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Viewing cable 02ROME1015, EX-KING DETERMINED TO GO HOME, BUT CONCERNED ABOUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02ROME1015 2002-02-27 05:54 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ARMITAGE, GROSSMAN, SA-DOBBINS, S/P, PM. 
NSC FOR DR. RICE AND MR. HADLEY. 
DOD FOR RUMSFELD AND WOLFOWITZ. 
JCE FOR MYERS. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X5, X6 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF IT PGOV AF IT IR IRPREL AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: EX-KING DETERMINED TO GO HOME, BUT CONCERNED ABOUT 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
REF: A. KABUL 200 
     B. STATE 35613 
     C. ROME 918 
     D. USNATO 214 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  01015  01 OF 02  270625Z 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POLMINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.6 X5 AND X6. 
 
1.  (S)  SUMMARY:  SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY KHALILZAD 
CALLED ON FORMER KING OF AFGHANISTAN ZAHIR SHAH FEBRUARY 25. 
FOR MOST OF THE SESSION, GENERAL WALI, ROYAL SON MIR WAIS, 
GRANDSON MUSTAPHA, SULTAN GHAZI AND HAMID SIDDIQ JOINED. 
ZAHIR WAS IN GOOD SPIRITS AND APPARENT GOOD HEALTH, JOKING 
WITH HIS VISITORS, THEN PUFFING A CIGAR.  MOST OF THE 
DISCUSSIONS CENTERED ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR ZAHIR'S PLANNED 
RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN IN MID-MARCH FOR NAWRUZ, THE AFGHAN NEW 
YEAR.  KHALILZAD ALSO MET WITH ITALIAN MFA UNDER SECRETARY 
MARGHERITA BONIVER AND AFGHANISTAN'S AMBASSADOR TO ITALY, 
HAMED NASSIR ZIA.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (S)  ZAHIR SHAH APPEARED ABSOLUTELY DETERMINED TO GO TO 
AFGHANISTAN, PENDING ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENTS.  THIS MAY NOT 
EQUALLY APPLY TO HIS ENTOURAGE, WHO SEEMED MUCH MORE 
CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION THAN THE KING HIMSELF. 
 (COMMENT:  SEE ALSO REF C.  IT APPEARED ZAHIR SHAH'S 
FAMILY'S CONCERNS WERE NOT AS EXTENSIVE AS INDICATED IN THOSE 
MEETINGS, AND WERE IN ANY EVENT GREATLY ASSUAGED BY 
KHALILZAD'S VISIT.  END COMMENT.)  THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT 
WILL FLY THE KING AND HIS ENTOURAGE TO KABUL, PERHAPS ON A DC 
9, BUT THE ROUTING WAS UNCLEAR.  KHALILZAD SUGGESTED THAT 
ENTERING AFGHANISTAN FROM THE NORTH, (I.E. UZBEKISTAN) MIGHT 
NOT RAISE POLITICAL CONCERN AS WOULD AN ENTRY FROM ELSEWHERE. 
 
3.  (S)  AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, HOWEVER, THE KEY ROYAL 
CONCERN REMAINS SECURITY.  KHALILZAD EXPLAINED THAT ISAF IS 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  01015  01 OF 02  270625Z 
BEGINNING TO TRAIN A PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND WILL INTENSIFY 
THIS EFFORT.  THIS UNIT WILL NUMBER 600 MEN, BUT 
UNFORTUNATELY ONLY 200 HAVE SHOWN UP THUS FAR.  THIS WILL BE 
THE PRINCIPAL SECURITY FOR THE FORMER KING'S RESIDENCE, 
SUPPLEMENTED BY ISAF, BUT WILL ALSO PROTECT THE PRESIDENTIAL 
PALACE.  IN ADDITION, KARZAI HAS CLOSE PROTECTION OFFICIALS 
BEING TRAINED, AND HAD OFFERED TO MAKE SOME AVAILABLE TO THE 
KING.  ISAF WOULD BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THE STATIC PROTECTION 
AROUND THE KING BUT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PERFORM CLOSE 
PERSONAL PROTECTION.  THE KING'S ADVANCE IN KABUL HAD 
INDICATED THAT KARZAI WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE SOME PERSONNEL, 
WHEN TRAINED, AS THE KING'S BODYGUARDS. 
 
