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Viewing cable 01HANOI952, ACTIVITIES OF PHIEU AND MANH IN THE RUN-UP TO THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS FORESHADOWED CHANGES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
01HANOI952 2001-04-20 11:19 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

201119Z Apr 01

2001HANOI00952 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3508

PAGE 01        HANOI  00952  01 OF 06  201134Z 
ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  SMEC-00  DINT-00  DOTE-00  
      SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    H-01     
      TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  
      OIC-02   OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   
      P-00     SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   STR-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00  
      PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-01   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   
        /009W
                  ------------------E1E0C3  201135Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2626
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5/FPA// PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 HANOI 000952 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/S-O, EAP, EAP/BCLTV, DRL, INR 
STATE PASS USTR FOR DAMOND 
NSC FOR EAST ASIAN DIRECTORATE 
SECDEF FOR ISA/EAP STERN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/13/2016 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  00952  01 OF 06  201134Z 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR VM DPOL
SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF PHIEU AND MANH IN THE RUN-UP TO THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS FORESHADOWED CHANGES 
 
REF: A) HANOI 919    B) HANOI 890 
 
C) 00 HANOI 670 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR JAMES BRUNO; 
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
2. (C) SUMMARY: THE FIERCE JOCKEYING AMONG THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY (CPV) LEADERSHIP THAT PEAKED AT THE APRIL 19-22 NINTH 
PARTY CONGRESS HAS BEEN BUILDING FOR MONTHS.  (REFTELS 
DETAIL OUR EXPECTATION THAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER MANH 
WILL BE CROWNED AS THE NEW CPV GENERAL SECRETARY ON APRIL 
22.)  THE IN-FIGHTING THAT HAS LED TO THE ECLIPSE OF 
INCUMBENT PHIEU HAS BECOME PARTICULARLY FEVERISH SINCE 
OCTOBER, WHEN THE THREE SENIOR ADVISORS CIRCULATED A LETTER 
RECOMMENDING HE STEP DOWN FOR POOR AND UNEVEN LEADERSHIP. 
OVER THIS PERIOD, THE EMBASSY HAS CONTINUED TO TRACK THE 
PUBLIC APPEARANCES OF THE POLITBURO IN VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL 
MEDIA, AND THESE ACCOUNTS GIVE US INSIGHTS ABOUT HOW THE 
LEADERSHIP "CAMPAIGN" HAS BEEN PLAYED OUT.  IN RETROSPECT, 
WE CAN SEE THAT PHIEU MADE A FURIOUS EFFORT, UNSUCCESSFUL 
IN THE END, TO "BARNSTORM" THE COUNTRY BY VISITING KEY 
PROVINCIAL PARTY LEADERS TO RALLY SUPPORT. 
 
3. (C) SUMMARY (CONT'D): AS NOTED IN EARLIER REPORTS 
DRAWING ON OUR YEAR-LONG TRACKING PROJECT, ROUGHLY HALF OF 
THE POLITBURO -- INCLUDING "THE ONCE AND FUTURE LEADERS" 
WHO SEEM THE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATES FOR THE NEXT GENERATION 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00952  01 OF 06  201134Z 
GENERAL SECRETARY, PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT -- HAVE 
HIGHLY VISIBLE PUBLIC ROLES.  THE OTHER HALF OF THIS 
POWERFUL BODY, HOWEVER, CONTINUES TO OPERATE IN THE 
SHADOWS, SHIELDED FROM PUBLIC VIEW.  THIS CABLE PROVIDES A 
SNAPSHOT OF VIETNAM'S NEW LEADERSHIP, WHICH COMES OUT OF 
THE OLD POLITBURO; SUMMARIZES OUR TRACKING OF THE 
INCUMBENTS OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS; AND INCLUDES IN-DEPTH 
"PUBLIC PROFILES" OF OUTGOING GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU AND 
HIS EVIDENT SUCCESSOR MANH.  (SEPTEL WILL PROFILE THE 
REMAINING 16 MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO.)  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------ 
SNAPSHOT OF VIETNAM'S NEW LEADERSHIP 
------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) ON APRIL 21 THE DELEGATES TO THE NINTH COMMUNIST 
PARTY CONGRESS WILL FORMALLY CAST THEIR VOTES FOR A NEW 
150-MEMBER CENTRAL COMMITTEE.  AS DETAILED REFTELS, 
HOWEVER, THE DECISIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE, AND WHEN THE 
RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED OFFICIALLY APRIL 22, NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY SPEAKER NONG DUC MANH IS WIDELY ASSUMED TO BE 
CONFIRMED AS THE NEW CPV GENERAL SECRETARY REPLACING LE KHA 
PHIEU.  FOLLOWING THE OPENING SESSION OF THE CONGRESS APRIL 
19, PHIEU GRANTED A RARE IMPROMPTU INTERVIEW TO THE REUTERS 
CORRESPONDENT, VIRTUALLY CONFIRMING HE WAS STEPPING DOWN TO 
MAKE WAY FOR YOUNGER LEADERSHIP.  (VIRTUALLY ALL OUR 
SOURCES CONFIRM MANH'S ELEVATION.)  ALSO NOTABLE IN PHIEU'S 
COMMENTS WAS HIS MENTION THAT NEITHER HE NOR THE THREE 
CURRENT "SENIOR ADVISORS" -- FORMER GENERAL SECRETARY DO 
MUOI, FORMER PRESIDENT LE DUC ANH, AND FORMER PM VO VAN 
KIET -- WOULD SERVE AS SENIOR ADVISORS.  TWO SOURCES TELL 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00952  01 OF 06  201134Z 
US SEPARATELY THAT MANH ONLY AGREED TO TAKE THE JOB IF 
THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY SENIOR ADVISORS LOOKING OVER HIS AND 
THE REST OF THE POLITBURO'S SHOULDERS. 
 
