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Viewing cable 01BEIJING12362, HU JINTAO: TAKING SHAPE AS CHINA´S LEADER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
01BEIJING12362 2001-12-27 05:25 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing
Appears in these articles:
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3994312.ece
P 270525Z DEC 01
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3767
INFO AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 
AMCONSUL SHENYANG 
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AIT TAIPEI 9368
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
JICPAC HONOLULU HI
ZEN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 012362

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/11

TAGS: PGOV PINR CH

SUBJECT: HU JINTAO: TAKING SHAPE AS CHINA´S LEADER

REFS: A) BEIJING 11318, B) STATE 194582
(U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JON
ALOISI. REASON 1.5 (B) (D).

SUMMARY
-------

1. (C) MOST CHINESE HAVE LITTLE IDEA OF HEIR-APPARENT
HU JINTAO´S PERSONAL VIEWS, BUT INSIDERS DESCRIBE HU AS
A TALENTED BUREAUCRATIC PLAYER WITH SOLID CREDENTIALS TO
SUCCEED JIANG ZEMIN. THEY REPORT THAT HU HAS STAKED OUT
A MULTI-FACETED AND SUBSTANTIVE POLICY ROLE IN IMPORTANT
AREAS OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT WORK. A MASTER AT
NETWORKING, HU MAINTAINS PERSONAL TIES THAT HAVE ALREADY
HELPED HIM STAVE OFF THREATS TO HIS ADVANCEMENT, WHILE
EARNING "CHITS" FROM JIANG ZEMIN THAT WILL HELP ENSURE
JIANG DOES NOT ACT AGAINST HIS INTERESTS IN THE
COMING MONTHS. CHINESE POINT TO HU´S CLOSE ASSOCIATION
WITH HU YAOBANG, AND HIS CURRENT ROLE IN ENLIVENING THE
CENTRAL PARTY SCHOOL, AS EVIDENCE THAT HU MAY WELL
PURSUE A REFORMIST AGENDA AFTER TAKING THE REINS OF
PARTY AND STATE OVER THE NEXT 15 MONTHS. END SUMMARY.

HU TAKES ON A HUMAN FACE
------------------------

2. (U) HU JINTAO HAS LONG BEEN THE LEAST VISIBLE MEMBER
OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY´S
POLITBURO. MOST OBSERVERS EXPLAIN THIS AS A CALCULATED
RESULT OF BUREAUCRATIC CAUTION. AS DENG´S SELECTION AS
THE "FOURTH-GENERATION" SUCCESSOR, HE IS A NATURAL
TARGET FOR THE JEALOUS AND AMBITIOUS. WITH HIS OCTOBER
28-NOVEMBER 12 VISIT TO RUSSIA, BRITAIN, FRANCE, SPAIN
AND GERMANY (REF A), HOWEVER, HU MADE HIS MOST PROLONGED
AND PUBLIC APPEARANCE TO DATE -- AND MADE OFFICIAL THE
UNDERSTANDING THAT HE IS DESTINED TO BECOME THE "CORE"
OF CHINA´S FOURTH-GENERATION LEADERSHIP.

3. (C) CHINESE SOURCES AND OUR EUROPEAN COUNTERPARTS
ALIKE AGREE THAT THE "MYSTERIOUS" HU IS, IN FACT, AN
APPROACHABLE, LIKEABLE LEADER WITHOUT PRETENSIONS WHO
TALKS AS EASILY WITH STAFFERS AS HE DOES WITH THEIR
BOSSES. ACCORDING TO BOTH BRITISH AND FRENCH DIPLOMATS,
HU WAS CONSTANTLY ENGAGED THROUGHOUT HIS TRIP, ASKING
THOUGHTFUL QUESTIONS ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES. HE
REPORTEDLY DISPLAYED A REMARKABLE MEMORY THAT ALLOWED
HIM TO MAKE ALL HIS SPEECHES WITHOUT CUE CARDS.
EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS ALSO NOTED HIS ANALYTICAL ABILITY AND
COMMAND OF DETAIL, PARTICULARLY ON ECONOMIC MATTERS. ON
A MORE PERSONAL LEVEL, THE BRITISH FLATLY DENIED REPORTS
THAT HU COULD SPEAK ENGLISH, ALTHOUGH HE APPARENTLY HAS
A LIMITED ENGLISH READING CAPABILITY.

