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Viewing cable 01HARARE3263, EU'S NEXT STEPS ON ZIMBABWE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
01HARARE3263 2001-10-31 15:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ2023

PAGE 01        HARARE  03263  010010Z 
ACTION EUR-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  
      SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   
      IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   
      OIG-03   OMB-01   PA-00    PC-01    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   
      P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    STR-00   
      TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  R-00     EPAE-00  SNIS-00  NISC-00  
      PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   
        /011W
                  ------------------383CE0  010010Z /69    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0167
INFO NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY ABUJA 
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 
AMEMBASSY OSLO 
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
C O N F I D E N T I A L  HARARE 003263 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER 
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEU 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL. 10/31/11 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: EU'S NEXT STEPS ON ZIMBABWE 
 
REF: USEU BRUSSELS 5442 
 
CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF MATT HARRINGTON.  REASONS: 
1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) THE EU WILL FORMALLY NOTIFY THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE 
WITHIN 15 DAYS OF ITS DECISION TO MOVE TO ARTICLE 96 DISCUSSIONS 
UNDER THE COTONOU AGREEMENT.  THE GOZ WILL HAVE 15 DAYS TO DECIDE 
WHETHER TO PARTICIPATE, THEN UP TO 60 DAYS (I.E. LATE JANUARY) TO 
ADDRESS EU CONCERNS IN FIVE BROAD CATEGORIES.  ABSENT GOZ PROGRESS 
AT THE END OF THIS PERIOD, THE EU CAN REDUCE OR ELIMINATE 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OR SUSPEND TRADE PRIVILEGES, ALTHOUGH THE 
EC DELEGATION INFORMED US THAT THE LATTER HAS NEVER BEEN DONE AND 
THE EU FEARS THE FORMER MIGHT EXACERBATE ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMIC 
PROBLEMS.  IMPOSITION OF SMART SANCTIONS IS NOT AN OPTION UNDER 
THE COTONOU AGREEMENT.  ALTHOUGH THE GOZ'S INITIAL REACTION WAS 
SUBDUED, FOREIGN MINISTER MUDENGE SUBSEQUENTLY TOUGHENED HIS 
RHETORIC, LASHING OUT AT THE EU'S ISSUANCE OF "THREATS AND 
ULTIMATUMS" AND CRITICIZING THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR LEADING THE EU 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  03263  010010Z 
ASTRAY.  END SUMMARY. 
 
EU'S MOVE TO ARTICLE 96 DIALOGUE 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) REFTEL REPORTS THE OCTOBER 29 DECISION BY THE EU'S GENERAL 
AFFAIRS COUNCIL (GAC) TO MOVE TO A TOUGHER POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH 
ZIMBABWE UNDER ARTICLE 96 OF THE COTONOU AGREEMENT.  POLITICAL 
SECTION CHIEF MET ON OCTOBER 31 WITH ALEX KREMER, DEPUTY HEAD OF 
DELEGATION FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN HARARE, TO DISCUSS THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GAC MOVE. 
 
PROCESS 
------- 
 
3.  (C) ACCORDING TO KREMER, THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE LIKELY 
WOULD NOT BE FORMALLY NOTIFIED OF THE GAC DECISION UNTIL LATER IN 
THE WEEK.  THE OFFICIAL LETTER OF NOTIFICATION IS CURRENTLY BEING 
DRAFTED IN BRUSSELS EXPLAINING THE DECISION AND CONVEYING THE 
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE PROPOSED ARTICLE 96 DIALOGUE. (NOTE: 
THAT LETTER IS NOT LIKELY TO BE READY UNTIL ABOUT NOVEMBER 12, 
ACCORDING TO EU COMMISSIONER MOSCA.  END NOTE.)  AFTER IT RECEIVES 
THE LETTER, THE GOZ WILL HAVE 15 DAYS TO DECIDE WHETHER TO 
PARTICIPATE.  KREMER PREDICTED THAT THE ANSWER ALMOST CERTAINLY 
WOULD BE "YES" BUT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE CONVEYED UNTIL DAY 14 OR 
15.  THE EU AND ZIMBABWE WOULD THEN ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE -- WHICH 
CAN LAST UP TO 60 DAYS, BUT NO LONGER -- INTENDED TO ACHIEVE 
PROGRESS ON THE FIVE BROAD CATEGORIES OF CONCERN DESCRIBED IN THE 
GAC'S DECISION:  ENDING POLITICAL VIOLENCE, ELECTION MONITORING, 
FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA, INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, AND ENDING 
ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF PROPERTIES.  THE EC DELEGATION IN HARARE HAS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  03263  010010Z 
RECOMMENDED THAT THE EU SHARE WITH THE GOZ SPECIFIC BENCHMARKS TO 
BE USED IN MEASURING PROGRESS, AND THAT THE BENCHMARKS BE LINKED 
TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ABUJA AGREEMENT.  KREMER NOTED THAT NO 
FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE ON THAT ISSUE, AS "SOME IN BRUSSELS" 
ARE  CONCERNED THAT SHARING EXPLICIT BENCHMARKS MIGHT APPEAR TOO 
MUCH LIKE IMPOSING DEMANDS, AND THUS MIGHT NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO 
PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE.  KREMER SPECULATED THAT THE DIALOGUE WOULD 
MOST LIKELY BE CONDUCTED AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL.  THIS MAKES IT 
EASIER FOR THE GOZ TO DRAW THE PROCESS OUT, AND THE EU DOES NOT 
WANT THE LEVEL OF DIALOGUE TO BE USED BY THE GOZ AS AN EXCUSE FOR 
LACK OF SUCCESS. 
 
