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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
02HARARE44	2002-01-07 04:43	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Harare

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

070443Z Jan 02


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTO7739

PAGE 01        HARARE  00044  01 OF 03  070547Z 
ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   USNW-00  DODE-00  
      DS-00    EUR-00   VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   
      VCE-00   M-00     NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   SSO-00   SS-00    
      EPAE-00  DSCC-00  DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /005W
                  ------------------540795  070548Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0647
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR A/S KANSTEINER, P/DAS BELLAMY AND AF/S 
NSC FOR SR DIR FRAZIER 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: LIKELY SCENARIOS; POLICY TOOLS AND TIMING 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY JOSEPH G. SULLIVAN FOR REASONS 1.5B/D 
 
1.(C ) SUMMARY:  WITH THE ZIMBABWE DEMOCRACY ACT NOW IN 
PLACE, ZIMBABWE FIRMLY ON THE COMMONWEALTH'S CMAG AGENDA 
AND THE ELECTION DATE LIKELY TO BE ANNOUNCED BY JANUARY 
10, WE ARE APPROACHING A KEY MOMENT IN THE LEAD-UP TO 
ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. IT DOES NOT APPEAR 
THAT PRESIDENT MUGABE WILL BE DETERRED BY PRESSURES FROM 
THE US, THE EU, THE COMMONWEALTH OR SADC FROM HIS 
DETERMINATION TO WIN THE ELECTION BY WHATEVER MEANS 
NECESSARY.  IT IS INCREASINGLY UNCERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT 
ZANU-PF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION, ELECTORAL 
MANIPULATION AND POPULIST USE OF THE LAND ISSUE WILL 
DELIVER A MUGABE'S VICTORY IN THE FACE OF A DISASTROUS 
ECONOMIC SITUATION AND GROWING FOOD SHORTAGES. 
MOREOVER, AS LONGTIME ZANU-PF STRONGMAN EDDISON ZVOBGO 
TOLD US, IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT ZIMBABWEANS CAN BE BEATEN 
INTO VOTING FOR MUGABE WHEN THEY NOW HAVE ANOTHER VIABLE 
ALTERNATIVE. 
 
2.(C ) GIVEN THIS NEXUS OF DEVELOPMENTS, IT IS VERY 
IMPORTANT THAT WE BEGIN TO EXAMINE VARIOUS SCENARIOS IN 
THE PRE- AND POST-ELECTION PERIODS AND PREPARE POLICY 
TOOLS CALIBRATED FOR THE APPROPRIATE MOMENTS.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
¶3. (C ) CURRENT SCENARIO AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
 
(A) THE GOZ: NOTWITHSTANDING DOUBTS AMONG SOME SENIOR 
ZANU-PF FIGURES AND QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS OWN HEALTH, 
PRESIDENT MUGABE SEEMS DETERMINED TO COMPETE FOR AND TO 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  00044  01 OF 03  070547Z 
WIN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.  HE WILL UTILIZE 
VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION AND ELECTORAL MANUEVERS DESIGNED 
TO REDUCE THE VOTE FOR THE OPPOSITION.  ZANU-PF, 
NONETHELESS, WANTS THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
LEGITIMACY WHICH NORMALLY STEMS FROM AN ELECTION AND IS 
PLANNING TO MAINTAIN THE APPEARANCES OF A CREDIBLE 
PROCESS, INCLUDING LIMITED INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION AND 
ELECTION DAY OR WEEK NORMALITY. 
 
(B) MDC AND CIVIL SOCIETY: UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS, THE 
OPPOSITION MDC DEFINITELY INTENDS TO STAY IN THE RACE 
AND THINKS IT CAN WIN DESPITE THE OBSTACLES.  MOST CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS ARE ALSO COMMITTED TO REMAINING 
FULLY ENGAGED IN THE LEGAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND PUBLIC 
EDUCATION FIGHTS TO MAKE THE ELECTION AS FAIR AS 
POSSIBLE.(IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT LEGAL APPEALS TO 
EXTEND VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD AND TO FORCE THE 
REGISTRAR TO TURN OVER REGISTRATION LISTS HAVE BEEN WON 
AND MORE LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE AMENDED CITIZENSHIP LAW 
AND OTHER POTENTIAL ELECTION MANUEVERS ARE PLANNED.) 
 
