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Viewing cable 02ABUJA189, 2001 INCSR CHAPTER ON NIGERIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02ABUJA189 2002-01-22 17:49 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 ABUJA 000189 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FOR INL 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR NI
SUBJECT: 2001 INCSR CHAPTER ON NIGERIA 
 
REF: 01 STATE 203719 
 
 
The following is post,s INCSR submission. 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
Nigeria 
 
 
I. Summary 
 
 
1. Nigeria remains a hub of narcotics trafficking and money 
laundering activity. Nigerian organized criminal groups 
dominate the African drug trade, and transport narcotics to 
markets in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Some 
of these criminal organizations  are engaged in Advance-Fee 
Fraud, commonly referred to as "419 Fraud8 and other forms 
of defrauding U.S. citizens and businesses.   Years of 
military rule and an associated economic decline contributed 
significantly to the expansion of drug-trafficking and 
criminality in Nigeria. The resulting severe unemployment and 
widespread corruption provided both an incentive and a 
mechanism for Nigerian criminal groups to capitalize on 
Nigeria's central location along the major drug routes and 
access global narcotics markets. Southeast and Southwest 
Asian heroin smuggled via Nigeria accounts for a significant 
portion of the heroin imported into the United States. 
Nigerian criminal elements operating in South America 
transship cocaine through Nigeria on to Europe, Asia, and 
Africa, mainly South Africa. Nigerian-grown marijuana is 
exported to neighboring West African countries and to Europe, 
but not in significant quantities to the U.S.  Aside from 
marijuana, Nigeria does not produce any of the drugs that are 
trafficked by its nationals. 
 
 
2. During the past year, President Obasanjo,s public 
denunciation of this criminal activity has been matched by a 
number of steps he has taken to tackle drug-trafficking, 
money-laundering and other organized criminal activities 
while he seeks to improve the image of Nigeria abroad. 
Funding of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) 
--Nigeria,s sole drug control agency -- increased 200 
percent while the NDLEA,s dynamic leadership instituted a 
number of internal reforms that have improved the 
professionalism of the 3,500 men and women in the NDLEA. 
 
 
3. Nigeria,s effort to strengthen its commitment to drug 
control and the fight against organized crime suffered a 
tragic setback when Chief Bola Ige, the Attorney General and 
Minister of Justice, was assassinated on December 23.  Chief 
Ige, Nigeria,s top law enforcement official and the official 
responsible for the NDLEA,s operations, was the catalyst 
behind many of the new anti-drug and anti-crime initiatives 
in the past year.  President Obasanjo has pledged to find and 
prosecute those behind the assassination and to sustain the 
reforms started by the late Attorney General. 
 
 
4. A campaign to root out corruption started shortly after 
President Obasanjo's inauguration in May 1999 has this year 
been sustained and strengthened.  In late 2001, the 
Anti-Corruption Commission hired 93 investigators, 
prosecutors and administrators ) its first batch of 
dedicated personnel.  The Obasanjo Administration supports 
the domestically controversial 1990 NDLEA Act Number 33. This 
law dictates that Nigerians convicted of drug offenses abroad 
will be arrested upon their deportation back to Nigeria, and, 
if convicted, will be liable for a minimum of 5 years 
additional imprisonment for harming the reputation of 
Nigeria. But corruption embedded over 16 years of continuous 
military rule continues to be a problem for an Obasanjo 
Administration committed to rooting it out. 
 
 
5. Over the years, Nigerian law enforcement agencies have had 
sporadic success in combating the various elements of the 
drug trade. In 2001, however, the Obasanjo government took a 
number of steps to strengthen the capacity of these agencies 
to deal with organized crime.  Legislation was introduced 
into the National Assembly to improve the existing 1995 Money 
Laundering Act that only criminalizes money laundering 
related to drug trafficking.  Following the June 2001 
designation of Nigeria by the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) as a &Non-Cooperative Country or Territory,8 the 
Nigerian Government acted quickly to respond to the FATF by 
designing a new Anti-Terrorism, Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission that will serve as a strong centralized authority 
to coordinate anti-money laundering efforts, specifically to 
combat the financial activities of narcotics traffickers. 
Legislation creating this new commission has been drafted and 
is expected to be submitted and approved by the National 
Assembly within the first quarter of 2002.  There have been 
few arrests and no convictions under the existing Money 
Laundering Decree.  In addition, asset forfeiture has not 
been a successful deterrent against money laundering or drug 
trafficking activities. Interdiction and enforcement efforts 
are complicated by an absence of inter-agency cooperation and 
a serious lack of resources. Years of neglect by successive 
military regimes left the law enforcement community 
demoralized and ill-equipped to deal with sophisticated, 
international criminal networks. This problem is compounded 
by pervasive corruption throughout all levels of government. 
There have been a few arrests of major traffickers; however, 
it can take years for a case to actually come to trial and no 
mechanism exists to track cases. Cases are often lost within 
Nigeria's judicial system. Nigeria did take a significant 
step in November 2000 by transferring into U.S. custody four 
fugitives wanted on serious narcotics and narcotics-related 
charges, including two who are on the President,s List of 
Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers under the Foreign 
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. Nigeria is a party to the 
1988 UN Drug Convention. 
 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
 
6. Nigeria produces no precursor chemicals or drugs that have 
a significant effect on the United States. However, Nigeria 
remains a major drug-trafficking transit country and Nigerian 
criminal elements operate global networks. 
 
 
7. The law enforcement agency with sole  responsibility for 
combating narcotics trafficking and drug abuse is the 
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). The NDLEA was 
established in 1989, and works alongside Nigerian Customs, 
the State Security Service, the National Agency for Food and 
Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), the National 
Police, and the Nigerian Immigration Service at the various 
ports of entry. NDLEA's most successful interdictions have 
taken place at Nigeria,s international airports.  The agency 
has successfully apprehended individual drug couriers 
transiting these airports and some of the drug traffickers 
sponsoring these couriers.  An improved interdiction effort 
at the Lagos international airport during 2001 has forced 
smugglers to change tactics and ship contraband via Nigeria's 
five major seaports or across its porous land borders. 
 
 
8. In late 2001, the NDLEA carried out an unprecedented 
seizure of 60 kilograms of cocaine at the Lagos seaport of 
Tin Can Island.  Following this seizure, the President issued 
an executive decree granting the NDLEA full operational 
access to all of Nigeria,s international sea ports.   This 
move, long called for by the U.S. Government, is expected to 
greatly boost the NDLEA,s interdiction success. 
 
 
9. As specialists in moving narcotics and other contraband, 
Nigerian criminal organizations are heavily involved in 
corollary criminal activities such as document fabrication, 
illegal immigration, and financial fraud. Their ties to 
criminals in the United States, Europe, South America, Asia 
and South Africa are well documented. Nigerian poly-crime 
organizations exact significant financial and societal costs, 
especially among West African nations with limited resources 
for countering these organizations. 
 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001 
 
 
10. Policy Initiatives. In 2001 the democratically elected 
Obasanjo Administration  introduced a number of new 
legislative and executive initiatives to combat narcotics 
trafficking and organized crime.  These include:  drafting 
new money laundering legislation; drafting of legislation to 
create an &Anti-Terrorism, Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission8 to coordinate government-wide efforts against 
money laundering and financial crimes; granting expanded 
authority to the NDLEA to operate in the five major 
international seaports of Nigeria and the formation of an 
inter-agency anti-fraud committee to improve enforcement 
efforts against financial fraud.  The draft bill to create an 
Anti-Terrorism, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
shows the Government,s commitment to meeting its 
international obligations, particularly the criteria of the 
FATF.  Nigeria's counter-narcotics policy is based on the 
National Drug Control Master Plan (NDCMP), in place since 
1998. This plan assigns responsibilities to various 
government ministries and agencies as well as NGOs and other 
interest groups. The master plan also outlines basic resource 
requirements and time-frames for the completion of 
objectives. Many of these goals have not yet been met. 
 