4.  (S)  THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF IRANIAN INTERFERENCE 
WITH THE KING AND OTHERS ECHOING CONCERN ABOUT IRAN'S DUAL 
TRACK APPROACH TOWARD AFGHANISTAN.  AFTER HEARING THAT ISMAIL 
KHAN WAS PLAYING IRAN AGAINST THE U.S. TO GAIN ADDITIONAL 
ASSISTANCE, ZAHIR REMARKED THAT THIS REMINDED HIM OF HIS 
EARLY DAYS WHEN THE RUSSIANS AND THE BRITISH SIMILARLY 
COMPETED OVER AFGHANISTAN.  THIS COMPETITION WAS USED BY THE 
THEN-RULERS TO RETAIN THE COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE. 
 
5.  (S)  GEN. WALI WONDERED IF IT MIGHT NOT BE USEFUL TO 
RECRUIT YOUNG AFGHAN-AMERICANS WITH SOME TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 
FOR THE PROTECTION DETAIL.  WE ENCOURAGED THE ROYAL FAMILY TO 
ACTIVELY SEEK OUT THOSE IT COULD TRUST FOR ITS PERSONAL 
SECURITY UNIT. 
 
6.  (S)  KHALILZAD NOTED THAT RENOVATIONS TO THE RESIDENCE 
IDENTIFIED FOR THE KING, WHICH IS OUTSIDE THE ROYAL PALACE, 
ARE LARGELY COMPLETED, AND IT SHOULD SOON BE READY FOR 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  01015  01 OF 02  270625Z 
OCCUPANCY.  IN ADDITION, ISAF HAD INFORMALLY AGREED TO 
PROVIDE ZAHIR WITH EMERGENCY AND OTHER IN EXTREMIS MEDICAL 
SERVICES. 
 
7.  (S)  KHALILZAD MET SEPARATELY WITH THE KING TO PASS THE 
MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM KARZAI AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN KABUL THAT 
GRANDSON MUSTAPHA WAS TOO CONTROVERSIAL TO MAKE THE TRIP WITH 
THE KING AT THIS TIME (REFS A AND B).  ZAHIR AGREED, BUT 
ASKED KHALILZAD TO BREAK THE NEWS TO MUSTAPHA, WHICH HE DID 
IN A MEETING LATER IN THE DAY.  THE SWEETENER, AS SUGGESTED 
BY THE IA, WAS AN OFFER OF A DIPLOMATIC POST.  MUSTAPHA 
AGREED AND PLANNED TO PROVIDE A LIST OF HIS PREFERENCES LATER 
IN THE EVENING. 
 
8.  (C)  KHALILZAD ALSO MET WITH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
UNDERSECRETARY MARGHERITA BONIVER.  BONIVER CONFIRMED THAT 
THE GOI HAS ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE KING'S RETURN WELL IN HAND. 
HE WILL BE FLOWN IN A CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT TO AN AIRPORT NEAR 
KABUL, WITH THE FINAL LEG OF THE JOURNEY MADE IN A MILITARY 
AIRCRAFT.  BONIVER EXPRESSED MILD FRUSTRATION WITH SOME OF 
 
                          SECRET 
 
                              SECRET        PTQ5883 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  01015  02 OF 02  270625Z 
ACTION SSO-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   DODE-00  ANHR-00  TEDE-00  NEA-00   PM-00    P-00 
      SP-00    SS-00    SA-00    PMB-00   SAS-00     /000W 
                  ------------------6C40D1  270626Z /38 
O 270554Z FEB 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2454 
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
 
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 001015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ARMITAGE, GROSSMAN, SA-DOBBINS, S/P, PM. 
NSC FOR DR. RICE AND MR. HADLEY. 
DOD FOR RUMSFELD AND WOLFOWITZ. 
JCE FOR MYERS. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X5, X6 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF IT PGOV AF IT IR IRPREL AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: EX-KING DETERMINED TO GO HOME, BUT CONCERNED ABOUT 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
THE IDEAS OF THE KING'S ENTOURAGE, SUCH AS THE SUGGESTION 
THAT THE ENTIRE GROUP OVERNIGHT IN DUBAI.  KHALILZAD 
SUGGESTED THAT THE GOI DECLARE THAT THE GROUP WOULD MAKE THE 
SHORTEST POSSIBLE ROUTE TO MINIMIZE DISCOMFORT TO THE KING. 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  01015  02 OF 02  270625Z 
HE NOTED THAT LANDING IN TASHKENT OR DUSHANBE WOULD MEAN A 
SHORTER FLIGHT IN A LESS COMFORTABLE MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR 
THE KING'S FLIGHT INTO KABUL.  BONIVER APPRECIATED HIS IDEAS. 
 
