This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002832 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2011 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS NI
SUBJECT: GOVERNOR THINKS NIGERIA HAS HIT A CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 
REF: LAGOS 2787 
 
 
Classified by CDA Andrews for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: During an October 31 meeting with Polcouns 
and Poloff, Kaduna State Governor Ahmed Makarfi cited recent 
civil disturbances as very disquieting.  In order to prevent 
further political turbulance, the Governors were assembling 
in Abuja that day to discuss means to cool down the internal 
security situation.  As an outgrowth of that meeting, a 
smaller group of Governors would meet legislative leaders to 
massage differences and egos bruised by the electoral law 
controversy.  He predicted greater PDP cohesion and a 
resumption of the convention schedule after a meeting of 
party leaders also slated later that day.  While usually 
supportive of the President, Makarfi attributed much of the 
recent problems to Obasanjo's lack of domestic policy 
direction, an imperial leadership style that spurs Obasanjo 
to shun advice and crush dissent, and his surprising 
lassitude in bringing known instigators of unrest to book. 
End summary. 
 
 
----------------- 
National Security 
----------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) The usually reserved and pro-Obasanjo Makarfi 
incisively criticized President Obasanjo for his frequent 
sallies into the arena of international diplomacy while 
paying inadequate attention to the brushfires in his own 
backyard.  Obasanjo should stay home more, Makarfi bluntly 
declared. The Governor asserted Obasanjo was lethargic in 
moving to prevent simmering tensions from hitting the boiling 
point.  The crux of Makarfi's complaint was Obasanjo's 
failure to aggressively prosecute known perpetrators of civil 
unrest. Immediately after the Kaduna disturbances in February 
2000, Makarfi recalled that Obasanjo went to Kaduna to insist 
the State establish a Judicial Commission of Inquiry instead 
of immediately prosecuting suspects already under arrest. 
Obasanjo said that prosecuting people so quickly after the 
rioting would "overheat the political system."  Makarfi said 
Obasanjo cajoled and arm-twisted the Council of State to 
follow his wishes.  The Judicial Commission was established 
with the explicit promi 
se that the Federal Government would toss the book at the 
culprits identified by the Commission.  Although the 
Commission completed its report in September 2000, the 
President has failed to act on its findings, observed 
Makarfi.  In fact, the only thing Obasanjo did with the 
report was to write notes in the margins and return it to 
Kaduna, shrugged Makarfi.  This set a bad precedent, sending 
a message that people could bestir trouble with impunity, he 
commented. 
 
 
¶3. (C)  After 100 Hausa were killed in the OPC Ajegunle riot 
of  October 2000 in Lagos, the FG seemed powerless to arrest 
Gani Adams, the OPC ringleader.  (Comment: Adams finally was 
arrested this August, but was released October 31.  Adams is 
a bogeyman for many Northerners, and his release will, at a 
minimum deepen their sense of alienation.  See reftel.  End 
comment.)  During ethno-religious clashes which killed over 
2300 in and around Jos in September, the President idled.  No 
one was arrested.  The Federal government merely set up a 
Commission of Inquiry weeks later.  It took Obasanjo a week 
to visit the place, Makarfi complained.  President Obasanjo 
erred in telling the press that the FG "knew" something would 
happen in Kano this October, yet took no action to preclude 
the violence.  The President's remarks implied a dereliction 
of duty, Makarfi chided. 
 
 
¶4. (C)  Makarfi said the Government's ineptitude in dealing 
with these repeated crises created an atmosphere where 
"troublemakers" thrive.  The recent Tiv-Jukun upheaval was 
particularly disturbing.  He said Benue Governor Akume bore 
some responsibility for the blow-up, adding that the 
governors were going to address this issue with Akume. While 
asserting that soldiers responsible for killing innocents 
must be punished, Makarfi nonetheless believed the military 
was compelled to send a strong deterrent message to those who 
would attack soldiers.  The military had become the police 
force of last resort, Makarfi thought.  "If people see the 
military as vulnerable, if militias think they can touch the 
military, the country could fall apart." 
 
 
¶5. (C)  Comment:  Most Nigerians believe that the military 
had to send a clear message to the Tiv militia and others who 
might imitate them.  Military bases have been traditional 
zones of refuge during bloody communal clashes.  While there 
is a considerable debate over whether the military  (or 
renegade elements of the military) went "too far" by killing 
over 200 in Benue recently, there is little dissent from the 
tenet that Nigeria's stability and integrity depend on strict 
maintenance of the taboo on attacking soldiers.  End comment.) 
---------------------------- 
Election "Reform"--Background 
---------------------------- 
 
