R 291521Z MAY 01
FM AMEMBASSY BANJUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1495
ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANJUL 000327 
 
KINSHASA FOR D. TITUS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/11 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM LI SN GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA -- JAMMEH'S WEST AFRICA POLICY 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR GEORGE W. HALEY FOR 
REASONS 1.5 B/D 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT DEVELOPED A 
COHERENT STRATEGY FOR WEST AFRICAN REGIONAL 
SECURITY, PRESIDENT JAMMEH WANTS TO BE A MORE 
VISIBLE PLAYER IN SUB-REGIONAL DIPLOMACY. 
NEVERTHELESS, JAMMEH IS KEEN ON DEVELOPING A 
REPUTATION AS AN INFLUENTIAL PEACE BROKER.  WITH 
EFFORTS IN THE CASAMANCE STYMIED DUE TO SENEGALESE 
PRESIDENT WADE'S SPHINX-LIKE SILENCE TO BANJUL'S 
OVERTURES, JAMMEH PICTURES THE MANO RIVER AS HIS 
NEW WADING POOL.  SINCE PRESIDENT TAYLOR VISITED 
BANJUL LATE MARCH, THE GAMBIA HAS BEEN MORE 
INVOLVED IN ECOWAS DELIBERATIONS AND IN BILATERAL 
CONTACTS WITH MONROVIA.  THE SOPHOMORIC JAMMEH MAY 
BE OVER HIS HEAD AND WIND UP FLAILING IN THE MANO 
RIVER TURBULENCE.  HIS INTERVENTION WILL LIKELY BE 
INEFFECTUAL AND MAY ADD CONFUSION TO A MATTER 
ALREADY FLUSH WITH TROUBLE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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THE PERSON AS POLICY 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) THE GAMBIA HAS NO ARTICULATED SUB-REGION 
FOREIGN POLICY NOR STRATEGY.  JAMMEH AND COHORTS 
HANDLE ISSUES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.  THEY 
APPARENTLY HAVE EMBRACED THE WORKING ASSUMPTION 
THAT A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY WOULD NOT EXCEED THE 
SUM OF ITS COMPOSITE PARTS. 
 
¶3. (C) THE LODESTAR OF GAMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS 
JAMMEH'S APPETITE FOR INFLUENCE, HIS DESIRE TO BE A 
SUB-REGIONAL PLAYER OF SOME ACCOUNT.  BECAUSE THE 
GAMBIA IS SMALL, WEAK AND POOR, JAMMEH HAS FEW 
UTENSILS TO ACHIEVE HIS GOAL.  THUS, HE HAS USED 
THE GAMBIA'S RELATIVE DOMESTIC STABILITY AND ITS 
INHERENT GEOPOLITICAL IMPUISSANCE TO WIGGLE HIMSELF 
INTO THE MOLD OF A PEACE BROKER.  HOWEVER, CREATION 
OF A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF DURABLE PEACE AND 
CONFLICT PREVENTION SEEMS LESS AN IMPERATIVE THAN 
BEING PERCEIVED AS A CHARISMATIC LEADER CAPABLE OF 
ENGINEERING DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGHS.  DIPLOMACY AND 
FOREIGN POLICY ARE CONDUCTED IN THE REALM OF 
PERSONAL CONTACTS AND CHEMISTRY, NOT OBJECTIVE 
NATIONAL INTERESTS.  DRUM ROLLS AND FANFARE LOOM 
MORE IMPORTANTLY THAN THE SUBSTANCE OF PEACE.  THE 
BIRTHPLACE OF GAMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY SEEMS TO BE 
MORE INTESTINAL THAN INTELLECTUAL. 
 
¶4. (C) THAT MILITARY CONFLICTS HAD VISITED GAMBIA'S 
IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS GAVE JAMMEH READY VENUES TO 
PRACTICE HIS BRAND OF PERSONALIZED DIPLOMACY. 
AFTER TRANSIENT SUCCESSES MEDIATING DISPUTES IN 
GUINEA-BISSAU AND THE CASAMANCE IN 1999, JAMMEH'S 
FOREIGN POLICY HAS FOUNDERED LATELY.  HIS INFLUENCE 
IN BISSAU AND DAKAR HAS WANED SINCE THE ELECTIONS 
OF PRESIDENT YALA AND WADE, RESPECTIVELY.  ALTHOUGH 
YALA AND WADE HAVE THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND 
THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH EACH OTHER, JAMMEH 
INCREASINGLY HAS BEEN THE ODD MAN OUT IN THIS PART 
OF THE WEST AFRICAN NEIGHBORHOOD. 
 
¶5. (C) IN HIS LATEST ATTEMPT TO AVOID THIS DE FACTO 
ISOLATION, JAMMEH HAS COURTED NOUAKCHOTT AS EVINCED 
BY HIS EARLY MAY VISIT TO MAURITANIA WHERE SEVERAL 
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION WERE 
EXECUTED.  IN PART THE DALLIANCE WITH NOUAKCHOTT IS 
A CLUMSY ATTEMPT TO MAKE DAKAR "JEALOUS" AND THUS 
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO BANJUL. 
 