5. (C) REFTELS DETAIL THE LIKELY NEW ENTRIES TO THE 
POLITBURO -- INCLUDING CPV MASS MOBILIZATION HEAD TRUONG 
QUANG DUOC AND FORMER LABOR MINISTER NGUYEN DINH HOAN -- AS 
WELL AS THE LIKELY RETIREMENT OF SEVEN PRIMARILY OLDER AND 
LARGELY CONSERVATIVE MEMBERS.  (DEPUTY PM CAM IS A 
REFORMIST EXCEPTION AMONG THOSE RETIRING, BUT EXPECTED 
RETIREES PHIEU, HO CHI MINH POLITICAL ACADEMY HEAD BINH, 
FATHERLAND FRONT HEAD DUYET, HANOI PARTY CHIEF TUNG AND 
ARMED FORCES POLITICAL COMMISSAR NGAN ALL HAVE BEEN AMONG 
THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL OR THE STABILITY-FIRST-REFORM- 
SECOND CAMPS.)  IN ADDITION, THE NEW LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE 
AN ENHANCED ROLE FOR TRADE MINISTER VU KHOAN, SET TO SERVE 
AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OVERSEEING FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
TRADE ISSUES (NGUYEN MANH CAM'S OLD POSITION) AND REPORTED 
TO MOVE INTO AN IMPORTANT COORDINATING POSITION AS HEAD OF 
THE RECONSTITUTED POLITBURO SECRETARIAT.  (COMMENT: ONE OF 
THE MOST CAPABLE AND PRAGMATIC "REFORMERS" IN THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE, VU KHOAN OF COURSE WAS KEY TO SIGNING OF THE 
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S.  HIS ELEVATION TO A 
POSITION OF GREATER INFLUENCE OVERALL CPV DECISION-MAKING 
CAN ENHANCE THE REFORMIST CAUSE.  END COMMENT.) 
 
6. (C) ALL IN ALL, THESE CHANGES ADD UP TO A MORE 
STREAMLINED LEADERSHIP THAT PROMISES TO BE MORE 
PROFESSIONAL AND EFFICIENT.  SEVERAL FACTORS WILL 
CONTRIBUTE TO THIS: MANH, A PRAGMATIC MODERATE, HAS MUCH 
BETTER SKILLS AS AN ADMINISTRATOR THAN PHIEU.  HE IS WIDELY 
RESPECTED (INCLUDING AMONG HIS STRONGLY REFORM-MINDED MID- 
LEVEL STAFF) FOR HIS LEADERSHIP OF THE ASSEMBLY OVER THE 
PAST DECADE, DURING WHICH HE DEMONSTRATED HIS SKILLS AS A 
COALITION BUILDER.  HE HAS SPENT THE PAST DECADE HELPING 
GUIDE THE ASSEMBLY AS IT HAS ASSUMED AN INCREASINGLY 
IMPORTANT ROLE IN CRAFTING LEGISLATION TO MEET NEW DEMANDS 
AS VIETNAM HAS SHIFTED MORE TOWARD MARKET PRINCIPLES. 
PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, IF THE SENIOR ADVISORS INDEED ARE 
EXCLUDED FROM THE SCENE, THIS WILL BE A HUGE ADVANCE IN 
ALLOWING THE POLITBURO TO FUNCTION MORE AS A MODERN PARTY 
POLICY APPARATUS WITH MANH AS CEO. 
 
