This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002653 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF/RA:BITTRICK 
NSC FOR FRAZER AND MILLER, MCLEAN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2011 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR CG BY NI
SUBJECT: TFUS01: NIGERIA: DANJUMA'S CONDOLENCES, THE 
MIL-MIL RELATIONSHIP AND AFRICA PKO OPERATIONS 
 
 
REF: ABUJA 2562 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter, accompanied by DATT, 
PolMilOff and DOD Colonel Terry Tidler called on Defense 
Minister Danjuma October 10 (COL I.D. Pennap, Personal Staff 
Officer to the Minister, also attended).  Offering his 
condolences on September 11, Danjuma revealed that he had 
instructed the Chief of Army Staff to update contingency 
plans for Abuja.  The MOD was noncommittal whether Nigeria 
would renew MPRI for 2002.  He asked the DATT to discuss 
UNAMSIL rotation options with the Chief of Defense Staff. 
Nigeria continued to prepare for a Congo peacekeeping 
mission, and was preparing to support, but not lead, a 
Burundi mission.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
=============================== 
MPRI - WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE 
=============================== 
 
 
¶2. (U) During a discussion of the upcoming MPRI 
In-Progress-Review (which took place on October 12 - septel), 
Ambassador Jeter emphasized that MPRI was at a critical 
juncture.  MPRI's reform assistance was clearly important to 
Nigeria's military institutions, but could only be effective 
if embraced by the MOD and Services.  The Minister agreed, 
noting that he and the Service Chiefs would make their joint 
recommendation to the President based on the 
In-Progress-Review (IPR).  He agreed to attend a Presidential 
meeting with Generals Saint and Vuono of MPRI, which we hope 
to have the week of October 22. 
 
 
=============== 
OFR - GOOD NEWS 
=============== 
 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Jeter remarked that Operation Focus Relief 
Phase 3 (OFR P3) was going exceptionally well.  The Army was 
providing outstanding support to the DATT and the 3rd Special 
Forces Trainers.  Clearly pleased, Danjuma declined a trip to 
one of the base camps for fear of helicopters, but agreed to 
visit the FOB in Abuja with the Ambassador soon.  Raising the 
MOI, the Ambassador told Danjuma we still awaited the pending 
signature or a Nigerian response.  The MOD Legal Department 
had, for some unknown reason, sent the document to the 
Nigerian Defense Intelligence Agency, Jeter explained. 
Danjuma, incredulous, could not understand why the Legal 
Department transmitted the MOI to DIA, but stated he would 
get an answer to us soon.  Danjuma stated that he had already 
seen the 505 Note, and was confused why it had also not been 
completed.  He directed Pennap to "chase it." 
 
 
================= 
UNAMSIL ROTATIONS 
================= 
 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Jeter informally asked Danjuma if Nigeria 
might consider a 6-month rotation for one of the units now 
entering UNAMSIL, with the goal of getting the third OFR P3 
battalion into Sierra Leone by April.  Danjuma, not willing 
to supercede planning by the Services, suggested the DATT 
raise the question with the Chief of Defense Staff. 
 
 
======================== 
THE WORD ON DROC/BURUNDI 
======================== 
 
 
¶5. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question about 
peacekeeping commitments, Danjuma explained that Nigeria was 
committed to send troops to Congo and had designated a unit. 
However, delays in reaching a settlement in the DROC had 
caused them to stand down.  Having served in the Congo in the 
1960's, President Obasanjo felt a strong connection and was 
committed to participate when a mission began. 
 
 
¶6. (C) On Burundi, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana and one other 
country (Danjuma could not remember which), had begun 
discussions on a possible peacekeeping mission.  The planning 
meetings, which Danjuma expected to conclude soon, would 
determine the size of the contingents, and dates of possible 
deployment.  Deployment might begin in the near future, but 
Nigeria would be last to deploy in any rotation.  Troops from 
Southern African countries should lead since Nigeria was not 
sufficiently familiar with the area, Danjuma reasoned. 
 
 
========= 
TERRORISM 
========= 
 
 
¶7. (C) The meeting concluded with a brief discussion on 
terrorism.  Danjuma said that unfortunately globalization and 
information technology had afforded the terrorists as much 
propaganda capacity as the West.  He also expressed concern 
that the Al-Qa'ida and associated organizations would stop at 
nothing to drag ordinary Nigerians into the conflict. 
Ambassador Jeter contended that Nigeria's greatest 
vulnerability was its oil and natural gas facilities in the 
Delta.  Actually, said Danjuma, "We worry about Abuja." 
Explaining that Abuja had an open and excellent road system, 
which was essentially "deserted" at night, Danjuma had tasked 
Chief of Army Staff LTG Ogomudia to update Army contingency 
plans for the capital. 
 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT: Recently back from a long vacation in Spain, 
Danjuma appeared refreshed.  This boded well for the 
MPRI/IPR, but even after good, open and frank discussions, it 
remains unclear whether the Ministry and Services will 
support another round of the program.  While Danjuma's 
mentioning of Abuja as the greatest security concern in the 
aftermath of September 11 seems out of step with mainstream 
senior GON thinking, we are nonetheless heartened that he is 
taking precautions to guard the city and, by extension, the 
Embassy.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Freetown minimize considered. 
Jeter