This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

310808Z May 01

2001HANOI01308 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ7608

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ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    CIAE-00  SMEC-00  INL-00   DOEE-00  SRPP-00  
      DS-00    EUR-00   FBIE-00  VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   
      LAB-01   L-00     VCE-00   MOFM-05  MOF-03   AC-01    NSAE-00  
      OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     
      SP-00    TRSE-00  USIE-00  IIP-00   SNIS-00  NISC-00  PMB-00   
      DSCC-00  PRM-01   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /016W
                  ------------------F29C23  310814Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3006
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HANOI 001308 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, INR/EAP 
NSC FOR EAST ASIAN DIRECTORATE 
SECDEF ALSO FOR ISA/EA/LSTERN 
CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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E.O. 12958:  DECL:  05/31/11 
TAGS: PGOV VM DPOL
SUBJECT: ROLE OF VIETNAM'S COMMUNIST PARTY SECRETARIAT 
 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM DENNIS G. HARTER. REASONS 1.5 
(B) & (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) BEGIN SUMMARY:  ACCORDING TO A LEADING 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH LONG EXPERIENCE IN PARTY 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE STAFF WORK, THE NEW PARTY 
SECRETARIAT IS IN FACT A DECISION-MAKING BODY WHICH 
 
SIPDIS 
WORKS CLOSELY WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY.  IT DOES NOT 
SIMPLY PROVIDE POLICY STUDIES AND PAPERS FOR BROADER 
REVIEW BY THE POLITBURO.  THE POLITBURO ITSELF IS 
APPARENTLY MORE A SYMBOLIC INSTITUTION REPRESENTING 
CONSTITUENCIES WITH TOO INFREQUENT A MEETING SCHEDULE 
FOR IT TO BE AN EFFECTIVE DETERMINANT OF DAY-TO-DAY 
ACTIONS FOR THE PARTY LEADERSHIP.  THIS SAME SOURCE, 
WHILE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE ROLE PARTY GENERAL 
SECRETARY NONG DUC MANH WILL PLAY IN DIRECTING THE 
 
SIPDIS 
PARTY, BELIEVES MANH HAS NOT YET BEEN TESTED AS A 
LEADER CAPABLE OF BRIDGING THE DIFFERING VIEWS OF 
VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE PARTY.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  DURING THE COURSE OF A SEPARATE DISCUSSION ON 
BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH NGUYEN THU DO, SENIOR EXPERT 
ON AMERICAS ISSUES IN THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  01308  02 OF 02  310842Z 
DCM ASKED DO.ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
SECRETARIAT WHICH WAS RE-ESTABLISHED AT THE NINTH 
 
SIPDIS 
PARTY CONGRESS.  HE ASKED IF THIS BODY HAD ANY 
"POLICY" ROLES OR WHETHER IT WAS MERELY AN EXECUTIVE 
BODY ASSEMBLING AND COORDINATING PAPERS TASKED BY OR 
FOR THE POLITBURO AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 
 
¶3.  (C)  DO BEGAN HIS REMARKS BY INDICATING HE 
PREVIOUSLY HAD WORKED FOR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AS A 
STAFF EXPERT FOR ABOUT A DECADE AND SAID THE PARTY 
STRUCTURE HAD BEEN EVOLVING OVER THE YEARS, 
PARTICULARLY SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION 
AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES.  DURING 
THE EARLIER PERIOD, THE SECRETARIAT HAD 
RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO COORDINATING ACTIVITIES 
WITH OTHER COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS.  THERE WAS A 
REGULAR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, PLANNING OF 
COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES, AND DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY-TO- 
PARTY RELATIONS.  INSIDE VIETNAM AT THAT TIME, PARTY 
POLICIES WERE PARAMOUNT AND THE GOVERNMENT WAS SIMPLY 
AN EXECUTIVE ARM FOR THE PARTY WITH VIRTUALLY NO 
AUTHORITY OF ITS OWN.  HE NOTED THAT THE LATE PM PHAM 
VAN DONG HAD SAID HE WAS THE LONGEST SERVING PRIME 
MINISTER IN THE REGION, BUT HE HAD LESS POWER THAN 
ANYBODY ELSE BECAUSE OF THE LIMITED ABILITY OF THE 
GOVERNMENT TO ACT WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM 
THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY. 
 
¶4.  (C)  WITH THE COLLAPSE OF THE OTHER COMMUNIST 
REGIMES, THE SECRETARIAT BECAME MUCH MORE OF A 
COORDINATING ARM OF THE POLITBURO AND THE CENTRAL 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  01308  02 OF 02  310842Z 
COMMITTEE.  IT DID, HOWEVER, GRADUALLY ASSUME A POWER 
ROLE LINKED TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY.  IT BECAME LESS 
AND LESS RESPONSIVE TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND OTHER 
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO. 
 
¶5.  (C)  BECAUSE IT WAS ISOLATED FROM THE COMMITTEE 
AND HAD BECOME A POWER BASE IN ITS OWN RIGHT, THERE 
WAS INCREASING CRITICISM OF THIS BODY FROM OTHER 
ELEMENTS OF THE PARTY LEADERSHIP AND FROM WITHIN THE 
GOVERNMENT.  (DO REFERRED TO THE PREVIOUS SECRETARIAT 
AS A BUNCH OF OLD MEN FOCUSED ON THE PAST AND TIED TO 
THE GENERAL SECRETARY.)  DOI MOI REFORMS IN THE LATE 
1980'S HAD GIVEN THE GOVERNMENT MORE RESPONSIBILITY, 
AND THERE WAS MORE ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF MINISTRIES 
AND EVEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.  THE IDEA TO CREATE A 
STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE POLITBURO AT THE PREVIOUS 
CONGRESS IN 1996 WAS THE RESULT OF DISSATISFACTION 
WITH THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARIAT AND A BELIEF THAT 
THERE NEEDED TO BE A BROADER, MORE INDEPENDENT BODY 
OPERATING AT THE TOP. 
 