 
¶6. (C)  The House and Senate have passed two competing 
bills-both with provisions that safeguard incumbency--which 
seek to restructure upcoming elections.  Currently, local 
government elections are scheduled for April 13, 2002, 
followed by gubernatorial and presidential elections in 2003. 
 Both bills presume the Assembly has the constitutional 
authority to extend the tenure of local governments to 2003 
and delay local elections to that date.  The proposed 
legislation has created a political logjam.  The Governors 
don't want local elections delayed.  Delay would prevent them 
from strengthening their political base among local 
government area chairmen and councilors prior to the 
gubernatorial elections in 2003. Incumbent LGA chairmen, the 
National Assembly, and the President favor the changed LGA 
election date for their own parochial reasons. 
¶7. (C)  Makarfi lamented that the legislation pitted 
Governors against the National Assembly, the Executive and 
LGA chairmen.  This controversy, coupled with the recent 
civil violence, created the appearance that the civilian 
government could not manage the affairs of state, he 
remarked.  Makarfi feared the security situation and 
political logjams (including the internal PDP brouhaha) were 
being watched "closely" by elements in the military.  Clearly 
worried, Makarfi commented that six of his gubernatorial 
colleagues had moved out of their official residences in 
anticipation of a deteriorating security environment.  Since 
the President had not acted, Makarfi said all 36 governors 
were gathering in Abuja to hash out a compromise with the 
Assembly leadership on the electoral reform issue. Makarfi 
believed the gathering would also strike an informal 
agreement 
to eschew confrontational public statements that only roil 
the water and complicate resolution of delicate issues.  Once 
the agreement had been reached on these issues, a smaller 
group of Governors and Assembly leaders would meet the 
President, Makarfi stated. 
 
 
---------- 
PDP Crisis 
---------- 
 
 
¶8. (C)  Makarfi predicted progress in resolving the PDP 
leadership squabbles that threaten to scuttle the party's 
convention.  A party official had obtained a court injunction 
to suspend ongoing Party congresses and the upcoming PDP 
National Convention.  Despite the injunction, some states 
held their local government congresses on October 27, while 
others did not.  This inconsistency only added to the air of 
confusion.  (Comment:  There is some speculation that 
Barnabas Gemade and Okwesilieze Nwodo, PDP Chairman and 
National Secretary, respectively, secretly instigated the 
suit for injunctive relief in order to forestall their 
probable ouster from party leadership at the upcoming 
National Convention.  End Comment.) 
 
 
¶9. (C)  The Governor's prediction was partially correct.  An 
"inner caucus" of Governors, the VP and the President met on 
October 31. That meeting produced agreement on lifting the 
injunction.  Party congresses and the National Convention 
have been rescheduled.  Presidential favorite, Works Minister 
Tony Anenih, who had been expelled from the party by Gemade 
for opposing the injunction, was also reinstated.  However, 
the suddenly irascible Nwodo, who did not attend the October 
31 "caucus," issued a public statement that the caucus was 
improper and its decisions were nullities. The party remains 
an untidy affair.  State congresses were held the November 
3-4 weekend.  While most transpired without major problems, 
there were parallel congresses set up by rival party factions 
in several states.  In Enugu, a national assembly member was 
kidnapped.  Moreover, there is still no sign that Gemade and 
Nwodo have accepted the decision of October 31.  More 
intransigent statements attributed to Gemade appeared in 
major ne 
wspapers November 6.  Thus, additional suits and injunctions 
are possible. 
 
 
¶10. (C)  Makarfi remarked that non-performing governors and 
those who face serious opposition for the PDP nomination were 
supporting Gemade in his bid to retain the Party 
Chairmanship.  He said Gemade, a corrupt, ex-Abacha man, 
would attempt to guarantee those governors the PDP nomination 
in their states.  Audu Ogbeh, according to Makarfi, would not 
intervene for any candidate but would be more concerned about 
the fairness of the process. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
OBASANJO REFUSES TO LISTEN 
--------------------------- 
¶11. (U) Makarfi believed the political situation would not 
have become so dense if Obasanjo would listen to objective 
advice.  Instead Obasanjo allowed himself to be manipulated 
by an inner circle of advisors, some of whom do not have 
Obasanjo's best interests at heart.  Vice President Atiku is 
Obasanjo's worst enemy, Makarfi claimed.  Atiku persistently 
coaxes Obasanjo into standoffs with the party, the National 
Assembly and the Governors, asserted Makarfi.  Atiku's wants 
the Presidency and his strategy is to weaken Obasanjo by 
estranging him from important constituencies.  Makarfi 
remarked that Obasanjo plays the willing dupe in this game. 
He recalled that Obasanjo once relayed to Atiku a warning 
Makarfi had given the President about the Vice-President. 
Because Obasanjo betrayed his confidence that once, Makarfi 
swore he would not advise Obasanjo about Atiku's duplicity 
again. 
 
 
¶12. (C)  Comment: Clearly concerned that the ship of state 
had the appearance of being rudderless, Makarfi said a lot 
during the meeting.  The different sessions between the 
Governors, National Assembly and President seemed to have 
reduced tensions for the time being.  Whether this is 
permanent will become known soon enough.  Makarfi placed 
responsibility for a large share of the current tumult at 
Obasanjo's feet.  He believes Obasanjo will have to change 
his leadership style and pay more attention to domestic 
security matters if the spirit of compromise and dialogue 
engendered by the sessions of October 31 meeting is to stick. 
Andrews