This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001449 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2011 
TAGS: PGOV ECON SOCI KISL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR VISITS SOKOTO STATE: OFR 
SUPPORTED, SHARIA DISCUSSED 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard f. Jeter, reason 1.5 (B/D). 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
 
¶1.  (U) In his first trip to the Northwest, Ambassador Jeter 
travelled to Sokoto State on June 19 and 20 to hold meetings 
with Governor Bafarawa, Sultan of Sokoto Maccido and Brigade 
One Commander General Emejuru.  The Ambassador thanked the 
officials for their support for Operation Focus Relief Phase 
I training that took place in Sokoto State last Autumn, and 
asked for their support for future training in the Northwest 
region.  Governor Bafarawa described his Administration's 
progress, and his low-key approach to Sharia (and the 
limitations of his non-confrontational style).  Both he, the 
Sultan and General Emerju pledged support for OFR III.  End 
summary. 
 
 
 
 
The Governor 
------------ 
¶2.  (C) Governor Attahiru Bafarawa welcomed the Ambassador 
and the Embassy delegation, including the USAID Director, 
DATT and Poloff, with a State Dinner on the 19th, followed by 
a private meeting on the 20th.  The Ambassador began the 
discussion by asking what gains democracy had brought Sokoto 
State in the past two years.  The Governor responded, "the 
difference between military government and democracy is that 
I am from Sokoto State, I am responsible to my people and I 
am not going anywhere."  This compared favorably to military 
Governors from other parts of the country who, he said, did 
not dare return to their former constituency, given their 
wholesale theft of funds while in office.  As an example of 
his fiscal rectitude, Bafarawa said that Sokoto State,s 
budget for the past two years had been approximately 8.6 
billion naira (about USD 80 million).  He said of that 
amount, most of the money has gone to building roads, 
schools, hospitals and rural development (usually potable 
water) projects.  The Governor noted, with some degree of 
pride, that he had paid off 700 million naira in outstanding 
debts from the former military administration and had set 
aside one billion naira in an emergency fund.  "Without 
borrowing a penny," Bafarawa stated with a broad smile. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) On corruption, Barfarawa said that he is firmly in 
control of State Government officials: "If the leader is 
corrupt, the whole body will be corrupt--if the leader 
steals, everyone looks to get his share."  When asked his 
assessment of the Obasanjo Administration's sincerity in its 
anti-corruption efforts, Bafarawa said flatly that the 
President's Ministers are corrupt. Foremost on his list of 
corrupt officials was Tony Anenih, Minister of Works and 
Housing.  Bafarawa said that if Obasanjo meant to make 
serious inroads into corruption, he would have to forego the 
complicated zoning arrangements that keep certain Ministries 
tied to certain states, and hire the most competent people he 
could find.  (Comment:  Corruption within Federal Ministries 
is indeed rife. Anenih appears untouchable, given his 
position as one of Obasanjo,s key political &fixers.8  End 
comment). 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Asked about the performance of local government 
officials, the Governor opined that the Federal Government 
was "complicit" in their "looting."   The 20 percent 
apportionment that Local Government Councils (LGC) received 
from the federal government was paid directly to LGCs, 
instead of being funneled through state governments as 
required by the Constitution.  "Since they have control of 
their own money, there is little I can do to stop them from 
stealing it."  He complained bitterly about ALGON (All Local 
Government Association of Nigeria), which had been set up by 
the Federal Government in Abuja to direct LGA spending.  He 
repeated the well-publicized case of ALGON's purchase of 
Toyota Prados for the 774 LGC's without their permission--a 
contract alleged to have been arranged by Vice President 
Atiku Abubakar, and to have netted roughly USD 30,000 per 
vehicle in kick-backs to various federal officials. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) On Sharia reforms in the North, Bafarawa professed a 
low-key approach.  "If Sharia is done properly, no one will 
notice.  It has always been a part of our religion and 
culture."  Alluding to Governor Ahmed Sani of Zamfara State 
andhis intrusive and controversial Sharia regime, Bafarawa 
said that Sharia "only becomes dangerous when it is used for 
political gain."  Bafarawa noted the recent meeting in Abuja 
between National Security Advisor Aliyu Mohammed and 
Governors from eleven Northern states which had adopted new 
Sharia legislation, a session devoted to "harmonization" of 
Sharia approaches, in an attempt to prevent Sharia from being 
used as a political tool by their opponents. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Bafarawa mentioned that one local Sharia judge in 
Sokoto had handed down a sentence of amputation for a 
confessed thief, and that the defendant refused to appeal. 
Bafarawa had set up a committee of Sharia scholars to review 
the case, and to determine whether the case met all the 
elements required for imposing amputation under classical 
Sharia doctrine.  The Governor said that he would allow the 
sentence to be carried out if the committee sustains the 
judge's decision.  "It's not my business.  I am not the 
judge, and this is what the people have asked for."  He said 
he could over-ride the judgment of a Shari'a court--even if 
no appeal was filed--only when there were proper grounds for 
doing so in classical Sharia law. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Jeter said that the USG's concern was 
primarily for the potential impact of Sharia on non-Muslims, 
and the human rights consequences that would follow. 
Bararawa replied, "It is something to be handled with care." 
He said that in Sokoto State, consumption of alcohol by 
Christians in private is not criminalized, and in fact 
alcohol is sold freely at Sokoto's military and police messes 
and military grocery stores.  More importantly, none of the 
laws regulating social comportment that had been passed in 
Zamfara--requiring a dress code for women and banning 
mixed-gender public transport--had been introduced in Sokoto, 
the seat of the highest Muslim traditional authority in 
Nigeria.  Public school classes were divided by gender after 
a certain age, and more girls were being sent to school since 
this change was imposed, he said.   Christian children in 
Sokoto were taught "Christian religious knowledge," (CRK) 
while their Muslim counterparts were instructed in the Koran, 
he said (Comment: It is a long-running struggle throughout 
Nigeria for religious minorities to be provided instruction 
in their own faith in the public schools.  End Comment). 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Governor Bafarawa articulated the perception by some 
Northern governors and Northern populations--not often 
expressed directly to USG officials--that the USG is more 
interested in the South of Nigeria, and focuses more of its 
energy and resources on Southern states.  That Ambassador 
Jeter made his first official visit to Kaduna and Kano, and 
was undertaking a trip to Kebbi and Sokoto so early in his 
tenure, was taken as a sign of encouragement to Northern 
governors that the USG would have a more "balanced" focus in 
its outlook and programs, according to Bafarawa.  The 
Ambassador stated that the USG regarded all of Nigeria as 
worthy and deserving of support, and with the Embassy now 
moved to Abuja from Lagos, including the recent transfer of 
USAID operations to the capital, the USG would be able to 
focus more attention and assistance resources in the North. 
We want to help all of Nigeria, Ambassador Jeter emphasized. 
USAID Director Tom Hobgood discussed with the Governor what 
programs AID offered that provided assistance to the North 
(there are too few), and what it could offer in the future. 
Bafarawa replied that the primary needs of his state, and the 
North in general, were in the areas of education, health 
care, provision of potable water, and agriculture. 
 
 
The General 
--------------- 
¶9.  (U) The Ambassador met June 20 with General L. Emejuru, 
One Brigade Commander in Sokoto, who commands all Nigerian 
Army units in Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara.  The Ambassador 
thanked the General for his assistance during Phase I of 
Operation Focus Relief and asked for his continued support 
for OFR III training in Birnin-Kebbi which would be 
commencing in August.  The DATT provided an overview of what 
that training would entail, and the General promised his 
continued support for the mission.  He said that the training 
and equipment would benefit the soldiers under his command, 
and would assist them in enforcing peace in Sierra Leone.  He 
thanked the Ambassador for the courtesy call, and requested 
that the Commanding Officer of the Birnin-Kebbi barracks be 
made aware of the USG trainers' planned movements outside the 
camp in order to provide adequate security. 
 
 
 
 
The Sultan 
------------- 
¶10.  (SBU) Sultan of Sokoto Mahammadu Maccido, the formal 
leader of all Muslims in Nigeria, also received the 
Ambassador June 20.  The Ambassador, in a private sidebar, 
thanked the Sultan for his support of last year's OFR 
training in Sokoto.  The Sultan said that he was "displeased" 
by reports that "hoodlums" had hijacked and burned beer 
trucks in Kano, Katsina and Zamfara in the past months.  He 
said that he was using the influence of his office to prevent 
a recurrence of such incidents.  "I do not want Christians to 
feel threatened by Sharia, or hoodlums to take the law into 
their own hands." 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶11.  (C) Civilian support for OFR, as in neighboring Kebbi 
State (septel), appears genuine and enthusiastic in Sokoto. 
Governor Bafarawa, generally regarded as one of the more 
successful Northern executives, spoke frankly of his 
administration, including his attempt to keep Sharia reforms 
within manageable bounds.  However, his unwillingness to 
overturn a sentence of amputation unless his committee of 
religious experts deems it proper to do so shows the limits 
he faces in an overwhelmingly Muslim state. 
 
 
¶12.  (C) The Sultan of Sokoto, formally the head of the 
Muslim community in Nigeria, is in practice little more than 
a figurehead (the Emir of Kano, for example, is far more 
respected, and far more important).  The Sultan's pledge to 
reduce Sharia "incidents" in neighboring states will have 
little impact.  State Governors wield the real power, and 
when they hesitate to act, or act at cross-purposes (as 
Governor Sani of Zamfara) the Sultan can do little.  However, 
most Northern Governors pursue the same low-key approach as 
Bafarawa, and so far they have been largely successful in 
limiting tension and discord resulting from the Sharia 
"reform" movement.   End comment. 
 
 
 
Jeter