Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 01HANOI2817, VIETNAM AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND BEYOND:

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #01HANOI2817.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
01HANOI2817 2001-10-29 04:39 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


2001HANOI02817 - UNCLASSIFIED
 
 
 
                           UNCLASSIFIED     PTO9412

PAGE 01        HANOI  02817  01 OF 03  290455Z 
ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CEA-01   CIAE-00  COME-00  
      CTME-00  INL-00   USNW-00  DOEE-00  ITCE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    
      EB-00    EXME-00  OIGO-00  E-00     FBIE-00  UTED-00  VC-00    
      FRB-00   H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    ITC-01   L-00     
      VCE-00   MOFM-05  MOF-03   AC-01    NEA-00   DCP-01   NSAE-00  
      NSCE-00  OES-01   OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PC-01    PM-00    
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    STR-00   
      TEST-00  TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  SA-00    FMP-00   EPAE-00  
      PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   
      SWCI-00    /019W
                  ------------------3691DF  290455Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4519
INFO AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/ABLAGG//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 002817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; NEA/IAI; NEA/ENA; NEA/NGA; SA/PAB 
 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02817  01 OF 03  290455Z 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ETRD KPAL VM IZ IS PK SY TU AF LY
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND BEYOND: 
--         TRANSFORMING TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIPS 
 
REF: A.  HANOI 2139     B.  HANOI 2658 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY.  DESPITE A DESIRE TO PRESERVE 
"TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIPS" IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE LARGER 
THRUST OF THE GVN'S REGIONAL AND GLOBAL FOREIGN POLICY OVER 
THE PAST DECADE HAS BEEN TO BROADEN ITS BASE OF DIPLOMATIC 
PARTNERS AND TO PUT A GREATER EMPHASIS ON BUSINESS TIES. 
FOR EXAMPLE, VIETNAM SUPPORTS PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS FOR 
STATEHOOD, BUT ALSO MAINTAINS "NORMAL RELATIONS" WITH 
ISRAEL, ALBEIT WITHOUT AN EMBASSY THERE.  THE GVN HAS NO 
DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH THE TALIBAN AND WORRIES ABOUT CIVILIAN 
CASUALTIES IN THE CURRENT US-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS.  ITS 
MAJOR COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE REGION REMAINS WITH 
IRAQ.  RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN ARE GROWING INCREMENTALLY. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
PALESTINE/ISRAEL: WE CAN DEAL WITH BOTH 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) DOAN NGOC BOI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
MFA'S WEST ASIA AND AFRICA DEPARTMENT, DESCRIBED THE 
PALESTINE AUTHORITY AS AN IMPORTANT "TRADITIONAL FRIEND" OF 
VIETNAM, WHICH STRONGLY SUPPORTS PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD.  IN 
HIS VIEW, AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE "WOULD SOLVE MANY 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02817  01 OF 03  290455Z 
PROBLEMS" IN THE AREA.  BOI NOTED THAT PRESIDENT ARAFAT 
VISITS VIETNAM REGULARLY (REF A) AND WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE 
TO DO SO FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. 
 
3. (SBU)  BOI SAID THAT, IN LINE WITH VIETNAM'S EFFORTS "TO 
BE FRIENDS WITH ALL NATIONS," IT HAD EXPANDED ITS TIES WITH 
ISRAEL TO A MORE "NORMAL RELATIONSHIP," ADDING THAT "THERE 
IS NO REASON" THAT ECONOMIC TIES COULD NOT INCREASE.  THE 
MFA'S TU NOTED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS OFFICIAL VISITS 
(BUT NOT VERY HIGH LEVEL) SINCE ISRAEL OPENED ITS EMBASSY IN 
HANOI IN 1993, INCLUDING THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ISRAELI 
MFA ASIA AND PACIFIC IN JANUARY 2001, AND A DELEGATION FROM 
THE ISRAEL MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION IN APRIL 2001.  THE 
GVN DEPUTY MINISTER OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ENVIRONMENT 
VISITED ISRAEL IN 2000.  TU CLAIMED THAT VIETNAM'S "NORMAL" 
RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL "HAS NOT AFFECTED" ITS FRIENDSHIPS 
WITH ARAB STATES, BECAUSE "THEY UNDERSTAND WE SEEK GOOD 
RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES."  TU ADDED THAT DESPITE GVN 
WISHES TO OPEN AN EMBASSY IN ISRAEL SINCE 1993, THERE ARE 
STILL NO CONCRETE PLANS TO DO SO.  VIETNAM'S AMBASSADOR TO 
CAIRO IS ACCREDITED TO ISRAEL. 
 