 
11. Both chambers in the National Assembly have Narcotics 
Affairs Committees, which monitor the performance of the 
NDLEA and implementation of Nigeria's counter-narcotics 
strategy. While past frequent leadership changes at the NDLEA 
have  impaired the agency's interdiction activities, the 
tenure since October 2000 of the current NDLEA Chairman, 
Alhaji Bello Lafiaji has given the agency new life and much 
greater direction.  Chairman Lafiaji has declared an all-out 
offensive against drug trafficking and has instituted a 
number of internal reforms to improve the professionalism of 
NDLEA staff, including the retiring of officials suspected of 
corruption and improving training and benefits for NDLEA 
personnel.  Chairman Lafiaji also has called for the 
harmonization of Nigeria's narcotics legislation and has 
sought increased international assistance for his agency. The 
NDLEA has also embarked upon a publicity campaign to combat 
narcotics trafficking and drug abuse by staging various 
contraband destruction events around the country. 
 
 
12. Accomplishments.  Nigeria,s drug enforcement efforts 
improved substantially in 2001.  With INL assistance, the 
NDLEA launched a more aggressive drug interdiction campaign 
at the Lagos international airport ) long known as a major 
gateway for U.S.- and Europe-bound narcotics.   This effort 
coincided with the resumption of direct (nonstop) flights 
from Lagos to the U.S. in February, after a hiatus of eight 
years.   The report of only one seizure made by U.S. 
authorities at the port of entry of the flight (New York,s 
JFK airport) is evidence of greatly improved screening by the 
NDLEA in Lagos. 
 
 
13. The Nigerian Government also improved its record of 
drug-related prosecutions.  Using special drug courts, a more 
energetic effort by the NDLEA to prosecute drug traffickers 
efficiently and successfully produced over 2,000 convictions 
in calendar year 2001.   In a notable November 2001 case, the 
NDLEA froze a bank account of 1.6 million naira that belongs 
to a suspected drug-trafficker and money-launderer. 
 
 
14. The Government of Nigeria also pledged to design a 
mechanism to process U.S. extradition requests expeditiously 
while observing due process under Nigerian law and in 
accordance with the Nigerian constitution.  This mechanism 
will include the creation of an exclusive extradition team of 
public prosecutors and the designation of a special court and 
a High Court judge dedicated to extradition cases.  While 
extradition requests were formerly heard in any court, 
including lower magistrates, courts, the Government has now 
centralized the handling of all U.S. extradition requests in 
the Federal High Court of Abuja. 
 
 
15. At the Government of Nigeria,s initiative, a high level 
U.S.-Nigeria law enforcement dialogue was initiated in 2001. 
The first meeting of this semi-annual forum, the Bilateral 
Law Enforcement Committee, took place on November 9 in 
Washington D.C. and covered the full range of U.S. and 
Nigerian law enforcement interests: drug control; financial 
fraud; trafficking in persons; corruption; immigration 
crimes; police reform; extradition and money-laundering.  The 
dialogue has already led to commitments by the Government of 
Nigeria to take significant steps towards mutually agreed 
goals by March 2002. 
 
 
16. Law Enforcement Efforts.  Nigerian counter-narcotics 
efforts primarily focus on the interdiction of couriers 
transiting Nigeria's air- and sea ports as well as a public 
campaign focused on destroying plots of cultivated marijuana 
throughout the country.  Improved drug interdiction efforts 
at the Lagos airport and sea ports led to a 40 percent 
increase in drug seizures over 2000.  43 kilograms of heroin 
and 98 kilograms of cocaine were seized during 2001.  This 
included a record seizure of 60 kilograms of cocaine at the 
Lagos sea port of Tin Can Island.   The number of drug 
related arrests increased to 3,592 and 2,041 drug convictions 
were handed down during the last year.   Some major 
narcotics-smugglers and their networks continue to elude 
arrest and prosecution, even though the NDLEA recently began 
an intensified effort to investigate major international drug 
traffickers operating in Nigeria, in cooperation with the 
DEA.  Attempts by NDLEA to arrest and prosecute major 
traffickers and their associates often fail in Nigeria's weak 
judicial system, which is subject to intimidation and 
corruption. Asset seizures from narcotics-traffickers and 
money-launderers, while permitted under Nigerian law, have 
never systematically been utilized as an enforcement tool, 
but some convicted traffickers have had their assets 
forfeited over the years. However, the number of traffickers 
so far penalized remains small. 
 
 
17. Corruption. Corruption is a pervasive problem in Nigerian 
society. Estimated unemployment is over 25 percent. Civil 
servants, salaries are low. In addition, salaries are 
frequently months in arrears, compounding the corruption 
problem. After its inauguration, the Obasanjo Administration 
embarked on a public anti-corruption campaign. Legislation 
was enacted and an Anti-Corruption Commission was formed. 
This commission began prosecution of several minor officials 
on corruption charges, and has initiated investigations into 
allegations of high-level corruption have been launched.  The 
commission also has hired its first dedicated staff of 
prosecutors, investigators and administrators.  The U.S. 
Government is providing the Commission with training and 
technical assistance for its new staff.  A commission also 
was established to review government contracts awarded by 
past Administrations.  The Obasanjo Administration, however, 
has made limited progress  towards transparency and openness 
in its contracting and decision-making process.  A number of 
criminal cases, launched by the Anti-Corruption Commission 
against public officials accused of bribe-taking, are moving 
forward and are expected to conclude early in 2002, although 
an appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the Commission,s 
constitutionality has delayed these cases.   Meanwhile, 
corruption remains a significant obstacle to 
counter-narcotics efforts, especially in the judicial 
process. While the NDLEA has attempted to purge its ranks of 
officers suspected of corrupt practices, a fear of corruption 
hampers inter-agency cooperation as agencies are often 
distrustful and unwilling to share information. 
 
 
18. Agreements and Treaties. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 
UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 
1972 Protocol,  the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances; and the 2000 UN Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty, which 
was made applicable to Nigeria in 1935, is the legal basis 
for pending U.S. extradition requests.  Nigeria is a party to 
the World Customs Organization,s Nairobi Convention, Annex 
on Assistance in Narcotics Cases. 
 
 
19. Cultivation and Production. Cannabis is the only illicit 
drug produced in any significant quantity in Nigeria. The 
drug is produced in all 36 states. Major cultivation takes 
place in central and northern Nigeria and in Delta and Ondo 
states in the south. Marijuana, or "Indian Hemp" as it is 
locally known, is sold in Nigeria and exported throughout 
West Africa and into Europe. To date, there is no evidence of 
significant marijuana imports from Nigeria into the United 
States. The NDLEA has been engaged in an active eradication 
campaign. Through November  2001, the NDLEA claimed cannabis 
seizures in excess of 290 metric tons and eradication of 
cannabis plants in the field in excess of 270 hectares. In 
August 2001, the NLDEA invited dignitaries and the diplomatic 
corps  to a narcotics destruction ceremony in Lagos to 
highlight the agency,s seizures of narcotics throughout the 
country. 
 
 
20. Drug Flow/Transit. Nigeria is a major staging point for 
Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin smuggled to Europe and 
the United States and for South American cocaine transported 
to Europe. While Nigeria remains Africa's drug transit hub, 
there are indications that the preferred methods of 
trans-shipment have changed. Improvement of the overall 
security posture at Murtala Mohammed International Airport 
has forced drug traffickers to ship by sea from Nigerian 
seaports, concealing large quantities of contraband in 
shipping containers, or use other West African airport with 
laxer security controls. 
 
 
21. Demand Reduction. Local production and use of marijuana 
have been a problem in Nigeria for some time; however, 
according to the NDLEA and NGOs, the abuse of harder drugs 
(e.g., cocaine, heroin) is on the rise. Heroin and cocaine 
are readily available in many of Nigeria's larger cities. Law 
enforcement officials admit that Nigeria remains a major 
narcotics trans-shipment point, but some officials deny that 
domestic drug abuse is on the rise. U.S. officials and 
training instructors find that many Nigerian officials do not 
understand that by serving as a transit point, Nigeria may 
itself begin to suffer significant drug abuse problems. The 
NDLEA continues to expand its anti-drug clubs at Nigerian 
universities and distribute anti-drug literature. The NDLEA 
also has instituted a teacher,s  manual for primary and 
secondary schools, which  offers guidance on teaching 
students about drug abuse. 
 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
 
