This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ABUJA 000829 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
RIYADH FOR RUSS HANKS 
 
 
DECL:  02/13/12 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: RECENT EVENTS TEST NIGERIA'S RESILIENCE 
 
 
REF: 01 ABUJA 2938 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CDA ANDREWS.  REASON 1.5 (D) 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Nigeria has seen its share of calamity and 
contention in recent months.  The Ikeja cantonment 
explosion, abortive police and general strikes, and an 
electoral law enmeshed by controversy have decreased public 
confidence in the Government's competence and have added to 
a general skepticism about the country's direction. From 
the unrest in Jos last September to February's Yoruba-Hausa 
bloodletting in Lagos, episodes of communal violence have 
claimed at least 4,000 lives, a figure rivaling casualty 
counts for nations suffering low intensity warfare. The 
December assassination of Attorney General Ige heralds to 
many Nigerians that resort to violence to settle political 
disputes will increase as the 2003 elections draw near. 
Ethnicity, regionalism and, to some extent, religious 
intolerance have become more virulent, further tainting the 
political discourse while electoral considerations will 
likely increase government spending despite the reality 
that the economy will be hard pressed to approximate last 
year's modest growth. 
 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary Continued: The picture painted above is 
long on difficulties, short on optimism. The honeymoon 
occasioning the return of civilian rule not only is over, 
for many it is forgotten. Left remaining are the stark 
realities of weak democratic institutions and traditions, a 
near-unprecedented sense of public insecurity, a stagnant 
economy and a combative and fragmented political culture. 
Because confrontation is an ingrained aspect of most social 
and political exchange, controversy and violence are 
frequent by-products of the working of institutions usually 
associated with the peaceful resolution of political 
disputes in more mature democracies.  However, due to their 
frequency, these social and political conflicts have less 
impact than outside observers might think.  In other words, 
Nigeria is experiencing political decline but meltdown is 
not imminent, nor are people panicking, nor is the decline 
necessarily irreversible. Nigerians have been on this 
roller coaster before.  Nevertheless, levelheaded Nigerians 
are worried.  Unless a carminative is taken to purge 
politics of its dyspepsia (primarily by making electoral 
preparations transparent and neutral) and to improve the 
security situation, the electoral season will likely spawn 
more violence and shrill cries from government opponents 
that the electoral fix is on. This will complicate the task 
of governance, bringing the Obasanjo Administration's 
legitimacy and the propriety of the democratic experiment 
in Nigeria into very serious question.  End Summary. 
 
 
------------------- 
NOT A HAPPY PICTURE 
------------------- 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Last November, we reported that Nigeria had hit a 
very troubling period, described by some as the most 
violent period since the civil war (reftel.)  Religious and 
ethnic violence in Jos, Kano, the eastern Middle Belt and 
Lagos, and intermittent outbursts in the South-South 
coupled with internecine squabbling within the ruling party 
had engendered a feeling of widespread public insecurity 
and concern about the lack of domestic policy focus of the 
Government. The controversy over the electoral law raised 
the specter that Obasanjo was trying to fix the 2003 
election.  At that time, we stated tensions would mount 
unless political elites stopped seeing brinkmanship as 
their primary vocation and until Government devised a 
strategy for enhancing security by minimizing communal 
violence.  Since then, misstep, misfortune and mistake have 
dogged Nigeria even further. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
STILL TRAVELLING THE POLITICAL LOW ROAD 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶4.  (C) President Obasanjo and restive political elites 
have not made the needed adjustments either to the 
substance or style of their political debate and conduct. 
Continuation of business as usual is a major factor in the 
steady turning of the Nigerian situation from bad to worse. 
While the AD might be even more fractious, the squabbling 
within the ruling PDP demonstrates the impediments to 
effective governance produced by a combative political 
culture.  Since the PDP is the dominant party, it sets the 
tone in the political and electoral arena.  In so many 
instances, the winner of the PDP nomination will be 
considered the presumptive victor in the general election. 
Because of this, competition within the PDP often 
approximates what is usually seen in inter-party rivalry. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) For its November convention, the PDP leadership 
orchestrated a display of unity that turned acrimony into a 
festive event.  The naming of well-respected Audu Ogbeh to 
replace the embattled Barnabas Gemade as PDP National 
Chairman was to augur harmony.  However, the reconciliation 
was brief.  By early December, the President was mired in 
controversy over the inclusion of a restriction against new 
parties in the electoral law.  Friction turned to heat as 
Obasanjo attributed authorship of the noxious provision to 
House Speaker Na'abba while Na'abba pointed fingers at 
Obasanjo and Senate President Anyim.  Anyim, widely 
regarded as Obasanjo's loyal minion, was hounded in the 
press. Some Senate colleagues called for his impeachment. 
PDP Chairman Ogbeh tried to reconcile the trio, but failed. 
The Presidency and the PDP were able to stave an inchoate 
rebellion in January to eject Anyim from the Senate 
Presidency in Nigeria's most common fashion; according to 
many observers, they paid for it, doling out funds to key 
Senators to make sure Anyim stayed put.  The Senate 
leader's removal would have been a blow to the President, 
and an equally low blow to the Senate, which has removed 
two Senate Presidents in the past two years. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) The electoral law kindled the disunity Obasanjo and 
other politicians said they wanted to avoid. Ironically, 
this attempt by the Presidency to maximize its political 
and electoral advantage by unilaterally (and 
surreptitiously) amending the law failed. Neglect of the 
political interests of other aspirants for office whose 
destinies would be affected by the law doomed the measure 
ab initio. By trying to finesse via legislation what was 
essentially a political question, the Presidency created an 
unnecessary political storm that continues to rage.  With 
the PDP's top three elected officials engaged in a triangle 
of recrimination, other latent PDP squabbles resurfaced. 
 