7. (C) ANOTHER KEY DIFFERENCE IS THAT THE MILITARY LOOKS TO 
HAVE ITS LOWEST SENIOR PROFILE IN MEMORY, PERHAPS EVER IN 
THE HISTORY OF INDEPENDENT VIETNAM.  IF, AS LOOKS LIKELY, 
DEFENSE MINISTER TRA WILL BE LEFT AS THE SOLE MILITARY 
REPRESENTATIVE ON A LEANER 15-MEMBER POLITBURO, THE 
MILITARY'S ABILITY TO WEIGH IN WITH "NATIONAL SECURITY" 
ARGUMENTS FOR GOING SLOW ON REFORM AND GUARDING AGAINST 
FOREIGN THREATS WILL BE MUCH LESS THAN HISTORICALLY. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00952  02 OF 06  201135Z 
FURTHERMORE, TRA IS SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED PERSONALLY 
FOLLOWING HIS SEVERE CENSURE BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
EARLIER THIS MONTH FOR MISMANAGEMENT, IN PART BECAUSE OF 
THE VIOLATION OF VIETNAMESE AIR SPACE BY VIETNAMESE- 
AMERICAN ANTI-SRV ACTIVIST LY TONG.  (NOTE: IT APPEARS 
PUBLIC SECURITY MINISTER HUONG WILL ALSO REMAIN IN THE 
POLITBURO.  END NOTE.) IN ADDITION, THOUGH THIS HAS NEVER 
BEEN PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED, SEVERAL SOURCES REPORT THAT 
PART OF PHIEU'S DOWNFALL -- AND THE CENSURE OF TRA AND ARMY 
CHIEF OF STAFF DUNG -- OWED TO HIS MISUSE OF MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE ASSETS TO EAVESDROP ON HIS POLITBURO AND 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE PEERS.  ANGER BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
COLLEAGUES UPON DISCOVERY OF THIS REPORTED CAMPAIGN, 
RUMORED TO BE A WEAPON IN PHIEU'S CRITICISM/SELF-CRITICISM 
INITIATIVE, MAY HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN THE MILITARY'S 
WEAKENED LEADERSHIP PROFILE. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
THE NEW LEADERSHIP GROWS OUT OF THE OLD: 
"PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FACES" OF POLITBURO PRIOR TO CONGRESS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
8. (SBU) AS THE NEW VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP IS UNVEILED THIS 
WEEKEND, IT IS AN INSTRUCTIVE MOMENT TO ANALYZE WHAT 
BROUGHT ABOUT THESE CHANGES.  SINCE THE POLITBURO IS SUCH 
AN OPAQUE AND SECRETIVE BODY -- AND SUSPICION OF THE U.S. 
CONTINUES TO RUN HIGH, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE SECURITY- 
MINDED MINISTRIES AND CPV CADRE -- WE OFTEN OBTAIN ONLY 
INDIRECT INSIGHTS INTO THE WORKINGS OF THIS GROUP.  AS PART 
OF THE EMBASSY'S ONGOING TRACKING PROJECT OF THE PUBLIC 
FACES OF THE POLITBURO IN THE VIETNAMESE MEDIA OVER THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00952  02 OF 06  201135Z 
PAST YEAR, WE HAVE CONTINUED TO TALLY HOW FREQUENTLY AND IN 
WHAT MANNER VIETNAM'S MAJOR DAILY PAPERS TRACK THE 
APPEARANCES OF THE MOST SENIOR COMMUNIST PARTY (CPV) 
MEMBERS.  (IN PARTICULAR WE EXAMINED THE CPV MOUTHPIECE 
"THE PEOPLE" AND TWO LEADING DAILIES IN THE LARGEST CITIES: 
"NEW HANOI" AND "SAIGON LIBERATION."  WHILE NOT A 
COMPREHENSIVE LISTING, THIS GIVES US A GOOD SURVEY OF HOW 
THE LEADERSHIP IS FEATURED IN THE MOST PROMINENT OFFICIAL 
PUBLICATIONS.) 
 
9. (SBU) IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS, FROM OCTOBER 1, 2000-MARCH 
31, 2001, IN THE RUN-UP TO THE NINTH COMMUNIST PARTY 
CONGRESS, WE CONTINUED TO SEE THE SAME TRENDS ORIGINALLY 
DOCUMENTED PREVIOUSLY: ROUGHLY HALF OF THE POLITBURO HAVE 
POSITIONS WITH LARGELY "PUBLIC" FACES THAT INVOLVE 
SIGNIFICANT APPEARANCES IN THE PUBLIC EYE.  THE OTHER HALF 
WORKS LARGELY IN POSITIONS DEALING WITH INTERNAL CPV 
AFFAIRS AND REGULAR FROM REGULAR PUBLIC EXPOSURE.  THUS, 
TRACKING THE PUBLIC APPEARANCES OF THE POLITBURO IN THE 
STATE-CONTROLLED MEDIA GIVES ONLY AN INCOMPLETE, PARTIAL 
VIEW OF THE ACTIVITIES AND IMPORTANCE OF SENIOR LEADERS. 
BUT IT REVEALS HOW THE CPV WISHES TO CONVEY ITSELF TO ITS 
PUBLIC, AND THUS IS A USEFUL PIECE OF THE PUZZLE IN 
ANALYZING THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LEADERSHIP 
ELITE. 
 
