This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 003219 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF, AF/W, AF/RA 
EUCOM FOR DCINC AND POLAD LADESMA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2011 
TAGS: PREL MASS NI ECOWAS
SUBJECT: ECOWAS: KOUYATE TOUR D'HORIZON 
 
REF: A. STATE 210672 
     ¶B. FREETOWN 1559 
     ¶C. FREETOWN 1568 
     ¶D. ABUJA 3207 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a December 7 meeting with Ambassador 
Jeter, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate provided a 
tour d'horizon of sub-regional issues, including Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and the upcoming ECOWAS Summit.  While noting 
recent hiccups on disarmament, Kouyate was optimistic about 
Sierra Leone.  He was less sanguine about reconciliation in 
Liberia.  He expressed strong concern about Guinea-Bissau's 
President Yala, and hoped to convene a mini-Summit on 
Guinea-Bissau on the margins of the ECOWAS Summit in Dakar. 
Kouyate stated that his initial concern about Wade's 
ascension to the ECOWAS Chair had been allayed.  Other major 
issues on the Summit agenda include terrorism, human 
trafficking, and sub-regional harmonization.  His remarks on 
his own future are reported septel (Ref D).  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
============ 
SIERRA LEONE 
============ 
 
 
¶2. (C) Kouyate expressed some concern about reports of 
recalcitrance in carrying out disarmament in the diamond 
producing areas; he ventured that the foot-dragging was born 
of uncertainty.  If the RUF disarms, they have an uncertain 
future.  Electoral prospects are nil because the RUF is 
singularly unpopular.  Kouyate was unsure if the recent 
hesitance was a major tear in the disarmament process or a 
last-gasp attempt to wrench more assistance from the 
international community before disarming (see also Ref B and 
C).  Unsure of the magnitude of the foot-dragging, Kouyate 
planned to speak with President Kabbah and SRSG Adeniji.  He 
also noted some concern that, because of the intensified 
fighting in Lofa County, Taylor might press the RUF to slow 
down the DDR process. 
 
 
¶3. (C) SPECIAL COURT: The temporal jurisdiction of the Court 
had been discussed during his recent visit to New York, but 
without resolution.  Kouyate was unconcerned about the delay, 
believing it serendipitous.  He asserted that the disarmament 
process should be completed before the Court starts its work. 
 Otherwise, the prospect of looming criminal prosecution 
would cause many RUF combatants to balk at disarmament. 
(COMMENT: Kouyate did not seem to be aware of the recent 
decision by the GOSL, bringing closure to this issue.  END 
COMMENT). 
 
 
¶4. (C) RUF LEADERSHIP: The RUF appeared to be fragmenting as 
the peace process moved forward.  According to Kouyate, this 
fragmentation was in some ways a good sign, although it 
complicated dialogue with the RUF.  Issa Sessay, since he led 
the largest group of fighters, was the most important person 
in the hierarchy but seemed incapable of consolidating the 
RUF.  Omre Golley had resigned his role as the spokesman, but 
this was only a game to garner funds and attention, Kouyate 
said.  As soon as money was dangled, Golley's ambition and 
avarice would compel his return to the fold. 
 
 
¶5. (C) RUF AND AL-QAIDA: Kouyate said ECOWAS simply did not 
have the intelligence capabilities to investigate the 
Washington Post article.  Guinea's Conte called the report 
true, but Conte's response was visceral and not likely based 
on fact, Kouyate chuckled.  The Post article probably would 
be discussed at the Summit by Obasanjo, Kabbah, Konare and 
Conte.  Kouyate asked the USG to share information on this 
issue with ECOWAS; without it, there was little ECOWAS could 
do.  He did note that if Ibrahim Bah were involved in illicit 
transfers of diamonds, the center of the operation was 
Ouagadougou. 
 
 
====================================== 
LIBERIA - SANCTIONS AND RECONCILIATION 
====================================== 
 
 
¶6. (C) Kouyate recalled a recent meeting where President 
Taylor had agreed to participate in an all-Liberia Conference 
outside of the country.  The non-Liberia site was needed to 
attract key Liberian political figures who had been charged 
with treason by Taylor, including Ellen Sirleaf Johnson and 
Alhaji Kromah, who were too uncomfortable to return home 
despite the dismissal of the charges against them.  Taylor 
agreed to free more political prisoners before the conference 
began.  As a result, Kouyate had sent Taylor a missive 
outlining a two-day conference.  The first day would be among 
opposition parties, and the second day would involve 
everyone, including Taylor, Konare and Obasanjo.  Only a few 
days ago, Foreign Minister Monie Captan had called, saying 
that Taylor, despite his earlier acquiescence, now furiously 
objected to an all inclusive conference outside of Liberia 
because it would give implicit recognition to those fighting 
in Lofa County.  Captan was embarrassed. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Liberians were tired of suffering because of Taylor's 
venal leadership.  Kouyate added that fighting in Lofa County 
was growing, with some of it not attributed to the LURD. 
Clashes between the army and Taylor's Anti-Terrorism Unit 
(ATU) had also intensified.  The army was incensed about 
having to fend for itself, and not being paid, while the ATU 
was relatively flush with money and equipment. 
 
