powerful Arewa elite 
still bristles over his removal of senior Northern officers 
from the military.  They also complain that his government is 
corrupt, his economic mismanagement has decimated 
agriculture, the paramount sector in that region, and that he 
has given too many key positions to fellow Yorubas at the 
expense of Northern interests (when the Southwest arrayed 
against him in 1999).  Last, a PDP gadfly, former Kano 
Governor Abubakar Rimi is contesting for the Party's 
nomination.  While Rimi has a snowball's chance of winning, 
Obasanjo may further offend Northerners if he mishandles 
Rimi's challenge by attacking him too heavily since no one 
likes to see a family member publicly upbraided by an 
outsider. 
 
 
-- Southeast:  This area voted overwhelmingly for Obasanjo in 
¶1999.  Two reasons for Obasanjo's reversal of fortune are the 
Administration's insensitivity to Igbo political aspirations 
and perceived federal inattention to economic development in 
the densely populated region.  In addition to his politically 
costly, yet unnecessary, war of words with popular Abia State 
Governor Orji Kalu, Obasanjo has criticized 
Igbo-organizations (Ohaneze Ndigbo, for example) for 
undermining security and national unity.  Other 
Administration officials have been more acrid, labeling 
soldiers who fought on the Biafran side of the civil war 
"traitors" and deriding calls for an Igbo President as 
foolish. (These calls are indirect attacks against the Yoruba 
Obasanjo seeking a second term. Discarding the Obasanjo-Atiku 
ticket, opens the door to an Igbo as number one or two on the 
presidential ticket.) These statements by government 
officials cut deep into Igbo sensitivities, giving substance 
to Igbo grievances that they have not been reintegrated into 
the national political system as full partners. 
 
 
-- Middle Belt: The western Middle Belt, e. g. Niger and 
Kwara, is tied to the Northwest. Obasanjo suffers the same 
afflictions there as in the Northern heartland.  In the 
Eastern Middle Belt, he is in hot water with the Tivs, the 
Middle Belt's most populous and politically agile group. 
Tivs are bitter over the October 2001 massacre of Tiv 
villagers by federal government troops. They also suspect the 
Government of siding with their ethnic rivals, the Jukun, 
because Defence Minister Danjuma, a close Obasanjo ally, is 
Jukun. However, to Obasanjo's benefit,fundamentalist 
Christians (whether Tiv or of another ethnicity) are numerous 
in this area, and many would tend to vote Obasanjo over most 
Muslim alternatives. 
 
 
¶B. Finding Some Support: 
 
 
-- Southwest:  Obasanjo lost here in 1999; taking it this 
time will require walking a delicate tightrope, something 
Obasanjo does not do particularly well.  Slain Justice 
Minister Bola Ige, a stalwart of Yoruba politics, was making 
inroads toward rehabilitating Obasanjo in this region despite 
belonging to an opposition party (the AD). However, as Ige's 
assassination shows, the Southwest is not monolithic, and 
Yoruba politics can be fractious, even dangerous.  Yet, many 
Yorubas are willing to support Obasanjo out of ethnic unity; 
they realize the President in 2003 either will be Obasanjo or 
a non-Yoruba.  However, Obasanjo's desire to control the 
Southwest through the PDP fouls majority Yoruba sentiment. 
It is a case of right ethnic group, wrong party.  His best 
bet for winning the region is to cut an "incumbents deal" 
with AD Governors: in such a deal, he would promise not to 
actively support their PDP opponents; in exchange the 
Governors would tacitly endorse, at least not actively 
oppose, him in their states.  However, if he continues to 
press for PDP primacy in these states, support based on 
ethnic solidarity will yield to each AD governor's individual 
interests in his political self-preservation.  Initial signs 
are not positive.  One of Obasanjo's Special Advisers is 
running for Governor of Ogun, and there is no sign that he 
objects. 
 
 
-- Northeast: Primarily because of Vice President Atiku, who 
hails from Adamawa, the ticket should do well in the 
Northeast.  Yet, Atiku's loyalty may be frangible.  Many 
believe Atiku is double-dealing and would gladly pull the rug 
from under Obasanjo if that would give Atiku the party's 
nomination.  In any event, the Northeast is not as pivotal as 
the Northwest or Southeast,  and Atiku still is in trouble 
with many Northern leaders over his waffling over the 
introduction of criminal Sharia in the North. 
 