10. (SBU) DURING THIS PERIOD, NOT SURPRISINGLY, AMONG THE 
MOST PROMINENTLY FEATURED POLITBURO FIGURES IN THE MEDIA 
WERE THE TOP FIVE OFFICIALS WHO CONSTITUTE THE STANDING 
COMMITTEE.  EACH OF THEM HAS AN IMPORTANT "PUBLIC 
RESPONSIBILITY" REPRESENTING THE CPV AND THE GOVERNMENT: 
CPV GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU, PRESIDENT LUONG, PRIME 
MINISTER KHAI, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER MANH, AND 
FATHERLAND FRONT CHAIR DUYET.  IN ADDITION, FIRST DEPUTY 
PRIME MINISTER DUNG, HANOI PARTY CHIEF TRONG, HO CHI MINH 
CITY PARTY CHIEF TRIET AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER CAM ALSO 
MAINTAINED PROMINENT PUBLIC PROFILES IN THE MEDIA.  OF ALL 
OF THESE MENTIONED ABOVE, THEIR PUBLIC PROFILE REFLECTS 
GENERALLY THEIR RELATIVE CLOUT AS AMONG THE KEY "PLAYERS" 
IN THE CPV LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNMENT.  DEPUTY PM CAM IS 
PERHAPS THE ONE EXCEPTION.  AS DEPUTY PM OVERSEEING FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND TRADE ISSUES, HIS PUBLIC PROFILE IS DRIVEN BY 
FOREIGN VISITORS.  HE ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL RETIRE AT THE 
CPV CONGRESS. 
 
11. (SBU) MOST ALL OF THE LEADERS MENTIONED ABOVE HAVE 
FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN THE JOCKEYING OVER THE PAST MONTHS 
FOR A SPOT IN THE NEW SLATE OF LEADERS TO BE APPROVED AT 
THE CONGRESS -- PHIEU, MANH, LUONG, TRONG, DUNG AND TRIET. 
IN FACT, ONLY ONE OTHER POLITBURO MEMBER APPEARS TO HAVE 
BEEN CONSIDERED FOR A POSSIBLE SENIOR POSITION WHO IS NOT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00952  03 OF 06  201135Z 
IN THIS "PUBLIC GROUP": CPV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFAIRS CHIEF 
NGUYEN VAN AN.  AN, A FINALIST WHO LOST OUT TO PHIEU FOR 
THE TOP JOB IN 1997, HAS REMAINED LARGELY IN THE SHADOWS 
SINCE THEN.  IN THE ENDGAME TO SUCCEED PHIEU, HE AGAIN 
PROVED TO BE THE MAIN ALTERNATIVE.  AT THE PRE-CONGRESS 
MEETING APRIL 16 HE REPORTEDLY RECEIVED SERIOUS 
CONSIDERATION FOR THE POST AFTER MANH INITIALLY DEMURRED. 
(IN THE END, MANH APPARENTLY DID SO FOR TACTICAL REASONS, 
IN PART TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SENIOR ADVISORS 
FROM THE SCENE.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
PHIEU BARNSTORMED TO TRY TO SAVE HIS SKIN ... 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) LE KHA PHIEU, 69, HAS SERVED AS GENERAL SECRETARY 
SINCE DECEMBER 1997.  A YEAR AGO HE SEEMED FIRMLY ENSCONCED 
IN HIS POSITION AND LOOKED TO HAVE CONSOLIDATED POWER WITH 
THE AID OF FORMER PRESIDENT ANH, HIMSELF A MILITARY MAN. 
HOWEVER, ANH AND THE OTHER SENIOR ADVISORS TURNED AGAINST 
PHIEU, OWING TO HIS POOR MANAGEMENT OF CPV AFFAIRS AND 
MISCUES ON ECONOMIC REFORM AND RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE 
U.S., AS WELL AS RUMORED MISUSE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
AGAINST HIS CPV SENIOR COLLEAGUES.  PHIEU ALSO MAY HAVE 
OVERREACHED BY TRYING TO COMBINE THE PRESIDENCY WITH THE 
GENERAL SECRETARY POST -- A COMBINATION THAT WOULD HAVE 
DISRUPTED THE TRADITIONAL, CAREFULLY BALANCED ARRANGEMENT 
AMONG THE THREE TOP LEADERS REPRESENTING VIETNAM'S THREE 
REGIONS AND ALSO DIFFERENT POLICY LINES AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
ENTITIES (CPV, MILITARY, GOVERNMENT).  THE COUP DE GRACE 
MAY WELL HAVE BEEN HIS CALLING FOR ELIMINATING THE SENIOR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00952  03 OF 06  201135Z 
ADVISOR POSITIONS.  (IRONICALLY, IT APPEARS MANH WILL BE 
SUCCESSFUL WHERE PHIEU FAILED, WITH THE SENIOR ADVISORS 
AGREEING TO STEP BACK.  IN ADDITION, RUMORS CIRCULATE APRIL 
20 THAT MANH ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN OFFERED THE TWO CONCURRENT 
POSTS OF PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY, WITH CURRENT 
PRESIDENT LUONG RUMORED TO BE MOVING OVER TO NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY CHAIR.  WHILE POSSIBLE, WE DOUBT THIS WILL TAKE 
PLACE AT THIS TIME.) 
 