(C ) INTERNATIONAL ROLE: THE US AND MANY EUROPEANS ARE 
PROVIDING CRITICAL SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND OTHER 
INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWEAN FORCES, INCLUDING LABOR, THE 
INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND ELECTION WATCHDOG 
GROUPS. THE GOZ IS UNLIKELY TO PERMIT EU OR US 
OBSERVERS, BUT COMMONWEALTH AND SADC-PF OBSERVERS COULD 
STILL PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IF THEY CAN GET ON THE GROUND 
AT LEAST THREE-TO-FOUR WEEKS PRIOR TO ELECTIONS. APART 
FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND THE SADC PARLIAMENTARY FORUM, IT 
APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT SADC AS AN INSTITUTION, NIGERIA OR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  00044  01 OF 03  070547Z 
THE AU WILL PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN PRESSING FOR FREER 
ELECTIONS. 
 
(D) POLICY INSTRUMENTS: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MAINTAIN 
THE PRESSURE SO THAT ELECTION CONDITIONS NOT DETERIORATE 
FURTHER, BUT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE GOZ TO ALTER ITS 
COURSE AS A RESULT OF ANY ADDITIONAL PRESSURES WE CAN 
REALISTICALLY BRING TO BEAR.  JUST AS IMPORTANTLY, THE 
US, OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS, AND ZIMBABWEAN CIVIL 
SOCIETY MUST DO NOTHING TO UNDERMINE THE PROSPECTS OF 
THE MDC FOR WINNING DESPITE THE OBSTACLES PLACED IN ITS 
WAY.  FOR INSTANCE, ANY PRELIMINARY JUDGMENT WE RENDER 
ON ELECTION CONDITIONS SHOULD NOT PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR 
THE GOZ TO SHUT DOWN THE ELECTION PROCESS.  SIMILARLY, 
WE NEED TO AVOID ANY MEASURES WHICH COULD GIVE THE GOZ 
BASIS TO SHUT DOWN OUR SUPPORT FOR CSO'S, INCLUDING 
VISAS FOR TRAINERS, EXPERTS AND EMBASSY STAFF.  WE WILL 
WISH TO COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH THE COMMONWEALTH, SOUTH 
AFRICA AND THE EU SO THAT WE ACT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN 
HARMONY.  WE NEED TO ENGAGE WITH SADC AND NIGERIA TO 
PREVENT THEM FROM UNDERMINING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES ON 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTO7741 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  00044  02 OF 03  070548Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   USNW-00  DODE-00 
      DS-00    EUR-00   VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01 
      VCE-00   M-00     NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   SSO-00   SS-00 
      EPAE-00  DSCC-00  DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------5407A4  070548Z /38 
O 070443Z JAN 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0648 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 HARARE 000044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR A/S KANSTEINER, P/DAS BELLAMY AND AF/S 
NSC FOR SR DIR FRAZIER 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: LIKELY SCENARIOS; POLICY TOOLS AND TIMING 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  00044  02 OF 03  070548Z 
THE GOZ TO REDUCE VIOLENCE AND TO ORGANIZE A MINIMALLY 
CREDIBLE ELECTION. 
 
4.(C ) SCENARIO FOR SHARP DETERIORATION AND POLICY 
RESPONSES 
 
(A) GOZ: IT IS NOT LIKELY, BUT POSSIBLE THAT THE CURRENT 
SITUATION COULD DETERIORATE SHARPLY PRIOR TO ELECTIONS, 
MOST LIKELY IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE TO CONCLUDE THAT IT 
STOOD TO LOSE, OR IF LOOMING FOOD SHORTAGES WERE TO 
PRODUCE PUBLIC DISTURBANCES.  THE GOVERNMENT COULD 
IMPOSE A STATE OF EMERGENCY, ALTHOUGH, EVEN THEN, THERE 
IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION FOR PRESIDENT MUGABE 
REMAINING IN OFFICE BEYOND APRIL 1.  THE GOZ COULD ALSO 
SHUT DOWN THE OPPOSITION MDC OR ARREST ITS LEADERSHIP ON 
THE PRETENSE OF ITS ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST 
ACTIVITIES OR EVEN COMMISSION OFF-LINE ASSASSINATION OF 
OPPOSITION LEADERS.  IN THE COURSE OF THE ELECTION 
COUNT, THE ZANU GOVERNMENT COULD REACT TO AN APPARENT 
OPPOSITION VICTORY BY INERRUPTING OR SHUTTING DOWN THE 
PROCESS ON ONE OF A NUMBER OF PRETEXTS, NONE OF WHICH 
WOULD BE CREDIBLE. 
 
(B) OPPOSITION, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PUBLIC: OPPOSITION 
AND CIVIL SOCIETY WOULD LIKELY BE FORCED UNDERGROUND 
UNDER THESE SCENARIOS.  PENT-UP PUBLIC FRUSTRATIONS 
WOULD LIKELY LEAD TO CIVIL DISTURBANCES. THE WILLINGNESS 
OF SECURITY FORCES TO PUT DOWN THESE DISTURBANCES 
VIOLENTLY WOULD BECOME THE KEY ISSUE. 
 