 
¶C. A Toss-Up 
 
 
-- South/South: This area is tougher than the others to read 
because there is no one dominant group.  Obasanjo has some 
powerful detractors here but also has wheeler-dealer Works 
Minister Tony Anenih, an unabashed political operator who 
apparently believes that, no matter how bad things are, 
elections can be bought.  While he may not be viewed with 
much respect elsewhere, Anenih has sway here.  Much will 
depend on the deals Anenih can work with state governors and 
other political leaders.  Because most oil facilities are 
here, revenue and resource allocation questions between the 
federal and state governments will loom large in the lead-up 
to elections. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
ENEMIES TO THE NORTH OF HIM 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) After Obasanjo, former Head of State Babangida is the 
most discussed political figure in Nigeria.  Because IBB 
helped bankroll the President in 1999 and because he is one 
of few Nigerians who casts a nationwide shadow, the 
withdrawal of his support is a major blow.  Obasanjo will be 
hurt more if reports of Babangida's active opposition prove 
true.  A close associate of both Babangida and VP Atiku, 
recently informed us that OO and IBB had a very stormy 
telephone conversation in January after the President accused 
Babangida of fueling National Assembly opposition to him. 
The two hung up on each other.  Reportedly, Obasanjo later 
tried to make amends but Babangida has resisted detente. 
Babangida is said to have responded with cold silence when 
Atiku asked if he would back Obasanjo-Atiku in 2003.  Several 
 IBB-for-President campaigns are underway. while the Man from 
Minna does not acknowledge any of them,  it is widely 
believed he funds them, if for no other reason than to keep 
the political pot bubbling.  Babangida reportedly is also 
funds two unregistered political parties, the UNDP and NDP, 
both of which have support in the North and Southeast.  The 
Southeast is a region where Babangida has assiduously 
cultivated support.  Abacha-era Minister, former Senator from 
Akwa Ibom and current UNDP stalwart Don Etiebet said in early 
March that the party's Presidential nomination awaited 
Babangida if he wanted it. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Other Northern interests, including the ACF, are 
sending out feelers to other areas of the country; their 
liaison with groups in other regions, particularly the 
Southeast, spells trouble for Obasanjo.  ACF leaders have 
journeyed to the Southeast several times, ostensibly to 
discuss ethno-religious violence.  The ACF has inserted 
itself as a mediator in the Tiv-Jukun feud in the eastern 
Middle Belt.  In both cases, talks may have veered toward 
politics and toward channeling local disgruntlement with 
Obasanjo into real political opposition.  In early March, it 
was announced that Northern and Southeastern leaders would 
meet in Abia State to discuss national unity and internal 
violence.  Curiously, leaders from the Southwest were not 
invited to this session hosted by Obasanjo antagonist, Abia 
Governor Orji Kalu, who also  has links to Banbangida.  This 
line-up suggests that conference organizers may be exploring 
the potent North-Southeast axis that has decided previous 
Presidential elections while keeping Yoruba-centric 
candidates, e.g. Awolowo, from realizing their aspirations. 
 
 
------------------- 
Enemies from Within 
------------------- 
 
 
¶9. (C) Obasanjo faces a growing rebellion within the PDP led 
by House Speaker Na'Abba.  Personal animosity dates back to 
2000 when the Presidency unsuccessfully tried to dump Na'Abba 
as Speaker.  Since the electoral controversy erupted last 
December, Na'Abba has challenged Obasanjo on a variety of 
issue from fuel price hikes, the January police strike, 
disclosure of Assembly Members salaries, to the federal 
budget.  Na'Abba orchestrated a public debate in the House 
which blamed Obasanjo for Nigeria's woes and labeled his 
leadership inept.  That debate has the markings of the 
opening salvo of a concerted effort to keep Obasanjo from the 
party's nomination. Since then Na'Abba not only has 
pinpricked Obasanjo whenever he can on substantive issues 
like the budget and the threatened police strike, but the 
Speaker has been at the forefront of efforts to unite party 
dissidents in order to make a public statement against 
Obasanjo's candidacy.  Perhaps even more troubling for 
Obasanjo, PDP Chairman Audu Ogbeh appears to be listening to 
the malcontents.  Recently, Ogbeh felt compelled to state 
publicly that no candidate is preordained, and that he would 
not allow any party nomination to be orchestrated in 
frustration of the majority's will.  (Having helped  Ogbeh to 
the Chairmanship less than six months ago, Obasanjo cannot 
readily dump him now.) 
 
 
------------------- 
DON'T COUNT HIM OUT 
------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C) .  Given a few months of relative peace without major 
communal violence, if the economy does not dip, and if he 
learns to listen and accept a little help from his friends, 
Obasanjo's popularity perhaps can bounce back.  Additionally, 
the aura of incumbency is very strong in Nigeria.  While 
everyone  may  grumble, the benefits that accrue from being 
on the right side of that power and the hardships of being on 
the wrong side will keep many people from breaking formation. 
 Last, some Obasanjo opponents hate each other as much as 
they dislike the President.  While agreeing Obasanjo should 
walk the plank, they will have a tough time agreeing who 
should take his place.  The Obasanjo camp will try to exploit 
these cleavages to keep the opposition from coalescing. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶11. (C) Obasanjo is in deep trouble.  His popularity has 
declined and he is estranged from much of the political 
class, particularly in the all-important North.  Opponents 
know that Obasanjo rode the bank accounts and goodwill of 
others into office.  With many of his former backers now 
angered by his brusque manner and unremarkable job 
performance, these opponents feel Obasanjo is very vulnerable 
as they do not believe he has a loyal political machine or 
constituency to call his own.  However, by virtue of his very 
office, Obasanjo has a political machine -- the federal 
government.  If used prudently, this is the most powerful, 
influential machine in the nation. 
 
 
¶12. (C) Comment Continued.  For Obasanjo to bounce back  will 
require a level-headed strategy.  The outlines of that 
strategy  must include an attempt to regain some support in 
the North and Southeast by making amends with members of the 
political elites in both regions who have not completely 
written him off.  Additionally, he will have to avoid 
fighting with AD Governors and Afenifere in the Southwest. 
Obasanjo should also try to douse the ardor of his strong 
adversaries by breaking bread with some key figures that 
oppose him.  Last, and more importantly, he must govern 
better.  This means a lot less international junketing and a 
stronger focus on two key domestic issues -- internal 
insecurity/communal violence and the struggling economy, 
particularly the near-moribund agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors. 
Andrews