This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

041251Z Sep 01


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4347

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FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9625
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF, AF/RA, AND AF/S 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/06 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN PINR ZI
SUBJECT: EDDISON ZVOBGO ON SANCTIONS, PRESIDENTIAL 
         CANDIDATES, AND ZANU-PF ELECTORAL PROSPECTS 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY DCM REWHITEHEAD DUE TO 1.5 (B0 AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  ON AUGUST 30, DCM AND POLOFF MET WITH 
EDDISON ZVOBGO, ZANU-PF KINGPIN FROM MASVINGO AND ONE OF 
THE MOST PROMINENT ANTI-MUGABE MEMBERS OF ZANU-PF. 
ZVOBGO QUIZZED US ABOUT POSSIBLE U.S. SANCTIONS THAT 
MIGHT BE LEVIED AGAINST MUGABE/ZIMBABWE/ZANU-PF IN THE 
WAKE OF FAILED 2002 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.  HE WAS FIRM 
THAT MUGABE WILL STAND AS THE ZANU-PF CANDIDATE BUT 
STATED UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE MDC'S TSVANGIRAI WOULD WIN 
A HEAD-TO-HEAD CONTEST WITH MUGABE DESPITE ZANU-PF 
EFFORTS TO RIG THE GAME.  ZVOBGO WAS DISMISSIVE OF 
TSVANGIRAI'S PRESIDENTIAL POTENTIAL, CHARACTERIZING THE 
 
SIPDIS 
MDC LEADER AS SHALLOW AND UNAWARE OF THE ENORMITY OF THE 
CHALLENGES AHEAD.  ZVOBGO HEDGED ON WHETHER MUGABE WILL 
RESPECT THE OUTCOME OF A VOTE THAT, FOR WHATEVER REASON, 
DOES NOT GO HIS WAY.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------- 
THE CROSS EXAMINATION 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) ZVOBGO, A LONG-TIME ZANU-PF INSIDER WHOM MUGABE 
PURGED FROM THE POLITBURO IN 2000 FOR OPPOSING MUGABE'S 
HARDBALL POLICIES, IS ALSO A SEASONED MP AND A LAWYER OF 
CONSIDERABLE REPUTE.  HE LAUNCHED AT ONCE INTO A CROSS- 
EXAMINATION, INQUIRING EXACTLY WHAT OUTCOMES THE U.S. 
SEEKS IN ZIMBABWE.  DCM REPLIED THAT RESTORATION OF THE 
RULE OF LAW, AN END TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, RATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES, AND 
RESPECT FOR THE RESULTS OF 2002 PRESIDENTIAL POLLS (THAT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02594  01 OF 03  041303Z 
ARE NOT FATALLY FLAWED) ARE THE BASIC BENCHMARKS. 
ZVOBGO QUERIED ABOUT SECRETARY POWELL'S LIKELY REACTION 
IN THE "UNLIKELY" EVENT OF AN ELECTION THAT ZANU-PF 
LOSES BUT -- DESPITE OBSERVER CORROBORATION THAT THE 
ELECTION WAS VALID -- DOES NOT ACCEPT.  DCM RESPONDED 
THAT THE REACTION THROUGHOUT THE USG WOULD BE SHARPLY 
NEGATIVE.  THIS WOULD TRIGGER A DOWNTURN IN THE 
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. 
 
¶3.  (C) ASSUMING ZDERA IS EVENTUALLY ENACTED INTO LAW, 
ZVOBGO ASKED, WHAT SANCTIONS, BESIDES THOSE MENTIONED IN 
THE SENATE TEXT, WOULD THE USG IMPOSE?  DCM POINTED OUT 
THAT THE INCENTIVES LISTED IN THE SENATE VERSION (WHICH 
ZVOBGO HAD STUDIED) IN FACT REFLECT THE STATUS QUO.  ANY 
POSSIBLE PUNITIVE SANCTIONS ASIDE, ZIMBABWE STANDS TO 
PROFIT ENORMOUSLY FROM USG SUPPORT ON THE INCENTIVES 
SECTION OF THE ACT.  DCM ASKED ZVOBGO WHAT SANCTIONS HE 
THOUGHT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE IN MOVING MUGABE AND HIS 
ENTOURAGE AWAY FROM PRESENT POLICIES. 
 