¶6. (C) JAMMEH REMAINS FOCUSSED ON MAXIMIZING HIS 
INFLUENCE IN THE CASAMANCE PEACE PROCESS. 
CONSEQUENTLY, WADE'S INSCRUTABILITY HAS BEEN TOUGH 
TO MAW.  THE GAMBIAN FEARS THAT WADE IS 
COMMUNICATING WITH MFDC MODERATES WHILE KEEPING THE 
GAMBIA OUT OF THE LOOP. CONSEQUENTLY, THE DYNAMIC 
BETWEEN WADE AND JAMMEH REMAINS PRIMARILY 
CENTRIFUGAL.  THE MORE WADE SEEMS TO KEEP JAMMEH 
SIDELINED, THE MORE JAMMEH WANTS WADE TO FAIL. 
BECAUSE OF HIS SUSCEPTIBILITY TO VAULT INDIVIDUAL 
PIQUE OVER NATIONAL INTERESTS, JAMMEH MAY FEEL 
COMPELLED TO SYMPATHIZE WITH MFDC HARDLINERS AND 
THEIR MUSCLE-FLEXING REACTIONS TO WADE'S PEACE 
STRATAGEM.  AS LONG AS WADE DOES NOT LET THE GAMBIA 
MEDIATE THE NEGOTIATIONS, JAMMEH'S ATTITUDE WILL BE 
ONE OF SCHADENFREUDE NOT OF STATESMANSHIP IN 
SCULPTING A GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY THAT ACTUALLY 
PROMOTES A CASAMANCE PEACE. 
 
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WADING INTO DEEP WATER - THE MANO RIVER FRAY 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) DENIED HIS DESIRED ROLE IN THE CASAMANCE, 
JAMMEH NOW PEERS AT THE MANO RIVER IMBROGLIO AS A 
POTENTIAL VEHICLE TO SECURE HIS MANTLE AS PEACE 
BROKER.  JAMMEH IS ALSO ENERGIZED BY THE BELIEF 
THAT HE HAS THE INSIDE TRACK ON THE ECOWAS CHAIR 
ONCE PRESIDENT KONARE COMPLETES THIS TERM. 
CURRENTLY, JAMMEH SEES NO BETTER WAY TO PREPARE 
HIMSELF FOR THIS ASCENSION THAN VISIBLE INVOLVEMENT 
IN THE MOST CRUCIAL ISSUE FACING THE SUB-REGION. 
PRESIDENT TAYLOR'S LATE MARCH VISIT TO BANJUL WAS 
NOT A WHIM.  AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, TAYLOR LIKELY 
HAD TWO RELATED OBJECTIVES.  FIRST, HE RECOGNIZED 
THAT JAMMEH MAY BE IN LINE FOR THE ECOWAS -- HE 
WANTED TO CULTIVATE A PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP PRIOR 
TO JAMMEH'S TENURE.  SECOND, TAYLOR WANTED ECOWAS 
TO BE A DIVIDED HOUSE REGARDING SANCTIONS AGAINST 
LIBERIA.  REALIZING THAT MOST ECOWAS COLLEAGUES ARE 
AGAINST HIM, TAYLOR SEEKS A SYMPATHETIC MINORITY TO 
PREVENT ECOWAS CONSENSUS WHICH, IN TURN, WILL 
IMPEDE ANTI-LIBERIA ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY. 
 
¶8. (C) ALSO, THE COMMONALTIES BETWEEN THE TAYLOR 
AND JAMMEH CANNOT BE IGNORED.  BOTH ARE DISLIKED BY 
IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS.  BOTH BASICALLY ASSUMED POWER 
BY THE MUSKET AND THUS ARE BETE NOIRE TO THEIR 
COUNTRIES' POLITICAL INTELLIGENCIA.  BOTH HAVE 
STRONG ANTI-WESTERN STREAKS AND LONG STANDING TIES 
TO LIBYA.  TAYLOR AND BABA JOBE, ARGUABLY THE 
SECOND MOST POWERFUL FIGURE IN THE GAMBIA, TRAINED 
TOGETHER IN LIBYA IN THE 1980S.  PREDICTABLY, JOBE 
IS ENMESHED IN ALL FORMS OF SKULLDUGGERY.  WE 
SUSPECT TAYLOR AND HIS COMPANIONS MAY HAVE EXPLORED 
WITH JAMMEH AND JOBE THE USE OF THE GAMBIA AS A 
POSSIBLE BACK ALLEY FOR COMMERCE TO ESCAPE UN 
SANCTIONS.  BABA JOBE'S ALMOST INNATE CRIMINALITY 
WOULD LEAD HIM TO ACCEPT SUCH AN OFFER.  ALTHOUGH 
HE WOULD HAVE BEEN ATTRACTED BY ANY BANGLES AND 
TRINKETS TAYLOR MIGHT HAVE OFFERED, JAMMEH WOULD BE 
MORE CAUTIOUS THAN JOBE.  NONETHELESS, THE 
DIPLOMATIC OPENING BETWEEN BANJUL AND MONROVIA 
PAVES THE ROAD FOR MORE CONTACTS AND THIS INCREASES 
THE CHANCE OF ILLICIT COMMERCE FOR THERE ARE FEW 
THINGS THAT THE LIBERIAN TOUCHES WHICH DO NOT 
BECOME SULLIED. 
 