 
¶7.   (C) The factionalism that plagued the party in many 
states, particularly in the Southeast, before the November 
convention returned with the vigor of pent-up energy. 
Fists and gunshots were exchanged between rival Anambra 
State factions at a PDP national meeting in January.  Key 
party figures groused that Obasanjo was attempting to 
control party nominations at all levels. More than once, 
several governors, many fearing they were on Obasanjo's 
blacklist, met behind closed doors to discuss ways to 
secure their positions. By January, more independent-minded 
thinkers in the party were saying what was generally 
unthinkable a year ago: that Obasanjo should not seek 
reelection because he was a major reason for the country's 
political troubles. Around the same period, former Kano 
State Governor Mohammed Abubakar Rimi formally announced 
his candidacy for the Presidential nomination. Since then, 
the vociferous Rimi has been fustigating  Obasanjo, calling 
him unfit for office and the author of the Nigeria's woes. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) After years of military rule, many Nigerian's are 
not accustomed to "subordinates" publicly saying that their 
boss, especially a Head of State, should quit. Thus, public 
talk by PDP members that Obasanjo should forego the 2003 
election ironically has a conspiratorial ring to some. 
Psychologically, it is the political equivalent of coup 
plotting.  People are asking themselves if PDP politicians 
have become so bold as to attack Obasanjo so openly, what 
is happening when the politicians met behind closed doors? 
Adding to the sense of unease, people also wonder, how does 
the military view this lack of discipline within the 
political ranks? 
 
 
¶9.  (C) While the PDP seems in danger of devouring itself, 
the two other registered parties are too weak, enervated 
and afflicted by their own brand of factionalism to exploit 
the PDP's self-flagellation.  Thus far, neither of the two 
nor any of the unregistered parties has painted an 
alternative picture of governance and internal unity to 
attract the public. (Better competition from the other 
parties would also force the PDP, which now considers 
itself the only game in town, to straighten its act 
somewhat.) The major story with the unregistered parties 
has been whether former Head of State Babangida will emerge 
as a presidential candidate.  The Babangida aura mesmerizes 
some; but for most democratic-minded Nigerians, his name is 
synonymous with military rule, drift, waste and corruption. 
For them, even talk of his candidacy is considered a 
retrograde step. 
 
 
¶10.  (C) By re-igniting the antipathy between Obasanjo and 
House Speaker Na'abba, the electoral law fracas strained 
relations between the Executive and the Lower House. 
Reconvening late January, one of the House's first orders 
of business was to debate the state of the nation.  Spiced 
by media revelations that some lawmakers favored 
impeachment proceedings against the President, the debate 
pilloried Obasanjo.  The representatives blamed Obasanjo 
for much of the nation's woes, from poverty to corruption 
to communal violence.  Apparently upset by the House 
debate, Obasanjo withheld the lawmakers' salaries under the 
pretext that they failed to comply with his request for 
them to disclose fully their pay and emoluments. 
Continuing the tit-for-tat, the Representatives have filed 
suit and delayed consideration of the federal budget until 
Obasanjo releases the monies. 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Characteristic of Nigerian politics, both sides 
dug in their heels after taking confrontational positions. 
Because both sides took positions where yielding meant loss 
of face, third party intercession became necessary.  Again 
enter PDP Chairman Ogbeh, this time in concert with Senate 
President Anyim.  The two men shuttled between the Villa 
and the House to end the standoff.  After few weeks of 
tugging, the duo softened Obasanjo to the point of agreeing 
to partial payment of salaries and succeeded in temporarily 
quashing anger in the Assembly that was beginning to spur 
renewed chatter by some members about impeachment 
proceedings. 
 
