O 121151Z DEC 01
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1601
INFO AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMCONSUL CHENNAI 
AMEMBASSY DHAKA 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002233 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT REAP, DS/ATA, L/LEI, IO, SA/RA, SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL CE MV
SUBJECT:  SRI LANKA/MALDIVES:  2001 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORTS 
 
REFS:  (A) STATE 210627; (B) STATE 198192 
 
¶1.  POST'S RESPONSE TO REF B REQUEST FOR INPUT FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT'S 2001 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT FOLLOWS.  DATA 
ON SRI LANKA IS CONTAINED IN PARA TWO AND DATA ON THE 
MALDIVES IN PARA THREE.  PARAS 2-3 ALSO CONTAIN 
INFORMATION RESPONSIVE TO REF A CONCERNING UPGRADING 
HOST COUNTRY ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS. 
 
¶2.  DATA ON SRI LANKA FOLLOWS: 
 
BEGIN TEXT: 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
SRI LANKA HAS BEEN COOPERATIVE IN THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST TERRORISM.  THERE IS NO INFORMATION THAT 
INDICATES THAT THERE IS ANY RISK THAT GSL COOPERATION 
WILL DECREASE.  THROUGHOUT 2001, THE GSL CONTINUED TO 
BATTLE THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE), THE 
ONLY TERRORIST GROUP CURRENTLY BELIEVED ACTIVE IN SRI 
LANKA.  THE GSL SUFFERED LARGE-SCALE CASUALTIES IN AN 
OFFENSIVE ON LTTE POSITIONS IN NORTHERN SRI LANKA IN 
APRIL.  THE LTTE LAUNCHED A DEVASTATING ATTACK ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND AIRBASE COMPLEX NORTH OF 
COLOMBO IN LATE JULY.  THE LTTE ALSO ENGAGED IN NUMEROUS 
HIT-AND-RUN ATTACKS IN THE NORTH AND EAST THROUGHOUT THE 
YEAR.  IN EARLY NOVEMBER, A SUICIDE BOMBER BLEW HIMSELF 
UP IN DOWNTOWN COLOMBO, KILLING FIVE OTHER PEOPLE. IN 
OCTOBER 2001, THE DEPARTMENT RE-DESIGNATED THE LTTE AS A 
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE 
ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996. 
IN LATE OCTOBER 2001, THE LTTE WAS ADDED TO THE 
PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE ORDER 13224 BLOCKING THE ASSETS OF 
TERRORIST ENTITIES.  BOTH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA 
TOOK STEPS TO BAN LTTE ACTIVITIES IN 2001.  IN NOVEMBER, 
SRI LANKA TOOK STEPS TO IMPLEMENT UNSCR 1333 AND 1373, 
WHICH CALLED FOR U.N. MEMBER-STATES TO FREEZE THE ASSETS 
OF TERRORIST ENTITIES.  THE U.S. CONTINUES TO URGE THE 
SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT TO BECOME A PARTY TO THE REMAINING 
FOUR OF THE 12 INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 
CONVENTIONS IT DOES NOT BELONG TO ALREADY. 
 
(((THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO QUESTIONS A 
THROUGH M IN PARA TWO OF REF B.))) 
 
(A) IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATROCITIES, 
THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY DECLARED ITS 
WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. AND OTHER 
COALITION PARTNERS IN THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
TERRORISM.  IN NOVEMBER, SRI LANKA TOOK STEPS TO 
IMPLEMENT UNSCR 1333 AND 1373, WHICH CALLED FOR U.N. 
MEMBER-STATES TO FREEZE THE ASSETS OF TERRORIST 
ENTITIES.  BECAUSE OF THE LONGSTANDING WAR AGAINST THE 
LTTE, THE GSL ALREADY HAD MANY COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS ON 
THE BOOKS.  IN ADDITION, IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, 
INCLUDING AT THE UNITED NATIONS, THE SOUTH ASIAN 
ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC), AND THE 
COMMONWEALTH, THE GSL HAD ALREADY PROVEN ACTIVE IN 
DISCUSSIONS ON WAYS TO FIGHT TERRORISM INTERNATIONALLY. 
THERE IS NO INFORMATION THAT INDICATES THAT THERE IS ANY 
RISK THAT GSL COOPERATION WILL DECREASE. 
 