"APPROPRIATE MEASURES" 
---------------------- 
 
4.  (C) KREMER NOTED THAT, IF THE GOZ DECLINES TO PARTICIPATE IN 
THE DIALOGUE OR PARTICIPATES, BUT FAILS TO ADDRESS GENUINELY THE 
FIVE AREAS OF CONCERN DURING THE 60-DAY PERIOD, THE EU CAN THEN 
TAKE "APPROPRIATE MEASURES."  SUCH MEASURES, ACCORDING TO KREMER, 
COULD INCLUDE REDUCTIONS IN ASSISTANCE OR SUSPENSION OF TRADE 
PRIVILEGES, OR BOTH.  HE DOUBTED THAT THERE WOULD BE AN APPETITE 
WITHIN THE EU FOR IMPOSITION OF TOUGH MEASURES, EVEN IF LITTLE 
PROGRESS IS ACHIEVED.  TRADE PRIVILEGES, HE SAID, HAVE NEVER BEEN 
SUSPENDED, EITHER UNDER THE COTONOU AGREEMENT OR ITS LOME 
PREDECESSORS.  IN ADDITION, THERE IS CONCERN THAT SUSPENDING AID 
 
-- MOST OF WHICH GOES TO BASIC EDUCATION, COMMUNITY LEVEL 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, AND COMBATTING AIDS -- MIGHT WORSEN THE 
ALREADY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF ORDINARY ZIMBABWEANS.  KREMER 
POINTED OUT THAT IMPOSITION OF SO-CALLED SMART SANCTIONS, 
TARGETING PRESIDENT MUGABE, HIS INNER CIRCLE, AND THEIR FAMILIES, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 05        HARARE  03263  010010Z 
IS NOT AN OPTION UNDER THE COTONOU AGREEMENT.  INDIVIDUAL EU 
MEMBERS, NOT THE EC ITSELF, WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN 
PURSUING SUCH AN APPROACH UNDER THE EU'S COMMON FOREIGN AND 
SECURITY POLICY. 
 
LIKELY SCENARIOS 
---------------- 
 
5.  (C) ASKED HOW HE THOUGHT THE ARTICLE 96 PROCESS WOULD UNFOLD, 
KREMER OFFERED TWO POSSIBLE SCENARIOS.  THE GOZ WOULD AGREE TO THE 
DIALOGUE, WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE NO PROGRESS FOR 59 DAYS.  ON THE 
60TH DAY, THE GOZ WOULD THROW THE EU A BONE, SUCH AS ISSUING AN 
INVITATION TO ELECTION OBSERVERS, FORCING THE EU TO POSTPONE ANY 
DECISION ON SANCTIONS.  A SECOND POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE GOZ TAKES 
NO STEPS WHATSOEVER TO ADDRESS EU CONCERNS, CAUSING THE EU TO 
SUSPEND ONE OR TWO AID PROJECTS, BUT TO AVOID A LARGE-SCALE 
ASSISTANCE CUTOFF, FOR THE REASONS ELABORATED IN PARAGRAPH 4. 
 
