This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T ABUJA 000418 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FOR EB/ESC/ESP (GLASS), AF/EPS AND AF/W 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2012 
TAGS: PREL PINS EFIN ECON TU NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: TERRORIST LIST 9 
 
REF: (A) STATE 10592 (B) ABUJA 187 (C) 
     ANDREWS-EPSTEIN EMAIL 02/06/02 
 
 
¶1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter for reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
¶2. (S) Mission officers met on February 6, per Ref C, to 
discuss possible scenarios to lessen the negative impact of 
freezing the assets of NASCO Nigeria and its affiliated 
subsidiaries.  We found no way to separate the NASCO holding 
company in Turkey from its Nigerian subsidiaries, which 
employ more than 1500 Nigerians directly and several times 
that indirectly.  Without entering into discussions with the 
GON, we cannot begin to determine whether it would be 
possible or feasible to stop funds generated in Nigeria from 
reaching the Turkish holding company.  We know very little 
about NASCO's corporate structure. 
 
 
¶3. (S) Ref B described Mission perspectives on the impact of 
freezing NASCO's assets on the local Jos community in Plateau 
State and on U.S. relations with Nigeria's Islamic 
population.  Since then, the political situation has 
deteriorated.  Last week,s explosion of the Lagos armory, 
the President,s perceived insensitivity, however 
unjustified, to the plight of more than a thousand killed and 
injured and more than 12,000 displaced, and government 
incompetence in rescue and clean up of the unexploded 
ordinance have wounded the President seriously.   This week's 
attacks on northern Muslim Hausa by Yoruba vigilantes in 
Lagos is being portrayed as ðnic cleansing8 on northern 
Nigerian radio programs.  Northern Muslims, who supported 
Obasanjo in 1999, see him incapable of protecting them in 
Lagos.  Even mainstream northern politicians are speaking of 
the inevitability of retaliatory attacks on Christians in 
Kano and Kaduna.  Nigerians with a historical perspective 
remember that such attacks in Kano in 1966 were used as a 
justification for the Igbo East to declare independence, the 
act that led to the bloody Civil War.  We do not expect 
widespread conflict to break out here, but applying sanctions 
at this time on NASCO -- a major manufacturing company and 
employer -- could be used as further ammunition by Obasanjo's 
detractors, worsening his already difficult position.  In 
short, it would be a very inopportune moment for the USG to 
add to tensions in Nigeria, and applying sanctions to NASCO 
would be seen as destabilizing. 
 
 
¶4. (S) This Mission is not privy to the links between NASCO 
and international terrorism.  While most Nigerians roundly 
condemn al-Qaeda, there is considerable support for Hamas -- 
not for its suicide bombers, but for its clinics and schools. 
 That support extends beyond the Muslim community (Nigerian 
and expatriate alike) to the left-leaning intelligentsia 
centered in Lagos.  If, despite the information in paras one 
to three (above) and ref B, a decision is made to list NASCO, 
the Mission must have talking points for both public and 
private use.  If NASCO's links are to Hamas rather than 
al-Qaeda or Abu Sayyaf, or the like, we and the GON would be 
in for a very rough ride. 
Jeter