13. (SBU) IN OUR TRACKING SURVEY OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS, 
PHIEU WAS FEATURED ON 79 DIFFERENT DATES IN PAGE ONE 
ARTICLES IN THE MEDIA, AND BEFITTING HIS POSITION AS THE 
COUNTRY'S MOST POWERFUL FIGURE, HE WAS DEPICTED LEADING THE 
CPV AND NATION IN ITS POLITICAL LIFE.  ONE OF THE STRIKING 
THINGS WE NOTE FROM OUR TRACKING PROJECT IS HOW ACTIVE 
PHIEU WAS OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS IN "BARNSTORMING" THE 
COUNTRY, VISITING LOCAL PARTY CONGRESSES IN FAR-FLUNG 
PROVINCES AND ALL THE COUNTRY'S MAJOR CITIES.  SOURCES TELL 
US THIS HAS BEEN A KEY PART OF PHIEU'S STRATEGY IN RALLYING 
SUPPORT TO RESIST THE CAMPAIGN OF THE THREE SENIOR 
ADVISORS, ANH, MUOI AND KIET, TO HAVE HIM STEP DOWN.  (OF 
COURSE, THE LETTER OF THE SENIOR ADVISORS AND OTHER 
BACKROOM POLITICKING THAT WOULD BE A STAPLE OF POLITICAL 
REPORTING IN WASHINGTON, BANGKOK OR MANILA HAS NEVER BEEN 
MENTIONED IN VIETNAMESE STATE-RUN MEDIA.  THE FOREIGN 
CORRESPONDENTS BASED HERE HAVE REPORTED WIDELY ON THIS, OF 
COURSE.) 
 
14. (SBU) AMONG OTHER CPV GATHERINGS, PHIEU WAS FEATURED 
PROMINENTLY IN "THE PEOPLE" GIVING KEYNOTE ADDRESSES TO THE 
PARTY CONGRESSES FOR KEY ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE 
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY'S GENERAL POLICE DEPARTMENT 
(NOV. 8), THE CPV CONGRESSES FOR MILITARY REGIONS 3 (NOV. 
13) AND 5 (NOV. 21), AND THE CIVIL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 
(NOV. 28).  HIS KEYNOTE ADDRESSES OPENING AND CLOSING EACH 
OF THE CPV CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUMS WERE REPRINTED IN THE 
STATE MEDIA.  PHIEU WAS DEPICTED MEETING PRESIDENT CLINTON 
NOV. 18, AND VIETNAMESE MEDIA WENT TO UNPRECEDENTED EFFORTS 
TO DESCRIBE PHIEU'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, INCLUDING 
HIS STRIDENT DEFENSE OF SOCIALISM, WHICH PROVED TO BE ONE 
OF THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE BROAD CRITICISM OF 
PHIEU, PARTICULARLY FROM REFORMERS IN THE CPV. 
 
