This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 003288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2011 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S ELECTORAL LAW CONTROVERSY CONTINUES 
 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 3228 
     ¶B. ABUJA 3280 
 
 
Classified by CDA Andrews.  Reason:  1.5(d) 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  President Obasanjo denies having added an 
unpopular clause to the Election Law, asserting that some 
legislators inserted the language after he had noted its 
absence.  A senior legislator privately conceded the point, 
commenting that the legislators had grossly exceeded their 
mandate.  He thought Obasanjo would have to accept deletion 
of the clause, but public comments suggest Nigeria's Head of 
State is not yet there.  If Obasanjo is conciliatory, it will 
be good for Nigeria's nascent democracy.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Using his monthly radio program to respond to the 
Nigerian Senate's rejection of the law intended to govern the 
2003 electoral cycle (ref A), President Obasanjo said that he 
had not inserted the unpopular Clause 80.1.  This clause 
requires any party other than the three registered now (PDP, 
APP and AD) to prove itself at the local level before 
contesting state and federal positions.  As other parts of 
the law extend the tenure of local governments from 2002 
until 2003 and establish that local government elections will 
be held after state and national contests, Clause 80.1 denies 
any of the several new parties an opportunity to participate 
in state or national elections before 2007.  The clause drew 
scathing public attacks from dozens of prominent Nigerians. 
Even within the ruling PDP, there were many with strong 
reservations.  When it recently emerged (ref B) that Clause 
80.1 had not featured in the version of the law passed by the 
National Assembly and sent to the President for signature, 
the pressure grew stronger. 
 
 
¶3.  (U) The Senate met in a special session on December 28 
and took the position that Obasanjo had not acted on the bill 
sent to him December 5.  Since the 1999 Constitution gives 
him 30 days to act, Senator Idris Abubakar pointed out during 
debate, all the President need do is sign the bill that 
originally came to him. 
 
 
¶4.  (U) Obasanjo December 29 publicly absolved himself of 
having made a line-item amendment.  He said that he had 
simply called the attention of five members of the conference 
committee to the omission from the bill of a clause endorsed 
by the ruling PDP.  The conferees had, Obasanjo continued, 
asked him to send a letter stating his objections.  They had 
then adjourned to the home of Works and Housing Minister Tony 
Anenih, Obasanjo said, adding, "What transpired there I would 
not know."  In the evening, the President concluded, the 
legislators returned with a new version of the law.  It 
incorporated a requirement (Clause 80.1) that parties seeking 
to contest state or national elections must first obtain ten 
percent of the seats in local government councils (spread 
across two-thirds of the states).  Obasanjo noted that this 
was a lower hurdle than the 15 percent threshold the PDP 
caucus had agreed upon, but that he signed that second 
version.  Members of the House of Representatives December 30 
argued that it was Senate President Anyim rather than Na'Abba 
who had inserted the controversial clause. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Comment:  The President may conceivably have so 
misunderstood constitutional requirements that he truly 
thought a few members of the conference committee had the 
authority to amend a bill after passage without submitting 
the change for ratification.  A senior legislator privately 
confirmed December 29 that the President's account was 
basically correct and said he could not understand how the 
conference committee members had so grossly exceeded their 
mandate.  Whether it was Anyim or Na'Abba or some other 
legislator who inserted Clause 80.1 matters little:  Five 
legislators and some Villa officials (perhaps including the 
President) flouted Constitutional requirements to get the 
result they wanted.  The kindest conclusion one might draw is 
that the legislators realized they had indeed forgotten to 
include a passage that the party in control of both houses 
wanted and rationalized the change as a technical fix that 
would be broadly acceptable.  The Nigerian public may be less 
generous, however, since the redrafting took place at the 
home of Anenih, notorious as a political fixer.  Obasanjo has 
long disliked Na'Abba and probably relished telling his 
listeners that the House Speaker was among the legislators 
who adjourned to Anenih's house. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment Continued:  If the President now recognizes 
that the electoral law he signed is politically unviable and 
accepts deletion of Clause 80.1, the controversy that has 
bedeviled politics here for the past two weeks may prove 
beneficial to Nigeria's nascent democracy.  A clear object 
lesson in the importance of proper democratic procedure will 
have been delivered:  It does not suffice for backroom 
consensus to have been achieved; debate must take place in 
public, and individual politicians must accept accountability 
for their positions, not hide behind cloakroom consensus. 
One of the most positive elements of the Senate's special 
session was the Senators' decision to vote down a request for 
executive session, thereby leaving their deliberations open 
to journalists and cameras. 
¶7.  (C) Comment Continued:  Obasanjo's remarks to reporters 
about the Senate action ("Oh, they have rejected the Act. 
That is their own prerogative.  I am just hearing it now. 
You are just telling me now.") are unfortunately reminiscent 
of previous incidents of Executive-Legislative conflict where 
the President continued to advocate his position despite 
Constitutional questions.  He has often prevailed, with other 
participants in the political process left licking their 
wounds.  To paraphrase the senior legislator, Obasanjo is 
essential to Nigerian democracy now because there is no other 
person combining the (military) seniority to face down the 
generals and the government experience (previously Head of 
State) to crack the whip over unruly civilian politicians 
when it occasionally becomes necessary.  However, the senior 
legislator added, Obasanjo's experience, seniority and 
obduracy often make him too attentive to sycophants and lead 
him to reject compromise, especially with people so junior to 
him in years and experience. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment Concluded:  If Obasanjo is to complete the 
democratic transition he began, he must gradually learn to 
compromise with elected politicians.  This electoral law 
could be a test case.  There is much at stake, but less than 
many might claim.  Assuming present trends continue for 
another six to nine months, the PDP will dominate the 2003 
election cycle.  But Clause 80.1 would increase its dominance 
by excluding energetic new challengers in some places where 
the PDP ran strongly in 1999 but has since weakened.  For 
that very reason, the deletion of Clause 80.1 would be good 
for the growth of democracy here, and correspondingly bad for 
the interests of certain incumbents.  Obasanjo will need to 
balance his interest in satisfying them and his own innate 
stubbornness against the imperatives of greater political 
transparency, respect for process, and responsiveness to 
public opinion. 
Andrews