4. (SBU)  ACCORDING TO ISRAELI EMBASSY SECOND SECRETARY EYAL 
BUVILSKI, ISRAEL IS CURRENTLY FOCUSED ON EXPANDING BILATERAL 
TRADE WITH VIETNAM, NOW ONLY ABOUT USD 25 MILLION ANNUALLY. 
HE SAID THAT WHILE THERE HAS BEEN A GENERAL INCREASE IN 
INTEREST FROM ISRAELI BUSINESSMEN, LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS, SUCH 
AS WORKING WITH LOCAL BANKS AND OBTAINING VISAS, REMAIN 
OBSTACLES.  ISRAEL HAS EXPRESSED A HOPE THAT THE GVN SOON 
ESTABLISH SOME SORT OF OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN ISRAEL, 
SUCH AS A TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TO FACILITATE SUCH TIES. 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02817  01 OF 03  290455Z 
BUVILSKI NOTED THAT ISRAEL IS ALSO INTERESTED IN EXPANDING 
ITS ONGOING AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM AND IN 
PROVIDING TRAINING FOR ADDITIONAL VIETNAMESE STUDENTS IN 
ISRAEL. 
 
------------------------------------ 
AFGHANISTAN:  WORRIES ABOUT CIVILIANS 
----------------------------------- 
5.  (SBU)  NGUYEN HUY DZUNG, SENIOR EXPERT IN THE MFA'S ASIA 
II DEPARTMENT, CHARACTERIZED VIETNAM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH 
AFGHANISTAN AS "NONEXISTENT," BOTH POLITICALLY AND 
ECONOMICALLY.  VIETNAM MAINTAINED AN EMBASSY IN KABUL FROM 
1982-1992 BUT THEN CLOSED IT DUE TO THE CIVIL WAR AND 
VIETNAM'S OWN DIFFICULT FINANCIAL SITUATION.  DZUNG 
REAFFIRMED VIETNAM'S OPPOSITION TO "TERRORISM OF ANY KIND" 
BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE ONGOING US-LED MILITARY 
ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN DUE TO THE LIKELY IMPACT ON CIVILIAN 
POPULATIONS, A LINE REPEATED IN OFFICIAL MEDIA REPEATEDLY IN 
RECENT DAYS. 
 
6.  (SBU)  THE MFA'S BOI SEPARATELY NOTED THAT THE GVN IS 
KEEPING A CLOSE EYE ON FIVE AFGHAN NATIONALS APPARENTLY 
TEACHING AT AN ARABIC-LANGUAGE SCHOOL LOCATED ON THE LIBYAN 
EMBASSY COMPOUND. (NOTE:  REF B REPORTED ONLY FOUR AFGHANS 
AT THIS SCHOOL WHO WORSHIP AT HANOI'S SOLE MOSQUE.)  HE 
CLAIMED THAT THREE SHOULD BE LEAVING THE COUNTRY "SOON," 
SINCE THEIR VISAS HAVE EXPIRED. 
 