¶4.  (C) ZVOBGO REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE A GOOD 
ANSWER.  HOWEVER, IT WAS CLEAR THAT BLANKET ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS WOULD BE DEVASTATING FOR ZIMBABWE AND ITS 
PEOPLE.  DCM RESPONDED THAT SUCH MEASURES ARE NOT 
PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED.  ZVOBGO OBSERVED THAT FOREIGN 
MINISTER MUDENGE HAS THREATENED A STATE OF EMERGENCY IF 
ZDERA IS ENACTED, AT WHICH TIME ZVOBGO ANTICIPATES THE 
GOZ WILL REIMPOSE A COMMAND AND CONTROL ECONOMY.  HE 
NOTED THAT ZIMBABWE WOULD SOON HAVE ARREARS OF USD 1 
BILLION IN DEBT SERVICE.  HE ASKED IF THE BANK AND FUND 
WERE PREPARED TO WATCH ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMY COLLAPSE.  DCM 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02594  01 OF 03  041303Z 
OBSERVED THAT WHILE HE WAS UNABLE TO SPEAK FOR THE 
IFI'S, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO CONTEMPLATE THESE 
INSTITUTIONS, OR OTHERS, RUSHING TO ASSIST ZIMBABWE IN 
THE WAKE OF FATALLY FLAWED ELECTIONS AND CONTINUED SELF- 
DESTRUCTIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES. 
 
----------------- 
MUGABE WILL STAND 
----------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) ZVOBGO CONFIRMED THAT, BARRING A "MIRACLE", 
MUGABE WILL BE ZANU-PF'S CANDIDATE IN 2002.  HE DID NOT 
THINK THAT THE SPECIAL ZANU-PF CONGRESS IN NOVEMBER 
COULD DO ANYTHING ABOUT THIS, SINCE MUGABE HAS SHOWN NO 
INDICATION THAT HE PLANS TO STEP DOWN.  ZVOBGO NOTED 
BITTERLY THAT NO ONE IN MUGABE'S INNER CIRCLE OF 
"CRONIES AND BOOTLICKERS" HAD THE GUTS TO TELL MUGABE 
THAT IT IS TIME TO GO. 
 
¶6.  (C) "I'M FULL OF ADMIRATION FOR THE ZAMBIANS FOR 
WHAT THEY'VE JUST DONE," HE SAID (REFERRING TO THE 
REJECTION OF PRESIDENT CHILUBA'S THIRD-TERM BID). 
ZVOBGO ADDED THAT THE ZIMBABWEAN DYNAMIC WAS DIFFERENT, 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4349 
 
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O 041251Z SEP 01 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9626 
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
NSC WASHDC 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 HARARE 002594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF, AF/RA, AND AF/S 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/06 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN PINR ZI
SUBJECT: EDDISON ZVOBGO ON SANCTIONS, PRESIDENTIAL 
         CANDIDATES, AND ZANU-PF ELECTORAL PROSPECTS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02594  02 OF 03  041303Z 
SINCE ZAMBIAN PARTY POLITICS (DESPITE THE RHETORIC OF 
REVOLUTION) HAD BEEN STRICTLY CIVILIAN FROM THE 
INCEPTION, WHILE ZANU-PF HAD HATCHED FROM A ZIPRA/ZANLA 
CANNON BALL.  ZVOBGO NOTED THAT THE POLITBURO, WHICH IS 
COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES, HOLDS THE 
REAL POWER IN ZANU-PF.  PROSPECTS FOR AN INTRA-PARTY 
REVOLT AGAINST MUGABE ARE THUS VERY SMALL, ZVOBGO 
STATED, EVEN THOUGH EVERYONE REALIZES THAT ZANU-PF'S 
ELECTORAL PROSPECTS WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY ENHANCED IF 
MUGABE WOULD STEP DOWN. 
 
------------------------------ 
ZANU CAN'T WIN, NO MATTER WHAT 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) AT DCM'S REQUEST, ZVOBGO PROVIDED HIS ANALYSIS 
OF HOW THE 2002 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WILL UNFOLD.  HE 
NOTED THAT THE APPROXIMATE HALVING OF THE 120 ELECTED 
PARLIAMENTARY SEATS BETWEEN ZANU-PF AND MDC IN THE 2000 
ELECTIONS INDICATED THAT THE PARTIES HAVE ROUGHLY EQUAL 
SUPPORT COUNTRYWIDE.  HOWEVER, TURNOUT IN URBAN AREAS IS 
ALWAYS HIGHER, AND THE MDC'S LOCK ON THE TOWNS GIVES 
THEM A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE.  TURNOUT WOULD DETERMINE 
THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST, HE CONCLUDED. 
 