 
¶12.  (C) The bickering makes for good drama; however, the 
discord reinforces the public perception of a dysfunctional 
federal government in Abuja.  The debate on his leadership 
and talk of impeachment contribute to the sense that 
Obasanjo is vulnerable.  Obasanjo now has to protect 
himself from former supporters who think they can gain 
political capital by using his name as fodder. Likewise, 
Obasanjo is playing hardball politics and lashing out at 
critics in ways less than presidential. What Obasanjo and 
many of his ardent opponents fail to recognize is that 
their brawling continues to consume too much space on the 
political agenda. More so now than just three months ago, 
the public is dissatisfied with what they view as 
government mismanagement of the nation.  Too many Nigerians 
feel the politicians have had sufficient time to find their 
direction. The reason they have not done so is because they 
are hopelessly venal as a class. Most people believe a 
major change is needed, but a lot of Nigerians are at a 
loss as to what that change should be and how it should 
come. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
COMMUNAL VIOLENCE MAKES THE GOVERNMENT LOOK INEPT 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
¶13.  (C) The early February clashes in Lagos reinforce the 
belief that the Federal Government is unable to protect the 
lives and meager property holdings of average Nigerians. 
Moreover, every instance of violence increases ethnic, 
religious and regional tension.  With each clash, the group 
feeling victimized criticizes the Federal Government as 
uncaring about its suffering or even accuses it of being 
supportive of the "aggressor" group. To bolster their 
popularity, political figures are appealing to divisive and 
parochial interests. They demagogically blame the Federal 
Government and its alleged bias for others as a reason for 
their groups problems. The salience of ethno-regional 
organizations such as Ohaneze Ndigbo (Igbo-Southeast), 
Afenifere (Yoruba-Southwest) Arewa Consultative Forum 
(ACF) (North, Hausa-dominated) has increased in this 
milieu. 
 
 
¶14.  (C) The Federal Government has not helped matters by 
openly criticizing these organizations as being sources of 
divisiveness in national politics.  These groups have 
responded that they are forced to protect the interests of 
their "people" because of the inaction of the Federal 
Government. For example, in the wake of the Yoruba/Hausa 
clash in Lagos, the ACF issued a statement blaming the 
Federal and Lagos State Governments for being pro-Yoruba 
and lenient to Yoruba miscreants while not protecting Hausa 
residents.  This was the latest of a string of ACF 
statements castigating the Administration for neglecting 
Northern interests.  Other groups perceive the federal 
government as turning its back as well. Tivs in Benue 
complain they are still being targeted by federal soldiers 
and that they will take matters into their own hands to 
protect their ethnic brethren. While the government has 
established various commissions to examine instances of 
communal violence, it seems incapable of developing a 
consensus strategy to reduce the occurrences.  Because of 
the perceived government inability, ethnic and regional 
chauvinism have increased as groups threaten to take the 
law into their own hands to protect their own. If these 
feelings are not stemmed, they will feed violence and 
further fuel anti-government sentiment along ethnic and 
regional lines. 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
OF THINGS TO COME -- ELECTORAL VIOLENCE? 
---------------------------------------- 
¶15.  (C) Hyperbole, although now at a heightened level, is 
the usual fare in Nigerian politics.  However, the December 
23 assassination of Attorney General Bola Ige brought 
something more troubling to the mix.   Most likely the 
result of escalation in the rivalry between the Osun 
Governor and his Deputy, the murder shocked Nigerians. 
Some try to wish it away as an aberration; others hope it 
is a lesson that will force the political class to modulate 
its tone.  Uncharitably, more than a few non-Yorubas see in 
Ige's death evidence of the depravity of intra-Yoruba 
politics and a lesson that Yorubas, including Obasanjo, 
make bad politicians.  However, many sober-minded Nigerians 
fear the assassination is a harbinger for elections to 
come.  If political competition more than a year away from 
the actual polling can result in the death of a Cabinet 
Minister, what will be the level of violence when elections 
draw near?  Instances of intramural violence in the PDP, 
particularly in the Southeast, underscore the fear that 
violence and elections are close companions in the Nigerian 
context.  That a significant factor in the unrest in the 
Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa triangle is competition for control 
of local government areas also lends credence to the notion 
that violence and electoral politics go together. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
REALLY THE WRONG TIME -- IKEJA 
------------------------------ 
 
 
¶16.  (C) There never is an opportune time for tragedy, but 
the Ikeja explosion was more than untimely. Already nursing 
its many self-inflicted wounds, the Government was not 
prepared to react quickly to Ikeja.  The cantonment was a 
latent crisis inherited from the military.  While the 
Obasanjo Administration should not be blamed for the 
problem, the unpredictable explosion -- coming after many 
other recent troubles -- sent the impression to a populace 
that believes in omens that the Administration was doomed. 
 
 
¶17. (C) Obasanjo's initial poor handling of the  crisis, 
especially his public remarks that he did not want to visit 
the disaster area made him look callous. Subsequent excuses 
that he had not been informed that anyone had died, only 
made him look feckless.  The (for Nigeria) massive sums 
announced for relief assuaged some anger but did not 
address the underlying perception of Government's lack of 
compassion for the governed.   Ironically, the more 
conspiratorially-minded concluded that the Government might 
have literally dodged a bullet because a coup attempt had 
been foiled by the clumsiness of coup plotters mishandling 
ordnance stored at the depot. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
THE ECONOMY-- A LEAN YEAR IN THE MAKING 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶18.  (C) On the economic front, a soft global economy 
depresses demand for oil, Nigeria's economic mainstay. To 
help OPEC keep prices stable, Nigeria must cooperate in 
production cutbacks.  Government spending must therefore 
shrink in proportion to its revenues to avoid a huge 
deficit.  In part to save money, the government reduced the 
subsidy on fuel in January, causing a price hike.  Not only 
did fuel prices increase by about 20 percent, the price of 
many commodities climbed sharply and transportation costs 
nearly doubled in some areas as opportunistic transport 
operators sought to gouge the public and deflect blame onto 
the GON.  Stung by the price hike and by the failure of 
government to honor its 2000 promise to increase the 
minimum wage, the Nigerian Labor Congress called a national 
strike.  The strike fizzled after two days primarily due to 
lack of public enthusiasm.   The Government helped kill the 
strike by arresting NLC leaders.  While its tactics helped 
muzzle the strike, the Administration's adamant refusal to 
negotiate any aspect of the price hike and its timing 
caused the NLC leadership to lose face, straining the 
relationship between government and labor. 
 
 
¶19.  (C) Heavy-handedness was also evident in the 
government's response to the unprecedented police strike, 
just a few weeks after the general labor action.  Junior 
police officers organized the nationwide strike, protesting 
non-payment of allowances for several months.  The strike 
was honored in Lagos and several other states.  Government 
acted swiftly to quell the strike, perhaps fearing an 
increase in lawlessness should the strike hold.  The 
strike's architects were arrested and charged with mutiny. 
Dangling a carrot, the Government promised partial payment 
of the arrearages. While the combination of coercion and 
payment ended the strike, it did not resolve the gripes of 
police officers.  Again, by intimidating the strikers, the 
government damaged the morale of an institution crucial to 
democracy while also harming the relationship between 
government and rank-and-file police officers. 
 
 
¶20.  (C) Looming ominously is a potential shortfall 
regarding state civil servant salaries.  With the reduction 
of the federal revenue allocation to the states due to 
diminished oil prices, some states will be hard-pressed to 
pay civil servant salaries in a few months.  Affected civil 
servants in numerous states may strike. If so, the country 
may return to crisis mode, perhaps reviving calls for a 
nationwide strike especially now that organized labor is 
nursing a grudge.  Several states face bankruptcy, having 
taken out loans during the days of 30-dollar oil that they 
cannot possibly repay with oil in the low 20s and fewer 
barrels being pumped. 
 
 
¶21.  (C) There is a growing sense that the average Nigerian 
is worse off now than in 1999, when oil prices were in the 
low teens.  Coupled with liberal "official" overseas travel 
by politicians at all levels of government and the sudden 
affluence of many office-holders who were penurious three 
years ago, Nigerians are asking whether their "democracy 
dividend" has been used to unjustly enrich others. 
 
 
¶22.  (C) Driven by electoral considerations, the GON, 
unfortunately, seems poised to release large amounts of 
cash into the economy now that it has broken formally with 
the IMF (septel).  While citizens may feel better for a few 
weeks, suffusing a low-productivity economy with more paper 
will likely produce a new surge in inflation and 
depreciation of the Naira unless interest rates (already 
above 40 percent) are tightened further.  This scenario 
will make it much harder to generate the jobs and growth 
needed to genuinely improve living standards. 
 
 
¶23.  (C) Nigeria's governing elite continues to give little 
thought to the less fortunate.  The very same week 
authorities bulldozed the ramshackle booths of petty 
traders at Wuse Market -- claiming to restore the integrity 
of the city's master plan, Senate President Anyim Pius 
Anyim started to build a townhouse development on land 
reserved as green space.  Alerted to this incongruity, 
figures close to President Obasanjo said nothing could be 
done because Anyim is "someone we need very much."  Even 
PDP Chairman Audu Ogbeh (protect) despaired of elite 
attitudes:  "They think that once they have made it, then 
their brothers can just sleep (die or disappear)" 
 
 
¶24.  (C) The double standard is nothing new to Nigerians. 
Military figures were often more venal, but they were fewer 
in number and seemed less hypocritical because they never 
spoke to the public of the "benefits of democracy" while 
privately dipping their hands in the cookie jar. The 
country's elected elites and their hangers-on are far more 
numerous, causing many people to believe the total volume 
of graft exceeds that of the Abacha years.  Moreover, the 
elected elites talk about democracy and transparency, and 
the apparent hypocrisy has given rise to seething anger in 
some areas.  Some in the GON are working for transparency 
and good governance, but they must fight the ingrained bad 
habits of others.  While Obasanjo seems to detest 
misappropriation and bribery generally, he ignores it when 
figures such as Works and Housing Minister Tony Anenih and 
Legislative Liaison Officer Esther Uduehi use them as 
instruments to further his political objectives (see, for 
example, para 5). In large measure due to this ambivalent 
position, Obasanjo has been unable to make serious progress 
in his stated fight against official corruption. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
The Military: Waiting in the Shadows 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶25.  (C) Traditionally, the military has rationalized its 
takeovers as necessary to save the nation from the chaos of 
civilian incompetence and avarice. Despite the successive 
crises that have visited Nigeria recently, the military 
does not seem posed to takeover.  Morale in the military is 
low and the officer corps are not united about the way 
forward.  Many officers are against a return to military 
rule, and a public disillusioned by nearly two decades of 
military rule is not (yet) so fed up with elected civilians 
to accept the military's return. While the military may not 
be primed for a coup, all is far from well.  There is 
significant grumbling about Government neglect of the 
soldiers yet relying on them as its last line of defense 
against communal violence.  Events after the Ikeja 
explosion symbolize the estranged relationship between the 
military and the Administration.  When Vice President Atiku 
Abubakar visited Ikeja, he was forced to leave after 
soldiers pelted his motorcade with water bags and debris. 
They were angry over the government's failure to respond to 
their emergency needs immediately after the tragedy.  The 
offending unit was promptly rusticated.  Almost anywhere in 
the world, but more so in a country with Nigeria's 
political history, soldiers throwing things at the nation's 
second highest office-holder is not a good sign. 
 
 
------------- 
LOOKING AHEAD 
------------- 
 
 
¶26.  (C) Because Nigeria has not had a "new" crisis in the 
past few weeks, some of the high anxiety from the serial 
crises is wearing off. However, most Nigerians are acutely 
aware that their country is closer to the red zone than 
just a few months ago. Two big problems remain: 1) 
Electoral politics and fairness, and 2) Communal violence 
and internal insecurity.  As noted earlier in this message, 
these two issues are inter-related.  Because elections are 
now just one year away, time is precious. Unless the GON 
can get a grip on both of these problems, more violence and 
political malaise will be difficult to prevent. 
 
 
¶27.  (C) Because this Administration is the first adult 
experience with civilian democracy for much of the 
populace, may not be able to differentiate between 
Nigeria's democratic institutions and the flawed people now 
debasing them.  The return of civilian rule has been 
replaced by widespread frustration over the lack of 
manifest democracy dividends. The trials of the past few 
months have tested public faith in democracy. While few 
(yet) want to see a return to military rule, each new GON 
misstep incrementally increases the number of people who 
write off the Obasanjo Administration. The possibility of a 
military self-reintroduction into politics is inversely 
proportionate to popular support for civilian government. 
The great risk is that continued failures and missteps will 
increase the (still-minimal) numbers who question whether 
Nigeria is a viable host for democratic government. 
ANDREWS