This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002562 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF, AF/W, AF/RA AND AF/E 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO SPECIAL ENVOY DANFORTH 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME, OSLO FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
CAIRO FOR MAXSTADT 
NSC FOR FRAZER AND MILLER 
DIA FOR J.GERHARD 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2011 
TAGS: PREL KPKO CG SU BY NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED DISCUSSES SUDAN, DRC, BURUNDI 
 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 2113 
     ¶B. ABUJA 2560 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter, accompanied by PolCouns and 
PolMilOff, called on NSA Aliyu Mohammed on October 8. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sule Lamido, the Governor of 
Kaduna State, Alhaji Ahmed Mohammed Makarfi, Adobe Obe, an 
advisor to President Obasanjo, and LTC Idris, the NSA's 
Military Advisor also attended.  This message covers their 
conversation on the Sudan peace process, and Nigeria's 
mediation efforts on the DROC and Burundi. 
 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The NSA conveyed a message passed 
to President Obasanjo from Sudanese Minister al-Din 
requesting the U.S. suspend unilateral sanctions on Sudan. 
Mohammed explained Nigeria's plan to host conferences of 
Southern and Northern Sudanese leaders in Abuja next month. 
The NSA made a strong case for U.S.-Nigeria cooperative 
efforts to achieve peace in Sudan.  On Congo, after an 
initial attempt at a meeting with Kabila, Bemba and Onusumba 
failed due to logistical snafus, Nigeria now was working on a 
second meeting.  Finally, the NSA briefly discussed a 
possible peacekeeping mission in Burundi, and told us that an 
ailing Mandela had asked Obasanjo to take over as mediator. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
======================= 
SUDAN - TOO MANY COOKS? 
======================= 
 
 
¶3. (C) The NSA informed Ambassador Jeter that, during a 
recent meeting, the Sudanese Minister of Peace, Dr. Ghazi 
Salah al-Din, had asked President Obasanjo to appeal to 
President Bush to waive U.S. unilateral sanctions against 
Sudan (due for renewal on 4 November, according to the NSA). 
The NSA believed that lifting the sanctions would help the 
peace process.  Mohammed believed Sudan was making an effort 
to be on the right side of the war against terrorism and was 
seeking to engage bilaterally with many countries, including 
the U.S.  FM Lamido agreed, noting that Sudan appeared to be 
under "a new dispensation."  The NSA added that al-Din had 
suggested Special Envoy Senator Danforth travel to Abuja to 
meet with President Obasanjo when Danforth makes his first 
trip to Sudan.  President Obasanjo would welcome a meeting 
with Senator Danforth, either before or after he travels to 
Sudan, the NSA interjected. 
 
 
¶4. (C) The NSA outlined Nigeria's approach to facilitating 
the peace process.  Nigeria planned to hold two simultaneous 
conferences in Abuja from 12 to 17 November: one to get the 
fractious Southern leaders to a common position; the other 
for the Northern leaders.  Once both groups had achieved a 
workable degree of internal cohesion, the two conferences 
would be brought under one tent.  The goal was to reach a 
cessation of hostilities, and to come to agreement on a 
"united Sudan" that would grant significant autonomy to the 
South through a federation, "like Nigeria's."  On matters of 
health, education and development, the component states would 
have significant decision-making powers, but in foreign 
affairs and monetary policy, Khartoum would be paramount, 
Lamido noted.  The Carter Center, the office of the UN 
Secretary General, Libya, and other interested African states 
 
SIPDIS 
would be invited to have observers at the conference, 
particularly Sudan's neighbors. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Jeter asked if Sudan were willing to 
discuss self-determination.  Lamido responded that 
self-determination was a "complicated phrase," and that a 
more palatable term for Khartoum was "autonomy."  Both Lamido 
and Mohammed contended that some neighboring states had 
self-interested agendas which they were pushing to the 
detriment of peace in Sudan.  Some states were complicating 
matters by using phrases like self-determination that only 
stoked the passions of hard-liners on both sides of the 
North-South divide.  In this regard, it was important to keep 
the headstrong Garang from acting like a choleric 
jack-in-the-box who could up-end the entire process. 
Conversely, the NSA explained, Nigeria had no ulterior 
motives but was merely seeking to provide a venue where 
discussions could take place and was seeking the support of 
the UN, U.S. and EU for this effort.  (COMMENT:  The 
statement about pristine non-interest does not entirely ring 
true.  Nigeria is trying to cast itself as an important 
catalyst in African diplomacy.  Moreover, with an Islamic 
North that usually wields national power and a fractious 
Christian South, there is a certain impressionistic 
similarity between the two states that beckons to the 
Nigerians as they grapple with their own internal conflicts. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
 
======================= 
DROC - A MISSED MEETING 
======================= 
 
 
¶6. (C) The NSA stated that "Baby Kabila" (as President 
Obasanjo calls him) briefly had visited Nigeria for a meeting 
with Bemba, Onusumba and President Obasanjo on October 2. 
However, the other two were no shows.  Recounting the events 
that led to the abortive meeting, the NSA explained that 
Onusumba had been unable to make an airline connection from 
Brussels.  Bemba had therefore decided not to come to Abuja, 
fearing he would be accused of striking a secret deal if he 
met Kabila alone.  Kabila had a short meeting with President 
Obasanjo.  Meanwhile, all three agreed to try again.  The GON 
hoped to arrange the discussions for 12-13 October. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Responding to Ambassador Jeter's question whether the 
NSA expected any breakthrough, the NSA struck a much more 
positive note about President Kabila than in the past (Ref 
A).  The NSA described Kabila as intelligent and as having a 
vision for his country that would lead him to make 
compromises.  However, the NSA cautioned, the Kabila 
government only controlled Kinshasa and its environs. 
Additionally, Kabila was surrounded by his father's henchmen 
who did not embrace all of Kabila the Younger's more 
progressive ways. 
 
 
================================== 
BURUNDI - A NEW ROLE FOR OBASANJO? 
================================== 
 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador Jeter asked whether President Obasanjo had 
asked the National Assembly's permission to send troops to 
Burundi, as reported in the Nigerian press.  The NSA stated 
that Burundi had sought Nigeria's assistance, and thus Army 
Minister Batagarawa had visited Burundi the previous week. 
As a result, Nigeria, along with two other countries (South 
Africa and possibly Senegal), were considering sending 
peacekeeping forces there.  Obasanjo needed approval from the 
Nigerian legislature.  More significantly, the NSA stated 
that President Mandela had asked President Obasanjo to take 
over his role as mediator.  (COMMENT:  Obasanjo himself later 
told Ambassador Jeter, however, that he would not take over 
Mandela's role but would work more closely with Mandela on 
the Burundi problem than he has done in the past.  END 
COMMENT). 
 
 
¶9. (C) Lamido observed that President Mandela was "tiring and 
not well" and wanted out of the process but did not want his 
exit to create a vacuum in the peace process.  Thus Mandela 
had to seek a personality with high stature to fill his role. 
 The NSA did not indicate if President Obasanjo had agreed to 
Mandela's request.  (COMMENT:  During a later conversation, 
the SA to the Army Minister told PolMilOff that he and his 
Minister had in fact met in Arusha last week.  He was jetting 
off with his Minister (Lawal Batagarawa) to meet again with 
the same cast of characters, this time on October 11 in 
Pretoria.  He expected a Head of State meeting would take 
place in South Africa in the near future, but was unsure who 
would attend.  END COMMENT.) 
 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: In its quest to be a preeminent Continental 
actor, Nigeria continues to play a useful role, such as the 
recently negotiated Abuja agreement on Zimbabwe, and has had 
some successes, such as the recently negotiated peace in 
Sierra Leone. 
 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: NSA Mohammed clearly signaled 
Nigeria's willingness to work with us on Sudan.  Washington 
and Abuja's interests in Sudan generally coincide.  In 
tandem, we could do much to advance the process as well as to 
demonstrate the utility of a stronger U.S.-Nigeria 
partnership in Continental peacekeeping matters. 
¶12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: If we do not work together, this 
will complicate the Sudanese process and throw dirt on the 
foreign policy aspect of our bilateral relationship.  Working 
with Nigeria will also lessen the perception that our latest 
efforts in Sudan are faith-based and perhaps even 
anti-Islamic, a perception that we must assiduously guard 
against at this time.  Consequently, it would be extremely 
useful for Senator Danforth to meet President Obasanjo soon 
in order to coordinate efforts on the Sudan, preferably 
before the Senator travels to Khartoum.  END COMMENT. 
Jeter