HU´S RELATIONS WITH JIANG
-------------------------

4. (C) MOST CHINESE CONTACTS AGREE THAT JIANG ACCEPTS
HU AS HIS SUCCESSOR, DESPITE OCCASIONAL FOREIGN MEDIA
REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY. SOURCES HAVE POINTED OUT THAT,
SINCE 1992, JIANG HAS GRADUALLY GIVEN HU INCREASING
RESPONSIBILITY IN ORDER TO PREPARE HIM TO ASSUME JIANG´S
POSITIONS. HU WAS IN SUCCESSION MADE CENTRAL PARTY
SCHOOL PRESIDENT (1993), HEAD OF THE CENTRAL LEADING
GROUP FOR PARTY-BUILDING WORK (1994), STATE VICE
PRESIDENT (1998), AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE CCP´S CENTRAL
MILITARY COMMISSION (1999). HE HAS ALSO BEEN GIVEN
POLICY LEADERSHIP OVER ISSUES AS DIVERSE AS THE
MILITARY´S RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, PLANNING
FOR THE 16TH PARTY CONGRESS AND, MOST RECENTLY
(ACCORDING TO WHAT HU TOLD BRITISH PRIME MINISTER
BLAIR), AFGHANISTAN. IN ADDITION, HU HAS HELD IMPORTANT
POSITIONS IN PROVINCIAL CAPITALS. IN SUM, JIANG HAS
ENSURED THAT HU HAS THE BROADEST BASE OF EXPERIENCE OF
ANY MEMBER OF THE FOURTH GENERATION; THIS, IN TURN, HAS
BOLSTERED HU´S POSITION AS THE INDIVIDUAL MOST CAPABLE
OF SERVING AS THE NEXT LEADERSHIP´S CORE.

5. (C) AS JIANG´S SUCCESSOR-IN-WAITING, HU HAS LOYALLY
CARRIED OUT HIS DUTIES. FOR EXAMPLE, HU HEADED THE 1995
"CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION" OF THEN-BEIJING PARTY
SECRETARY CHEN XITONG, ONE OF JIANG´S STRONGEST
POLITICAL OPPONENTS. IN DOING SO, HE REPORTEDLY
PROTECTED MEMBERS OF DENG XIAOPING´S FAMILY WHO MAY HAVE
BEEN INVOLVED IN WRONGDOING, AND PERSUADED JIANG TO
REPLACE CHEN WITH THE MORE "NEUTRAL" WEI JIANXING,
RATHER THAN WITH HUANG JU OR ANOTHER MEMBER OF JIANG´S
SHANGHAI FACTION. HU ALSO PROVED HIS LOYALTY TO JIANG
BY NOT OPPOSING THE GENERAL SECRETARY´S MOVE TO FORCE
QIAO SHI´S RETIREMENT FROM THE CCP´S STANDING COMMITTEE
DURING THE 1997 15TH PARTY CONGRESS -- DESPITE THE FACT
THAT QIAO WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT INFLUENCES IN
HU´S METEORIC RISE.