(B) THROUGHOUT 2001, THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT HERALDED 
MANY INSTANCES WHEN PURPORTED LTTE TERRORIST ATTACKS 
WERE THWARTED.  IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM MOST OF THESE 
GSL CLAIMS.  IN NOVEMBER, HOWEVER, POLICE INTERCEPTED A 
SUICIDE BOMBER IN DOWNTOWN COLOMBO BEFORE HE REACHED HIS 
TARGET.  (NOTE:  THE TARGET COULD HAVE BEEN THEN-PRIME 
MINISTER WICKREMANAYAKE.)  THE SUICIDE BOMBER DID MANAGE 
TO DETONATE HIS BOMB, KILLING FIVE OTHER PEOPLE, 
INCLUDING TWO POLICE OFFICERS.  IN OCTOBER, THE POLICE 
ALSO CLAIM TO HAVE FOUND A "SUICIDE VEST" PACKED WITH 
HIGH-GRADE EXPLOSIVES IN A LOCAL COLOMBO PARK.  THE GSL 
CLAIMS THAT THIS VEST WAS TO BE USED TO ATTACK PRESIDENT 
KUMARATUNGA. 
 
(C) THE GSL CONDUCTED NO PROSECUTIONS OF PEOPLE INVOLVED 
IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 2001.  WITH RESPECT TO 
DOMESTIC TERRORISM, THE GSL CONTINUED TO ARREST AND 
DETAIN SUSPECTED OPERATIVES OF THE LTTE.  IN DOING THIS, 
THE GSL RELIED ON THE AUTHORITY PROVIDED BY THE 
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT (PTA) AND ALSO A 1998 
BLANKET ACT BANNING LTTE ACTIVITIES.  MANY OF THOSE 
ARRESTED ARE ULTIMATELY CHARGED AND CONVICTED OF THE 
CRIME OF WITHHOLDING INFORMATION.  TO DATE, THE GSL HAS 
NOT APPREHENDED OR PROSECUTED ANY IMPORTANT LTTE 
LEADERS.  LTTE LEADER VELUPILLAI PRABHAKARAN AND EIGHT 
OTHER LTTE MEMBERS REMAIN INDICTED FOR COMPLICITY IN THE 
 
 
JANUARY 1996 CENTRAL BANK BOMBING. 
 
(D) THE GSL DID NOT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE EXTRADITION 
OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING THE YEAR. 
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DID NOT REQUEST ANY EXTRADITIONS OR 
ASK FOR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES.  IN JUNE 1995, 
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA REQUESTED THE EXTRADITION OF 
LTTE LEADER PRABHAKARAN AND TWO OTHER SENIOR LTTE 
OFFICIALS (INTELLIGENCE CHIEF POTTU AMMAN AND WOMEN'S 
WING LEADER AKILA, ALTHOUGH MOST BELIEVE THE LATTER IS 
DEAD) FOR COMPLICITY IN THE 1991 ASSASSINATION OF RAJIV 
GANDHI.  NO EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEGUN, AND IT 
SEEMS UNLIKELY SECURITY FORCES OR POLICE WILL APPREHEND 
THESE LTTE LEADERS AS EVENTS NOW STAND. 
 
(E) THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT MAKES TERRORISM 
ILLEGAL IN SRI LANKA AND THE GSL PROSCRIBED THE LTTE IN 
¶1998.  POST HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS 
TO GSL PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED 
TERRORISTS.  IN FACT, THE SEPTEMBER 1999 SIGNING OF A 
GENERAL EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES 
(RATIFIED BY THE U.S. SENATE IN OCTOBER AND SIGNED BY 
THE PRESIDENT IN NOVEMBER 1999), FACILITATED EXTRADITION 
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.  SRI LANKA HAS SIGNED THE 
1988 SAARC REGIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF 
TERRORISM, WHICH DESIGNATES CERTAIN ACTS SPECIFICALLY AS 
TERRORIST ACTS AND NOT AS POLITICAL ACTS, THEREBY 
NULLIFYING ATTEMPTS BY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS TO CLAIM 
POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR VIOLENCE.  THE GSL THEREFORE 
SEEMS OBLIGED TO COOPERATE WITH THE REQUEST FROM INDIA 
FOR THE EXTRADITION OF PRABHAKARAN, THOUGH ITS OWN 
PROSECUTION OF THE LTTE LEADER WOULD LIKELY TAKE 
PRECEDENCE. 
 
(F) AS MENTIONED ABOVE, THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT 
CONSIDERS ITSELF A "FRONT-LINE" STATE IN THE WAR AGAINST 
TERRORISM, HAVING BATTLED THE LTTE FOR ALMOST 20 YEARS. 
AS PART OF ITS CAMPAIGN TO ISOLATE THE LTTE, THE GSL 
GIVES STRONG SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 
THE TERRORISM PROBLEM, INCLUDING IN THE 
POST-SEPTEMBER 11 TIMEFRAME.  THE GSL CONTINUES TO URGE 
STATES TO TAKE STEPS TO BAN THE LTTE, WHICH THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND CANADA DID EARLIER THIS YEAR.  THE GSL 
COOPERATED FULLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN ITS 
INVESTIGATION OF THE RAJIV GANDHI ASSASSINATION.  SRI 
LANKA REGULARLY CONDEMNS INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS 
IN OTHER COUNTRIES, HAS SIGNED THE TOKYO, THE HAGUE AND 
MONTREAL CONVENTIONS AGAINST TERRORISM, AND HAS PASSED 
THE NECESSARY ENABLING LEGISLATION FOR ALL THREE 
PROTOCOLS.  SRI LANKA HAS ALSO SIGNED THE INTERNATIONAL 
PROTOCOL AGAINST BOMBING IN JANUARY 1998.  IN 1997, SRI 
LANKA RATIFIED THE 1988 PROTOCOL FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF 
UNLAWFUL ACTS OF VIOLENCE AT AIRPORTS SERVING 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION.  IN ADDITION, IT HAS 
EITHER SIGNED, OR HAS TAKEN THE NECESSARY INTERNAL STEPS 
TO BECOME A SIGNATORY, TO THE 1979 CONVENTION AGAINST 
THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES, THE 1979 CONVENTION ON THE 
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, AND THE 1988 
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST 
THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION.  THOUGH THE GSL HAS 
YET TO RATIFY THE 1991 CONVENTION OF THE MARKING OF 
PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES FOR THE PURPOSES OF DETECTION, THE 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONTINUES TO INDICATE THAT 
THE GSL WILL CONSIDER BECOMING A SIGNATORY.  THE U.S. 
CONTINUES TO URGE THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT TO BECOME A 
PARTY TO THE REMAINING FOUR OF THE 12 INTERNATIONAL 
COUNTERTERRORISM CONVENTIONS IT DOES NOT BELONG TO 
ALREADY. 
 
(G) THROUGHOUT 2001, THE GSL CONTINUED TO CONDUCT A 
LARGE-SCALE WAR EFFORT AGAINST THE LTTE.  THIS WAR HAD 
MANY FACETS:  BY CONDUCTING COUNTER-TERRORIST AND 
COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE LTTE, 
INCLUDING MILITARY ACTIONS AND SPECIAL MEASURES TO 
PROTECT URBAN AREAS, IMPORTANT INSTALLATIONS AND 
GOVERNMENT LEADERS, THE GOVERNMENT HOPES TO WEAKEN THE 
LTTE AND INHIBIT ITS ABILITY TO CONDUCT TERRORIST 
ATTACKS AS WELL AS MILITARY OPERATIONS.  IN ADDITION, AS 
REVIEWED ABOVE, SRI LANKA REMAINED ACTIVE IN 
INTERNATIONAL FORA AND IN BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN 
URGING COUNTRIES TO TAKE STRONG STEPS AGAINST TERRORISM. 
SRI LANKA WAS COOPERATIVE IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 
TIMEFRAME, REPEATEDLY CONDEMNING THE ATROCITIES 
COMMITTED THAT DAY, AND SUPPORTING THE INTERNATIONAL 
EFFORT TO HOLD THOSE RESPONSIBLE FULLY ACCOUNTABLE. 
 
(H) NOT APPLICABLE - THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT 
SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 
 
(I) THE GSL HAS MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF 
A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE. 
THAT SAID, LARGELY BECAUSE OF ITS "NON-ALIGNED" STATUS, 
SRI LANKA HAS NOT PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CONDEMNATION OF THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF CUBA, IRAN, 
IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SUDAN, OR SYRIA. 
ADDITIONALLY, ITS CONDEMNATION OF ANTI-ISRAELI 
TERRORISM, SUCH AS THAT CARRIED OUT BY HAMAS AND ISLAMIC 
JIHAD, IS RELATIVELY MUTED. 
 
(J) THERE WAS NO DISCERNIBLE CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S 
STRONG ANTI-TERRORISM POSTURE IN 2001.  IF ANYTHING, THE 
EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 ONLY SOLIDIFIED THE GSL VIEW THAT 
TERRORISM IS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM THAT NEEDS TO BE 
ADDRESSED THROUGH COHERENT, COORDINATED MULTILATERAL 
EFFORTS.  THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS THE CONTINUING USG 
DESIGNATION OF THE LTTE AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATION AS POSITIVE, AND THE RECENT ACTIONS BY THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA BANNING LTTE ACTIVITIES AS 
BREAKTHROUGHS IN ITS ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS. 
 
(K) IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ENVIRONMENT, THE U.S. 
HEIGHTENED ITS COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE GSL CONCERNING 
THE INTERNATIONAL MENACE OF TERRORISM.  IN RESPONSE, SRI 
LANKA WAS COOPERATIVE AND TOOK ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT 
UNSCR 1333 AND 1373 VIA FREEZING THE ASSETS OF TERRORIST 
ENTITIES.  IN TERMS OF BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH THE 
U.S., THE GSL CONTINUES TO ACCEPT U.S. OFFERS OF 
ASSISTANCE UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
(ATA).  THREE SEPARATE TRAINING PROGRAMS TOOK PLACE IN 
¶2001.  THESE INVOLVED: 
 
-- HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION; 
 
-- CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION; AND, 
 
-- SURVEILLANCE DETECTION. 
 
(L-I)  THE GSL CONTINUES TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH U.S. 
OFFICIALS INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF U.S. LAW 
BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. 
 
(L-II)  AMERICAN CITIZENS ARE NOT BELIEVED TO BE THE 
PRIMARY TARGET OF TERRORIST ATTACKS IN SRI LANKA. 
AMCITS, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN IN THE WRONG PLACE AT THE 
WRONG TIME, AND HAVE BEEN INJURED IN AT LEAST ONE PAST 
ATTACK:  IN OCTOBER 2000, TWO AMERICANS BYSTANDERS WERE 
INJURED IN A SUICIDE BOMB EXPLOSION IN COLOMBO. 
 
(M) THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS MADE SEVERAL REQUESTS TO THE 
GSL FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES FOR U.S. PERSONNEL 
AND FACILITIES IN SRI LANKA.  THE GSL HAS MET ALL 
REQUESTS EXPEDITIOUSLY, INCLUDING IN THE 
POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ATMOSPHERE WHEN THERE WERE SOME ANTI- 
U.S. PROTESTS.  THESE REQUESTS WERE MADE TO ENHANCE 
SECURITY IN GENERAL AND NOT IN RESPONSE TO ANY 
IDENTIFIABLE THREAT. 
 
END TEXT. 
 
¶2.  DATA ON THE MALDIVES FOLLOWS: 
 
BEGIN TEXT: 
 
CONSISTING OF OVER 1,100 ISLANDS SET IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
WITH A POPULATION OF APPROXIMATELY 270,000, THE REPUBLIC 
OF MALDIVES HAS NO INDIGENOUS TERRORISM PROBLEM AT THIS 
TIME.  THE MALDIVIAN GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, HAS EXPRESSED 
CONCERNS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE TRANSIT OF TERRORISTS 
THROUGH THE COUNTRY (THERE IS NO SOLID EVIDENCE OF THIS) 
AND ALSO OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF SOME HARD-LINE RELIGIOUS 
ELEMENTS OPERATING IN THE COUNTRY (SOME OF WHOM HAVE 
BEEN DETAINED).  MALDIVIANS ALSO REMAIN FOCUSED ON 
PREVENTING A REPEAT OF THE EVENTS OF 1988 WHEN A FORMER 
MALDIVIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL LAUNCHED A COUP ATTEMPT 
WITH THE HELP OF SRI LANKAN TERRORIST ELEMENTS.  THE 
COUP FAILED DUE TO THE INTERVENTION OF THE INDIAN ARMED 
FORCES.  DESPITE THESE CONCERNS, THE MALDIVES HAS 
EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT IT CAN DEAL WITH POTENTIAL 
PROBLEMS.  IN THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE MALDIVES PROVED EXTREMELY COOPERATIVE 
IN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION, AND 
REPEATEDLY DENOUNCED THE ATROCITIES COMMITTED THAT DAY. 
IN TERMS OF CONCRETE ACTIONS, THE MALDIVES TOOK 
IMMEDIATE STEPS TO FULLY IMPLEMENT UNSCR 1333 AND 1337, 
WHICH BLOCKED THE ASSETS OF TERRORIST ENTITIES.  THE 
U.S. CONTINUES TO URGE THE MALDIVIAN GOVERNMENT TO 
BECOME A PARTY TO THE REMAINING FIVE OF THE 12 
INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CONVENTIONS IT DOES NOT 
BELONG TO ALREADY. 
 
END TEXT. 
 
 
WILLS