 
----------------------- 
PAKISTAN:  LITTLE STEPS 
----------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) DR. FAZAL-UR-RAHMAN KAZI, THE PAKISTAN EMBASSY'S 
FIRST SECRETARY, TOLD POLOFF ON OCTOBER 16 THAT PAKISTAN IS 
ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE ITS POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP 
WITH VIETNAM AS PART OF ITS OWN EFFORT "TO BECOME MORE 
ENGAGED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA."  PAKISTAN ESTABLISHED RELATIONS 
WITH VIETNAM IN 1973, BUT CLOSED ITS EMBASSY IN 1985, DUE TO 
"FINANCIAL REASONS."  DR. FAZI DESCRIBED THIS MOVE AS A 
"MISTAKE" THAT WAS NOT RECTIFIED UNTIL OCTOBER 2000. 
HOWEVER, VIETNAM STILL DOES NOT HAVE AN EMBASSY IN 
ISLAMABAD, ALTHOUGH IT HAS AGREED "IN PRINCIPLE" TO OPEN 
ONE, ACCORDING TO DR. KAZI. 
 
8. (SBU)  PAKISTANI LEADER GENERAL MUSHARRAF VISITED VIETNAM 
FOR THREE DAYS IN MAY 2001, DURING WHICH THE TWO COUNTRIES 
SIGNED A TRADE AGREEMENT, A DRAFT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
AGREEMENT, AND AN AGREEMENT TO FORM A JOINT MINISTERIAL 
COMMISSION.  THE GVN DURING THE VISIT ALSO PLEDGED SUPPORT 
FOR PAKISTAN'S GOAL OF BECOMING A MEMBER OF THE ASEAN 
REGIONAL FORUM AND THE ASIA-EUROPE FORUM.  DEPUTY PRIME 
MINISTER NGUYEN CONG TAN HAS NOW POSTPONED HIS VISIT TO 
PAKISTAN SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER, CITING THE ONGOING MILITARY 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02817  02 OF 03  290455Z 
ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION, DR. KAZI ADDED. 
 
9. (SBU)  DR. KAZI ADMITTED THAT THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONSHIP IS "LIMITED," WITH BILATERAL TRADE ONLY WORTH 
ABOUT USD 25 MILLION IN 2000.  PAKISTAN IMPORTED 
APPROXIMATELY USD 16 MILLION WORTH OF GOODS FROM VIETNAM, 
PRIMARILY TEA, BLACK PEPPER AND FOOTWEAR, WHILE VIETNAM 
IMPORTED ABOUT USD 9 MILLION WORTH OF FERTILIZER, YARN, 
COTTON, AND OTHER GOODS.  BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE PLEDGED TO 
INCREASE THE TRADE VOLUME TO USD 100 MILLION, BUT DR. KAZI 
SAID THAT THERE ARE NO FIRM TARGETS ON WHEN TO ACHIEVE THIS 
GOAL.  DR. KAZI ADDED THAT ONE SIGNIFICANT LOGISTICAL 
PROBLEM FOR PAKISTANI BUSINESSMEN IS THEY CANNOT OBTAIN 
VIETNAMESE VISAS IN PAKISTAN. 
 
10. (SBU)  THE MFA'S DZUNG SEPARATELY CONFIRMED THAT VIETNAM 
WOULD LIKE TO INCREASE BILATERAL TRADE WITH PAKISTAN, 
CLAIMING THAT THIS IS NOW VIETNAM'S "PRIMARY INTEREST" IN 
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.  ACCORDINGLY, VIETNAM IS 
"EXPLORING VARIOUS OPPORTUNITIES," HE ADDED WITHOUT OFFERING 
ANY SPECIFICS.  DZUNG NOTED THAT THE IMPROVING POLITICAL AND 
COMMERCIAL TIES WITH PAKISTAN ARE IN LINE WITH THE 9TH PARTY 
CONGRESS' POLICY STATEMENT TO INCREASE VIETNAM'S PRESENCE IN 
"ALL SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES."  HE ALSO NOTED THAT VIETNAM 
WOULD LIKE TO OPEN AN EMBASSY IN PAKISTAN, BUT ADMITTED HE 
NOT KNOW WHEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DO SO.  HE AND DR. 
KAZI MADE PARALLEL STATEMENTS ABOUT HOW THE BILATERAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP COULD IMPROVE QUICKLY ONCE THE 
SITUATION IN THE REGION "STABILIZES." 
 
--------------------- 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02817  02 OF 03  290455Z 
"TRADITIONAL FRIENDS" 
--------------------- 
 
11.  (SBU)  THE MFA'S BOI, DESCRIBED IRAQ (ALONG WITH LIBYA) 
AS VIETNAM'S MOST IMPORTANT "TRADITIONAL FRIENDS" IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST DURING A MEETING WITH POLOFF ON OCTOBER 12.  HE 
NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT IRAQ HAD PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT 
ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM DURING THE WAR WITH THE US. 
SEPARATELY, COLONEL TRAN NHUNG, DIRECTOR OF THE PEOPLES' 
ARMY NEWSPAPER INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, CLAIMED THAT 
VIETNAM COULD NEVER FORGET IRAQ'S "INVALUABLE SUPPORT" 
DURING THAT PERIOD, WHILE ADMITTING THAT VIETNAM STILL 
"OWES" IRAQ APPROXIMATELY USD 100 MILLION.  BOI NOTED THAT 
VIETNAM HAD, HOWEVER, NOT SUPPORTED THE IRAQ'S INVASION OF 
KUWAIT.  COLONEL NHUNG STATED THAT VIETNAM HAD NONETHELESS 
"PROTESTED" UN SANCTIONS BECAUSE THEY "ESSENTIALLY HURT 
CIVILIANS." 
 
12.  (SBU)  BOI STRESSED THAT THE IRAQ-VIETNAM COMMERCIAL 
RELATIONSHIP IS "COMPLETELY WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK." 
VIETNAMESE EXPORTS TO IRAQ IN 2000 WERE WORTH APPROXIMATELY 
USD319 MILLION, PRIMARILY RICE, RUBBER, TEXTILES, AND 
GARMENTS.  VIETNAM IMPORTS MAINLY OIL FROM IRAQ, PARTLY FOR 
RE-SALE ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET.   BUT BOI PREDICTED 
THAT VIETNAM'S TRADE WITH IRAQ WOULD DECLINE AS IRAQ 
INCREASINGLY LOOKS TOWARD MORE TRADE WITH SYRIA, TUNISIA, 
AND TURKEY. 
 
13.  (SBU)  ACCORDING TO SENIOR EXPERT TRAN VIET TU OF THE 
MFA'S WEST ASIA DEPARTMENT, ABOUT 2,000 VIETNAMESE NATIONALS 
ARE CURRENTLY WORKING IN LIBYA, ANOTHER "TRADITIONAL 
FRIEND."  "A FEW" OTHERS ARE WORKING IN LEBANON AND THE 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE), HE ADDED.  IN LIBYA, MOST ARE IN 
THE CONSTRUCTION FIELD, WORKING FOR SOUTH KOREAN 
CONTRACTORS.  TU STATED THAT THE WORKERS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE 
IN ANY DANGER, BUT IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATED, VIETNAM 
WOULD TAKE ACTION TO REPATRIATE THEM.  HE NOTED THAT VIETNAM 
HAD SUCCESSFULLY REPATRIATED 16,000 WORKERS FROM IRAQ DURING 
THE GULF WAR; BRINGING BACK THOSE IN LIBYA, LEBANON, AND THE 
UAE "WOULD NOT PRESENT A PROBLEM" SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY TO 
DO SO. 
 
14. (SBU)  COMMENT:  MUCH AS VIETNAM WOULD LIKE TO ENHANCE 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH NEWER PARTNERS AS WELL AS 
"TRADITIONAL" FRIENDS IN AND NEAR THE MIDDLE EAST, DISTANCE, 
BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES AND WEAK MARKETS WILL REMAIN 
UNAVOIDABLE CONSTRAINTS.  VIETNAM'S OWN FINANCIAL 
LIMITATIONS HAMPER ITS ABILITY TO OPEN NEW DIPLOMATIC 
MISSIONS, A FURTHER DISINCENTIVE FOR THE KINDS OF 
IMPROVEMENTS IN BILATERAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS IT SEEKS. 
PORTER 
 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02817  03 OF 03  290455Z 
 
                       UNCLASSIFIED