6. (C) A VICE-MINISTERIAL-RANK OFFICIAL CURRENTLY
STUDYING AT THE CENTRAL PARTY SCHOOL AND KNOWS HU
PERSONALLY REPORTS AN "ANHUI ANGLE" TO THE HU
RELATIONSHIP WITH JIANG (AND ZHU RONGJI). THIS SOURCE
RELATED THAT HU, JIANG AND ZHU COMMONLY -- AND PUBLICLY
-- JOKED THAT THEY WERE AN "ANHUI TRIO." HU´S FAMILY
WAS FROM THE SOUTHERN CITY OF JIXI, ZHU´S WAS ORIGINALLY
FROM NORTHERN ANHUI, WHILE JIANG´S GRANDPARENTS
REPORTEDLY MIGRATED TO YANGZHOU (JIANGSU PROVINCE) FROM
EASTERN ANHUI. DESPITE HIS ANHUI ROOTS, "CHAIRMAN JIANG
ALWAYS PUTS DOWN ´YANGZHOU´ AS HIS HOMETOWN ON HIS PARTY
PERSONNEL DOCUMENTS, BUT HU JINTAO PROUDLY LISTS HIMSELF
AS A PERSON FROM JIXI." THIS CONTACT ALSO ASSERTED THAT
HU WAS A DISTANT RELATIVE OF FAMED CHINESE INTELLECTUAL
HU SHI.

A MASTER NETWORKER...
---------------------

7. (C) HU HAS SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING A SERIES OF
RELATIONSHIP NETWORKS WHICH HAVE MADE HIM A PLAYER IN
HIS OWN RIGHT WITHIN THE PARTY´S TOP HIERARCHY. THESE
NETWORKS INCLUDE:
-- THE QINGHUA CLIQUE. HU STUDIED AT QINGHUA, CHINA´S
PREMIER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNIVERSITY, BETWEEN 1959
AND 1964. QINGHUA HAS LONG TAKEN PRIDE IN DEVELOPING
STUDENTS WHO ARE BOTH TECHNICALLY EXPERT AND
IDEOLOGICALLY "RED" BY SELECTING PARTICULARLY PROMISING
STUDENTS TO BECOME UNDERGRADUATE "POLITICAL ADVISORS."
HU WAS SUCH AN ADVISOR AND, UPON GRADUATING, STAYED ON
FOR THREE MORE YEARS AS A POLITICAL INSTRUCTOR. WELL-
INFORMED CHINESE SOURCES CONFIRMED THAT, IN THESE
POSITIONS, HU CAME TO KNOW MOST OF HIS CONTEMPORARIES AT
QINGHUA WELL, INCLUDING CURRENT MINISTER OF JUSTICE
ZHANG FUSEN, CCP UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT DEPUTY LIU
YANDONG, MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY JIA CHUNWANG, AND
SHAANXI PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARY TIAN CHENGPING.
-- THE GANSU FACTION. IN 1968, HU ESCAPED THE WORST OF
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION BY VOLUNTEERING TO "GO DOWN" TO
GANSU PROVINCE, WHERE HE SERVED ON CONSTRUCTION TEAMS.
HU WAS PROMOTED RAPIDLY THROUGH THE RANKS UNTIL HE CAME
TO THE ATTENTION OF PARTY SECRETARY SONG PING. HU ALSO
MET OTHER MEMBERS OF SONG PING´S "GANSU FACTION,"
INCLUDING CURRENT VICE PREMIER (AND PREMIER ZHU RONGJI´S
PROBABLE SUCCESSOR) WEN JIABAO AND MINISTER OF
SUPERVISION ZHANG XUEZHONG. SONG PING WAS INSTRUMENTAL
IN HU´S INTRODUCTION TO HU YAOBANG AND HIS 1992
PROMOTION TO THE POLITBURO´S STANDING COMMITTEE.
-- THE COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE (CYL). THE CYL IS LIKE A
MINIATURE COMMUNIST PARTY WITH A NATIONAL STRUCTURE THAT
MIMICS THE CCP´S OWN ORGANIZATION. IT HAS BEEN A
SPRINGBOARD TO PROMOTION FOR LEADERS, SUCH AS HU
YAOBANG, WHO SUBSEQUENTLY ROSE TO SENIOR POSITIONS.
HU´S CONTACTS FROM HIS YEARS AS CYL PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
(1982-1984) AND FIRST SECRETARY (1984-1985) INCLUDED:
HENAN GOVERNOR (AND ONE OF HU´S CLOSEST PERSONAL
FRIENDS) LI KEQIANG, FUJIAN PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARY
(AND ANOTHER CLOSE FRIEND) SONG DEFU, MINISTER OF PUBLIC
SECURITY JIA CHUNWANG, STATE COUNCIL NATIONALITIES
AFFAIRS´ COMMISSION CHAIRMAN LI DEZHU, AND XINJIANG
PARTY SECRETARY WANG LEQUAN. HU YAOBANG, WHO WAS
GENERAL SECRETARY WHILE HU WAS AT THE CYL, SUBSEQUENTLY
INTRODUCED HU TO QIAO SHI. QIAO, IN TURN, LIKE SONG
PING, WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN GIVING HU´S CAREER A NUMBER OF
BOOSTS.