¶6.  (C)  THE SET-UP OF THE FIVE-PERSON STANDING 
COMMITTEE WITH LE KHA PHIEU AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN 
1997 DID NOT BRING A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE 
PROBLEM EITHER.  THE COMPOSITION OF THE GROUP, PARTY 
GENERAL SECRETARY, PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN, AND DIRECTOR OF THE FATHERLAND 
FRONT WHICH OVERSEES OFFICIAL MASS ORGANIZATIONS, 
ITSELF BECAME TOO ISOLATED FROM THE REST OF THE 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE.  IT WAS EMPOWERED TO ACT IN THE 
ABSENCE OF THE POLITBURO BEING CONVENED BUT IT LACKED 
A STRONG CONSENSUS OF ITS OWN.  IT HAD POWER, HE SAID, 
BUT IT RARELY SEEMED TO USE THAT POWER EFFECTIVELY. 
THIS IN PART, HE ARGUED, RESULTED IN VERY LIMITED 
CREATIVITY IN DECISION-MAKING DURING THE LE KHA PHIEU 
ERA. 
 
¶7.  (C)  DURING THE RUN-UP TO THE NINTH PARTY 
CONGRESS, DO SAID, THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF DEBATE 
ABOUT RECREATING THE SECRETARIAT AND DISCUSSION ABOUT 
ITS ASSUMPTION OF AUTHORITY WITHIN THE TOP PARTY 
CIRCLES.  DCM ASKED IF THE NEWLY RE-CREATED 
SECRETARIAT THEN WAS SLATED TO BECOME A STAFF UNIT 
 
SIPDIS 
PREPARING MATERIALS FOR THE GENERAL CONSIDERATION OF 
THE POLITBURO AT LARGE, THEREBY TRANSFERRING THE 
DECISION-MAKING ROLE OF THE FIVE-MEMBER STANDING 
COMMITTEE TO THE LARGER GROUP FOR ACTION.  DO SAID 
THIS WAS NOT THE CASE AT ALL.  THE POLITBURO, HE 
ASSERTED, IS JUST "A BUNCH OF HATS."  THEY REPRESENT 
"CONSTITUENCIES" WITHIN VIETNAM.  "THE INDIVIDUALS 
HAVE STATUS AND PRESTIGE, BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE THE 
CHIEF POWER," HE SAID.  "THEY MEET AT BEST ONCE A 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  01308  02 OF 02  310814Z 
WEEK, MORE LIKELY ONLY ONCE A MONTH OR SO."  REAL 
"DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY" IS IN FACT VESTED "IN THE 
SECRETARIAT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY" WITHIN THE 
 
SIPDIS 
BROADLY ESTABLISHED PARTY GUIDELINES SET DOWN BY THE 
POLITBURO AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.  "THIS IS WHY," 
HE SAID, "VU KHOAN'S ROLE (AS HEAD OF THE SECRETARIAT) 
IS SO IMPORTANT TODAY."  SECRETARIAT MEMBERSHIP IS 
ALSO REFLECTIVE OF CONSTITUENCIES, BUT THE GENERALLY 
YOUNGER FIGURES OCCUPYING THOSE POSITIONS MEANS A MUCH 
MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO POLICY WILL BE POSSIBLE IN 
THE FUTURE.  (COMMENT:  DO PROBABLY IS REFLECTING HERE 
MORE THE HOPE OF WHAT THE SECRETARIAT MIGHT BECOME, 
BECAUSE OF ITS COMPOSITION, THAN THE ACTUAL POWER ROLE 
IT HAS CURRENTLY ASSUMED.  END COMMENT) 
 
¶8.  (C)  DCM ASKED DO IF HE SENSED THERE HAD ALREADY 
BEEN SIGNS OF CHANGE IN THIS RESPECT SINCE THE NEW 
GROUP HAD ASSUMED POWER.  DO SAID HE FELT THE SIGNS 
WERE OPTIMISTIC AND HE HAD "GOOD FEELINGS" ABOUT THE 
LEADERSHIP OF NONG DUC MANH.  AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION 
OF THE ROLE OF MANH IN LEADING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
TO BE A MORE ASSERTIVE BODY IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
ON THE GOVERNMENT SIDE, DO CONCLUDED THAT MANH WAS 
CLEARLY A "GOOD LISTENER." HE IS "OPEN TO A WIDE 
RANGE OF IDEAS," HE SAID, "BUT WE HAVE YET TO SEE 
ENOUGH OF HIM AS A DECISION-MAKER TO BE ABLE TO DECIDE 
HOW WELL HE WILL DO."  WHEN HE WAS RUNNING THE 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THERE WERE NOT A LOT OF TRULY BIG 
ISSUES THAT HAD TO BE RESOLVED.  "THERE ARE STILL A 
LOT OF GROUPS AND CONSTITUENCIES WHICH MUST BE HEARD 
AND THEIR VIEWS BALANCED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO KEEP THEM 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  01308  02 OF 02  310814Z 
ALL PART OF THE CONSENSUS ON PARTY POLICIES."  DO 
IMPLIED THIS WOULD NOT BE AN EASY TASK AND, WHILE HE 
IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT MANH'S ABILITIES, HE REMAINS 
UNCERTAIN ABOUT HOW WELL MANH WILL BE ABLE TO PULL THE 
VARIOUS ELEMENTS TOGETHER. 
 
PETERSON