This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 003093 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
AF FOR PDAS BELLAMY AND FOR AF/S 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2006 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DEMARCHE AND DISCUSSION WITH NIGERIAN 
SPECIAL ENVOY TO ZIMBABWE, EARNEST SHONEKAN 
 
 
REF: STATE 202946 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d). 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  During a December 1 meeting with recently 
appointed Nigerian Special Envoy to Zimbabwe Earnest 
Shonekan, Ambassador Jeter raised reftel talking points while 
also leaving a nonpaper and a copy of the SADC Parliamentary 
Forum election norms.  Pleased to hear our views, Shonekan 
said he would factor our points in his upcoming discussions 
in Harare next week.  He promised to consult with frequency 
and to share information with us.  Acknowledging the weight 
of the task before him, Shonekan thought that his good 
personal rapport with Mugabe would help.  Shonekan stated 
that his new role was not to supercede Nigeria's 
participation in the CMAG but to complement the Commonwealth 
effort with subtle private diplomacy.  The former Head of 
State commented that he would urge Mugabe to desist from 
inflammatory rhetoric and move deliberately toward better 
economic management and a level playing-field for elections. 
Shonekan believed that Mugabe was guilty of playing to the 
hard-liners but was not wedded 
to these extremists.  Concerted diplomatic pressure, backed 
by incentives for good behavior, had a better chance of 
persuading Mugabe than the threat of sanctions, according to 
Shonekan. End Summary. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Talking To Mugabe 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶2.  (?) At an afternoon meeting at Chief Shonekan's 
colonial-era compound in Lagos appropriately named Lugard 
House, Ambassador Jeter delivered reftel talking points and 
discussed the election guidelines developed by the SADC 
Parliamentary Forum. Jeter stressed that the September Abuja 
Agreement had raised hopes that Zimbabwe would steer clear of 
irrational action and walk the path toward responsible land 
reform and democratic elections.  Instead, the trajectory of 
events had been negative.  Political intimidation and the 
truncation of civil liberties had intensified to the extent 
that credible elections were unattainable in the current 
atmosphere.  Without a change of course, the Government of 
Zimbabwe risked further international opprobrium for 
manufacturing defective elections when the conduct of decent 
elections were within the GOZ, grasp but for the requisite 
political will. 
 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador continued that mal-governance was 
harming the economy, now bogged down by the weight of a 
ninety percent inflation rate and the understandable 
skittishness of would-be investors. Moreover, Zimbabwe's 
excursion into divisive, strong-arm politics and economic 
brinkmanship mocked the tenets of the New Partnership of 
African Development (NEPAD) launched by President Obasanjo in 
October. Harare's misconduct presented a challenge to NEPAD 
credibility.  Obasanjo and other leaders must do all they can 
to prevent an important nation like Zimbabwe from flouting 
NEPAD and undermining the group almost at its very inception. 
 Mugabe, Jeter underscored, was in danger of rewriting his 
historical legacy from being an architect of Zimbabwe's 
independence to being responsible for mortgaging the 
country's future to misguided short-term political 
expediencies. 
 
 
¶4. (C) The affable Shonekan thanked the Ambassador for 
sharing USG views and committed to keeping the lines of 
communication open to us.  Shonekan observed his appointment 
as Special Envoy was not to supplant Foreign Minister Lamido 
or the Commonwealth process.  His role was to complement that 
process by serving as a conduit for private, personalized 
diplomacy between Abuja and Harare. 
 
 
¶5. (C) While acknowledging the difficult task before him, 
Shonekan believed he stood in Mugabe's good books and that 
their congenial relationship would reap benefits down the 
road.  Recounting his days as civilian interim Head of State 
between the khaki-garbed Babangida and Abacha regimes, 
Shonekan retold his side-bar conversations with Mugabe during 
Commonwealth and OAU meetings.  In those days, it was Mugabe 
sidling up to Shonekan, giving avuncular prodding to 
democratize Nigeria.  In a twist of fate, Shonekan would now 
reciprocate with Mugabe. 
 
 
¶6. (C)  Shonekan mentioned he had visited Harare a few weeks 
ago to present a letter from President Obasanjo to Mugabe. 
In fact, his audience with Mugabe was scheduled immediately 
after the Zimbabwean leader's tense session with the EU 
delegation.  Shonekan, sensing that Mugabe was already 
bilious after the EU encounter, decided to change tactics, 
leaving "the stick" in the antechamber. Shonekan joked that 
Mugabe looked surprisingly well despite the recent sparring 
he had been doing.  After a laugh that broke the residual 
tension still in the President's office, Shonekan contended 
they held a substantive discussion free of rancor and 
histrionics. 
 
 
¶7. (C)  Mugabe took issue with only one aspect of the letter 
he presented from President Obasanjo, Shonekan declared. 
Mugabe complained that Obasanjo's letter stated that Zimbabwe 
had not honored its Abuja commitments, when the missive also 
should have faulted London for not honoring its obligations. 
Despite Mugabe's parsing of the letter's text, Shonekan found 
him attentive and reasonable.  Mugabe did not seem wedded to 
the hard-line posture he often assumed in public, Shonekan 
said.  Much of Mugabe's hectoring was for domestic political 
consumption.  Mugabe was playing to the hard-liners to shore 
up his support.  Unfortunately, Mugabe had succumbed to 
rhetorical excess.  One of the first things Shonekan said he 
would propose to Obasanjo was for Obasanjo to personally urge 
Mugabe to moderate his public statements and those of his 
senior officials. 
 