15. (SBU) PHIEU WAS ALSO FEATURED ADDRESSING PROVINCIAL 
PARTY CONGRESSES AROUND THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THOSE IN HA 
GIANG IN THE FAR NORTH (DEC. 4), HO CHI MINH CITY (DEC. 
19), HANOI (DEC. 28), NINH BINH AND THANH HOA (JAN. 2), 
AMONG MANY OTHERS.  PHIEU ALSO ADDRESSED THE NATIONAL 
MILITARY CONGRESS AND WAS AWARDED A GOLDEN STAR MEDAL BY 
THE PAVN GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, WHICH HE FORMERLY 
HEADED.  IN ADDITION, PHIEU TRAVELED AROUND THE COUNTRY FOR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00952  04 OF 06  201136Z 
MANY OTHER REPRESENTATIONAL FUNCTIONS; HE VISITED FLOODED 
AN GIANG PROVINCE IN THE MEKONG DELTA IN EARLY OCTOBER AND 
FLOODED REGIONS OF HCMC AT THE END OF THE MONTH.  HE MET 
MANY OTHER VISITING DIGNITARIES, RANGING FROM THE ALGERIAN 
PRESIDENT (OCT. 16), A VISITING CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 
DELEGATION ATTENDING A WORKSHOP ON SOCIALISM (NOV. 11), THE 
INDIAN PRIME MINISTER (JAN. 9), THE PRC DEFENSE MINISTER 
(FEB. 9), THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER (FEB. 24), AND RUSSIAN 
PRESIDENT PUTIN (MARCH 2).  IN SUM, PHIEU MAINTAINED AN 
ACTIVE PUBLIC SCHEDULE, PARTICULARLY WHEN ONE NOTES HIS 
NURTURING OF KEY CPV ALLIES IN THE MILITARY, PUBLIC 
SECURITY AND PARTY CADRE AREAS. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
... WHILE MANH'S ONGOING NETWORKING MADE ALLIES OVER TIME 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
16. (C) NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN NONG DUC MANH, 60, IN 
CONTRAST TO PHIEU, SEEMS TO HAVE SLOWLY AND STEADILY 
DEVELOPED A BROAD NETWORK OF ADMIRERS AND SUPPORTERS IN 
SENIOR CPV RANKS.  IN THE END, HIS STRONG SUPPORT AMONG THE 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE DECISIVE FACTOR 
IN BRINGING HIM TO HIS LIKELY "CORONATION" APRIL 22 AS THE 
NEW GENERAL SECRETARY.  CONTRASTED WITH HIS PREDECESSORS 
PHIEU, DO MUOI, TRUONG CHINH AND LE DUAN, WHO USED EITHER 
REVOLUTIONARY OR MILITARY CREDENTIALS TO REACH THE TOP 
SPOT, MANH'S PATH TO THE SEAT OF POWER WAS BUILT PATIENTLY 
THROUGH HIS WORK AS HEAD OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SINCE 
1992.  TRADITIONALLY, THE ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN A WEAK 
RUBBERSTAMP IN VIETNAMESE POLITICS, BUT MANH PRESIDED OVER 
A PERIOD OF THE ASSEMBLY'S ASSUMING MUCH GREATER PROMINENCE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00952  04 OF 06  201136Z 
AS A MORE GENUINELY DELIBERATIVE BODY.  ON OCCASION THE 
ASSEMBLY HAS BUCKED THE POLITBURO'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
PRESSED FOR THE SACKING OF NOMINATED CANDIDATES DEEMED 
INCOMPETENT.  ALSO DURING HIS TENURE THE ASSEMBLY BEGAN 
LIVE QUESTIONING OF MINISTERS ON NATIONAL TELEVISION AND 
VIGOROUSLY DEBATED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES, WITH MEMBERS 
STRONGLY DEFENDING THE INTERESTS OF THEIR LOCAL 
CONSTITUENTS.  IF ANYTHING, MANH'S PUBLIC VISIBILITY AND 
THE ROLE HE WAS PLAYING TO MEET PUBLIC INTERESTS ENHANCED 
HIS RECOGNITION IN LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS PUBLIC CIRCLES. 
 
17. (C) MANH'S SMOOTH STYLE OF MANAGING THE ASSEMBLY -- 
BUSINESS-LIKE AND COMMITTED TO BUILDING BROAD COALITIONS 
AMONG THE CPV'S DISPARATE FACTIONS AND SECTORAL GROUPS 
REPRESENTED IN THE FATHERLAND FRONT -- HAS WON HIGH MARKS. 
HIS STRONG "CORRIDOR REPUTATION" IN THE HALLS OF THE 
ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN BUILT PATIENTLY OVER A DECADE OF WORK; 
CONSISTENTLY OVER THE PAST YEAR HE HAS POLLED AMONG THE 
MOST RESPECTED MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.  ONE KEY 
LIEUTENANT AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SAYS MANH IS "DEVOTED, 
WORK-ORIENTED AND CLEAN," WITHOUT THE CORRUPTION 
ALLEGATIONS HANGING OVER HIM THAT OTHERS (INCLUDING PHEIU) 
HAVE FACED RECENTLY.  MANH REPORTEDLY IS A "GOOD LISTENER," 
AND WE HAVE NOTED HE IS AN ENGAGING INTERLOCUTOR FOR 
VISITING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.  MANH'S LIEUTENANT SAYS HIS 
MENTOR, HOWEVER, MAY NOT HAVE DEEP SUPPORT FROM KEY 
FACTIONS IN THE CPV'S SENIOR RANKS -- THOUGH HE COMMANDS 
BROAD SUPPORT -- AND THIS COULD COMPLICATE HIS EARLY TIME 
IN OFFICE.  A DEPUTY HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ETHNIC 
MINORITIES COMISSION, WHO FORMERLY WORKED FOR MANH, SAID HE 
IS PRAGMATIC, COLLABORATIVE AND RESPECTFUL OF OTHERS, AND 
THESE PERSONAL TRAITS ARE PART OF THE SOURCE OF HIS APPEAL. 
 
