This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002985 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2011 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS MARR PINS NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED ON BENUE 
 
 
REF: ABJUA 2982 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter, accompanied by PolCouns and 
PolMilOff, called on NSA Aliyu Mohammed on November 11. The 
President's Special Coordinator on Sudan, Dr. Usman Bugaje 
also attended.  This message covers their conversation on 
recent events in Benue. 
 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Defensive of the President and the 
Federal Government, Mohammed placed the blame for the 
civilian deaths squarely on the shoulders of the Tiv militia 
in Benue.  While the military and security services have 
begun inquiries, the NSA was unsure if the Federal Government 
would carry out its own investigation or whether a Benue 
State Government investigation would be undertaken. 
Ambassador urged the NSA to move quickly to a transparent 
review.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
=============== 
THE NSA'S OPTIC 
=============== 
 
 
¶3. (C) The NSA, responding to the Ambassador's request for 
explanation of what happened in Benue, explained that after 
recent failed local and state government interventions to 
cool the Tin-Jukun conflict, Tiv militia had set roadblocks 
throughout the area.  Anyone passing would have to pay a 
toll, unless they were Jukun or Fulani, in which case they 
could be killed.  When the police could not contain and 
eliminate the militia activities, the Governors of Benue and 
Taraba States had asked the President to send in the Army. 
At one roadblock in the area near Zaki-Biam, 20 soldiers had 
come upon a roadblock, and had asked to speak with the Tiv 
militia leader.  To do so, the soldiers were informed, they 
would have to put down their weapons, to which the Captain 
agreed.  After doing so, the soldiers were slaughtered "like 
rams," Mohammed said, gesturing across his belly.  The 
President gave the Benue Governor, George Akume, 24 hours to 
hand over the guilty militiamen.  Akume said he was unable to 
do so, and asked the President to send more soldiers, 
according to the NSA. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Jeter noted that, according to reports that 
we had received, between 100 and 300 unarmed civilians 
reportedly had been killed, including women and children. 
Who gave the orders, the Ambassador asked?  The NSA responded 
defensively, saying that the Federal Government was 
responsible for the lives and property of each and every 
Nigerian.  Nigeria has lost over one million people in the 
civil war, and more in coups and ethnic conflicts.  The 
President's first act on May 29, 1999, the NSA declared, was 
to commute a death sentence of a Nigerian soldier, because, 
as President, he "would not intentionally spill the blood of 
a single Nigerian."  "How could anyone believe that the 
President would do such a thing?", the NSA asked.  Many 
people in Benue were heavily armed, and taking the law into 
their own hands.  To prove his point, the NSA said, that even 
after the killing of the 19 soldiers, the Tiv militia had 
continued to mount roadblocks and had ambushed the second 
group of soldiers sent in. 
 
 
============================= 
JUDICIAL COMMISION OF INQUIRY 
============================= 
 
 
¶5. (C) Responding to recent press reports of a planned 
judicial commission of inquiry, the NSA said he was unsure 
the form the official inquiry would take.  The military had 
already begun an internal investigation; the security 
services were undertaking one as well.  However, Mohammed was 
unsure whether the Federal Government or Benue State would 
establish a commission, as had been done in Kaduna, Bauchi 
and Jos.  In any case, the terms of reference were still 
being worked out.  Ambassador Jeter explained that without an 
open and transparent inquiry, and an exhaustive and fair 
response, the U.S.-Nigeria military-to-military relationship 
could be affected.  The USG and Congress were watching this 
development closely. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Jeter went on to note that he planned to 
travel to Benue soon to see for himself what had happened. 
The NSA said that was a matter for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, but, almost as an aside, he said he would not expect 
Ambassador Aminu to go to Chicago "to see for himself" if 
something similar had happened there.  In any case, there was 
still tension in the area and such a trip could be dangerous, 
the NSA warned. 
 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT: Popular perceptions of Tiv culpability, 
coupled with horrific acts against government soldiers (the 
last line of defense in internal conflicts), have muted the 
GON's response to apparent Army brutality.  The village-to 
-village action, which could have been driven in part by 
pursuit of fleeing Tiv militia, will have to be clarified in 
an open and transparent fashion.  Only an independent and 
impartial review will allow the GON to clear its name and 
sanction those who may have been responsible. 
 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The NSA's aggressive response of 
the President was surprising, as the Ambassador never stated 
or implied that the President was responsible for giving the 
fatal order. However, early public claims from Benue Governor 
Akume and Tiv leaders that placed blame at the President's 
feet (since retracted by the Governor) may have been the 
source of the NSA's unease. 
¶9. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: More than most, the NSA clearly 
understands the depth of U.S. concerns about the Benue 
massacre, and the serious implications for our bilateral 
military-to-military relationship if senior-level culpability 
is confirmed. END COMMENT. 
Jeter