This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2011 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OPUTA PANEL WRAPS UP HEARINGS 
 
 
REF: A. 00 LAGOS 3586 
     ¶B. LAGOS 0079 
     ¶C. LAGOS 0845 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Oputa Panel held its final session on 
October 19, and has begun to draft its findings, due by 
year's end.  While Panel proceedings kept Nigerians glued to 
their televisions, many came away feeling the Panel did not 
delve far enough into the death of Abiola.  Nor was the Panel 
able to force former Heads-of-State Buhari, Babangida and 
Abubakar to appear and answer questions (the three snubbed a 
special Panel offer to make in camera statements without 
cross-examination). Beyond a few instances of personal and 
inter-communal reconciliation and catharsis, the Panel's 
greatest contribution was to provide a national forum for the 
airing of human rights grievances, a first for Nigeria. 
Despite its failings, this often emotional reminder of the 
hardships suffered during military rule and the civil war was 
a useful exercise, particularly when Nigeria has experienced 
a degree of political tension and communal conflict that have 
led some Nigerians to talk about the "order" provided by past 
military governments.  A by-product of the Oputa Panel may 
hav been to further boost the consolidation of Nigeria's 
nascent and sometimes shaky democracy.  The Panel may seek 
funding from the USG in order to complete its report.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
========================= 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION? 
========================= 
 
 
¶2. (U) The National Human Rights Violations Investigation 
Commission (HRVIC), known as the Oputa Panel, finished its 
public hearings in Abuja on October 19 (hearings were 
previously held in Lagos, Port Harcourt and Kano).  Highly 
respected former Supreme Court Justice Chukwudifu Oputa 
chaired the Panel, which received over 10,000 petitions and 
memoranda alleging human rights violations by military 
regimes from 1966 to 1998.  To manage this vast workload, 150 
cases were ultimately selected for public presentation based 
on popular demand, different patterns of violations, the 
evidence supporting the allegations and the possibility of 
alternative redress for the violations.  The public hearings 
also included special institutional and sectoral hearings on 
civil society, the military and the security agencies. 
 
 
===================== 
A PANEL MEMBER SPEAKS 
===================== 
 
 
¶3. (C) During an October 10 meeting with Ambassador Jeter, 
Panel member Father Matthew Hassan Kukah optimistically 
described the Panel's outcome.  Kukah outlined the goals of 
the Panel as: (1) reconciliation between individuals; (2) 
reconciliation between communities; and, (3) national 
reconciliation.  Considering its limited budget, the Panel 
had provided a cathartic event for Nigeria, Kukah opined. 
Reconciliation had occurred between some individuals and some 
communities, and the country had been given a peek under the 
veil of history to see the depredations inherent in military 
regimes.  Not every stone had been turned, but enough muck 
had been exposed to remind people of the dangers and excesses 
of military rule. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Kukah noted that almost all of Nigeria's ethnic 
communities had complained of "marginalization," through 
denial of full access to resources, limited or no services 
provided by government, or repression by another ethnic 
group.  Kukah, mindful of the irony, noted many complainants 
were themselves the subject of petitions by other communities 
on the same grounds.  The Igbos had accused the Hausa-Fulani 
of resource strangulation; in turn, the Ibibios accused the 
Igbos of the same offense.  (COMMENT: Calls for a Sovereign 
National Conference to review the 1999 Constitution, thus far 
rejected by President Obasanjo, reflect the strong belief 
that the current governmental framework will only promote 
marginalization.  Only a fundamental change in the national 
"rules of the game" (i.e., derivation of power and resources 
to regionally-based ethnic groups) will protect the 
fundamental rights of the groups advocating the conference. 
However, there is no guarantee that such a conference will 
foster reconciliation; instead, it might degrade into 
inter-ethnic caviling and separatist polemics. END COMMENT.) 
 
 
¶5. (U) In his closing remarks on the last day of the Panel's 
sitting, Justice Oputa commented in a similar vein, saying, 
"from the memoranda and evidence from those groups, it became 
apparent that there exists a simmering discontent which 
should not ever be allowed to boil over.  The challenge then 
is to find an answer to this dreadful trend called 
marginalization; and find an answer Nigeria must." 
 
 
================= 
WHERE'S THE BEEF? 
================= 
¶6. (C) The largest single complaint against the HRVIC was the 
lack of closure regarding M.K.O. Abiola's death.  Numerous 
claims came from numerous quarters, including a distasteful 
insinuation that Dr. Susan Rice was involved because she 
served the tea at the meeting where Abiola became ill. 
Despite the time expended, the Panel was unable to make 
conclusive findings that would satisfy rank-and-file 
Nigerians regarding Abiola's demise.  Kukah described the 
testimony surrounding Abiola's death as inconclusive and 
dismissed accusations against Rice as "sensationalistic." 
(COMMENT:  Some newspapers tried to give the insinuations 
against Dr. Rice high media play, due to the obvious 
sensational value of the by-line.  Fortunately, this 
non-story never gained traction and has faded away.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
 
¶7. (C) Coming in a close second as the other major public 
disappointment was that, after much wrangling, Generals 
Abubakar, Babangida, and Buhari never appeared.  There was 
considerable debate whether the three military Heads-of-State 
who ruled Nigeria between 1983-1999 would appear before the 
Panel and address allegations.  On October 3, the HRVIC 
denied a claim of immunity argued by lawyers representing 
Generals Abubakar, Babangida and Buhari, and suggested that 
it could compel their attendance before the Commission.  By 
the end of the hearings, however, the three had not appeared 
and the Panel never sought to compel their presence.  (A 
Court of Appeal subsequently ruled that they could not be 
forced to appear, but this appellate decision was largely 
moot, as it came after the Panel's final day of hearings.) 
(See additional background in paras 11-14.) 
 
