This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002113 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND INR 
NSC FOR FRAZER 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2011 
TAGS: PREL SL IV SU ZI LY CG LI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED DISCUSSES AFRICA ISSUES 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 1587 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶B. PERRY-BOOTH 8/17 EMAIL 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Ambassador Jeter, accompanied by PolMilOff, called on 
NSA Aliyu Mohammed on August 22.  LTC Idris, the NSA's 
Military Advisor also attended.  In addition to security 
assistance, UNAMSIL troop rotations, the WCAR and 
counter-narcotics (septels), the Ambassador and NSA discussed 
Nigeria's perspectives on a number of African conflicts, 
including Sudan, the DROC, Sierra Leone, and Liberia's impact 
on Cote d'Ivoire, offering a virtual tour d'horizon on 
conflict situations around the Continent. 
 
 
¶2. (C) SUDAN: The NSA emphasized that President Obasanjo had 
received a number of Sudanese representatives in the past 
months, including al-Mahdi, Garang, General Joseph Lagu, Bona 
Malwal and others.  Francis Deng was expected soon from 
Washington.  Malwal had informed the President that the 
Southern Sudanese Civic Forum had decided to organize a 
conference to discuss Sudan and form a common position among 
the southern groups.  Nigeria had agreed to host the 
conference of Southern Sudanese leaders in October (if the 
various groups would agree to attend), which would ideally 
lead them to unite in support of a "One Sudan" policy.  The 
NSA described a possible outcome of a "One Sudan" policy as 
"southern autonomy in some things -- a federation -- like 
Nigeria." 
 
 
¶3. (C) Later, Joseph Lagu had suggested that both Southern 
and Northern conferences were needed, to discuss terms for 
progress, and President Obasanjo had agreed to work with 
Egypt and Libya to arrange a conference of Northern Sudanese 
leaders.  The NSA described the IGAD process as "dead," but 
said Turabi had suggested a September meeting in Tripoli as 
an opportunity to bring about a cease-fire and negotiations, 
and build support for the Nigerian process.  The meeting in 
Tripoli would include Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Libya and 
Egypt.  Mohammed stated that President Obasanjo would go to 
the meeting in Libya directly after his participation in the 
WCAR in Durban.  Meanwhile, Nigeria planned to send its 
envoy, Dr. Usman Bugaje (Vice President Atiku Abubakar's 
Special Advisor on Political Affairs) to Sudan on August 24 
to begin discussions. 
 
 
¶4. (C) DROC: The NSA stated that Nigeria had been developing 
a plan for the DROC that would include a Presidential Council 
with a rotating chairmanship of three to five people to rule 
the country for an initial period of up to five years.  In 
addition, an Executive Secretary to the Council would be 
appointed, ideally from an Anglophone African country. 
Ultimately, within five years, democratic elections would be 
held on the ward, local, regional and national levels. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Mohammed said the current leadership in DROC had not 
been informed about the plan; he dismissed Kabila as 
"illegitimate" and in power without a democratic mandate. 
The NSA alluded to questions about Kabila's nationality 
(stories that Kabila is possibly a Tutsi from Rwanda), and 
emphasized that Kabila is only in power because of support 
from neighboring states, particularly Zimbabwe.  Moreover, 
Kabila only controlled 40 percent of the country.  Ambassador 
Jeter asked about the role of Botswana in the DROC.  The NSA 
dismissed the relevance of Botswana, saying that Masire had 
not done a good job.  (The NSA was aware, however, of the 
gathering of Congolese parties in Botswana to begin 
preparations for the National Conference.) 
 
 
¶6. (C) Mohammed said the plan Nigeria is putting forward 
would require 30,000 African peacekeeping troops, and a good 
amount of money from the U.S., UN and EU.  He emphasized 
that, in the 1960s, there had been 24,000 troops and 2000 
civilian personnel in the DROC.  A similar solution was 
needed now.  When Ambassador Jeter noted that the cost of 
such an operation would be "colossal," Mohammed agreed, but 
said it was worth the cost because of the DROC's strategic 
location, wealth in resources, and the impact of Congo's 
instability on neighboring states.  When asked if Nigeria had 
discussed the plan with other African states, the NSA felt 
sure that the plan had only been discussed with the U.S. so 
far, but Obasanjo planned soon to raise it with the EU.  If 
the U.S. and EU agreed with the plan and would support it 
financially, African countries would fall into line. 
 
 
¶7. (C) SIERRA LEONE: Mohammed gave a positive read-out on 
Sierra Leone.  He noted that President Kabbah recently had 
been to Abuja for a meeting with President Obasanjo, that 
peace was returning and disarmament was progressing. 
Mohammed offered the continuing RUF disarmament as an example 
of a major step forward.  President Obasanjo would travel to 
Sierra Leone on September 3 to meet with Kabbah.  He would 
then travel with Kabbah to meet with RUF leader Issa Sessay 
in Kono, and there call on the RUF to disarm.  Ambassador 
Jeter asked if the GON had contact with Omre Golley. 
Mohammed said discussion with Golley may have taken place, 
but "not with me." 
 
 
¶8. (C) LIBERIA/COTE D'IVOIRE: The NSA noted that Charles 
Taylor was "tired now" and seemed to want peace.  The NSA 
said that Nigeria's greatest present concern was Taylor's 
meddling in Cote d'Ivoire.  Ambassador Jeter, noting that 
Taylor was a manipulator, asked Mohammed how Nigeria planned 
to blunt Taylor's effort with General Guei, emphasizing that 
Taylor would listen to Nigeria.  Mohammed stated that the GON 
had been in contact with President Gbagbo on this issue, and 
had asked Gbagbo to mention these concerns to the French, who 
have "sympathy" for Taylor.  The NSA also expected that 
Konare would "discuss it for Taylor's ears," implying an 
indirect warning from the ECOWAS Chairman.  He said that the 
GON had not yet approached Taylor directly, but assured us 
that Obasanjo would do so.  He concluded, "We know Charles 
Taylor well enough not to trust him." 
 
 
¶9. (C) ZIMBABWE: Ambassador Jeter asked the NSA where Nigeria 
stood on Zimbabwe, now that the Commonwealth meeting in Abuja 
had been postponed.  The NSA said he had assured Dr. Rice at 
the NSC that Nigeria would not let Qadhafi, who had met with 
Mugabe after the OAU Summit in Lusaka, damage chances for 
stability in Zimbabwe.  Obasanjo had promised to talk to 
Qadhafi to warn him against meddling in that country. 
 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: President Obasanjo continues to engage 
across Africa on a number of conflicts, often at the expense 
of pressing issues at home.  Thus far, he appears to be 
bringing his considerable weight to bear to bring parties 
closer together, to negotiate their differences rather than 
continue their resort to force of arms.  We continue to be 
impressed by Nigeria's activism on the Continent and its 
attempts to try to bring closure to conflict situations in 
the sub-region.  However, as Nigeria's "solution" on the DROC 
demonstrates, some of its plans and proposals are often 
expensive propositions for non-regional players.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
¶11. (U) Freetown minimize considered. 
Jeter