18. (SBU) DURING THE OCTOBER-MARCH PERIOD, MANH WAS 
FEATURED 53 TIMES IN THE THREE KEY VIETNAMESE PRESS ORGANS 
WE ANALYZED.  ON NOVEMBER 14 HE OPENED THE FALL SESSION OF 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, PRESIDING OVER THE BODY'S BUSINESS 
UNTIL ITS RECESS DECEMBER 9.  THE FALL SESSION PRIMARILY 
FOCUSED ON DISCUSSION AND APPROVAL OF THE 2001 BUDGET AND 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PLAN, THOUGH LIKE OTHER SESSIONS IT INCLUDED 
QUESTIONING OF MINISTERS AND A MODEST LAWMAKING AGENDA 
(WHICH IN THE FALL SESSION IS GENERALLY LIGHTER THAN THE 
SPRING'S).  FOLLOWING THE FALL SESSION, HE CHAIRED THE 
MONTHLY MEETINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY STANDING 
COMMITTEE, WHICH CONDUCTS THE ASSEMBLY'S ONGOING BUSINESS 
THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. 
 
19. (C) A LARGE PORTION OF MANH'S "PUBLIC" APPEARANCES IN 
THE MEDIA WAS TIED TO PROTOCOL FUNCTIONS AS HEAD OF THE 
ASSEMBLY: ON OCTOBER 4 HE MET THE CHAIRMAN OF THE VISITING 
JAPAN-VIETNAM FRIENDSHIP PARLIAMENTARIANS ASSOCIATION (WHO 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00952  05 OF 06  201136Z 
HAS RETURNED THIS WEEK AS ONE OF THE VISITING DELEGATIONS 
TO THE CONGRESS).  HE ALSO RECEIVED PARLIAMENTARY 
DELEGATIONS FROM CAMBODIA, AUSTRALIA, MONGOLIA, FRANCE, 
THAILAND AND LAOS, AMONG OTHERS.  ON MARCH 2 HE MET 
VISITING RUSSIAN PRESIDENT PUTIN.  ON NOVEMBER 17 HE MET 
WITH SEN. KERRY AND FOUR HOUSE MEMBERS ACCOMPANYING 
PRESIDENT CLINTON ON HIS HISTORIC TRIP TO VIETNAM.  IN THIS 
MEETING, MANH DEFENDED THE 15 YEARS OF ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE 
"DOI MOI" (RENOVATION) PROCESS, AND, IN RESPONSE TO KERRY'S 
QUESTION, SAID VIETNAM DID NOT NEED MULTIPLE PARTIES SINCE 
"ALL SECTOR GROUPS" OF VIETNAM ARE REPRESENTED IN THE 
ASSEMBLY, THE CPV AND THE FATHERLAND FRONT.  (COMMENT: 
WHILE CLEARLY A PRAGMATIC, MORE MODERN LEADER THAN PHIEU, 
MANH TO ALL APPEARANCES IS A LOYAL, COMMITTED COMMUNIST WHO 
DOES NOT ENVISION ANY "EVOLUTION" TO A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM. 
END COMMENT.)  IN JANUARY MANH MET THE VISITING GEPHARDT 
CODEL. 
 
20. (SBU) MANH ALSO CARRIED WATER FOR THE CPV IN ITS 
INTERNAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS.  HE ADDRESSED 
PROVINCIAL PARTY CONGRESSES IN BAC GIANG IN DECEMBER AND 
BAC KAN AND THAI NGUYEN  IN JANUARY.  HE ATTENDED THE HANOI 
CPV CONGRESS IN DECEMBER, AND WAS FEATURED ATTENDING BOTH 
ROUNDS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S 11TH PLENUMS DURING THE 
PERIOD (INCLUDING THE FINAL 12TH PLENUM AND PRE-CONGRESS 
ONLY DAYS AGO IN MID-APRIL).  ON DECEMBER 1, HE, LIKE ALL 
THE OTHER SENIOR LEADERS, ATTENDED A GATHERING FOR LE DUC 
ANH'S 80TH BIRTHDAY.  FOR TET CELEBRATIONS IN LATE JANUARY 
HE JOINED A CPV DELEGATION PAYING TRIBUTE TO HO CHI MINH; 
VISITED THE HAI BA TRUNG DISTRICT OF HANOI, WHICH HE 
FORMALLY REPRESENTS IN THE ASSEMBLY; AND TRAVELED TO VINH 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00952  05 OF 06  201136Z 
PHUC PROVINCE.  IN FEBRUARY HE WAS DEPICTED COMMEMORATING 
THE 71ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE CPV. 
 