9.  (C)  KHALILZAD BRIEFED BONIVER ON THE SECURITY SITUATION 
INSIDE AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF IA CHAIRMAN 
KARZAI'S REQUESTS THAT ISAF BE EXTENDED BOTH IN TIME AND TO 
OTHER LOCATIONS.  HE SAID THERE WAS CLEARLY A NEED TO TRAIN 
AFGHAN MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES, BUT UNTIL THESE FORCES ARE 
UP TO PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, HOW CAN AFGHANISTAN'S SECURITY 
BE ASSURED?  WHEN ASKED ABOUT ITALY'S PARTICIPATION IN ISAF, 
BONIVER'S INITIAL RESPONSE WAS THAT ITALY WOULD LIKE TO 
EXTEND ITS PARTICIPATION.  SHE QUICKLY ADDED THAT DEFENSE 
MINISTER MARTINO WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE AND NOTED HE HAD 
RECENTLY SAID ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN ISAF WOULD NOT BE 
EXTENDED BEYOND THE INITIAL THREE MONTHS.  SHE ENCOURAGED THE 
USG TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH MARTINO, HOWEVER, IF WE WANTED 
FURTHER INFORMATION ON ITALIAN PLANS. 
 
10.  (C)  COMMENT:  MARTINO HAD USED ITALY'S POTENTIAL 
COMMAND OF AN EXTENDED TASK FORCE FOX AS ONE REASON NOT TO 
PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN ISAF.  LAST WEEK'S DECISION THAT 
GERMANY, NOT ITALY, WOULD COMMAND TFF COULD CONCEIVABLY CAUSE 
HIM TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE.  HOWEVER, HE HAS BEEN CLEAR IN 
PUBLIC COMMENTS AND THOSE MADE IN MEETINGS WITH USG 
OFFICIALS, THAT HE HAS OTHER GOOD REASONS FOR NOT EXTENDING 
OR EXPANDING ITALY'S ISAF ROLE.  HE WAS, INDEED, VERY 
RELUCTANT TO PARTICIPATE IN ISAF IN THE FIRST PLACE.  HE 
PREFERS TO FOCUS ITALY'S LIMITED MILITARY RESOURCES AND 
TROOPS, WHICH ARE ALREADY STRETCHED THIN BY OEF AND BALKANS 
OPERATIONS, ON BOLSTERING REGIONAL STABILITY CLOSER TO HOME. 
                          SECRET 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  01015  02 OF 02  270625Z 
END COMMENT. 
 
11.  (C)  FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH U/S BONIVER, CHIEF OF 
STAFF GIORGIO MALFATTI FOLLOWED KHALILZAD INTO THE HALLWAY TO 
URGE THAT ATTENTION BE PAID TO IRAN'S ONGOING EFFORTS TO 
ENCOURAGE DIRECT COOPERATION WITH EU MEMBERS ON AFGHAN 
RECONSTRUCTION.  MALFATTI SAID THIS AS A CONSISTENT AND 
RELATIVELY HARD-SELL IRANIAN APPROACH TO ALL EU MEMBERS; HE 
MENTIONED ITALY, GERMANY AND FRANCE IN PARTICULAR.  MALFATTI 
SAID THE GOI DID NOT INTEND TO ENGAGE IN SIGNIFICANT 
BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH IRAN ON AFGHAN RECONSTRUCTION, BUT 
URGED U.S. ATTENTION TO THE PHENOMENON. 
 
12.  (U)  DR. KHALILZAD CLEARED THIS CABLE IN SUBSTANCE 
BEFORE DEPARTING POST. 
SEMBLER 
 
                          SECRET 
 
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 2002ROME01015 - Classification: SECRET