Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 01HANOI2151, STAFFDEL HEARS VOICES OF REFORM FROM WITHIN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #01HANOI2151.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
01HANOI2151 2001-08-31 07:29 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

310729Z Aug 01


 2001HANOI02151 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ8839

PAGE 01        HANOI  02151  01 OF 03  310844Z 
ACTION H-01     

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    DS-00    EAP-00   TEDE-00  SS-00    DSCC-00  
      DRL-02   SAS-00     /003W
                  ------------------193EA3  310844Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3828
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 002151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
STATE ALSO FOR DRL 
SECDEF FOR ISA/LSTERN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/11 
TAGS: PGOV ECON PHUM VM SOE FINREF DPOL
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL HEARS VOICES OF REFORM FROM WITHIN 
 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ROBERT PORTER. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02151  01 OF 03  310844Z 
REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
2. (C) SUMMARY: STAFFDEL REES AND GUNDERSON MET SEPARATELY 
ON AUGUST 10 AND AUGUST 14 WITH TWO MEMBERS OF THE 
PRESIDIUM OF THE FATHERLAND FRONT - PHAN DINH DIEU IN HANOI 
AND NGUYEN XUAN OANH IN HCMC.  ALTHOUGH NEITHER BELONGS TO THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY, BOTH HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN PARTY 
AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS DURING THEIR CAREERS AND REPORTEDLY 
CONTINUE TO BE INFLUENTIAL.  BOTH ARE STRONG ADVOCATES OF 
REFORM, ECONOMIC AS WELL AS POLITICAL.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MEETING WITH PHAN DINH DIEU 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (C) JOSEPH REES (COUNSEL TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS) AND BRIAN GUNDERSON (CHIEF OF 
STAFF TO HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER), ALONG WITH CONGENOFF, MET 
WITH PROF. PHAN DINH DIEU ON AUGUST 10 AT HIS HOME IN 
HANOI.  DIEU WAS A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DELEGATE IN THE 
1970'S.  CURRENTLY HE IS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE STEERING 
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAM ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
AND, ALTHOUGH NOT A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, IS A 
MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL PRESIDIUM OF THE PARTY'S NATIONAL 
FATHERLAND FRONT. 
 
4. (C) SPEAKING MOSTLY IN ENGLISH, BUT OCCASIONALLY RELYING 
ON AN INTERPRETER, SIXTY-FOUR-YEAR-OLD DIEU DESCRIBED 
HIMSELF TO THE STAFFDEL AS A MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTER 
SCIENCE RESEARCHER.  HE TOLD THEM THAT HE WAS A NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY DELEGATE IN THE 1970'S BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER 
REUNIFICATION.  HE DESCRIBED THE FATHERLAND FRONT AS AN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02151  01 OF 03  310844Z 
UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION FOR VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND 
SOCIETIES, BUT NOTED THAT HE PARTICIPATED IN THE FRONT AS 
AN INDIVIDUAL AND AS A SCIENTIST.  "I AM NOT A POLITICIAN," 
HE CLAIMED, "I AM A CITIZEN AND A PATRIOT." 
 
5. (C) DIEU SAID HE STUDIED IN THE SOVIET UNION IN THE 
1960'S.  HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVED IN THE SOCIAL 
AND HUMANITARIAN GOALS OF COMMUNISM, HIS YEARS IN THE 
SOVIET UNION TAUGHT HIM THAT THOSE GOALS COULD NOT BE 
REACHED THROUGH THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MECHANISMS HE 
SAW THERE.  HE SAID THAT VIETNAM'S COMMUNIST PARTY HAD MADE 
GREAT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COUNTRY, BUT THAT HE FELT THE 
COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY THAT WAS EFFECTIVE IN 
WARTIME COULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN 
PEACETIME.  "I SAID THAT OPENLY IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN 
THE LATE 1970'S, AND I STILL SAY SO TODAY QUITE OPENLY AND 
PUBLICLY," HE DECLARED. 
 
