This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

031011Z Apr 01


 2001HANOI00762 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4884

PAGE 01        HANOI  00762  01 OF 03  031013Z 
ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DOTE-00  DS-00    EB-00    
      FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    VCE-00   
      NSAE-00  OIC-02   IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    DSCC-00  DRL-02   
      NFAT-00  SAS-00     /004W
                  ------------------DAB023  031015Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2426
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
SECDEF WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5/FPA/JTF-FA//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000762 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
UNCINCPAC FOR FPA 
SECDEF ALSO FOR ISA/EA/LSTERN 
 
CONFIDENTIAL -NOFORN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:(INDEFINITE ) 
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL VM
SUBJECT: USG OBJECTIVES IN THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM 
 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY DENNIS G. HARTER, DCM, 1.5 B AND D 
 
¶1.  (C) INTRODUCTION:  THE FOLLOWING IS THE FIRST OF A 
TWO-PART ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF U.S.-VIETNAM 
RELATIONS.  IT FOCUSES ON THE BACKGROUND OF 
"NORMALIZATION" AND WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED TO MEET USG 
AS WELL AS VIETNAMESE INTERESTS.  IT WILL BE FOLLOWED 
BY A SECOND MESSAGE THAT DELINEATES A SIGNIFICANT 
NUMBER OF FRICTIONS IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS. 
THESE FRICTIONS ARE EXACERBATED BY THE RECENT AND 
CONTINUING POWER STRUGGLE AMONG VIETNAMESE LEADERS 
OVER PERSONAL STATUS AND STATURE IN THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY HIERARCHY AND OVER THE PACE OF POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC REFORM TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE COMING YEARS. 
FAILURE TO TAKE NOTE OF THESE SENSITIVITIES IN 
CARRYING OUT USG POLICY OBJECTIVES COULD RESULT IN A 
SERIOUS SETBACK TO BILATERAL RELATIONS AND TO THE 
SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS WE HAVE HAD IN BUILDING A NEW AND 
CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH A FORMER ENEMY.  END 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
¶2.  (C) LESS THAN FIFTEEN YEARS AGO, THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VIETNAM WAS ONE OF HOSTILITY. 
VIETNAM'S DECISION TO INVADE CAMBODIA IN 1978 CREATED 
AN INTERNATIONAL UPROAR.  THE UNILATERAL U.S. EMBARGO 
AND ISOLATION POLICY BECAME AN INTERNATIONAL POLICY, 
EXCLUDING VIETNAM FROM VIRTUALLY ALL "NORMAL" 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00762  01 OF 03  031013Z 
DEALINGS.  FROM A VERY SLOW BUT STEADY BEGINNING, THE 
UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM HAVE TURNED THIS HOSTILITY 
INTO AN UNPRECEDENTED SCOPE OF COOPERATION AND SHARED 
BENEFIT.  ANNUAL MISSION AND INTER-AGENCY REVIEWS OF 
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM HAVE CONFIRMED THE HIGH 
PRIORITY WE HAVE ATTACHED TO THEIR ACHIEVEMENT. 
 
¶3.  (C) THE SUCCESSES HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED VERY 
QUICKLY, WITH MOST OF THE BENEFITS HAVING BEEN 
ACHIEVED IN THE FIVE AND A HALF YEARS SINCE THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.  THUS, IT IS 
PERHAPS NOT READILY PERCEIVED IN THE U.S. THAT THIS 
RELATIONSHIP REMAINS FRAGILE AND STILL SUBJECT TO 
BEING PULLED APART BY MISPERCEPTIONS OF POLICY ON BOTH 
SIDES. VIETNAM'S LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE REMAINS IN A 
STATE OF TRANSITION, MOVING FROM AN ELDER GENERATION 
OF WAR-TIME HEROES TO A NATION WHERE THE QUESTIONS OF 
EDUCATION, ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, AND INTERNATIONAL 
INTEGRATION ARE FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN IDEOLOGIES 
BASED ON COMMUNIST THEORY.  THE LEADERS ARE SENSITIVE 
TO THE FEAR THAT U.S. FAILURE TO OVERTHROW VIETNAM'S 
COMMUNIST STATE BY WAR HAS ONLY BEEN REPLACED BY A 
"PLAN" TO DO SO THROUGH "PEACEFUL EVOLUTION" AND AN 
UNDERMINING OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM. 
 
