O 110706Z SEP 01
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6775
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 
AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 
AMEMBASSY TIRANA 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
SKOPJEBETA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/POLAD//
USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/BTF//
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
DIA WASHDC//DH-10//
CDR TASK FORCE FALCON//POLAD/G2//
USMISSION USOSCE 
USDOCO SOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAF//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 001593 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR SCHULTE, USOSCE FOR ODLUM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2006 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM EAID ECON NATO SR
SUBJECT: THACI SCENESETTER: LEADER LOOKING FOR APPROVAL 
 
¶1. (U)   CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JOHN K. MENZIES, COM, FOR 
REASONS 1.5 (B&D) 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶2.  (C) DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KOSOVO (PDK) PRESIDENT HASHIM 
THACI IS CONCERNED THAT WASHINGTON IS NEITHER MUCH INTERESTED 
IN NOR FRIENDLY TOWARDS HIM, AND WILL SEEK DEMONSTRATIONS OF 
APPROVAL, LARGELY TO BOLSTER HIS IMAGE IN KOSOVO, BUT ALSO 
BECAUSE HE WANTS THE RECOGNITION.  HIS POLITICAL STRENGTH IN 
KOSOVO A BIT RAGGED, THACI MAY BE MORE OPEN TO ENCOURAGEMENT 
TO BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE, PARTICULARLY IN REACHING OUT TO 
KOSOVO SERBS.  IN HIS MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, WE SHOULD ALSO 
PUSH HIM TO DO HIS PART BEFORE AND AFTER THE NOVEMBER 
ELECTIONS TO CONSOLIDATE DEMOCRACY IN KOSOVO.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
POLITICIAN IN SEARCH OF... 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) AS PDK PRESIDENT THACI LEAVES KOSOVO FOR THE U.S. 
SEPTEMBER 11, HE IS A POLITICIAN WHOSE RHYTHM HAS BEEN BROKEN 
BOTH BY HIS COMPATRIOTS' PREFERENCE FOR MOVING PAST THE WAR 
AND FOR POLITICAL MODERATION, AND BY AN ACUTE AWARENESS OF 
POLITICAL CHANGES IN WASHINGTON.  NEVER ONE TO LOOK TO OTHER 
EUROPEAN CAPITALS, THACI NOW FEARS THAT HIS STOCK HAS FALLEN 
IN U.S. POLICY CIRCLES.  A MAJOR REASON FOR HIS TRIP, HE HAS 
IMPLIED, IS TO GAUGE JUST HOW DEEP THE DISENCHANTMENT WITH 
HIM GOES THERE. 
 
 
...APPROVAL 
----------- 
 
¶4.  (C) SOMEWHAT COUNTER-INTUITIVELY PERHAPS, IT IS THACI WHO 
HAS MOST RELIED ON A PRESUMED "ALLIANCE" WITH THE U.S. TO 
BOLSTER HIS POLITICAL FORTUNES.  HIS POLITICAL FORTUNES IN 
KOSOVO HAVE SAGGED.  DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE OF KOSOVO (LDK) 
PRESIDENT RUGOVA HAS SOME 12 YEARS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT 
AND LEADERSHIP IN KOSOVO, AS WELL AS STILL VERY STRONG 
POPULAR SENTIMENT IN HIS FAVOR.  THACI WILL ALWAYS FALL SHORT 
OF RUGOVA,S STATURE AS A FATHER FIGURE FOR THE K-ALBANIANS. 
AT A PRISTINA CULTURAL EVENT SEPTEMBER 8, RUGOVA APPEARED 
RELAXED AND CONNECTED WELL WITH THE AUDIENCE.  IN CONTRAST, 
THACI FELL FLAT IN HIS SPEECH. 
 
¶5.  (C) ALLIANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF KOSOVO (AAK) PRESIDENT 
RAMUSH HARADINAJ CAN POINT TO HIS OWN WAR RECORD WHEN HE 
NEEDS TO, BUT HAS NOT SAT ON HIS LAURELS, INSTEAD 
ENERGETICALLY PURSUING A RANGE OF POLITICAL ALLIANCES AND 
BROADENING THE APPEAL OF HIS COALITION.  SPECULATION IS RIFE 
THAT THE AAK WILL SURPASS THE PDK ON NOVEMBER 17 AND BECOME 
KOSOVO,S SECOND POLITICAL FORCE AND REAL OPPOSITION.  AS THE 
BRITISH COM PUT IT RECENTLY, THACI COULD BECOME "YESTERDAY,S 
MAN" IN KOSOVO. 
 
¶6.  (C) BOTH RUGOVA AND HARADINAJ ARE EAGER TO COOPERATE AND 
MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., OF COURSE, BUT NEITHER 
NEEDS US IN THE WAY THACI, WHO REMAINS PERSONALLY VESTED IN 
HAVING "LIBERATED" KOSOVO, SEEMS TO DO.  HE WILL BE ANXIOUS, 
AS THE CAMPAIGN SEASON STARTS IN KOSOVO, TO PORTRAY HIMSELF 
AS PLUGGED INTO THE USG IN WASHINGTON AND UN IN NEW YORK.  HE 
WILL SEEK A PUBLIC POLITICAL EMBRACE FROM U.S. OFFICIALS. 
 