¶9. (C) ALREADY, THE GAMBIA'S VOCABULARY TOWARD 
LIBERIA HAS CHANGED.  MONTHS AGO, FM SEDAT JOBE 
WOULD IMPRECATE TAYLOR THE MOMENT THE LIBERIAN 
ISSUE WAS RAISED.  DURING A MID-MAY CONVERSATION 
WITH AMBASSADOR HALEY, JOBE GROANED THAT SANCTIONS 
AGAINST LIBERIA WERE INIMICAL TO PEACE.  JOBE 
PROTESTED THAT TRAVEL SANCTIONS WERE PARTICULARLY 
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BECAUSE THEY WOULD PREVENT TAYLOR 
FROM ATTENDING PEACE CONFERENCES.  JOBE WENT SO FAR 
AS TO LABEL GUINEAN PRESIDENT CONTE, NOT TAYLOR, AS 
THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PEACE.  (COMMENT: THAT JOBE 
WOULD UTTER SUCH AN IMPOVERISHED RATIONALE REVEALS 
THE EXTENT THAT HE HAS RECEIVED NEW MARCHING ORDERS 
REGARDING LIBERIA.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶10. (C) THE GAMBIANS, SEEMINGLY OBLIVIOUS TO THE 
RECENT HISTORY OF THE TROUBLED MANO RIVER UNION, 
APPARENTLY BELIEVE THEY CAN SUCCEED WHERE OTHERS 
HAVE WRECKED -- IN DISCOVERING A FORMULA THAT WILL 
PERSUADE TAYLOR TO NEGOTI9E IN GOOD FAITH.  THE 
FIRST STEP, ACCORDING TO THE GAMBIANS IS THE 
HOLDING OF A TAYLOR-CONTE SUMMIT AIMED AT 
PACIFICATION OF THE GUINEA-LIBERIA BORDER. 
CONSEQUENTLY THE GAMBIANS BLAME CONTE'S REFUSAL TO 
MEET TAYLOR AS THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK TO THEIR 
APPROACH.  WE HAVE REMINDED THE GAMBIANS ABOUT THE 
NUMEROUS MEETINGS ATTENDED BY BOTH CONTE AND TAYLOR 
AND THE MANY COMMUNIQUQS BOTH HAVE SIGNED.  EVERY 
KNOWN PLATITUDE AND BROMIDE KNOWN TO DIPLOMATIC MAN 
HAS BEEN USED -- TO NO AVAIL.  WE ADVISED THAT 
PUSHING FOR A SUMMIT IN THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE 
PREPARATORY WORK WOULD RAISE EXPECTATIONS UNDULY. 
DISAPPOINTMENT WAS INEVITABLE BECAUSE THE GULF 
BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS IS MUCH TOO VAST TO BRIDGE 
IN ONE HIGHLY VISIBLE MEETING.  INSTEAD, FOREIGN 
MINISTERS AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS NEED TO MEET TO 
LESSON THE DIFFERENCES AND IDENTIFY THOSE AREAS 
NEEDING PRESIDENTIAL RESOLUTION.  JOBE SAID HE 
WOULD INCORPORATE THIS RECOMMENDATION IN THE 
GAMBIA'S APPROACH.  WE WILL SEE. 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT: IN BOTH THE CASAMANCE AND THE MANO 
RIVER PROCESSES, THE GAMBIA SEEKS A DRAMATIC 
BREAKTHROUGH.  JAMMEH'S EFFORTS ARE DRIVEN MORE BY 
HIS ITCH TO BE A STAR THAN HIS DESIRE TO BE A 
STATESMAN.  THEREFORE, HE SEEKS TO MAKE A BIG 
SPLASH, GIVING SECONDARY CONSIDERATION TO WHETHER 
HE IS JUMPING INTO SAFE WATERS OR A HOT CAULDRON. 
EQUIPPED WITH NO REAL STRATEGY, JAMMEH'S EFFORTS 
LIKELY WILL NOT ADVANCE PEACE IN THE CASAMANCE NOR 
LIBERIA.  UNFORTUNATELY, JAMMEH'S MEDDLING IN THE 
MANO RIVER FISTICUFFS WILL LIKELY SERVE TAYLOR'S 
AIMS.  JAMMEH'S DIPLOMATIC EXPLOITS MAY CLOUD AND 
WEAKEN ANY ECOWAS POLICY CONSENSUS REGARDING 
SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBERIA.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
HALEY