 
¶8. (C) Kukah told the Ambassador that he had personally 
spoken to all three, urging them to appear.  They had been 
promised examinations of limited scope -- no issues outside 
the four filed petitions would be allowed.  Moreover, Kukah 
had informed them that the objective was not to assess 
culpability, but to seek socially responsible national 
reconciliation.  Kukah told the trio that after President 
Obasanjo appeared twice before the Panel they were exposing 
themselves to charges that they were contemptuous or afraid 
because they really had something to hide.  Despite Kukah's 
urgings, the three Generals never showed.  Kukah remarked 
that the three were probably seen as the "last (viable 
leaders) the North has to offer," and opined that those 
surrounding the Generals might have urged them not to appear. 
 
 
==================================== 
COMMENT - THE SUM IN A ZERO SUM GAME 
==================================== 
 
 
¶9. (C) COMMENT: The Panel's report, due at the end of the 
year, is expected to focus on steps the Federal Government 
should take to reduce the likelihood of future human rights 
violations.  Many human rights problems in Nigeria are the 
result of institutional weaknesses, i.e. a lack of human 
rights training for the police, the use of an untrained 
military for internal security, lack of resources for the 
prison system, and a crippled judiciary.  Fundamentally, the 
severe economic inequalities between the rich political and 
economic elite and the poor majority highlight a major 
cleavage, and ethnic and religious divisions continue to fuel 
the perception among nearly every group that they are being 
wronged by another group.  While the Panel managed to forge 
limited personal and inter-communal reconciliation, it also 
underscored that the larger questions, which gave rise to 
past abuses, remain no closer to resolution now than before 
the Panel convened. 
 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT CONT: The Panel did, however, allow the 
"common man" to see in an unflattering glare some of the 
major figures of Nigeria's military regimes.  This was useful 
to remind Nigerians how problematic, ruthless and fractious 
military rule was for the country.  This was particularly 
helpful at a time when civilian leadership is faced with 
numerous challenges.  The Oputa proceedings reminded many 
Nigerians that the past does not offer solution; therefore, 
the Panel may have provided a boost to greater consolidation 
of Nigeria's nascent and unsteady democracy. 
 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT CONT: An opportunity to differentiate himself 
from the Generals may partially explain why President 
Obasanjo appeared before the Panel.  Many of his supporters, 
and perhaps Obasanjo himself, believe the Generals, 
particularly Babangida, are even now instigating political 
problems, including fomenting unrest in the North.  Obasanjo 
does not want a direct confrontation with these still 
powerful king-makers.  However, he might like to see them 
slog through a bit of mud.  By appearing at the Panel, 
Obasanjo implicitly laid down the gauntlet to face public 
scrutiny, or fail to appear and face public approbation. 
Additionally, Obasanjo's appearance totally undermined any 
claims of indemnity the three Generals might have asserted as 
former Heads-of-State, since Obasanjo appeared as a sitting 
President.  However, it would have been confrontational to 
force the Generals' appearance.  Both Justice Oputa and 
Obasanjo are southerners, and a confrontation with the three 
northern Generals might have taken on regional and even 
religious connotations.  Instead of reducing discord, the 
Panel could have added to it. 
 
 
===================== 
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND 
===================== 
 
 
¶12. (U) Initially created by President Obasanjo in June 1999, 
the Oputa Panel was constituted under the Tribunals of 
Inquiry Act to investigate human rights violations committed 
by military regimes ruling Nigeria from December 31, 1983 to 
May 29, 1999.  In September 1999, the Panel was re-designated 
as a Judicial Commission, giving it powers to compel 
appearance and issue orders equivalent to those of a High 
Court.  With this amendment, the Commission became known as 
the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC), 
or more commonly, "The Oputa Panel."  The scope of the Panel 
was also adjusted to include all military regimes since 
January 1966, and the duration of its mandate was extended to 
one year from the date of its first public sitting. 
 
 
¶13. (U) Public hearings began October 23, 2000 in Abuja. 
Since then, hearings have been held in Lagos, Port Harcourt, 
Kano, Enugu and again in Abuja.  The Commission listed for 
public presentation and evidence 150 of over 10,000 petitions 
and memoranda submitted by members of the public. 
 
 
¶14. (U) The Commission has requested a six-month extension of 
its current mandate to draft and submit its report, findings 
and recommendations.  The HRVIC expects to complete this work 
by the end of 2001.  A preliminary concept of its report 
proposes a document in seven volumes, with an executive 
summary constituting an eighth volume.  The volumes will 
cover: the background, evolution and mandate of the 
Commission; the nature and typologies of human rights 
violations under the military; the summary of the proceedings 
of and petitions submitted to the Commission (2 volumes); the 
legal and international context to the work of the 
Commission; reparations and remedies; findings and 
recommendations. 
 
 
¶15. (U) Specialists in international and human rights law 
will write the report working under the supervision of the 
Commission.  The Commission is not fully funded for the 
drafting and publication phase.  The Federal Government plans 
to release funds to assist the Commission.  However, 
additional funding will likely be required.  The Commission 
has begun to seek such assistance, but has not yet approached 
the USG. 
Jeter