6. (C) IN 1980, HE SAID, PRIME MINISTER PHAM VAN DONG 
REQUESTED HIM TO PREPARE A PAPER CLARIFYING HIS IDEAS AND 
SUGGESTIONS.  HE SAID HE CRAFTED A LONG STATEMENT ON 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BASED ON SCIENTIFIC METHODS, MARKET 
MECHANISMS, AND A LOOSENING OF CENTRAL PLANNING AND 
CONTROL.  HE SAID HE PARTICULARLY CRITICIZED THE IDEA OF 
VIETNAM'S MILITARY BEING IN CHARGE OF MANAGING PEACETIME 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES.  IN 1980, DIEU SAID, THE LEADERS WERE 
NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE IDEAS, BUT BY 1986, THEY 
RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR CHANGE.  HE SAID HE ENCOURAGED THEM 
TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF GRADUAL REFORMS, BEGINNING WITH THE 
INTRODUCTION OF LIMITED MARKET MECHANISMS IN THE ECONOMY. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02151  01 OF 03  310844Z 
7. (C) HE SAID HE WAS WITH PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL DO MUOI 
IN 1989 DURING THE EVENING THE COUP TOOK PLACE IN THE 
SOVIET UNION.  THAT EVENT HAD A PROFOUND EFFECT ON THE 
SECRETARY GENERAL, DIEU SAID.  AFTERWARDS, DIEU SAID HE 
 
SIPDIS 
ADVISED DO MUOI TO ACCEPT CHANGE BECAUSE IT WAS INEVITABLE, 
AND FURTHER ADVISED THAT CHANGE COULD OCCUR STEP BY STEP, 
RATHER THAN AS A CATACLYSMIC EVENT SUCH AS WHAT OCCURRED IN 
THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST STATES IN EASTERN 
EUROPE. 
 
8. (C) REES INTERJECTED THAT WHAT DIEU SUGGESTED SOUNDED 
LIKE "PEACEFUL EVOLUTION."  DIEU REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH THE 
PARTY DETESTS THE PHRASE "PEACEFUL EVOLUTION," THAT IN FACT 
IS WHAT HAS BEEN OCCURRING FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS. 
 
9. (C) DIEU SAID PARTY LEADERS ARE AFRAID OF THE POTENTIAL 
FOR INSTABILITY THAT A CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP WOULD ENTAIL. 
HE SAID HE HIMSELF BELIEVES A CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IS NOT 
NECESSARY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY; INSTEAD, A 
CHANGE IN THE WAY OF THINKING WAS ESSENTIAL.  VIETNAM HAS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02151  02 OF 03  310844Z 
NEVER HAD A HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY, HE STATED, AND THERE ARE 
TIMES IN A COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT WHEN A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM 
IS INAPPROPRIATE. 
 
10. (C) DIEU SAID HE BELIEVED VIETNAM WOULD EVENTUALLY 
DEVELOP A FREE MARKET ECONOMY AND A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.  HE 
QUICKLY ADDED THAT A COUNTRY MIGHT TAKE MANY DIRECTIONS ON 
THE ROAD TO A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM, HOWEVER.  HE SAID HE 
WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO PREDICT WHAT VIETNAM'S NEXT STEPS 
WOULD BE, BUT ADDED, "WE ARE ALREADY EMBARKED ON A NON- 
REVERSIBLE TREND TOWARD ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM."  HE 
SAID THE GREATEST HOPE FOR FURTHER REFORM IN VIETNAM IS THE 
FRESH OUTLOOK AND DYNAMISM OF VIETNAM'S YOUTH. 
 
MEETING WITH NGUYEN XUAN OANH 
----------------------------- 
 
11. (C) REES, GUNDERSON AND CONGENOFF MET WITH NGUYEN XUAN 
OANH AT HIS OFFICE IN HCMC ON AUGUST 14.  OANH WAS DEPUTY 
PRIME MINISTER FOR ECONOMY AND FINANCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM 
FROM 1963-67, AND WAS ACTING PRIME MINISTER FOR A SHORT 
TIME IN 1965-66.  IN THE LATE 1970'S HE RE-EMERGED AS AN 
ADVISOR FOR TO VO VAN KIET.  CURRENTLY, HE IS PRESIDENT OF 
N.X. OANH ASSOCIATES, A BUSINESS, MANAGEMENT & FINANCE 
CONSULTING AGENCY IN HCMC.  OANH, WHO IS IN HIS LATE 70'S 
OR EARLY 80'S, RECEIVED A BA IN ECONOMICS AT THE KYOTO 
IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY IN JAPAN IN 1949 AND A PH.D. FROM 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY IN 1954.  LIKE PHAN DINH DIEU, OANH IS 
NOT A COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER, BUT IS A MEMBER OF THE 
CENTRAL PRESIDIUM OF THE PARTY'S NATIONAL FATHERLAND FRONT. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02151  02 OF 03  310844Z 
12. (C) OANH TOLD THE STAFFDEL THAT AFTER 1975, THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT PLACED HIM UNDER HOUSE ARREST FOR NINE MONTHS 
UNTIL THEY DECIDED HE WAS A "HARMLESS TECHNOCRAT."  HE SAID 
HE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN WRITING FOR THE "TIN SANG" ("MORNING 
NEWS") NEWSPAPER, AND THAT MANY OF HIS ARTICLES WERE 
CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISMS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM AND OF 
GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES.  HE SAID THAT IN 1978, VO VAN 
KIET (THEN COMMUNIST PARTY SECRETARY FOR HO CHI MINH CITY) 
SUMMONED HIM TO HIS OFFICE.  OANH RECOUNTED THAT KIET 
ORDERED HIM TO STOP HIS PUBLIC NEWSPAPER CRITICISMS, BUT 
ALSO SAID HE FOUND THE IDEAS IN OANH'S ARTICLES THOUGHT 
PROVOKING AND WISHED TO DISCUSS THEM FURTHER.  ACCORDING TO 
OANH, THUS BEGAN A CONFIDENCE THAT CONTINUED AS OANH 
ADVISED KIET ON MONETARY AND FISCAL MATTERS EVEN AFTER KIET 
WENT TO HANOI IN 1988, EVENTUALLY BECOMING PRIME MINISTER. 
 