22. Policy Initiatives. U.S.-Nigerian counter-narcotics 
cooperation focuses on interdiction efforts at major 
international entry points and on professionalizing the NDLEA 
and other law enforcement agencies. U.S. training and 
material assistance have continued, with the NDLEA as the 
primary target.  The U.S. DEA office deals with a small group 
of NDLEA representatives to lessen the chance of compromise 
by corrupt individuals. USG working-level representatives 
enjoy good access to their counterparts and there is an 
evident desire on both sides to strengthen these 
relationships. The new NDLEA Chairman appears committed to 
meeting agency goals and improving the morale of NDLEA 
officers.  Bilateral discussions during the last year on the 
need to reform Nigeria,s Police have presaged the planned 
start in 2002 of a USG police reform program.   The Nigerian 
Government has reviewed plans for reform and U.S. assistance 
agencies have prepared their own suggestions for ways to 
proceed, however, the task will be formidable as the police 
lack so much in the way of equipment, and their morale has 
suffered over the years as the situation deteriorated. For 
example, salaries are low and frequently paid months late. 
23. Bilateral Accomplishments.   In 2001, at the request of 
the GON, a U.S.-Nigeria Bilateral Law Enforcement Committee 
was created to advance mutual drug and crime control issues. 
Co-chaired by Nigeria,s Attorney General and the State 
Department,s Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs, the group met for the first time 
in November 2001 in Washington.  This meeting produced a 
joint declaration containing Government of Nigeria pledges 
to:  a) introduce new money laundering legislation; b) begin 
investigation of at least one major drug trafficker in 
cooperation with DEA; c) draft and introduce to the National 
Assembly new legislation allowing for the civil forfeiture of 
assets derived from organized crime or drug-trafficking; d) 
commence extradition proceedings of individuals wanted for 
prosecution by the U.S. Government; and e) boost resources 
for the new Anti-Corruption Commission.  Meanwhile, The U.S. 
DEA office in Nigeria continues to work with the NDLEA on 
expanding their relationship.   New INL assistance to the 
NDLEA allowed for a stronger interdiction posture at the 
Lagos international airport ) Nigeria,s largest  drug 
transit point ) forcing many traffickers to re-route drug 
shipments through neighboring countries.   INL assistance has 
also been provided to the Nigerian Police Force to improve 
investigations and enforcement operations against criminal 
organizations involved in advance fee or &4198 fraud, which 
largely targets American citizens and businesses. 
 
 
24. The Road Ahead. The U.S.-Nigerian relationship has 
improved significantly with the reintroduction of democratic 
government in Nigeria.  During the past year President 
Obasanjo demonstrated his commitment to the international 
drug fight by increasing the NDLEA,s budget by 200 percent 
and giving this agency long-awaited operational access to 
Nigeria,s sea ports. Nevertheless, much remains to be done 
in the area of drug control and the Federal Government needs 
to address key weaknesses, including the processing of U.S. 
extradition requests and the local prosecution of major drug 
traffickers.  As noted elsewhere in this report, the 
narcotics and crime problems in Nigeria are deeply rooted in 
Nigeria's present governmental system, and in Nigerian 
society.  It will require strong political will and continued 
international assistance for any Nigerian government to 
confront these difficult issues and bring about meaningful 
change. 
 
 
25. The U.S. government is working to aid Nigeria in its 
counter-narcotics efforts. One area of prime concern is the 
judiciary. Law enforcement efforts are often stymied by the 
slow pace of the judicial system, which can be attributed to 
both intimidation and corruption of the judiciary by criminal 
organizations. The U.S. Agency for International Development 
has implemented a "Rule of Law" program with the Nigerian 
government to help strengthen and professionalize the 
judiciary.  Through the framework of the new Bilateral Law 
Enforcement Committee, the Nigerian Government has committed 
itself to the establishment of  a reliable extradition 
process that will allow extradition requests to be heard 
expeditiously and fairly. Many U.S. extradition requests for 
narcotics-traffickers have been outstanding for years. 
 
 
26. The U.S. Government is also concerned about fundamental 
problems with the Nigerian Police Force and other law 
enforcement agencies.   While President Obasanjo and his 
advisors are aware of the need to modernize the Nigerian 
Police as a key pillar of democratic consolidation, little 
has been done to address key issues such as low salaries for 
police and other law enforcement  personnel.  Salary arrears 
also remain a problem.  The Government of Nigeria needs to 
demonstrate a commitment of its own resources to the fight 
against narcotics trafficking and transnational crime in 
order to strengthen its case for additional foreign donor 
assistance. 
 