¶4.  (C) THE LATE 1980'S COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION 
AND EASTERN EUROPE'S COMMUNIST SYSTEM, CONVINCED 
VIETNAM'S LEADERS THEY COULD NOT SURVIVE IN THE WORLD 
WITHOUT ADJUSTING THE COUNTRY'S DOMESTIC POLICY (THE 
GENESIS OF "DOI MOI" ECONOMIC REFORMS) AND ITS FOREIGN 
POLICY (GETTING OUT OF CAMBODIA).  THE USG REACTION, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00762  01 OF 03  031013Z 
FORMULATED BY THEN PRESIDENT BUSH AND HIS ADVISORS, 
WAS TO BUILD A STEP-BY-STEP EXPANSION OF OFFICIAL 
CONTACTS WITH THE VIETNAMESE.  THESE CONTACTS WERE 
PREDICATED ON HANOI'S WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA AND THE 
START-UP OF A DEMOCRATIC ELECTION PROCESS IN THAT 
COUNTRY.  THESE STEPS WERE PARALLELED BY A STRUCTURED 
AND INTENSIFIED USG ATTENTION TO RESOLVING RESIDUAL 
POW/MIA ISSUES WITH VIETNAMESE COOPERATION. 
 
¶5.  (C) THE EVOLUTION OF THIS PROCESS IN THE EARLY 
1990'S RESULTED IN VIETNAM'S RESUMPTION AND INITIATION 
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AROUND THE WORLD AND ITS 
MEMBERSHIP IN ASEAN AND THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM 
(ARF).  VIETNAM BEG 
AN A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CHINA AND 
SUBSEQUENT DIALOGUE WITH THE PRC LED TO THE CONCLUSION 
OF A LAND AND GULF OF TONKIN BORDER DEMARCATION THAT 
HAD VEXED THE TWO COUNTRIES FOR THOUSANDS OF YEARS. 
VIETNAM WELCOMED INTERNATIONAL DONOR ASSISTANCE FROM 
THE WORLD BANK, IMF, ADB AND A HOST OF BILATERAL 
CONTRIBUTORS TO REBUILD ITS ECONOMY.  VIETNAM'S 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REINTEGRATION TO THE WORLD AND 
THE REGION SERVED TO DIMINISH THE AREAS OF CONTENTION 
AND BUILD A NEW POSSIBILITY FOR COOPERATION AND PEACE 
WHERE THERE HERETOFORE HAD BEEN ALMOST CONTINUOUS 
CONFLICT SINCE WORLD WAR II.  (OTHER PARTS OF THE 
WORLD HAVE STILL NOT YET ACHIEVED THAT STABILITY SINCE 
WORLD WAR II.) 
 
¶6.  (C) BILATERALLY WITH THE U.S., A SERIES OF 
DIALOGUES TO IMPROVE MIA-RELATED WORK RESULTED IN THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICIAL USG PRESENCE IN HANOI FOR 
THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE 1950'S.  THIS PRESENCE 
GRADUALLY PROGRESSED UNDER THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 
TO A STEP-BY-STEP OPENING UP OF DIRECT AND NORMAL 
RELATIONS.  FROM THE LIFTING OF THE TRADE EMBARGO IN 
FEBRUARY OF 1994 TO THE ENTRANCE ON DUTY OF THE FIRST 
AMBASSADOR IN MAY 1997, THE U.S. AND VIETNAM ENGAGED 
IN A PROCESS OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS DESIGNED TO 
BUILD CONFIDENCE ON BOTH SIDES ABOUT WHAT COULD BE 
ACCOMPLISHED.  IN ADDITION TO THE U.S. GOAL OF DEALING 
WITH VIETNAM AS AN "INDEPENDENT" NATION, THE U.S. WAS 
ALSO LOOKING MORE BROADLY AT A GROWING CONCERN ABOUT 
CHINA'S MILITARY AND ECONOMIC MIGHT.  THE U.S. SAW 
VIETNAM AS A USEFUL "PARTNER" BECAUSE OF SHARED 
CONCERNS OVER CHINA.  VIETNAM'S INVOLVEMENT IN AND 
WITH ASEAN WAS SEEN AS A WAY IN WHICH THE SOUTHWARD 
ADVANCE OF CHINA'S INFLUENCE MIGHT BE LESS CERTAIN. 
 
¶7.  (C) THE DIRECT RESULT OF THIS ENGAGEMENT HAS BEEN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00762  02 OF 03  031014Z 
A TWENTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN OUR LISTS OF UNACCOUNTED 
FOR AMERICANS THROUGH REPATRIATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
OF REMAINS AND AN EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSION 
 CONSIDERED RECOVERABLE.  VIETNAM'S MEMBERSHIP IN ASEAN 
 AND ARF WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE APEC IN 1998 AND OUR 
 INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION NOW INCLUDES 
 SHARED VOTING AND CANDIDATE SUPPORT WITHIN UN 
 AGENCIES.  EVEN BEFORE ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC 
 RELATIONS, THE TWO SIDES ENGAGED IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION 
 OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE U.S. AND WE 
 HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY ADDED STRATEGIC POLICY TALKS AS WELL 
 AS SPECIFIC REVIEW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ISSUES AS 
 SEPARATE DIALOGUES.  WHILE WE STILL REMAIN FAR APART 
 ON OUR VIEWS OF BASIC FREEDOMS, VIETNAM'S RECORD ON 
 THESE FRONTS HAS BEEN ONE OF MEASURED IMPROVEMENT -- 
 MORE INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS, MORE 
 ACTIVE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGIOUS WORSHIP, 
 MORE RELIGIOUS GROUPS OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED TO 
 OPERATE, AND FEWER INDIVIDUALS THROWN INTO PRISON 
 ARBITRARILY, TO NAME A FEW OF THE IMPROVEMENTS. 
 