¶8.  (C) ZVOBGO PREDICTED THAT THE NATIONAL TURNOUT IN 
2002 WOULD BE SECOND ONLY TO THE FIRST POST-UDI 
ELECTIONS IN 1980.  THE MDC WAS "BOUND TO CLEAN UP" IN 
URBAN AREAS FROM MUTARE IN THE EAST TO PLUMTREE IN THE 
WEST.  ZVOBGO SAID THAT AS MANY AS 80 PERCENT OF 
REGISTERED URBAN VOTERS WOULD TURN OUT.  ZANU-PF HAS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02594  02 OF 03  041303Z 
BEEN UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THESE VOTERS WHY ZANU RE- 
ELECTION WOULD BENEFIT THEM.  THE GOZ HAS NOTHING TO 
OFFER IN TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT, STABLE PRICES FOR FOOD 
STAPLES, AND OTHER URBAN CONCERNS.  TOWN-DWELLERS, HE 
CONTINUED, ARE NOT INTERESTED IN FARMLAND EVEN IF IT IS 
OFFERED GRATIS.  HE SAID THAT URBAN DISLIKE OF MUGABE 
HAS FESTERED INTO HATRED, WHICH WOULD BE VENTED AT THE 
POLLS. 
 
¶9.  (C) ZVOBGO AGREED THAT ZANU-PF RETAINS CONSIDERABLE 
STRENGTH IN RURAL AREAS.  HOWEVER, ELECTIONS IN MARCH 
WOULD COINCIDE WITH RAINS, POLLING STATIONS LOCATED FAR 
FROM MOST HABITATIONS, UNPAVED COUNTRY ROADS IN A 
DEPLORABLE STATE DUE TO A LACK OF MAINTENANCE IN 2001, 
AND NO AGRICULTURAL INPUTS FOR THOSE RESETTLED IN THE 
FAST TRACK PROGRAM, HALFWAY THROUGH THE GROWING SEASON. 
(HE ADDED THAT EVEN IF THE GOZ HAD THE MONEY FOR INPUTS, 
IT HAD NO WORKABLE MECHANISM FOR DISTRIBUTING THEM.) 
ZVOBGO PREDICTED A RURAL TURNOUT OF BETWEEN 30 AND 40 
PERCENT, AND NO MORE THAN 40 PERCENT EVEN IF ZANU-PF 
PULLS OUT ALL THE STOPS.  (IN THE JUNE 2000 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, ONLY 11 RURAL CONSTITUENCIES 
TOPPED 50 PERCENT TURNOUT, AND SOME OF THESE WERE NOT IN 
ZANU-PF AREAS.) 
 
¶10.  (C) HE NOTED THAT RECENT BY-ELECTIONS HAVE 
INDICATED ERODING ZANU-PF SUPPORT IN RURAL 
CONSTITUENCIES, WITH MDC PULLING DOWN 25-30 PERCENT OF 
THE VOTE.  THE MATHEMATICAL OUTCOME OF ALL THIS WAS 
CLEAR.  MASSIVE URBAN TURNOUT, LIGHT RURAL TURNOUT, AND 
GROWING MDC SUPPORT IN SOME RURAL AREAS WOULD INEVITABLY 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02594  02 OF 03  041303Z 
TIP THE SCALES IN THE MDC'S FAVOR.  ZVOBGO CONCLUDED 
THAT AT THIS POINT, "THERE IS PROBABLY NOTHING ZANU CAN 
DO TO TURN AROUND THE VOTE." 
 
------------- 
PARTING SHOTS 
------------- 
 
¶11. (C) TO DCM'S QUERY ABOUT HIS VIEWS ON HOW WELL MDC 
WOULD PERFORM IN THE EXECUTIVE ROLE, ZVOBGO WAS 
DISMISSIVE.  HE SAID THAT HE WAS WELL ACQUAINTED WITH 
TSVANGIRAI, WHO SPOKE TO HIM ON A DAILY BASIS.  HE 
 