 
¶8. (C) SANCTIONS: Kouyate stated that the Liberia sanctions 
were having an effect.  First, Taylor did not like anything 
that diminished his self-perception before other Heads of 
State.  The psychological impact was telling.  Second, the 
Liberian dollar had precipitously declined against its U.S. 
counterpart.  Finally, the travel ban was having a 
significant impact.  Most states were enforcing the measure, 
Kouyate said.  Ghana was going a step further, even sending 
back suspicious Liberians although their names were not on 
the list. 
 
 
============= 
GUINEA-BISSAU 
============= 
 
 
¶9. (C) Kouyate expressed strong concern about the situation 
in Guinea-Bissau.  President Yala was becoming increasingly 
erratic and irrational.  Yala had arrested numerous perceived 
opponents in what appeared to be a contrived coup threat. 
President Konare had sent an envoy to restore some balance, 
but the emissary was rebuffed by Yala.  Wade and Obasanjo 
were also concerned, and had offered to send envoys.  Kouyate 
had asked Obasanjo and Konare, who had planned a "drop in" 
visit on Yala, to wait.  He believed that a mini-Summit on 
the margins of the ECOWAS Summit might provide a better forum 
for a discussion, and appear less of a threat to Yala. 
Kouayte underscored the need to calm Yala and harness 
tensions in Guinea-Bissau -- lest the distemper spill into 
Cassamance to everyone's chagrin. 
 
 
======================================= 
DAKAR SUMMIT DATES, TOPICS, AND OUTCOME 
======================================= 
 
 
¶10. (C) Kouyate explained the Summit schedule: the technical 
level meetings would take place on December 15-16, followed 
by the Ministerial on December 17.  Heads of State would 
assemble on December 20-21.  In addition to sub-regional 
security issues, the Summit would also address human 
trafficking, further harmonization between ECOWAS and UEMOA, 
and terrorism.  Ambassador Jeter passed the Executive 
Secretary a list showing the implementation status of the 
 
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dozen major counter-terrorism conventions by all sub-regional 
states.  Kouyate reviewed the document carefully, noting that 
it would be a useful basis for discussions on terrorism at 
the Summit. 
 
 
============================================= ==== 
THE NEXT CHAIRMAN - NO LONGER AN UNGUIDED MISSILE 
============================================= ==== 
 
 
¶11. (C) Kouyate acknowledged that Wade would take the ECOWAS 
Chair.  Wade was selected despite initial apprehension by 
some, including Kouyate himself.  Kouyate was convinced that 
Wade could do well for ECOWAS.  Describing Wade as an 
"unguided missile" at times, Kouyate explained that he had 
recently met the Senegalese leader, who had not been 
adequately informed of ECOWAS efforts towards regional 
economic integration.  After briefing him privately for two 
hours, Kouyate was no longer concerned that Wade would 
short-change ECOWAS in favor of the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (UEMOA).  According to Kouyate, Wade's 
reluctance to fully embrace ECOWAS was understandable in 
part.  In ECOWAS, Senegal is not primus inter pares given the 
presence of Nigeria and Ghana.  In UEMOA, Senegal is the 
heavyweight.  "It is better to be the head of a cat than the 
tail of a tiger," Kouyate quipped.  As long as the ECOWAS 
Secretariat maintained close contact with Wade, Kouyate said, 
 
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he would do fine.  In fact, Wade's leadership of ECOWAS may 
be very timely.  Wade is singularly positioned to provide the 
leadership that bridges the gap between ECOWAS and UEMOA and 
to eliminate redundancy between the two organizations. 
 
 
¶12. (C) Kouyate showed Jeter a Note from the Russian Embassy 
requesting accreditation to ECOWAS for Russia's Ambassador to 
Nigeria, and sought Ambassador Jeter's reaction.  Ambassador 
Jeter thanked Kouyate, noting that the U.S. also hoped to 
present its request for accreditation to ECOWAS in the very 
near future. 
 
 
¶13. (C) COMMENT: Kouyate was open and relaxed, clearly close 
to the end of his very successful tenure as ECOWAS Executive 
Secretary.  As he heads off, Kouyate believes ECOWAS is 
 
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stronger now than when it was handed to him.  We agree. 
 
 
¶14. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Now that the Konare-Kouyate duo is 
preparing its exit from the ECOWAS epicenter, it will be 
imperative to engage Wade and the new Executive Secretary -- 
who will be selected at the Summit -- as early as possible. 
The U.S. worked well with Konare and Kouyate and we got good 
mileage from our efforts.  We must now seek an even stronger 
relationship with those who are taking charge.  END COMMENT. 
Jeter