 
...SUPPORT 
---------- 
 
¶7.  (C) THACI AND OTHER PDK LEADERS HAVE NOT DONE MUCH EITHER 
TO REDEFINE THEMSELVES IDEOLOGICALLY OR TO RE-ENERGIZE THE 
PARTY ORGANIZATION FOLLOWING THEIR DISAPPOINTING, BUT NOT 
WHOLLY UNEXPECTED, SHOWING LAST OCTOBER.  RUMORS OF 
INFIGHTING HAVE INCREASED DURING THE YEAR (ALTHOUGH THACI WAS 
ABLE IN DECEMBER AND JANUARY TO DISAPPEAR TO THE U.S. FOR 6 
WEEKS WITHOUT APPARENT CONCERN OVER A COUP D'ETAT).  MORE 
THAN ONCE, THE PRESS STATEMENTS AND PUBLIC POSITIONS OF PDK 
OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN AT VARIANCE, HIGHLIGHTING SHAKY CENTRAL 
CONTROL.  MOREOVER, THE PDK HAS SEVERAL WELL-KNOWN AND MEDIA 
SAVVY HIGH OFFICERS, MORE THAN ONE OF WHOM MAY SEEK AN EVEN 
HIGHER PROFILE IN THE PARTY.  ANOTHER DISAPPOINTING SHOWING 
IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS COULD SHARPEN THE INTERNAL 
CHALLENGE TO THACI. 
 
 
...ENCOURAGEMENT TO DO RIGHT 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) DESPITE HIS POLITICAL WOES, HOWEVER, THACI IS SHOWING 
SOME OPENNESS TO POSITIVE STEPS ON THE KOSOVO SCENE.  FOR 
EXAMPLE, IN A RECENT DISCUSSION WITH THE COM, HE AGREED TO 
MEET WITH THE K-SERB LEADER MOMCILO TRAJKOVIC, PROVIDED USOP 
ASSISTED IN FACILITATING AND PROVIDING A VENUE.  THE KOSOVAR 
PRESS IS REPORTING ON THE INVITATION OF SERBIAN PM DJINDJIC 
FOR THACI TO VISIT BELGRADE.  EARLIER THIS SUMMER, WHEN 
DJINDJIC SUGGESTED ORALLY THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO MET WITH BOTH 
THACI AND KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS (KPC) COMMANDER AGIM CEKU, 
THACI EXPRESSED SOME WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A MEETING ON 
NEUTRAL GROUND.  WE DO NOT KNOW IF HE WILL GO TO BELGRADE (HE 
MAY SUSPECT A POLITICAL OR JUDICIAL TRAP), BUT HE HAS 
ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIVING THE SERBIAN PM'S LATEST, AND MORE 
OFFICIAL, INVITATION. 
 
¶9.  (C) INTERESTINGLY, THOSE WHO ATTEND MEETINGS OF THE 
INTERIM ADVISORY COUNCIL (IAC) KNOW THAT IN PRIVATE, THACI IS 
COMFORTABLE AND GETS ALONG WELL WITH SERB OBSERVER RADA 
TRAJKOVIC, JOKING WITH HER EVEN IN SERBIAN.  PRECISELY 
BECAUSE OF HIS KLA LEADERSHIP DURING THE WAR, THACI IS 
POLITICALLY SAFER IN REACHING OUT TO KOSOVO SERBS THAN IS 
RUGOVA.  THE LATTER WAS MORE THAN ONCE PORTRAYED AS "SOFT ON 
SERBIA", AND FINDS THIS HIS MOST SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL 
VULNERABILITY.  THACI CANNOT BE ACCUSED OF COMPLICITY.  WE 
BELIEVE THAT HE RECOGNIZES THIS AND MAY SEEK TO USE DEALINGS 
WITH THE SERBS TO RAISE HIS PROFILE -- AND GAIN OUR APPROVAL. 
 WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE HIM TO UNDERTAKE CONSTRUCTIVE MOVES IN 
THIS DIRECTION, SINCE THIS IS AN AREA IN WHICH HE AND HIS 
FOLLOWERS CAN DO A LOT TO IMPROVE THE CLIMATE FOR 
RECONCILIATION AND RETURNS. 
 
¶10.  (C) IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT, AS EVENTS IN THE FYROM 
DEGENERATED DURING THE SPRING, THACI TOOK THE MOST 
CONSTRUCTIVE PUBLIC LINE FOR SOME TIME (WHATEVER HE OR HIS 
COHORTS MAY HAVE DONE LESS PUBLICLY), OFFERING POLITICAL 
SUPPORT TO HIS OLD MENTOR ARBEN XHAFERI, PRESIDENT OF THE 
ALBANIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDSH) IN FYROM AND MOST PROMINENT 
OF THE ALBANIANS IN PARTICIPATING IN GOVERNMENT THERE.  THACI 
MAINTAINED THIS SUPPORT DESPITE CRITICISM FROM WITHIN HIS OWN 
PARTY AS TO HIS LOYALTY TO THE ALBANIAN CAUSE. 
 
 
...A FUTURE 
----------- 
 
¶11.  (C) THACI TOLD THE COM RECENTLY THAT VIOLENCE HAS 
TAPERED OFF IN KOSOVO.  THERE ARE STILL OCCASIONAL REPORTS OF 
ATTACKS OR INSTANCES OF INTIMIDATION AGAINST LDK ACTIVISTS IN 
PARTICULAR, HOWEVER, AND THACI KNOWS WELL THAT PDK IS ALWAYS 
THE FIRST SUSPECT.  IN OUR PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS,  THACI IS 
ALREADY WARNING OF LDK POLITICAL DOMINANCE, WHICH HE FEARS 
WILL BECOME "ONE-PARTY RULE."  USG OFFICIALS MAY WISH TO 
ENCOURAGE HIM TO ENCOURAGE CONTINUED REDUCTION OF VIOLENCE, 
TO BEHAVE CONSTRUCTIVELY DURING THE CAMPAIGN, AND TO DO HIS 
PART, NO MATTER WHAT THE ELECTORAL OUTCOME, TO CONSOLIDATE 
DEMOCRACY IN KOSOVO. 
 
¶12.  (U) BELGRADE MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
 
MENZIES