 
----------- 
Elections 
----------- 
 
 
¶8. (C) Shonekan said he would review the SADC Parliamentary 
Forum electoral norms and standards.  If Zimbabwe has signed 
its name to these standards, Shonekan asserted, Mugabe cannot 
now turn away from what he had endorsed previously. Showing 
particular concern about Zimbabwe's aversion to election 
observers, Shonekan opined that observers were necessary; 
elections without observers would raise a negative 
presumption against the credibility of the exercise.  Based 
on his November conversations with Mugabe, Shonekan felt 
Mugabe would ultimately relent on the issue of international 
observers but would steadfastly resist an  EU observer team, 
since he now considered Brussels his mortal enemy. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
The Season For Land Reform 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶9. (C)  Shonekan did not envy the UNDP delegation's job.  In 
Zimbabwe during the team's visit, he remembered that they 
were being pushed and tugged by sundry and divergent forces. 
The team cannot write a report that will please everyone, 
said Shonekan.  From his talks in Harare, he knew that the 
report will be critical of the GOZ.  The task will be to 
draft a non-political, technical report that, although 
pointing a finger at the GOZ, did not ostracize Mugabe and 
kept the door open to cooperation.  At that point, it would 
be up to the diplomatic community to cajole Mugabe towards 
doing the right thing on land reform, and keeping him from 
using the report to line his wastebasket. 
 
 
¶10. (C)  Ambassador Jeter reminded Shonekan that Mugabe 
recently had moved faster in the wrong direction by amending 
the Land Acquisition Act to accelerate farm seizures, as if 
he wanted to rush wholesale seizures, perhaps to present them 
to the international community as a fait accompli.  Shonekan 
accepted that this misguided legislation would complicate 
efforts to formulate a balanced reform program but said 
Nigeria would try to influence Mugabe to return to his pledge 
of cooperation with the international community on this 
important issue. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
A Little More Prodding From Its Neighbors 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
 
¶11. (C)  Shonekan maintained that resolution of the land 
reform was vital not only for Zimbabwe but for the precedent 
it sets for South Africa.  South Africa has a large political 
stake in Zimbabwe, he noted.  Because of the historic 
affinity between ZANU-PF and the ANC and the volatility in 
South Africa regarding land reform, Mbeki has been reticent 
to exert pressure on Mugabe, according to Shonekan.  However, 
the time has come for Mbeki and other SADC leaders to 
pressure Mugabe, Shonekan believed.  Jeter concurred that a 
unified chorus of neighbors might generate effective 
political pressure that could not as easily be sidestepped by 
an African leader as protestations from the West. The 
Ambassador added that Nigeria might try to woo Namibia's 
Nujoma to play an active and more positive role. Mugabe would 
take notice if Nujoma, who at times has encouraged Mugabe's 
antics, would now begin to counsel accommodation, Jeter 
remarked. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
Carrot, Stick, Or Both? 
---------------------------- 
 
 
¶12.  (C)  Shonekan felt that "positive pressure" could be 
most effective on Mugabe.  Offering a roadmap of required 
actions and parallel incentives (diplomatic and financial 
reward) would have the best chance of getting Mugabe back 
into the fold.  Shonekan feared that the threat of sanctions 
would be counter-productive at this point.  He claimed 
sanctions would only bolster GOZ hard-liners who are already 
arguing that Mugabe should turn his back on  Western nations 
because they were engineering his ouster.  A proposal that 
highlights incentives would buoy moderates and help quiet the 
hard-liners, Shonekan postulated.  Ambassador Jeter mentioned 
the proposed Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act on 
the Hill contained a number of potential incentives but also 
held out the suggestion of sanctions if Mugabe continued his 
undemocratic conduct.   Shonekan stated that the Democracy 
Act seemed to strike the right balance; again, he stressed 
that sanctions should not feature prominently at this moment 
and shoul 
d only be applied as a last resort.  (Note: Shonekan asked 
for a copy of the proposed Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic 
Recovery Act, which we will provide on Shonekan's return to 
Nigeria.  End note.) 
 
 
¶13.  (C) A well respected businessman, Shonekan lamented 
Zimbabwe's macroeconomic condition.  Shaking his head after 
Ambassador Jeter told him the inflation rate, Shonekan stated 
that Zimbabwe used to export food but now needed humanitarian 
aid to feed many of its people.  Shonekan worried that 
continued mal-governance and exacerbation of the political 
crisis eventually could lead to a meltdown.  It would be a 
tragedy if Zimbabwe were to become a source of instability 
and refugees in the SADC region, he declared. Ambassador 
Jeter agreed that continued misrule could lead to political 
and economic breakdown the tremors of which would be felt 
throughout the region, particularly in South Africa. Not only 
would its economy be hard hit by a Zimbabwean collapse, South 
Africa would be asked to play host to thousands of refugees 
who would see South Africa as their haven of first resort. 
 
 
------------- 
Comment 
------------- 
 
 
¶14. (C) Preparing to fly to London that evening for 
consultations with the British, Shonekan believed that 
Nigeria, thanks to his good offices, can exert some pressure 
on Mugabe.  Whether that pressure will be sufficient to drown 
out the hard-liners and give Mugabe the guidance needed to 
walk out of the box in which he has placed himself is most 
uncertain.  However, Shonekan's selection seems like a wise 
move on two scores.  First, it increases GON bilateral 
communication with Zimbabwe, making it much easier to sustain 
diplomatic pressure than the periodic CMAG mechanism. 
Second, that Shonekan may have a friendly relationship with 
Mugabe, may make it easier for Shonekan to say some things 
that would cause Mugabe to bristle if heard from another 
source.  Additionally, Shonekan likes working with the US. We 
anticipate that he will remain true to his promise to consult 
and share information with us. End comment. 
Jeter