This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 X6 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR PGOV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: FORMER HEAD OF STATE THINKS OBASANJO 
SHOULD FORGET SECOND TERM 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reason 1.6 x6 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: During a February 1 breakfast meeting, 
former military Head of State Abdulsalami Abubakar told 
Ambassador Jeter that President Obasanjo meant well but has 
performed badly the past several months.  Obasanjo's sincere 
intentions have been betrayed by his abrasive manner and by 
maladroit decisions that have alienated many supporters. 
With his stature in the Northwest and Southeast significantly 
eroded, Obasanjo would be hard-pressed to duplicate his 1999 
electoral victory in 2003.  Because Obasanjo's candidacy 
would now be divisive, Abubakar hoped the President would 
follow the example of Nelson Mandela and not seek a second 
term.  The former Head of State also warned that, despite the 
National Assembly's excision of the clause barring new 
parties from the 2003 national and state elections, the 
electoral law still contained provisions that could 
precipitate major constitutional and political crises. 
Abubakar also expressed annoyance at the recent suit filed 
against him and other former Nigerian military Heads of State 
by Southwest-based politicians for alleged human rights 
abuses and the death of putative 1993 electoral victor, 
Moshood Abiola.  Abubakar's comments on his role in the DROC 
peace process and in Zimbabwe will be reported septel.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
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A Historic Opportunity Being Squandered 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶2.  (C) During a February 1 breakfast at the Ambassador's 
residence, a relaxed, avuncular Abubakar commented that 
President Obasanjo had the best interests of Nigeria at heart 
and was a patriot who thought of Nigeria first. There was no 
other figure who could have assumed the Presidency in 1999 
without having further convulsed an already frail body 
politic. Nigeria would have been worse off without Obasanjo, 
he maintained. Generous and brief, these encomiums were the 
prelude to a tactful but harsh critique of the Obasanjo 
Presidency. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Abubakar believed that Obasanjo's utility as a 
stabilizing force had waned; in fact, the President appeared 
to have forgotten his mandate. Obasanjo's task when elected 
was to advance the democratic transition the 1999 elections 
had set in motion.  In 1999, civilian politicians united to 
escort the military from office.  However, they had no 
program beyond the military's ejection.  As President, it was 
incumbent on Obasanjo to stand above the fray of power 
politics and forge a national consensus around key issues. 
His mandate was to guide the nation down the critical path to 
genuine democratization.  He should have focused his 
attention as well as sacrificed his ambitions to the building 
of republican institutions and a democratic political 
culture.  Instead, Obasanjo had sunk into the thick of 
political mudslinging and intrigue, Abubakar complained. 
Meanwhile, his Administration had no domestic social and 
economic policy focus.  Unlike a good general, Obasanjo was 
operating on multiple fronts, dealing with too many issues 
simultaneously. By trying to do everything himself and 
failing to delegate sufficiently, Obasanjo has achieved 
little except generate resentment among the political elite 
and frustration among Nigerians in general. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) However, Obasanjo's greatest self-disservice, 
according to Abubakar, has been his combative style and 
disdain for compromise and dialogue.  Obasanjo thinks he is 
omniscient and does not need to listen, the former Head of 
State emphasized.  Preferring to surround himself with 
second-rate hacks who echo his tune, Obasanjo has banished 
independent-minded advisors like Patrick Dele Cole who could 
have helped him from stumbling into the recent spate of 
political miscalculations, such as the electoral law. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) For Abubakar, the electoral law represents Obasanjo's 
biggest recent political blunder. Abubakar was nonplussed by 
Obasanjo's alleged personal involvement in the unseemly 
inclusion in that law of the prohibition against new 
political parties in the 2003 elections.  By inserting his 
hand in this roiling pot, Obasanjo singed both his pride and 
prestige, thus lowering his stature as President.  The 
President's involvement in this backroom meddling 
strengthened his critics in and out of his party, the PDP. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Abubakar continued that the President's involvement 
in the electoral law controversy strongly suggested that 
Obasanjo sought to bar new parties to lessen competition and 
assure his reelection.  However, slipping that prohibition 
into the law after the measure had been passed by the 
National Assembly had backfired severely. Not only was there 
a sustained public hue and cry, but all 36 Governors filed 
suit against the measure's postponement of local elections 
from April 2002 to 2003, while Senator Arthur Nzeribe filed a 
companion case against the ban on political parties. 
Meanwhile, the two houses of the National Assembly voted to 
repeal the bar on new parties.  But these "cleansed" bills 
have not been forwarded to the President for his assent. 
Consequently, no one really knows if there is an electoral 
law or not.  Abubakar feared a major constitutional showdown 
if some governors make good their threats to hold local 
elections this year in face of the federal government's 
insistence that it, not the states, had the authority to 
determine the date for local elections.  Such a standoff 
between Governors and the President, Abubakar predicted, 
would fog an already dense political atmosphere. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Abubakar added that the Governors would not have felt 
the need to hold local elections in 2002 but for their fear 
that Obasanjo is actively trying to engineer the demise of 
governors he dislikes, even those in his own party. Holding 
local elections prior to the national polls would strengthen 
the Governors' position in influencing all subsequent 
elections in their states, including the Presidential 
contest.  Conversely, should the Presidential election occur 
first, the bandwagon effect would dictate that contestants in 
the subsequent state and local elections would need the 
imprimatur of the President-elect to maximize their chances 
for victory. (Comment: In Nigeria, once people know who the 
President will be, they flock to his party and its candidates 
at all levels in hopes that their support for the winning 
team will translate into lucrative favors from government. 
End comment.) 
 
 
¶8. (C) Despite his manipulations, Obasanjo's chances to 
reclaim the presidency were fading; in fact, Abubakar thought 
that Obasanjo has suffered a major loss of political 
goodwill.  Three years ago, he was a unifying force, someone 
in whom all major political constituencies reposed a degree 
of confidence.  Then, he was perceived as de-tribalized, and 
his lack of support in the Southwest actually strengthened 
his hand on the national stage.  Unfortunately, Obasanjo's 
personality could not tolerate losing his home region to 
those he saw as his inferiors. Consequently, he has focused 
too much attention on garnering support in his ethnic 
backyard. 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Any incremental support gained in the Southwest came 
at the expense of alienating key segments of the North and 
Southeast.  Obasanjo had paid scant attention to the North, 
and any meaningful policy initiative or infrastructure 
project in that region was the work of state governors not 
the federal government.  Moreover, Obasanjo was dismissive of 
Northern opinion leaders; he failed to meet and when he met, 
he failed to listen, Abubakar quipped.  Abubakar noted that 
the Constitution provided for the President to confer with 
former Heads of State, but only two such meetings had 
occurred.  Both times, Obasanjo treated his predecessors to 
long monologues that precluded any exchange of views.  All of 
the other former Heads of State were Northerners, except for 
the deferential Earnest Shonekan, Abubakar, wryly remarked. 
 
 
10  (C) Abubakar contended that Obasanjo grievously erred if 
he thought keeping Atiku Abubakar as his running mate would 
ensure significant Northern support.  Atiku's name does not 
resonate  beyond his native state, Adamawa.  To Abubakar, the 
trappings of office appeared to have rendered both Obasanjo 
and Atiku so heady that they forgot the electoral formula 
(and its chemists, primarily Northern power brokers) that 
ensured their victory. Additionally, Abubakar surmised, there 
might be growing tension between Obasanjo and Atiku.  In 
private talks, the Vice President acted as if he would be 
running for the top office next year but Obasanjo's actions 
suggest that he is not heading for the sidelines. 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Compounding his electoral challenge, Obasanjo's 
disapproval rating in the Southeast now ran high.  Obasanjo 
had hurt himself by engaging in a running public feud with 
charismatic Abia state governor Orji Kalu.  Each skirmish 
with Kalu rubbed too many Igbos the wrong way.  Although not 
every Igbo supported the flamboyant governor, many saw him as 
a spokesperson for Igbo political aspirations. The more 
Obasanjo upbraided Kalu, the more the President was seen as 
being against an independent Igbo politician rising to 
national prominence, reinforcing the sentiment that Igbos 
remain marginalized as a result of the civil war thirty years 
ago. 
 
 
¶12.  (C) Unwittingly, postulated Abubakar, Obasanjo was 
constructing a scenario familiar to Nigerian politics but one 
that would leave him the odd man out.  Spurned by a sense of 
estrangement from the Presidential Villa, more Northern and 
Southeastern politicians were talking to each other. 
Abubakar foresaw a possible North-Southeast alignment against 
Obasanjo, the Southwesterner.  (Comment:  If the North and 
Southeast ally against him, Obasanjo would be in the same 
corner that kept Awolowo from finding the Presidential grail. 
 Moreover, Obasanjo would not be able to count on the keep, 
abiding support of his fellow Yoruba that Awolowo had.  End 
Comment.) 
¶13. (C) As evidence of the North-Southeast axis, Abubakar 
said the yet-to-be registered party, UNDP, was born in the 
North but was gaining support in the Southeast.  When 
Ambassador Jeter mentioned the rumor that the UNDP was 
brainchild of former Head of State Babangida, Abubakar did 
not deny that his close friend was the money behind the UNDP. 
 He did state, however, his uncertainty about Babangida's 
electoral plans; Abubakar himself was trying to figure out if 
Minna's more famous favorite son would dive into the 
electoral fray. 
 
 
¶14.  (C) Because Obasanjo's candidacy now would be ethnically 
and regionally divisive, Abubakar thought Obasanjo should 
stand down and not run again.  As has been raised in the 
print media recently, Abubakar hoped Obasanjo would take the 
"Mandela option."  The problem was that Obasanjo was so 
obdurate that he would not even listen to Mandela, much less 
follow him. 
 
 
¶15.  (C) Abubakar did not have many salutary things to say 
about the three registered parties.  Obasanjo's desire to 
have a chokehold on party operations had demoralized and 
divided the ruling PDP.  Some party members were talking 
about the need to jettison Obasanjo or find breathing space 
for themselves in another party.  The AD was too subservient 
to Yoruba socio-cultural interests such as Afenifere, and 
therefore, could not make headway outside the Southwest.  The 
APP was wracked by internal dissent, some engineered by 
Obasanjo, the rest self-inflicted.  In short, the political 
landscape had deep pocks that needed to be filled or the 
upcoming electoral campaign would be an unsteady, tumultuous 
ride for the entire nation, Abubakar felt. 
 
 
----------------------- 
On A More Personal Note 
----------------------- 
 
 
¶16.  (C) Abubakar stated that unexpectedly he had been handed 
a court summons during a recent visit to Chicago.  The suit 
was brought in the US District Court of the Eastern District 
of Michigan.  Plaintiffs included NADECO stalwarts Gani 
Fawahinmi and Anthony Enahoro.  The gravamen of the complaint 
was the detention of these plaintiffs and the death of 
Moshood Abiola, were both human rights abuses punishable 
under federal law. Former Heads of State Buhari, Babangida 
and Shonekan also were named codefendants.  Visibly annoyed, 
Abubakar contended he was the "last Head of State that should 
be accused of human rights abuses" since he released dozens 
of political prisoners from detention, including some of the 
plaintiffs, and was preparing for Abiola's release when the 
latter died.  Abubakar contended that the suit was not a 
fitting reward for having been the general who voluntarily 
returned the reins of government to civilian hands.  Now the 
Yoruba-dominated NADECO group, still seething that Abiola was 
not allowed the Presidency, wanted to embarrass Abubakar, the 
other former Heads of State, and Nigeria.  He claimed the 
plaintiffs seek to convict the entire history of military 
rule and have raised issues dating back to the 1966 coup.  He 
said that he would enlist the Ministry of Justice to help 
defend the case since it was Nigeria more so than he that 
would be on trial in this "political case." 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶17. (C) Abubakar may have one or two personal bones to pick 
with Obasanjo. For instance, Abubakar believes that Obasanjo 
wanted him, Babangida and Buhari to testify before the Human 
Rights "Oputa" Panel so that they would receive public blows 
to their prestige through questioning by hostile lawyers 
about Abiola's death, corruption and human rights abuses 
during the years of military rule. (Abubakar and the other 
Northern Heads of State refused to appear at the Oputa 
hearings.) Despite this perception, Abubakar's indictment of 
Obasanjo did not seem to be fueled by personal rancor. 
Instead, it probably reflects the views of many in the 
Northern elite.  Perhaps more importantly, what Abubakar said 
probably reflects the mindset of Ibrahim Babangida, a much 
more powerful and unforgiving personality who may emerge as 
Obasanjo's real political nemesis in the months leading up to 
the Presidential elections. 
Jeter