 
27. The U.S. government provided training for NDLEA personnel 
on general investigative techniques and sent two NDLEA 
officers responsible for drug interdiction at the Lagos 
international airport to a specialized training course in the 
United States.  Since narcotics-trafficking and financial 
crimes are closely linked, the Government of Nigeria must 
also strengthen and utilize its asset forfeiture legislation, 
already in place. In addition, Nigeria must work to bring its 
money-laundering laws into compliance with the FATF 40 
recommendations and work to regulate its banking industry. 
 
 
28. The U.S. government will continue to actively engage 
Nigeria on the issue of counter-narcotics and money 
laundering. There have been incremental successes, but 
long-term progress will only come about through the 
continuation of serious dialogue and cooperation, and a 
willingness on the part of Nigeria's government to confront 
difficult issues. The underlying institutional and societal 
factors that contribute to narcotics-trafficking and 
money-laundering activities in Nigeria are deep-seated and 
require comprehensive, long-term solutions. 
 
 
============================================= === 
 
 
Money Laundering Chapter: 
 
 
29. Nigeria (Primary). The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a 
hub of money laundering and  financial crime activity, not 
only for the West African sub-region but also increasingly 
for the entire continent. It is the most populous country in 
Africa, dominating the West African sub-region economically 
and militarily. Nigeria is also Africa's most significant 
narcotics trans-shipment point. Nigerian criminal 
organizations utilize sophisticated global networks to ship 
narcotics via Nigeria to markets in the United States, 
Europe, and other African countries. Nigerian 
money-laundering is directly linked to narcotics-trafficking 
as well as corollary activities such as document, 
immigration, and financial fraud. Though the execution and 
coordination of these criminal activities may be taking place 
increasingly outside of Nigeria, the majority of the proceeds 
from these illegal activities continues to be  repatriated to 
Nigeria and these funds are often used to fund subsequent 
criminal operations. 
 
 
30. The combination of narcotics-trafficking and money 
laundering, and the fact that Nigeria has failed to 
adequately address corruption among law enforcement, customs, 
immigration, other government agencies, and within 
society-at-large, makes it unusually difficult to have an 
effective anti-money laundering program. 
 
 
31. In June 2001 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
declared Nigeria, along with 15 other countries, a 
&Non-Cooperating Country or Territory8 (NCCT) for its 
failure to address FATF concerns on international money 
laundering. 
 
 
32. Nigeria is notorious for the various financial schemes 
that originate there. Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud, commonly 
known as "Four-one-nine Scams," (419 is the reference to 
fraud in Nigeria's criminal code) has become highly lucrative 
for criminal enterprises. With the help of phone books, 
business directories, and email lists, Nigerian criminal 
organizations fax, mail, and email targeted businesses and 
individuals around the world with enticing "get rich quick" 
offers. The proposed schemes take various forms, for example, 
by promising a transfer of funds "from an over-invoiced 
contract" in Nigeria to a target's bank account. The cash in 
question might be profit from a crude oil sale that a 
business person "needs help in transferring out of the 
country" or the disbursement of funds for a specific charity 
from the estate of a recently deceased individual. Often, 
these 419 letters and schemes are written on "official" 
letterhead stationary. An elaborate system may be utilized to 
provide bogus references. Advance Fee Fraud perpetrators may 
request bank account information to gauge the targeted 
victim's level of trust and provide the impression that a 
funds transfer is imminent. All 419 Scams eventually request 
payment of a fee (or fees) so that the alleged transfer of 
funds can be facilitated. While actual monetary losses by US 
citizens are difficult to gauge -- many victims are reluctant 
to report such activity to law enforcement agencies -- 
conservative estimates place such losses by American citizens 
and businesses in the hundreds of millions of dollars 
annually. Substantial proof exists that narcotics traffickers 
have utilized 419 Scams to fund their illicit smuggling 
efforts. 
 
 
33. The current anti-money laundering law, Money Laundering 
Decree No. 3 of 1995, criminalizes narcotics-based money 
laundering, but is useful only if the predicate offense is 
narcotics trafficking. It requires banks to identify 
customers, maintain records, and report large and suspicious 
transactions to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). It also 
provides for the seizure and forfeiture of drug-related 
assets, although forfeiture requires a conviction and thus is 
seldom effectively used. Enforcement of the legislation 
relies on the effective record keeping of banks, submissions 
of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and account holder 
identification.  Enforcement of this banking oversight 
responsibility, which is shared by the CBN and the National 
Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), has been weak and 
inconsistent because of lack of training, excessive 
bureaucracy, and corruption. 
 