SIPDIS 
OBSERVED THAT WHILE TSVANGIRAI IS "INTENSE AND 
PASSIONATE", HE WAS ALSO RATHER "SHALLOW AND IMMATURE." 
IN ZVOBGO'S VIEW, TSVANGIRAI'S LACK OF BROAD-BASED 
EDUCATION IS A CRITICAL SHORTCOMING.  ZVOBGO SAID THAT 
IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, TSVANGARAI SHOWS LITTLE 
APPRECIATION FOR THE DEPTH OF ZIMBABWE'S PROBLEMS AND 
THE CHALLENGES THAT WOULD CONFRONT TSVANGIRAI, SHOULD HE 
BE ELECTED PRESIDENT.  HE ADDED THAT TSVANGIRAI'S 
ELECTION WOULD BE BY DEFAULT AND SIGNAL A REJECTION OF 
MUGABE RATHER THAN A STRONG PREFERENCE FOR TSVANGIRAI. 
ZVOBGO CONCLUDED THAT IT SEEMS THAT ZANU-PF IS BOUND BY 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4350 
 
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O 041251Z SEP 01 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9627 
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
NSC WASHDC 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 HARARE 002594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF, AF/RA, AND AF/S 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/06 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN PINR ZI
SUBJECT: EDDISON ZVOBGO ON SANCTIONS, PRESIDENTIAL 
         CANDIDATES, AND ZANU-PF ELECTORAL PROSPECTS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02594  03 OF 03  041304Z 
A SUICIDE PACT.  HE FOUND IT VERY FRUSTRATING. 
 
¶12.  (C) IN RESPONSE TO POLOFF'S QUERY ON WHAT VOTERS 
ARE THINKING IN THE PIVOTAL PROVINCE OF MASVINGO, ZVOBGO 
ANSWERED THAT HE HAD ALREADY HELD FIVE OF TWENTY-FIVE 
SCHEDULED CONSTITUENCY MEETINGS.  MANY OF HIS RURAL 
SUPPORTERS WERE TELLING HIM THAT WHILE THEY STILL PREFER 
ZANU, THEY NO LONGER WANT AND WILL NOT VOTE FOR MUGABE. 
THEY WERE ASKING ZVOBGO IF THEY SHOULD VOTE AT ALL, 
WHICH HE TOOK TO MEAN THAT SHOULD THEY VOTE, IT WOULD BE 
FOR THE MDC.  ZVOBGO DECLINED TO ANSWER A FINAL QUESTION 
ON WHETHER OR NOT MUGABE WOULD ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF A 
VOTE THAT, IN ZVOBGO'S OWN ANALYSIS, IS CERTAIN TO GO 
AGAINST THE INCUMBENT. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13.  (C) IF ZVOBGO'S ANALYSIS IS ANYWHERE NEAR THE MARK, 
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT RESTRICTED VOTER EDUCATION, ZANU-PF 
INTIMIDATION, AND OTHER CHICANERY MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH TO 
TURN THE TIDE.  ZVOBGO'S PROJECTION OF A MASSIVE URBAN 
TURNOUT OVERWHELMING A MODEST AND MIXED RURAL TURNOUT -- 
WITH MUGABE'S PERSONAL UNPOPULARITY THE MAJOR ISSUE -- 
WOULD INDICATE (IF ACCURATE) THAT THE PIVOT-POINT WILL 
COME THE DAY AFTER THE VOTE IS TALLIED, AND NOT IN THE 
RUN-UP TO ELECTIONS.  ZVOBGO'S POINTED QUESTIONS ON HOW 
THE USG (AND PRESUMABLY MUCH OF THE REST OF THE WORLD) 
MIGHT REACT SHOULD MUGABE REFUSE TO ACCEPT A VOTE THAT 
OUSTS HIM HIGHLIGHTS THIS AS A SCENARIO THAT ZVOBGO SEES 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02594  03 OF 03  041304Z 
AS LIKELY.  HE SEEMED TO ASSUME THAT ZDERA SANCTIONS (OR 
OTHERS) WOULD BE HELD IN RESERVE FOR THAT MOMENT. 
 
¶14.  (C) GIVEN HIS ANTI-MUGABE VIEWS, WE DOUBT THAT 
ZVOBGO HAS MUCH ACCESS TO MUGABE, ALTHOUGH HE PROBABLY 
MAINTAINS LINKS WITH THE INNER CIRCLE.  HE IS AN 
INTERESTING INTERLOCUTOR WHO MAY BE ABLE TO PASS ALONG 
OUR MESSAGES.  ALTHOUGH MENTALLY ACUTE, ZVOBGO APPEARED 
PHYSICALLY FRAIL AND TIRED. 
 
ROTH 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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