GOVERNMENT'S REACTION 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (C) ALTHOUGH THE EU HAS NOT YET FORMALLY NOTIFIED THE GOZ OF 
ITS DECISION ON ARTICLE 96, THE MOVE HAS BEEN WIDELY COVERED IN 
THE LOCAL PRESS.  THE INITIAL PUBLIC REACTION OF FOREIGN MINISTER 
MUDENGE, THE GOZ'S PRIMARY INTERLOCUTOR WITH THE EU OF LATE, WAS 
SURPRISINGLY SUBDUED.  IN THE OCTOBER 30 EDITION OF THE GOZ- 
CONTROLLED "THE HERALD," MUDENGE CALLED THE EU DECISION 
"PROCEDURAL," AND SAID "I AM READY TO DISCUSS WITH THEM UNDER 
ARTICLE 96.  ZIMBABWE IS READY FOR THE CONSULTATIONS...AT THE 
MOMENT WE GO WITH AN OPEN MIND."  THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RHETORIC 
TOUGHENED CONSIDERABLY THE FOLLOWING DAY, HOWEVER, AS MUDENGE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 06        HARARE  03263  010010Z 
LASHED OUT AT THE EU FOR ISSUING "THREATS AND ULTIMATUMS" AND 
BLAMED THE BRITISH FOR MOBILIZING THE EU AGAINST ZIMBABWE.  "WE 
WILL NOT ACT ON THE BASIS OF THREATS AND ULTIMATUMS," HE SAID, AND 
STRESSED THAT FOREIGN OBSERVERS WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MONITOR 
ZIMBABWE'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BUT ONLY TO OBSERVE IT.  KREMER 
JOKED TO US THAT MUDENGE'S CONCILIATORY INITIAL REMARKS LIKELY 
PRECEDED CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MUGABE. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  (C) WE SHARE KREMER'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE GOZ LIKELY WILL 
AGREE TO THE ARTICLE 96 DIALOGUE, BUT WILL THEN DELAY ADDRESSING 
THE EU'S CONCERNS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, PERHAPS MAKING A MINOR 
CONCESSION OR TWO AT THE LAST MINUTE.  IT DOES NOT APPEAR AS IF 
THE EU HAS MANY POLICY OPTIONS ON WHICH IT CAN DRAW IF THE 60-DAY 
DIALOGUE FAILS COMPLETELY.  THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT MOST 
DEVELOPMENTS ABOUT WHICH THE EU IS CONCERNED ARE KEY ELEMENTS OF 
THE GOZ'S ELECTORAL STRATEGY, AREAS THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE LOATHE 
TO CHANGE UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS.  THE ABOVE NOTWITHSTANDING, THE 
EU DECISION INCREASES PRESSURE ON ZIMBABWE AND MAKES CLEARER TO 
ALL -- INCLUDING THE ZIMBABWEAN PUBLIC -- THAT THE COUNTRY'S 
DISASTROUS COURSE IS BROADLY CONDEMNED. 
 
8.  (C) TIME IS WORKING IN THE GOZ'S FAVOR, SINCE THE ARTICLE 96 
TIMELINE WILL NOT HAVE RUN ITS COURSE UNTIL LATE JANUARY WITH 
ELECTIONS LOOMING, POSSIBLY JUST WEEKS AWAY.  EU COMMISSIONER 
MOSCA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR SHE RECOGNIZED THAT THE 60-DAY PERIOD 
ENDS TOO LATE FOR TIMELY PRESSURE ON ELECTION ISSUES, AND SHE WAS 
OPEN TO FINDING OTHER MEANS FOR PRESSING FOR EARLY AND EFFECTIVE 
ELECTION OBSERVATION AND REDUCTION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE.  IN THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 07        HARARE  03263  010010Z 
MEANTIME, THE GOZ STRATEGY APPEARS TO BE "DIVIDE AND CONQUER," 
DEMONIZING THE BRITISH FOR LEADING THEIR CONTINENTAL BRETHREN 
ASTRAY.  THIS IS SIMILAR TO THE GOZ ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY AN 
AFRICAN/NON-AFRICAN SPLIT IN THE COMMONWEALTH OVER ABUJA 
IMPLEMENTATION, A PLOY THAT HAS FOOLED NO ONE.  WE DO NOT THINK 
THAT IT PLAYS WELL EVEN ON MAIN STREET HERE. 
 
