This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002451 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2011 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR KPKO SL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: MINISTER OF DEFENSE ON UNAMSIL ROTATIONS, 
505 AGREEMENT 
 
REF: A. STATE 143583 
     ¶B. ABUJA 2117 
     ¶C. ABUJA 2289 
     ¶D. STATE 151930 
     ¶E. ABUJA 2218 
     ¶F. ABUJA NI 228 
     ¶G. STATE 141654 
     ¶H. ABUJA 2448 
 
 
Classified by CDA Andrews; Reasons 1.5 (b/d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) CDA Andrews, accompanied by DATT, called on Minister 
of Defense Danjuma 25 September.  After the Minister offered 
his personal condolences on the attacks against the U.S., and 
CDA offered his condolences for the victims of the Jos riot, 
he raised the USG request that Nigeria adjust its troop 
rotations for UNAMSIL (Refs A-F).  Danjuma stated that when 
he returned from his vacation, he was told of the meeting 
between Ambassador Jeter and the President and informed that 
the President had agreed to keep one battalion in Sierra 
Leone until January.  However, Danjuma explained, the MOD had 
reviewed this and the subsequent request (that Nigeria not 
replace one battalion leaving Sierra Leone in September), and 
had determined that the MOU between Nigeria and the UN that 
governs Nigeria's participation in UNAMSIL did not permit the 
GON to meet the U.S. request.  He added that he had briefed 
the President on his analysis, and the President had agreed 
that Nigeria could not make the change without UN consent. 
The President had agreed to send a letter to the Ambassador 
explaining this position, and Danjuma provided a copy of the 
letter. (Text of the letter to Ambassador Jeter, which 
Embassy has yet to receive in original, is at para. 7.) 
 
 
¶2. (C) If UNDPKO approached the GON and made the request, 
would the GON reconsider, Andrews asked?  Danjuma replied 
that Nigeria had already begun to rotate troops, and that 
some had been airborne (over the Ivory Coast) when told to 
return (following our initial requests).  Danjuma said, "The 
troops have been at the two airports ready to go for two 
weeks.  I would not want to face them.  I would not want to 
explain to them the kind of game we're playing."  When 
Andrews asked the timing of the planned September rotations, 
Danjuma was unsure, explaining that that information was with 
the Chief of Defense Staff.  (DATT COMMENT:  65 Battalion 
rotation began on 17 September but was summarily cancelled 
and troops called back.  The cancellation does not support a 
Nigeria/UN agreement either, since rotating units after one 
year is a general policy.  END DATT COMMENT.) 
 
 
¶3. (C) Turning to OFR P3, Andrews explained that the 505 
Agreement between the U.S. and Nigeria signed in September 
2000 would have to be amended to cover some equipment being 
transferred in Phase 3 (Ref. H).  Andrews explained that the 
MFA had forwarded the Embassy's Note and the proposed 
response to the Minister's office for approval, which was 
required urgently.  Danjuma said he had not seen the 
documents.  (COMMENT:  CDA provided the Minister with another 
copy.  END COMMENT) 
 
 
¶4. (C) Andrews then told Danjuma that he had been to see the 
Air Force Minister, Dan Chuke, to request a blanket clearance 
for medical evacuation in light of OFR P3. (Ref G).  Danjuma 
was unsure if even he could approve such a request, let alone 
the Air Force, and opined that the request might have to be 
forwarded to the Presidency for a decision. (DATT COMMENT: 
MOD was the next stop after seeing Air Force Operations and 
the Air Force Minister.  END DATT COMMENT.) 
 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Finally, Andrews noted that former PDAS-D McConnell 
was planning a trip to Nigeria soon, and that OFR and MPRI 
FY02 would be on his agenda.  Andrews noted that Nigeria 
still had not paid the outstanding $320K for MPRI FY01. 
Danjuma seemed mildly surprised that the outstanding payment 
remained an issue. 
 
 
¶6. (C) COMMENT: Its seems clear that MOD and DHQ have driven 
the reversal of the President's decision to support the 
initial USG request.  Nigerian soldiers are poorly paid, and 
UN PKO deployments mean equipment and additional salary.  The 
Minister's concerns about informing expectant soldiers that 
they will not deploy and will not receive additional income 
are unfortunate but understandable.  It is unlikely that the 
GON would reconsider this position, or would have the ability 
to reconsider it (due to bureaucratic inertia) in time before 
rotations occur.  The two battalions rotating in (73 and 65) 
are the units that were originally scheduled for training in 
OFR P1 but were replaced because of logistical/basing issues. 
 With these two Nigerian battalions rotating in now, there 
may be room under the UNAMSIL troop ceiling for only two of 
the three Nigerian battalions being trained in OFR P3.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Begin Text: 
 
 
21 September 2001 
 
 
UNAMSIL TROOP DEPLOYMENT 
 
 
I write in respect of your meeting with President Olusegun 
Obasanjo on 24 August, 2001 during which you conveyed a 
proposal from your Government concerning the rotation of 
Nigerian battalions participating in the United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).  On that occasion, as 
might be recalled, the President was positively disposed to 
the US suggestion that one of the Nigerian battalions 
expected to be rotated out in September be kept until January 
¶2002.  A further request was subsequently made on behalf of 
your Government that the Nigerian battalion to be rotated out 
of Sierra Leone should not be replaced. 
 
 
I am to inform you however the His Excellency's attention has 
been drawn to the fact that Nigeria's participation in 
UNAMSIL is governed by conditions spelt out in the Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) signed between it and the United 
Nations (UN).  This agreement requires certain steps be taken 
before a contributing country can increase or decrease its 
troop size in UNAMSIL. 
 
 
It will therefore be understood that it will not be proper at 
this stage for Nigeria to change the composition of its 
forces in UNAMSIL, as this will amount to unilateral 
abrogation of the MOU.  accordingly, it has been decided that 
the rotation of Nigerian battalions in UNAMSIL should proceed 
along the lines earlier arranged with the UN and it is hoped 
that you will appreciate the difficulty in acceding to the 
request of the US Government. 
 
 
Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and 
personal esteem. 
 
 
/sgd/ 
Ambassador A.O. Esan, 
Ag. Chief of Staff to the President, C-In-C 
 
 
cc: 
Honorable Minister of Defense 
Honorable Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
 
End Text 
 
 
¶8. (U) Freetown minimize considered. 
Andrews