(C ) INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE: THE INTERNATIONAL 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  00044  02 OF 03  070548Z 
COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE EU, THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE US 
WOULD NEED TO RESPOND RAPIDLY AND HARSHLY TO SUCH A 
SCENARIO WITH THE CLEAR MESSAGE THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT 
CANNOT STAND.  IF THE SITUATION REMAINED FLUID, WE WOULD 
WISH TO COMMUNICATE TO SECURITY OFFICIALS THE 
UNACCEPTABILITY OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL 
REGIME AND ENCOURAGE THEIR COOPERATION IN A RETURN TO 
LEGALITY.  IT WILL ALSO BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO HAVE 
SOLID AND STRONG RESPONSE FROM SOUTH AFRICA, SADC AND 
NIGERIA, AS WELL AS FROM UN SYG ANNAN AND THE UNSC. 
UNDER THIS SCENARIO, FULL AND PUNITIVE PERSONAL 
SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY AND SELECTED 
ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC MEASURES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. 
 
5.(C ) POST-ELECTION SCENARIOS 
 
(A) MDC VICTORY: IN THE EVENT OF AN MDC VICTORY, THE MDC 
IS LIKELY TO WORK THROUGH EXISTING ZANU-PF AND SECURITY 
SERVICE CONTACTS TO SEEK TO ASSURE THAT TSVANGIRAI CAN 
TAKE OFFICE AND THAT HE WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT SUPPORT IN 
THE PARLIAMENT AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE TO GOVERN.  MUGABE 
HARD-LINERS CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTEMPT TO BLOCK THIS BY 
WHATEVER MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL.  WE AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS WILL WANT TO SUPPORT TSVANGIRAI'S 
EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE HIS VICTORY AND TO ENCOURAGE 
ZANU-PF AND THE SECURITY FORCES TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME. 
IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FOOD CRISIS, IT WILL 
BE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE RAPID HUMANITARIAN 
AND FAST-DISBURSING ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  00044  02 OF 03  070548Z 
(B) A MUGABE VICTORY IN A SERIOUSLY FLAWED ELECTION: A 
MUGABE VICTORY, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS ONLY POSSIBLE BY THE 
FLAGRANT USE OF VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION AND ELECTORAL 
MANIPULATION, IS A FORMULA FOR PERMANENT TRANSITION 
CRISIS -- ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL.  REGARDLESS OF LIKELY 
POLICY REVERSALS INTENDED TO APPEAL TO DOMESTIC 
INVESTORS AND INTERNATIONAL DONORS, THERE IS LIKELY TO 
BE NO REVERSAL OF ZIMBABWE'S DECLINE.  UNDER THIS 
SCENARIO, WE SHOULD PROCEED TO IMPLEMENT THE PERSONAL 
TARGETTED SANCTIONS ENVISIONED IN ZDERA AGAINST A WIDE, 
BUT CAREFULLY SELECTED LIST OF REGIME LEADERS, INCLUDING 
THOSE WHO HAVE MANIPULATED THE A-2 LAND GRAB TO THEIR 
PERSONAL BENEFIT.  WE SHOULD SEEK TO MAINTAIN A WORKING 
RELATIONSHIP HERE, PARTICULARLY FOR THE ABILITY IT GIVES 
US TO WORK WITH OTHER ZIMBABWEANS AND CONTINUE SOME 
PROGRAMS OF SUPPORT FOR THE ZIMBABWEAN PEOPLE, E.G. 
HIV/AIDS. WE AND OTHER INTERNATIONALS -- THE 
COMMONWEALTH, THE EU AND US -- SHOULD ALSO ASSURE 
ZIMBAWE'S EXCLUSION FROM AGOA, COUTONOU, IFI LARGESSE 
AND OTHER BENEFITS.  ZIMBABWE AND THE ZANU-PF WILL 
REMAIN IN CONTINUING CRISIS IN THIS SCENARIO AND WE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTO7742 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  00044  03 OF 03  070548Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   USNW-00  DODE-00 
      DS-00    EUR-00   VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01 
      VCE-00   M-00     NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   SSO-00   SS-00 
      EPAE-00  DSCC-00  DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------5407A8  070548Z /38 
O 070443Z JAN 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0649 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 HARARE 000044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR A/S KANSTEINER, P/DAS BELLAMY AND AF/S 
NSC FOR SR DIR FRAZIER 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: LIKELY SCENARIOS; POLICY TOOLS AND TIMING 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  00044  03 OF 03  070548Z 
WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE US WILL DO NOTHING TO HELP 
ZIMBABWE EMERGE FROM THAT CRISIS UNTIL A NEW ROUND OF 
CREDIBLE ELECTIONS IS HELD. 
 
SULLIVAN 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
>

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