SULLIVAN 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
> 
@@@OASYS@@@ 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1817 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  03263  01 OF 02  312223Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00 
      SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    UTED-00  VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00 
      OIC-02   OIG-03   OMB-01   PA-00    PC-01    PM-00    PRS-00 
      ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00 
      STR-00   TEST-00  TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  R-00     EPAE-00 
      SNIS-00  NISC-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   G-00 
      NFAT-00  SAS-00     /011W 
                  ------------------38357E  312223Z /69 
P 311535Z OCT 01 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0167 
INFO NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY ABUJA 
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 
AMEMBASSY OSLO 
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 003263 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  03263  01 OF 02  312223Z 
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEU 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL. 10/31/11 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: EU'S NEXT STEPS ON ZIMBABWE 
 
REF: USEU BRUSSELS 5442 
 
CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF MATT HARRINGTON.  REASONS: 
1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) THE EU WILL FORMALLY NOTIFY THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE 
WITHIN 15 DAYS OF ITS DECISION TO MOVE TO ARTICLE 96 DISCUSSIONS 
UNDER THE COTONOU AGREEMENT.  THE GOZ WILL HAVE 15 DAYS TO DECIDE 
WHETHER TO PARTICIPATE, THEN UP TO 60 DAYS (I.E. LATE JANUARY) TO 
ADDRESS EU CONCERNS IN FIVE BROAD CATEGORIES.  ABSENT GOZ PROGRESS 
AT THE END OF THIS PERIOD, THE EU CAN REDUCE OR ELIMINATE 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OR SUSPEND TRADE PRIVILEGES, ALTHOUGH THE 
EC DELEGATION INFORMED US THAT THE LATTER HAS NEVER BEEN DONE AND 
THE EU FEARS THE FORMER MIGHT EXACERBATE ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMIC 
PROBLEMS.  IMPOSITION OF SMART SANCTIONS IS NOT AN OPTION UNDER 
THE COTONOU AGREEMENT.  ALTHOUGH THE GOZ'S INITIAL REACTION WAS 
SUBDUED, FOREIGN MINISTER MUDENGE SUBSEQUENTLY TOUGHENED HIS 
RHETORIC, LASHING OUT AT THE EU'S ISSUANCE OF "THREATS AND 
ULTIMATUMS" AND CRITICIZING THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR LEADING THE EU 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  03263  01 OF 02  312223Z 
ASTRAY.  END SUMMARY. 
 
EU'S MOVE TO ARTICLE 96 DIALOGUE 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) REFTEL REPORTS THE OCTOBER 29 DECISION BY THE EU'S GENERAL 
AFFAIRS COUNCIL (GAC) TO MOVE TO A TOUGHER POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH 
ZIMBABWE UNDER ARTICLE 96 OF THE COTONOU AGREEMENT.  POLITICAL 
SECTION CHIEF MET ON OCTOBER 31 WITH ALEX KREMER, DEPUTY HEAD OF 
DELEGATION FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN HARARE, TO DISCUSS THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GAC MOVE. 
 
PROCESS 
------- 
 
3.  (C) ACCORDING TO KREMER, THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE LIKELY 
WOULD NOT BE FORMALLY NOTIFIED OF THE GAC DECISION UNTIL LATER IN 
THE WEEK.  THE OFFICIAL LETTER OF NOTIFICATION IS CURRENTLY BEING 
DRAFTED IN BRUSSELS EXPLAINING THE DECISION AND CONVEYING THE 
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE PROPOSED ARTICLE 96 DIALOGUE. (NOTE: 
THAT LETTER IS NOT LIKELY TO BE READY UNTIL ABOUT NOVEMBER 12, 
ACCORDING TO EU COMMISSIONER MOSCA.  END NOTE.)  AFTER IT RECEIVES 
THE LETTER, THE GOZ WILL HAVE 15 DAYS TO DECIDE WHETHER TO 
PARTICIPATE.  KREMER PREDICTED THAT THE ANSWER ALMOST CERTAINLY 
WOULD BE "YES" BUT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE CONVEYED UNTIL DAY 14 OR 
15.  THE EU AND ZIMBABWE WOULD THEN ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE -- WHICH 
CAN LAST UP TO 60 DAYS, BUT NO LONGER -- INTENDED TO ACHIEVE 
PROGRESS ON THE FIVE BROAD CATEGORIES OF CONCERN DESCRIBED IN THE 
GAC'S DECISION:  ENDING POLITICAL VIOLENCE, ELECTION MONITORING, 
FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA, INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, AND ENDING 
ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF PROPERTIES.  THE EC DELEGATION IN HARARE HAS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  03263  01 OF 02  312223Z 
RECOMMENDED THAT THE EU SHARE WITH THE GOZ SPECIFIC BENCHMARKS TO 
BE USED IN MEASURING PROGRESS, AND THAT THE BENCHMARKS BE LINKED 
TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ABUJA AGREEMENT.  KREMER NOTED THAT NO 
FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE ON THAT ISSUE, AS "SOME IN BRUSSELS" 
ARE  CONCERNED THAT SHARING EXPLICIT BENCHMARKS MIGHT APPEAR TOO 
MUCH LIKE IMPOSING DEMANDS, AND THUS MIGHT NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO 
PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE.  KREMER SPECULATED THAT THE DIALOGUE WOULD 
MOST LIKELY BE CONDUCTED AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL.  THIS MAKES IT 
EASIER FOR THE GOZ TO DRAW THE PROCESS OUT, AND THE EU DOES NOT 
WANT THE LEVEL OF DIALOGUE TO BE USED BY THE GOZ AS AN EXCUSE FOR 
LACK OF SUCCESS. 
 
"APPROPRIATE MEASURES" 
---------------------- 
 
4.  (C) KREMER NOTED THAT, IF THE GOZ DECLINES TO PARTICIPATE IN 
THE DIALOGUE OR PARTICIPATES, BUT FAILS TO ADDRESS GENUINELY THE 
FIVE AREAS OF CONCERN DURING THE 60-DAY PERIOD, THE EU CAN THEN 
TAKE "APPROPRIATE MEASURES."  SUCH MEASURES, ACCORDING TO KREMER, 
COULD INCLUDE REDUCTIONS IN ASSISTANCE OR SUSPENSION OF TRADE 
PRIVILEGES, OR BOTH.  HE DOUBTED THAT THERE WOULD BE AN APPETITE 
WITHIN THE EU FOR IMPOSITION OF TOUGH MEASURES, EVEN IF LITTLE 
PROGRESS IS ACHIEVED.  TRADE PRIVILEGES, HE SAID, HAVE NEVER BEEN 
SUSPENDED, EITHER UNDER THE COTONOU AGREEMENT OR ITS LOME 
PREDECESSORS.  IN ADDITION, THERE IS CONCERN THAT SUSPENDING AID 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1818 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  03263  02 OF 02  312223Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00 
      SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    UTED-00  VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00 
      OIC-02   OIG-03   OMB-01   PA-00    PC-01    PM-00    PRS-00 
      ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00 
      STR-00   TEST-00  TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  R-00     EPAE-00 
      SNIS-00  NISC-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   G-00 
      NFAT-00  SAS-00     /011W 
                  ------------------383582  312224Z /69 
P 311535Z OCT 01 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0168 
INFO NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY ABUJA 
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 
AMEMBASSY OSLO 
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HARARE 003263 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  03263  02 OF 02  312223Z 
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEU 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL. 10/31/11 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: EU'S NEXT STEPS ON ZIMBABWE 
 
-- MOST OF WHICH GOES TO BASIC EDUCATION, COMMUNITY LEVEL 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, AND COMBATTING AIDS -- MIGHT WORSEN THE 
ALREADY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF ORDINARY ZIMBABWEANS.  KREMER 
POINTED OUT THAT IMPOSITION OF SO-CALLED SMART SANCTIONS, 
TARGETING PRESIDENT MUGABE, HIS INNER CIRCLE, AND THEIR FAMILIES, 
IS NOT AN OPTION UNDER THE COTONOU AGREEMENT.  INDIVIDUAL EU 
MEMBERS, NOT THE EC ITSELF, WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN 
PURSUING SUCH AN APPROACH UNDER THE EU'S COMMON FOREIGN AND 
SECURITY POLICY. 
 
LIKELY SCENARIOS 
---------------- 
 
5.  (C) ASKED HOW HE THOUGHT THE ARTICLE 96 PROCESS WOULD UNFOLD, 
KREMER OFFERED TWO POSSIBLE SCENARIOS.  THE GOZ WOULD AGREE TO THE 
DIALOGUE, WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE NO PROGRESS FOR 59 DAYS.  ON THE 
60TH DAY, THE GOZ WOULD THROW THE EU A BONE, SUCH AS ISSUING AN 
INVITATION TO ELECTION OBSERVERS, FORCING THE EU TO POSTPONE ANY 
DECISION ON SANCTIONS.  A SECOND POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE GOZ TAKES 
NO STEPS WHATSOEVER TO ADDRESS EU CONCERNS, CAUSING THE EU TO 
SUSPEND ONE OR TWO AID PROJECTS, BUT TO AVOID A LARGE-SCALE 
ASSISTANCE CUTOFF, FOR THE REASONS ELABORATED IN PARAGRAPH 4. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  03263  02 OF 02  312223Z 
 
