This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000828 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FOR AF/FO, AF/RA, AF/S AND AF/W 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 032/12/2012 
TAGS: PREL NI ZI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA TO "TARRY" BEFORE PRONOUNCING ON ZIMBABWE 
 
 
REF: BELLAMY/JETER EMAIL 12 March 
     HARARE 657 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CDA ANDREWS.  REASON: 1.5(D) 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  MFA PermSec says Nigeria will avoid a 
rush to judgment on the Zimbabwe election.  Abuja will 
consult with Pretoria and Canberra, as well as various 
observer groups, before developing a position.  The GON 
might even await the results of electoral challenges.  DCM 
urged the GON, consonant with its leading regional role, to 
stake out a position in support of democratic principles. 
Nigeria's position would be "principled," Hart responded; 
should the elections turn out to have been fundamentally 
flawed, however, Nigeria would speak out, and Mugabe would 
not escape criticism.  Comment at para 8 and action request 
in para 9.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2.  (U) President Obasanjo was out of the country in the 
days before the Ambassador's departure for London.  FM Sule 
Lamido was also unavailable. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) DCM 12 March engaged MFA Permanent Secretary T.D. 
Hart on Zimbabwe.  The 40-minute discussion afforded an 
opportunity to deploy all of ref talking points.  DCM gave 
the Secretary's letter to Hart for onward transmission to 
Lamido and provided Hart with a copy of the letter. 
Earlier, PolCouns had delivered a copy of the letter to the 
National Security Adviser's Military Assistant, LTC Idris, 
to pass to the President. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Hart provided a thorough explanation of Nigeria's 
approach to Zimbabwe, stating at several intervals that the 
GON intended to "tarry" before making any pronouncement on 
the election's legitimacy.  Abuja would "eschew any rush to 
judgment."  It was necessary to hear from "our observers on 
the ground" before even beginning to draw conclusions.  The 
GON's principal source of information on Zimbabwe was CNN, 
Hart noted, commenting the CNN was "an American source" and 
its reporting had to be viewed in that light. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) DCM reiterated that the purpose of meeting with 
Hart was to give the GON a heads-up on the direction in 
which U.S. thinking was trending.  No decisions had been 
taken and none would be until sufficient evidence was in 
place to draw a conclusion.  Hart said that the USG had 
faster access to far more information than did the GON. 
President Obasanjo would consult with President Mbeki and 
PM Howard and the GON would review all information coming 
to its attention before drawing a conclusion about the 
legitimacy of the election.  Hart thought Nigeria would 
also consult with SADC.  The GON position would be built on 
this base and would be consistent with Harare Principles. 
Hart went on to discuss at some length the history of the 
Harare Principles, recalling Abacha-era FM Tom Ikimi's 
frequent remonstrations with Zimbabwe's Stan Mudenge when 
Nigeria's status in the Commonwealth was in question:  "Tom 
told him to be careful about trying to use the Harare 
Principles for sanctions against one country because you 
don't know; it might be your own [country] tomorrow." 
 
 
¶6.  (C) DCM re-emphasized the importance of Nigeria taking 
a position in defense of democratic principles consistent 
with its role as Africa's most important state.  Hart stood 
firm against "acting precipitously" but averred that the 
GON would not silently condone an illegitimate electoral 
outcome.  Disturbingly, Hart suggested that Abuja might 
await the outcome of legal challenges before taking a 
stance.  However, he insisted that, if the case was clearly 
made that Mugabe had stolen the election, Nigeria would say 
so and deny Mugabe support.  While Hart did not say that 
Nigeria would then urge Mugabe to step aside, he did offer 
that President Obasanjo was increasingly frustrated with 
Mugabe and his tactics and that Obasanjo had made this 
point to Mugabe on at least one occasion. 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Hart did not think that Mugabe's popularity in some 
Nigerian quarters would preclude a firm GON stance if the 
evidence warranted it.  It was "well-known," said Hart, 
that Mugabe was brutally repressive.  Many years ago, when 
he was a Nigerian diplomat in Harare, Hart had seen Mugabe 
dispatch troops to violently quell such minor unrest as 
student strikes, with deaths a usual consequence.  Mugabe 
"never brooked dissent," Hart commented, noting how 
Zimbabwe's ruler had politically vanquished Joshua Nkomo, 
the "father of the liberation struggle." 
 
 
¶8.   (C) Comment: Sufficiency of evidence is in the eye of 
the beholder, and the beholder may wish to wear blinders or 
rose-colored glasses.  Nigeria's long and strong support 
for liberation in southern Africa and Obasanjo's personal 
role in establishing that support has formed a strong bond 
between Obasanjo and Mugabe and given Mugabe great stature 
among the many Nigerians who resent what they perceive as 
Western meddling in African affairs.  Moreover, widespread 
fraud marred the 1999 election that brought Obasanjo to 
power, but most observers thought the electoral malfeasance 
affected Obasanjo and his opponent (Olu Falae) more or less 
equally; the fraud on one side cancelled out the fraud on 
the other, resulting in popular will being respected in the 
overall result if not in every part of the country.  Today, 
an Obasanjo whose popularity seems to diminish a bit more 
with each passing day is clearly trying to preserve his 
options.  His advisers, most of whom desperately want him 
to remain in power (in order to retain its perquisites for 
themselves), will likely discourage him from being forward- 
leaning on Zimbabwe. 
¶9.  (C) Recommendation:  We should help those in the GON 
who want Nigeria to stand firmly in support of Zimbabwean 
democracy.  Insufficiency of evidence is likely to be the 
basis for an eventual decision either to let others take 
the lead or to oppose criticizing Mugabe firmly.  We ask 
that we be provided as much specific evidence of ZANU-PF/ 
GOZ rigging and malfeasance as can be released to the GON. 
The GON will then have a difficult time pleading ignorance 
of the facts or insufficiency of evidence.  Such support by 
us will encourage the GON to do what many know must be done 
but find so hard to do. 
ANDREWS