 
34. The NDLEA and the CBN,s Money Laundering Surveillance 
Unit (MLSU) have the power to demand, obtain, and inspect the 
books and records of a financial institution to confirm 
compliance with the provisions of the money laundering 
decree.  Yet, the effectiveness of this authority is hindered 
by weak record keeping and analysis of bank records, 
including account holder identification data, filing of SARs 
and information on bank management staff and affiliate 
overseas banks.  These deficiencies were highlighted by the 
FATF in its declaration of Nigeria as a Non-Cooperative 
Country or Territory (NCCT) in June 2001.   There have been 
no money laundering convictions. 
 
 
35. In response to international concerns, particularly the 
NCCT status given Nigeria by the FATF, the GON has taken 
steps to revise the 1995 money laundering law and create a 
centralized unit under the Office of the Presidency to combat 
money laundering and financial crimes.   It took the 
initiative in late 2001 to engage the FATF in a dialogue on 
how to improve Nigeria,s money laundering control regime, 
including a GON-initiated  meeting with the FATF,s Africa 
and Middle East Review Group in Rome in December 2001.  The 
Nigerian government has also opened up a high-level law 
enforcement exchange with the U.S. Government, covering a 
wide array of issues, including money laundering and 
financial crimes.  This forum, the U.S.-Nigeria Law 
Enforcement Committee, first met in Washington in early 
November 2001.  In 1998, the GON began cooperating with the 
U.S. Postal Inspection Service to identify and crack down on 
fraud operations through the mail. In addition, the U.S. 
Secret Service has maintained an office in the U.S. Consulate 
 
SIPDIS 
General in Lagos since 1995, and in June 2000, opened a 
separate office to assist in the effort to combat Advanced 
Fee Fraud and other illegal operations, including U.S. dollar 
counterfeiting operations. In May 1999, a decree was issued 
that, according to the NDLEA, altered the burden of proof in 
money laundering cases to facilitate prosecution. 
 
 
36. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in 
December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. 
 
 
37. The steps taken to address the FATF,s concerns are 
encouraging.  Nigeria urgently needs to enact and implement 
the draft changes to its anti-money laundering law so that it 
can meet international standards and protect itself against 
financial crimes and money laundering. Nigeria also needs to 
demonstrate its ability to take action against corruption and 
fraud. In addition, Nigeria should move quickly to create a 
centralized financial intelligence unit, something that the 
proposed Anti-Terrorism, Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission might incorporate, that would receive and analyze 
information and cooperate with foreign counterparts in money 
laundering investigations so that Nigeria can protect its 
financial system from widespread abuse by criminals and 
criminal organizations. 
 
 
============================================= === 
 
 
------------------------ 
Nigeria Statistics Table 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Category . . . CY 1999 . . . CY 2000 . . . .CY2001 
 
 
Drug Seizures 
------------- 
Heroin (kilograms)81.35 ** . .56.60 . . . . 43.59 
Cocaine . . . . . 15.64 . . . 50.42 . . . . 98.47 NN 
Marijuana . . .  . .NA . . .272,260 . . . 293,022 
Ephedrine . . . . . NA . . . . . 0 . . .  116.00 
 
 
Marijuana Eradication 
--------------------- 
 
 
Operation &Burn-the-Weed8 
Hectares . . . . . . . . . . .1,038 . . . . . 394 
Kilograms destroyed . . . 1,038,345 . . . 394,250 
 
 
Prosecution 
----------- 
 
 
Drug Arrests . . .NA . . . . . 2,385 . . . . 3,592 
 
 
Drug Convictions .NA . . . . . 1,624 . . . . 2,041 
 
 
Drug Acquittals . NA . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . 0 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
 
** 1999 heroin seizures included one single seizure of 60 
kilograms 
made at the Kano airport 
NN 2001 cocaine seizures include one single seizure of 60 
kilograms made 
at the Lagos sea port of Tin Can Island . 
Jeter