13. (C) OANH SAID THAT DURING THE 1980'S, HE ADVOCATED 
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL AND OF ENTERPRISES.  HE 
RECOUNTED THAT PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL DO MUOI ONCE ASKED 
HIM, "BUT HOW CAN PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OWN A BANK?"  OANH 
SAID THAT CURRENT LEADERS STILL SUFFER FROM THE OLD 
COMMUNIST MINDSET, AND THAT IS WHY THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR IS STILL LIMITED IN VIETNAM.  AS AN EXAMPLE, HE 
NOTED THAT THREE YEARS EARLIER, THE GOVERNMENT DISBANDED 
THE MINISTRY OF HEAVY INDUSTRY AND REPLACED IT WITH SEVERAL 
CORPORATIONS.  "BUT THE CAPITAL FOR THESE CORPORATIONS 
STILL COMES FROM THE GOVERNMENT," HE SAID, "AND THE 
MANAGEMENT IS STILL DIRECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT."  HE SAID 
VIETNAM SHOULD GIVE UP ALTOGETHER THE NOTION OF STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES IF IT WANTS ITS ECONOMY TO WORK. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02151  02 OF 03  310844Z 
14. (C) REES ASKED OANH IF HE THOUGHT ECONOMIC REFORM COULD 
PROGRESS WITHOUT POLITICAL REFORM.  OANH SAID HE BELIEVED 
POLITICAL REFORM HAD ALREADY "COME IN THROUGH THE BACK DOOR 
OF ECONOMIC REFORM," ALBEIT AT A VERY SLOW PACE.  HE NOTED 
THAT SEVERAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DELEGATES ARE NON-PARTY 
MEMBERS.  HE SAID HE KNEW MANY PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY 
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, WHO WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A "LOYAL OPPOSITION, AS IN ENGLAND."  HE 
FURTHER SAID, "WE ALL, INCLUDING NONG DUC MANH AND THE 
OTHERS, BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN 
VIETNAM IN 10-15 YEARS."  THEN HE ADDED THAT THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY WOULD MANAGE THE TRANSITION SO THE RESULTING MULTI- 
PARTY SYSTEM WOULD NOT BE WHAT OUTSIDERS MIGHT EXPECT.  IT 
WILL BE A POLITICAL SYSTEM UNIQUE TO VIETNAM, HE CONCLUDED. 
 
15. (C) REES NOTED THAT MANY OF THE THINGS OANH SAID 
SOUNDED SIMILAR TO THINGS DISSIDENT NGUYEN DAN QUE HAD SAID 
IN THE PAST, BUT QUE ENDED UP IN PRISON FOR HIS COMMENTS. 
OANH ADMITTED THAT THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN WHAT YOU CAN AND 
CANNOT SAY IS VERY FUZZY.  OANH SAID HE NEVER ADVOCATED 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02151  03 OF 03  310844Z 
OVERTHROWING THE GOVERNMENT, BUT INSTEAD CRITICIZED 
POLICIES IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY.  "IF ONE CRITICIZES, ONE 
SHOULD ALSO OFFER PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS.  IT IS AS IMPORTANT 
HOW YOU SAY THINGS, AS IT IS WHAT YOU SAY," HE EXPLAINED. 
 
16. (U) THE STAFFDEL DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR 
THIS MESSAGE BEFORE DEPARTURE. 
 
PORTER 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL