This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000242 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2011 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ABUJA'S APPROACH TO THE DROC PEACE PROCESS 
 
 
REF: 01 ABUJA 2113 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d) 
 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary: While cognizant of the complexities in the 
DROC peace process, the GON nevertheless remains engaged and 
appears more upbeat than last October when NSA Aliyu Mohammed 
intimated Nigeria may extract itself from this diplomatic 
morass(reftel) . However, Abuja did not walk, in part, 
because it sees its role in the peace workout as evidence of 
Nigeria's centrality to African diplomacy. The thrust of 
Nigeria's efforts in DROC have been to cajole the Congolese 
Big Three -) Kabila, Bemba and Onusumba -- toward agreement 
on key issues such as the composition and duration of an 
interim government, composition of the national army, a 
cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign forces from 
Congolese soil. While supportive of the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue (ICD), Abuja's approach indicates that it sees 
progress in the ICD as dependent on the Big Three reaching a 
general understanding on these key issues.  End summary. 
 
 
¶2.  (C)  During a recent meeting with PolCouns, Special 
Presidential Advisor on Conflict Resolution Ambassador Ralph 
Uwechue provided an account of the December 7, 2001 meeting 
of representatives of the Big Three in Abuja.  Contrary to 
public perception, the December meeting was not a product of 
Abuja's insistence, the affable Uwechue maintained.  The 
meeting came at the Big Three's behest.  Further, the 
December session was actually "chaired" by the UN, with 
Nigeria simply providing the venue.  That the three sides saw 
Abuja as a neutral site and agreed to meet here reflected the 
GON's progress in establishing itself as an honest-broker. 
(Comment:  Uwechue likely massaged the truth a bit by stating 
the GON did nothing to promote the meeting.  There had been 
plenty of GON prodding of the major Congolese factions in the 
weeks and months before the meeting.  Nevertheless, that the 
three sides all felt relatively comfortable in coming to 
Abuja is a point well taken.  End Comment.)  The tripartite 
meeting resulted in a basic understanding on the procedures, 
roster of invitees, and to a significant degree, the agenda 
for the ICD set to resume in Sun City. 
 
 
¶3.  (C)  Uwechue mentioned the parties also discussed the 
vexatious issues of interim government composition and 
longevity, reconstruction of a national army, and the 
presence of foreign interlopers on Congolese soil.  Uwechue 
tried to dress this aspect of the meeting as neatly as 
possible by claiming progress was made because no side 
rejected the others' recommendations outright.  Instead, they 
all agreed to carry the others' positions back to their 
principals for further study.  Asked whether the lack of 
acrimony represented actual progress or was just a display of 
African etiquette not to spark a row when a guest in 
another's home, Uwechue smiled, then admitted there was 
substantial distance between the sides on these cardinal 
political and military issues. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Nonetheless, Uwechue asserted the December meeting had 
been a net positive.  Before the delegates returned to their 
respective camps, Obasanjo hosted a dinner.  During that 
event, Obasanjo plied his special brand of diplomacy, 
imploring each side to bridle personal ambition and 
animosities in order to embrace compromise in the search for 
something loftier -) national reconciliation and peace.  The 
evening was pitched with emotion, recalled Uwechue. Delegates 
from each side, voices crackling with strong emotion, 
promised to honor the charge President Obasanjo had given. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Using these examples as a segue, Uwechue extolled the 
efficacy of Nigerian diplomacy in the Congo.  He discussed it 
as labor intensive and centered on the Big Three.  Uwechue 
stated that, in the context of African diplomacy, building 
personal relationships was essential to success.  If a 
protagonist considers you a friend he will listen and 
consider proposals that he would reject if heard from a 
stranger, claimed Uwechue. Moreover, the Congolese realized 
that Nigeria had no vested national interests in the Congo 
that would pollute its role as a honest-broker in the DROC. 
Consequently, Uwechue asserted that President Obasanjo had 
given him the mandate to build close relationships with the 
Congolese trio.  The Special Envoy declared that he speaks to 
the three, particularly Onusumba and Bemba, regularly by 
phone.  Also, Uwechue recalled making numerous trips to the 
Congo to see the players.  Because of the relationships he 
and Obasanjo had established with the trio, Uwechue believed 
that Nigeria could push the sides toward peace, inch by slow 
inch.  However, Uwechue acknowledged this process would be 
prolonged and time consuming.  He predicted progress in 
increments with little chance of major leaps forward. 
¶6. (C)  While defending the focus on faction heads, Uwechue 
stated that Abuja supported the ICD.  Nigeria's efforts 
should be seen as collaborative with, not undermining the 
larger deliberative mechanism.  However, the reality of power 
politics must be acknowledged, he stressed.  Notwithstanding 
the numbers that might attend the ICD, the Big Three will 
primarily determine the success or failure of the peace 
process in the DROC.  If the Big Three agree on an issue, the 
others will be hard pressed not to acquiesce.  If the three 
major armed groups oppose an idea, there will be little the 
other groups can do to make the trio reverse course.  Having 
superior numbers of delegates around a conference table does 
not alter the reality of the power equation on the ground, he 
proffered. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Regarding DROC's interfering neighbors, Uwechue 
believed that Kagame was the most problematic.  Rwanda's role 
in the Congo was a result of objective security concerns as 
well as Kagame's increscent ambition.  Wanting to be a major 
regional player, Kagame sought influence beyond Rwanda's 
borders in any event.  The DROC morass, given the 
FAR/Interahamwe presence, provided ample justification for 
interference. Under the guise of self-defense, Kagame has 
sated his ambition by an intervention in DROC that exceeds 
Rwanda's legitimate security concerns.  Because of his 
appetite for influence, the Rwandan was in no rush to alter 
the status quo. Uwechue predicted Kagame would lean on his 
clients, Bemba and Onusumba, to hew a hard-line instead of 
encouraging them toward compromise. 
 
 
 ¶8.  (C) Uwechue felt Uganda's Museveni was less of a problem 
than the man in Kigali.  To a large degree, Museveni's 
intrusion was derivative of Kagame's.  Museveni could not 
idle and risk being overshadowed by Kagame in the contest for 
regional influence.  In large measure, Museveni remained in 
DROC to counterbalance his rival in Rwanda.  If Kagame can be 
coaxed to the exit door, Museveni would follow with litle 
difficulty, Uwechue believed.  Encouraging the disengagement 
of both Kagame and Museveni were areas where Nigeria believed 
the international community could best play a diplomatic 
role, he stressed. 
 
 
¶9. (C) In the lead-up to the Sun City ICD in late January, 
the Special Advisor held out the possibility of a  Big Three 
meeting hosted by President Obasanjo in Abuja.  During a 
January 11 talk with Emboff, Lt. Col. Idris, Special 
Assistant to the NSA and Lawal Hamadu of the NSA's Office, 
confirmed that the GON might call a meeting of the Big Three 
prior to the scheduled resumption of the ICD in late January. 
 Hamadu added that the ICD would again feature well over 300 
delegates, and that the Mai Mai would attend but would attach 
itself to a pre-existing ICD delegation and not go to the ICD 
as a separate delegation.  However, he added, that the 
facilitator was scrambling to find money to pay for 
conference expenses, such as transportation costs, that the 
South Africans were not paying.  (South Africa will absorb 
the lodging and associated expenses.)  Due to funding 
questions, Hamadu predicted that commencement of the ICD 
session in Sun City would be delayed. 
 
 
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Comment 
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¶10.  (C)  While supportive of the ICD, Abuja has focussed on 
the leaders of the three armed groups. This implies a 
decision that the ICD, given the financial, logistical, and 
substantive challenges resulting from its large composition, 
is an all too unwieldy and infrequent by deliberative 
mechanism to tackle the most sensitive issues in the peace 
process.  Abuja believes establishing close personal rapport 
with the three key leaders is the sine qua non to significant 
progress on a cease-fire, agreement on the transition 
government and on reconstructing the army.  Consequently, 
Abuja will continue to work the Big Three.  Although the 
Nigerians have not clearly articulated this, they apparently 
believe this spadework with the Big Three actually 
complements the ICD by forging progress in areas extremely 
difficult for the ICD to handle.  Under this informal 
division of labor, Nigeria seemingly hopes the ICD will not 
get bogged down in dealing with the "demilitarization" phase 
of peace and will focus on issues that come up later, such as 
elections and democratization. 
 
 
¶11. (C)  The danger exists that Nigeria's approach could be 
perceived as creating a second negotiating track capable of 
undermining the ICD or, worst, of presenting a potential 
understanding among the Big Three as a fait accompli to the 
ICD.  While the danger exits, we think believe the Nigerians 
are cognizant of the potential jeopardy and will take pains 
to make sure it does not happen. 
Jeter