21. (SBU) AS PART OF HIS NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND CPV DUTIES, 
MANH HAD A WIDE RANGE OF MEETINGS THAT CAN BE SEEN IN 
RETROSPECT AS PART OF THE BROAD "CONSTITUENT BUILDING" HE 
HAS DONE DURING THE PAST DECADE.  AS A GOOD LISTENER AND 
ENGAGING CONVERSATIONALIST, MANH HAS BEEN QUIETLY BUILDING 
A WELLSPRING OF GOOD OPINION THROUGH THESE KINDS OF 
MEETING.  ON OCT. 19 HE ATTENDED THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF 
THE FOUNDING OF THE VIETNAM WOMEN'S UNION.  THROUGHOUT THE 
PERIOD, HE WAS PICTURED IN THE PRESS MEETING WITH 
VIETNAMESE GROUPS HANDLING THE PRESS, POVERTY REDUCTION 
PROGRAMS, THE RAILWAY SERVICE, THE POSTAL SERVICE, WOMEN'S 
ISSUES, AND THE CPV YOUTH UNION, AMONG MANY OTHERS. 
 
22. (C) A MEMBER OF THE ETHNIC TAY MINORITY, AND THE ONLY 
MINORITY MEMBER SERVING IN THE POLITBURO, MANH HELD A HIGH 
PROFILE THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD MEETING MINORITY MEMBERS.  HE 
HELD WORKING SESSIONS WITH CPV LEADERS OF THE COMMITTEE FOR 
ETHNIC PEOPLE AND MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS, MET MINORITY 
REPRESENTATIVES FROM QUANG NINH AND DAKLAK PROVINCES IN 
HANOI, AND VISITED SEVERAL PROVINCES WITH LARGE MINORITY 
POPULATIONS.  FROM OCT. 12-16 HE VISITED FLOOD VICTIMS IN 
NORTHWESTERN LAI CHAU PROVINCE AND HAD WORKING MEETINGS 
THERE.  ON MARCH 9 HE SPOKE TO 60 ETHNIC MINORITY OFFICIALS 
FROM DAKLAK WHO ARE ATTENDING THE PROVINCE'S CPV POLITICS 
SCHOOL.  MANH APPEALED TO MINORITIES TO OBEY THE LAW AND 
COOPERATE WITH AUTHORITIES, PRAISED MINORITIES' 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND URGED TEACHERS 
TO FOCUS ON PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE IN THEIR CLASSES. 
(COMMENT: PARTICULARLY IN THE WAKE OF FEBRUARY'S SOMETIMES- 
VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS, WE EXPECT 
MANH WILL BE PUT FORWARD MORE FREQUENTLY AS A NEW SIGN OF 
THE CPV'S TOLERANCE INTEGRATION OF MINORITIES.  UNDER 
MANH'S LEADERSHIP WE DO NOT EXPECT DRAMATIC CHANGES IN 
VIETNAM'S POLICIES TOWARD MINORITIES, HOWEVER.  SENIOR CPV 
LEADERS ANNOUNCED THIS WEEK THE GVN WILL UNDERTAKE A 
REINVIGORATED DEVELOPMENT PLAN TO HELP THE SEVERELY 
IMPOVERISHED CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.  CLEARLY THIS AREA HAS 
GOTTEN THE ATTENTION OF SENIOR LEADERS, AND WE BELIEVE THEY 
RECOGNIZE THAT DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LIVES OF THE 
REGION'S "MONTAGNARDS" ARE NEEDED IF THERE IS NOT TO BE 
FURTHER RADICALIZATION OF THE CITIZENS.  HOWEVER, 
TRANSLATING SUCH CONCERN INTO ACTION IS A HUGE CHALLENGE 
FOR THE GVN.  END COMMENT.) 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00952  06 OF 06  201136Z 
23. (C) COMMENT: ONE OF THE MOST STRIKING INSIGHTS TO COME 
FROM OUR TRACKING PROJECT IS HOW MANH HAS QUIETLY AND 
CONSISTENTLY BEEN BUILDING PERSONAL SUPPORT AMONG THE CPV'S 
DISPARATE CONSTITUENT GROUPS THROUGHOUT THE PAST MONTHS AND 
YEARS.  IN THE END, HIS WINSOME THOUGH NON-CHARISMATIC 
PERSONALITY, HIS PRAGMATIC POLICY BENT, HIS PERSONAL LACK 
OF "SCANDAL," AND HIS COLLEGIAL LISTENING SKILLS SEEM TO 
HAVE WON THE DAY IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.  LIKE ALL THOSE 
WHO WIN CAMPAIGNS, HOWEVER, NOW COMES THE HARD PART.  END 
COMMENT. 
PETERSON 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL