This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001366 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2006 
TAGS: PINS PGOV PHUM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN KANO RISING 
 
REF: A) ABUJA B) ABUJA 0762 C) ABUJA 1644 D) ABUJA 
     1635 E) LAGOS 1225 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard Jeter for reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d). 
 
 
 ¶1. (U)  Summary:  In a series of meetings held in Kano May 
10-12, Government officials, religious leaders, academics and 
journalists repeatedly stressed to Poloff the "dangerous" 
level of tension between Kano's Hausa-Fulani "indigenes" and 
large "immigrant" Igbo and Yoruba population.  Communal 
relations there have deteriorated since the Ambassador's 
visit in March, largely because of the continued perception 
among Kano's Hausa majority that the Lagos State Government 
is unwilling to prosecute OPC members responsible for the 
killing of Hausas in the Ajegunle incident last October (Ref. 
C).  The activities of Shari'a vigilante groups have also 
increased apprehension among 
Southerners.  Leaders on all sides are concerned, and are 
warning of the potential for a bloody inter-ethnic conflict 
in the city if something is not done to lessen the tension. 
The Obasanjo Administration's reluctance to go beyond 
immediate intervention in times of crisis has not helped to 
alleviate those concerns.  If the Lagos and Kano Governors do 
not begin to coordinate their efforts, and take at least some 
steps towards reconciliation, another round of violence may 
be difficult to avoid.  End Summary. 
 
 
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Storm Clouds 
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¶2. (C)  The Chairman of the Kano chapter of the Christian 
Association of Nigeria, Reverend G.A. Ojo, is pastor of the 
First Baptist Church, the largest Yoruba church in Kano. Ojo 
said that his church was being reduced to an all-male 
membership, as the Yoruba in Kano were sending their families 
back South.  He said that tensions between Kano's Hausa 
majority and its Southern population had risen 
"significantly."  Ojo praised the efforts of Governor 
Kwankwaso, the Emir of Kano, the police and Muslim religious 
leaders for preventing reprisals by Kano's Hausa against 
their Yoruba neighbors following the Ajegunle incident last 
October, in which an estimated one-hundred-fifty 
Hausas--largely from Kano--were killed in a Lagos suburb. 
 
 
¶3. (C)  Ojo said that Kano's long-resident Southern minority, 
which numbers in the range of half a million people, was very 
aware of the historical ebb and flow of inter-ethnic violence 
in Kano.  That collective memory extends to the pogrom 
against Igbos in Kano in 1966--itself a reaction to the coup 
attempt in which mostly-Igbo officers killed Northern Premier 
Sir Ahmadu Bello, Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and 
other Nigerian leaders.  By some estimates, up to 30,000 
Southerners (mostly Igbo) were thought to have been killed in 
that incident, which was a major precipitating factor in the 
Biafran secession.  Ojo commented that "everyone" was aware 
that tensions were particularly high at the moment, and that 
any of several eventual incidents--in Kano or Lagos--could 
spark a major episode of inter-ethnic violence.  Ojo added 
that the Igbos in Sabon Gari were all armed, and implied that 
the Yorubas were as well.  He said that a direct attack 
against Sabon Gari--a densely-populated, rectangular enclave 
of mostly Southerners approximately 2.5 by 1 
kilometers--would be unlikely because it is essentially an 
"armed camp."  Ojo predicted that the violence would probably 
be focused on the substantial number of Igbo and Yoruba 
living elsewhere in the city and its environs. 
 
 
¶4. (C)  Ojo asserted that while the Shari'a issue in Kano did 
not help matters, Christian leaders had confidence in the 
Government's intentions not to allow Shari'a to affect their 
population unduly.  Their primary concern, he said, was with 
crime and mob violence.  He added that an action by Shari'a 
enforcers, for example, could provide an opportunity for 
Kano's "Yandabas" (gangs of criminally inclined, unemployed 
youth) to set off unrest in order to begin looting.  Ojo said 
that Kano's Hausas were "furious" over the failure of Lagos 
State to prosecute Frederic Fashehun (leader of the OPC) and 
other OPC members for their perceived involvement in the 
Ajegunle incident.  He complained bitterly about the actions 
of the OPC in Lagos and Lagos State Governor Bola Tinubu: 
"Either they do not know that what they do puts us at risk, 
or they do not care.  But we have no control over them.  We 
can only sit and wait." 
 
 
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The National Police 
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¶5. (C)  Deputy Commissioner of Police, Emmanuel Ezozue, an 
Igbo, confirmed that Kano's security situation had become 
"dangerous."  He said that preventing reprisal violence after 
Ajegunle was a significant accomplishment, but added that 
anger in the Hausa community over that incident had not 
dissipated in the intervening seven months.  If anything, he 
said, it was increasing because of a perceived lack of 
justice in Lagos and the severely depressed economy in Kano. 
Ezozue said, "My own brother left Kano for Abuja.  It's just 
too dangerous."  Asked whether Kano's police would be able to 
stop the unrest feared by many, the Deputy Commissioner said 
flatly, "No.  There are too many of them, and not enough 
police." 
 
 
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The Governor 
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¶6. (C)  Governor Kwankwaso discussed at length the recent 
Hisbah enforcement action against hotels that continue to 
serve alchohol in the State (Ref. A).  He said that while he 
had arrested those involved in the burning of the Igbo-owned 
Henzina Hotel, he could not try them at this point because of 
the potential reaction by Shari'a supporters.  Kwankwaso said 
that Kano's Hausa majority, independent of the Shari'a 
question, continued to be outraged by the failure to 
prosecute any of the organizers or perpetrators of the 
violence in Ajegunle.  He was especially critical of Lagos 
Governor Bola Tinubu: "The man should have kept Fashehun 
under house arrest in his hotel, a house, anywhere, for six 
months so people up here would calm down.  Letting him go 
after one week did not help me manage the situation here." 
(Comment: The Governor's statement is reflective of a broader 
misperception in the North over Fasheun's role in the 
violence.  The investigation by National Police failed to 
find adequate evidence of Fasheun's involvement to support a 
murder charge, for which he was arrested. The fact that 
Ganiyu Adams, who is thought to control the militant wing of 
the OPC, is under house-arrest, does not seem to have 
registered with Northern leaders, who appear inappropriately 
fixated on Fasehun as the symbol of the militant OPC, and 
Lagos' State's disregard for Hausa lives.  End Comment.) 
 
 
¶7. (C)  Kwankwaso said that he had requested but not received 
any help from the Obasanjo Administration on how to handle 
the increasingly precarious security situation in Kano.  In 
the immediate aftermath of the Ajegunle violence, delegations 
sent by the Federal Government fanned out across the 
nation--including Kano--to preach peace and restraint. 
Clearly frustrated with the lack of current support from 
Abuja in addressing the causes of the violence, Kwankwaso 
declaimed: "Kano is the most difficult city in Nigeria to 
manage!  It is the second largest in the country, and most of 
its people are poor, even by our standards.  Lagos has 
bankers, lawyers--a middle class--in addition to its poor.  I 
have a few rich Alhajis--the rest are nail clippers and 
people selling sugar-cane on the streets."  Acknowledging the 
economic roots of recurring unrest in Kano, Kwankwaso added, 
"A hungry man is an angry man.  And many people in Kano are 
hungry."  (Comment: Lagos was recently called "uninhabitable" 
and a "jungle" by President Obasanjo.  Incidents of violent 
crime in Lagos occur more frequently, and with more lethal 
results, than in Kano.  Officers in Police Command in Kano 
describe its street crime as typical of any large, poor city, 
which they consider to be relatively manageable.  While 
Islam--and to a certain extent Shari'a law--may serve to 
restrain individuals, those same people become very dangerous 
when formed into a mob, which the poor on Kano's streets are 
only too willing to join.  End Comment.) 
 
 
¶8. (C)  Kwankwaso reiterated that many of Kano's poor Hausas 
were focusing much of their anger about their current 
economic circumstances on the perceived injustice against 
their kinsmen in the Ajegunle incident and its aftermath.  He 
said that immediate revenge would have dissipated the 
collective anger generated by that incident.  Kwankwaso added 
that he had been only half successful in preventing a 
recurrence of violence: while immediate reprisals for 
Ajegunle were averted, the anger it generated remains. 
According to Kwankwaso, the desire for vengeance now appeared 
to be growing. 
 
 
¶9. (C)  Consulate General Lagos reports that the commission 
convened to study the causes of the Ajegunle riots is nearing 
the completion of its report.  It appears that the Commission 
may adopt the conspiracy theory that the violence was 
instigated by a prominent Northerner to de-stabilize the 
country, and therefore conclude that the Hausas in the 
Ajegunle market riot started the violence and essentially 
provoked the conflict that led to their own deaths.  The 
incident may have been sparked by one in a series of 
often-lethal market disputes.  Whatever happened in Ajegunle, 
as far as many Northerners are concerned, the bare facts of 
the incident speak for themselves: Lagos' Yoruba majority 
killed a large number of its Hausa minority, suggesting the 
simpler explanation of long-standing inter-ethnic grievances 
boiling over, with the minority ethnic group taking the 
lion's share of the casualties.  Not surprisingly, Hausas and 
Yorubas have divergent perspectives on those events, and on 
the Odu'a Peoples' Congress (OPC), that are not easily 
reconciled.  The OPC is viewed by many Yoruba as a 
legitimate, civilian, cultural and law enforcement 
organization.  It is generally viewed in the North as an 
criminal, para-military organization that targets other 
ethnic groups, and enjoys the tacit support of Governor 
Tinubu and his Attorney General, as well as GON Federal A.G. 
Bola Ige.  Most Northerners believe that the OPC took the 
lead in the unrest that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of 
Hausas. 
 
 
¶10. (C)  Amconsul Lagos reports that Governor Tinubu has 
engaged in an extensive effort to forestall a repeat of the 
violence that occurred last October.  He has worked closely 
with leaders of the Hausa community in Lagos to prevent a 
take-over of an abbatoir by criminal elements, which would 
likely have resulted in violence.  Acting in the ad-hoc 
manner of previous Heads of State, President Obasanjo has 
been reluctant to address this situation beyond traditional 
responses to immediate violence--police and army repression. 
He risks alienating what Yoruba base he has if he 
aggressively pursues the OPC, and is already viewed by much 
of the Northern leadership as having "gone ethnic."  In the 
eyes of Northerners, neither Minister of Justice Bola Ige nor 
Governor Tinubu appear interested in prosecuting criminal 
acts by OPC members either.  Although there are many 
Northerners serving in the Obasanjo Administration, including 
senior conservatives who remain loyal to his government, many 
other Hausas believe that President Obasanjo is representing 
Yoruba--rather than national--interests.  Barring 
intervention by the Executive, the problem is left to the 
Governors, the police, and--if there is a truly serious 
outbreak of inter-communal violence--the military to solve. 
 
 
¶11.  Comment: Truth can remain highly elusive in any 
discussion across ethnic lines about occurrences of 
inter-ethnic violence in Nigeria.  Unfortunately, Hausas in 
Kano are focusing their anger--largely derived from desparate 
economic circumstances--on the Ajegunle incident and their 
Yoruba brethren.  There has been limited contact between 
Governors Tinubu and Kwankwaso, while the Mission maintains 
close ties with both.  During a recent meeting with Governor 
Tinubu in Lagos, Ambassador Jeter raised the idea of a 
possible meeting between Tinubu and Kwankwaso.  Tinubu said 
that our report about the situation in Kano confirmed what he 
had been hearing, and agreed to meet with Kwankwaso, most 
probably in Kaduna, using Governor Makarfi as a facilitator. 
(Note:  As Makarfi is out of the country and Tinubu has not 
had time to broach this subject with him, this proposal 
should not be raised during Makarfi's upcoming visit to 
Washington.  End Note.) 
 
 
¶12. (C) Makarfi has set the standard for fostering 
co-operative relations among Governors across regional lines, 
and may prove to be instrumental in improving relations 
between Kwankwaso and Tinubu.  It is encouraging that 
Governor Tinubu is aware--and concerned--about the plight of 
his kinsmen in Kano.  Hopefully, these efforts will begin to 
dissipate some of the mis-directed ethnic resentment in Kano 
before another round of violence occurs.  End Comment. 
Jeter