8. (C) SUCH NETWORKS ARE NOT UNUSUAL IN RELATIONSHIP-
ORIENTED CHINA AND, INDEED, MOST PARTY MEMBERS NEED
THESE NETWORKS FOR POLITICAL SURVIVAL AND ADVANCEMENT.
WHAT IS UNUSUAL, HOWEVER, IS THE BREADTH AND VARIETY OF
HU´S BACKING. HIS MULTIPLE NETWORKS, IN TURN, HAVE
ALLOWED HIM TO CAPITALIZE ON HIS STATUS AS THE HEIR
APPOINTED BY DENG AND HIS SKILLS AS A CONSENSUS-BUILDER,
AND TO AVOID LINKING HIS FATE TOO CLOSELY TO ANY ONE
FACTION WITHIN THE THIRD GENERATION. HU´S GENERAL
ABILITY TO AVOID DISABLING ENTANGLEMENTS HAS, ACCORDING
TO AT LEAST ONE WELL-INFORMED SOURCE, ENHANCED THE VICE
PRESIDENT´S REPUTATION AS A CONSENSUS-BUILDER AND
STRENGTHENED HIS SUPPORT AMONG DIVERSE FACTIONS WITHIN
THE PARTY. IT WAS THIS STRENGTH, ACCORDING TO THIS
SOURCE, THAT ALLOWED HU TO BLUNT JIANG´S EFFORTS DURING
THE 2000 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM TO WIN ZENG QINGHONG´S
PROMOTION TO THE POLITBURO.

9. (C) NONETHELESS, HU´S RECORD IN GAINING THE SUPPORT
OF IMPORTANT FACTIONS IS NOT PERFECT. A PARTY
PRINCELING GROUP HEADED BY HE GUANGWEI REPORTEDLY
ENGINEERED HU´S SUMMARY DEPARTURE FROM THE CYL IN 1985
AND HIS APPOINTMENT AS PARTY SECRETARY OF POVERTY-
STRICKEN GUIZHOU PROVINCE. CONTACTS ATTRIBUTED THIS
INCIDENT BOTH TO JEALOUSY OF HU AND TO THE FACTIONAL
INFIGHTING THAT EVENTUALLY LED TO HU YAOBANG´S DEMISE.
WHILE NONE OF THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE SINCE RISEN ABOVE
THE VICE-MINISTER LEVEL, IT IS UNCLEAR TO WHAT DEGREE
THE AFTERMATH OF THIS INCIDENT COULD AFFECT HU´S FUTURE
RELATIONS WITH OTHER PARTY PRINCELINGS.

IS HU A CLOSET REFORMER?
------------------------

10. (C) HU HAS BEEN CAREFUL SINCE 1992 NOT TO DIVERGE
FROM JIANG ON THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL REFORM. YET HINTS
FROM HIS PAST SUGGEST THAT HE MAY HAVE REFORMIST
INCLINATIONS, SOURCES REPORT. ACCORDING TO A WELL-
CONNECTED ACADEMIC, WHILE IN GUIZHOU (1985-1988), HU
ENCOURAGED HIS SUBORDINATES TO EXPERIMENT WITH ECONOMIC
AND LIMITED SOCIAL REFORMS. HU´S ECONOMIC POLICIES AT
THAT TIME WERE IN LINE WITH THE REFORMS BEING INTRODUCED
ALONG CHINA´S COASTAL REGIONS, BUT WERE CONSIDERED TO BE
UNIQUE IN AN INTERIOR PROVINCE. AS CYL FIRST SECRETARY,
HU WAS AT THE FOREFRONT OF DEFENDING HU YAOBANG´S
REFORMS AGAINST CONSERVATIVE ATTACKS AS "SPIRITUAL
POLLUTION." FURTHERMORE, AS PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL
PARTY SCHOOL, HE HAS MOVED TO PROFESSIONALIZE THE
CURRICULUM, AND ENCOURAGED THE SCHOOL TO BRING IN MORE
OUTSIDE EXPERTS AND TO RESEARCH ALTERNATIVES TO
TRADITIONAL SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY. MANY ALSO POINT TO THE
HEAVY INVOLVEMENT BY CENTRAL PARTY SCHOOL LEADERS IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF JIANG´S "THREE REPRESENTS," AND HU´S OWN
ROLE AS ONE OF THE CHIEF CHEERLEADERS FOR "JIANG
THOUGHT."

11. (C) WHILE MOST CONTACTS CONCUR THAT HU RECOGNIZES
THE NEED FOR CHANGE, THE TYPE AND PACE OF REFORM HE
MIGHT FAVOR IS STILL UNCLEAR. SOME CONTACTS ASSERT
WISTFULLY THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT´S SUPPORT THE
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF "JIANG THOUGHT" IS GENUINE, AND
THAT HE VIEWS THOSE CONCEPTS AS STEPPING STONES TO MORE
SUBSTANTIAL REFORMS. STILL OTHERS MAINTAIN THAT HU´S
CULTURAL REVOLUTION EXPERIENCE HAS SENSITIZED HIM TO THE
DESTABILIZING DANGERS OF TOO-RAPID CHANGE AND THAT HE
WILL CONTINUE TO "GO SLOW." NO MATTER WHERE HU STANDS
ON REFORM, HOWEVER, ONE SOURCE CLOSE TO HU´S FRIENDS HAS
SUGGESTED THAT HU´S STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE
WILL LIKELY BE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE HEAVY-
HANDED "CAMPAIGN"-STYLE TACTICS THAT JIANG HAS FAVORED
IN MOVING FORWARD HIS OWN AGENDA.

COMMENT
-------

12. (C) WHILE HU JINTAO APPEARS WELL-GROOMED TO TAKE ON
THE CHALLENGE OF GUIDING CHINA INTO THE 21ST CENTURY,
HIS ABILITY TO AFFECT CHANGE WILL IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS
DEPEND UPON HIS ABILITY TO PERSUADE THE 63 MILLION PARTY
MEMBERS THAT CHANGE IS IN THEIR BEST INTEREST. AT THE
VERY LEAST, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HU WILL BE ABLE TO
AFFECT ANY MAJOR CHANGES FOR SEVERAL YEARS AFTER HE
TAKES OVER THE "CORE" LEADERSHIP ROLE. EVEN IF HU´S
TRANSITION GOES SMOOTHLY, HE WILL STILL NEED TO SPEND
SEVERAL YEARS CONSOLIDATING HIS POSITION AMONG THE
PARTY´S MEMBERSHIP -- MOST OF WHOM WOULD IMMEDIATELY
BLOCK ANY REFORM-ORIENTED ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE
PERKS THEY HAVE COME TO TAKE FOR GRANTED.
RANDT