GOVERNMENT'S REACTION 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (C) ALTHOUGH THE EU HAS NOT YET FORMALLY NOTIFIED THE GOZ OF 
ITS DECISION ON ARTICLE 96, THE MOVE HAS BEEN WIDELY COVERED IN 
THE LOCAL PRESS.  THE INITIAL PUBLIC REACTION OF FOREIGN MINISTER 
MUDENGE, THE GOZ'S PRIMARY INTERLOCUTOR WITH THE EU OF LATE, WAS 
SURPRISINGLY SUBDUED.  IN THE OCTOBER 30 EDITION OF THE GOZ- 
CONTROLLED "THE HERALD," MUDENGE CALLED THE EU DECISION 
"PROCEDURAL," AND SAID "I AM READY TO DISCUSS WITH THEM UNDER 
ARTICLE 96.  ZIMBABWE IS READY FOR THE CONSULTATIONS...AT THE 
MOMENT WE GO WITH AN OPEN MIND."  THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RHETORIC 
TOUGHENED CONSIDERABLY THE FOLLOWING DAY, HOWEVER, AS MUDENGE 
LASHED OUT AT THE EU FOR ISSUING "THREATS AND ULTIMATUMS" AND 
BLAMED THE BRITISH FOR MOBILIZING THE EU AGAINST ZIMBABWE.  "WE 
WILL NOT ACT ON THE BASIS OF THREATS AND ULTIMATUMS," HE SAID, AND 
STRESSED THAT FOREIGN OBSERVERS WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MONITOR 
ZIMBABWE'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BUT ONLY TO OBSERVE IT.  KREMER 
JOKED TO US THAT MUDENGE'S CONCILIATORY INITIAL REMARKS LIKELY 
PRECEDED CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MUGABE. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  (C) WE SHARE KREMER'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE GOZ LIKELY WILL 
AGREE TO THE ARTICLE 96 DIALOGUE, BUT WILL THEN DELAY ADDRESSING 
THE EU'S CONCERNS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, PERHAPS MAKING A MINOR 
CONCESSION OR TWO AT THE LAST MINUTE.  IT DOES NOT APPEAR AS IF 
THE EU HAS MANY POLICY OPTIONS ON WHICH IT CAN DRAW IF THE 60-DAY 
DIALOGUE FAILS COMPLETELY.  THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT MOST 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  03263  02 OF 02  312223Z 
DEVELOPMENTS ABOUT WHICH THE EU IS CONCERNED ARE KEY ELEMENTS OF 
THE GOZ'S ELECTORAL STRATEGY, AREAS THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE LOATHE 
TO CHANGE UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS.  THE ABOVE NOTWITHSTANDING, THE 
EU DECISION INCREASES PRESSURE ON ZIMBABWE AND MAKES CLEARER TO 
ALL -- INCLUDING THE ZIMBABWEAN PUBLIC -- THAT THE COUNTRY'S 
DISASTROUS COURSE IS BROADLY CONDEMNED. 
 
8.  (C) TIME IS WORKING IN THE GOZ'S FAVOR, SINCE THE ARTICLE 96 
TIMELINE WILL NOT HAVE RUN ITS COURSE UNTIL LATE JANUARY WITH 
ELECTIONS LOOMING, POSSIBLY JUST WEEKS AWAY.  EU COMMISSIONER 
MOSCA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR SHE RECOGNIZED THAT THE 60-DAY PERIOD 
ENDS TOO LATE FOR TIMELY PRESSURE ON ELECTION ISSUES, AND SHE WAS 
OPEN TO FINDING OTHER MEANS FOR PRESSING FOR EARLY AND EFFECTIVE 
ELECTION OBSERVATION AND REDUCTION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE.  IN THE 
MEANTIME, THE GOZ STRATEGY APPEARS TO BE "DIVIDE AND CONQUER," 
DEMONIZING THE BRITISH FOR LEADING THEIR CONTINENTAL BRETHREN 
ASTRAY.  THIS IS SIMILAR TO THE GOZ ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY AN 
AFRICAN/NON-AFRICAN SPLIT IN THE COMMONWEALTH OVER ABUJA 
IMPLEMENTATION, A PLOY THAT HAS FOOLED NO ONE.  WE DO NOT THINK 
THAT IT PLAYS WELL EVEN ON MAIN STREET HERE. 
 
SULLIVAN 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
>