 ¶8.  (C) U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONS ALSO HAVE A MILITARY- 
 TO- MILITARY DIMENSION, A DIRECT RESULT OF USG 
 INTENTIONS TO REDUCE THE BASIS FOR SUSPICIONS BETWEEN 
 THE TWO MILITARIES.  VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION IN 
 MILITARY-RELATED PROGRAMS OPEN TO ASEAN MEMBERS AND 
 HIGH-LEVEL VISITS, INCLUDING THE VISIT OF THEN 
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COHEN HAVE PROVIDED OPPORTUNITIES 
 FOR THE TWO SIDES TO BETTER COMPREHEND THE OTHER'S 
 OBJECTIVES.  THIS PROCESS OF BUILDING UNDERSTANDING 
 HAS BEEN SLOW, AND BOTH SIDES HAVE CERTAINLY CAREFULLY 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00762  02 OF 03  031014Z 
 CALIBRATED EACH STEP IT WAS PREPARED TO TAKE.  U.S. 
 PROVISION OF INFORMATION RELATED TO VIETNAM'S 
 BATTLEFIELD CASUALTIES, DISCUSSION OF CHEMICAL STORAGE 
 AND SPILL SITES, AND RELEASE OF GEOGRAPHICAL AND 
 TECHNICAL DATA RELATED TO AGENT ORANGE SPRAYING ALL 
 HELP TO DEAL WITH GVN SENSITIVITIES IN WHICH THE 
 MILITARY HAS TENDED TO TAKE AN ANTI-U.S. POSTURE OVER 
 THE YEARS. 
 
 ¶9.  (C) AS IT WAS RE-ENGAGING DIPLOMATICALLY WITH THE 
 U.S., VIETNAM WAS ALSO SHIFTING ITS ECONOMIC 
 PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.  HANOI'S 
 OBJECTIVES FOCUSED ON BUILDING MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS 
 INTO THE STATE-RUN ECONOMY AND OPENING UP TO FOREIGN 
 INVESTMENT.  THIS PROCESS, IN TURN, LED TO THE 
 NEGOTIATION AND CONCLUSION OF A BILATERAL TRADE 
.AGREEMENT (BTA).  THIS AGREEMENT, A LANDMARK FOR BOTH 
 COUNTRIES, WOULD PROVIDE BOTH SIDES REAL BENEFITS IN 
 THE BILATERAL/INTERNATIONAL TRADING AND INVESTMENT 
ARENA.  THE BTA BECAME COMPANIONED WITH A VARIETY OF 
OTHER ARRANGEMENTS INCLUDING AGREEMENTS ON IPR AND S&T 
COOPERATION WHICH COLLECTIVELY WILL LEAD VIETNAM TO A 
MORE TRANSPARENT SYSTEM WHICH CAN DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTE 
TO A BETTER LIVELIHOOD FOR ITS PEOPLE.  U.S. AID AND 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ALSO BEGAN TO SHIFT 
TO DISASTER MITIGATION, ENABLING VIETNAM FOR THE FIRST 
TIME IN ITS HISTORY TO DEAL WITH THE RECURRING 
PROBLEMS OF FLOODS, TYPHOONS, AND OTHER FORMS OF 
NATURAL DISASTERS.  PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL U.S. 
HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAM PROVIDED A CONCRETE 
DEMONSTRATION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT TO EASE THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF WAR.  AND, U.S. EDUCATION PROGRAMS 
UNDER FULBRIGHT AND OTHER PRIVATE AND PUBLIC AUSPICES 
HAVE CREATED THE FOUNDATION OF A YOUNGER GENERATION 
WHICH LOOKS ON THE U.S. AS A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION AND 
NOT OF DEVASTATION. 
 
¶10.  (C) THE AVENUE FOR FURTHER U.S.-VIETNAM 
COOPERATION WAS OPENED WIDE AS A RESULT OF THE CLINTON 
VISIT LAST NOVEMBER. PUTTING BOTH CLOSURE TO THE 
WARTIME-ERA OF HOSTILITY AND ADVERTISING A WILLINGNESS 
TO DEAL WITH VIETNAM'S NEW GENERATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE, 
THE U.S. MESSAGE WAS ONE OF EMPOWERMENT BROUGHT ON BY 
THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES OF THE NEW CENTURY.  IT WAS 
A PROMISE OF ALMOST UNLIMITED SCOPE AND DURATION BASED 
ON SHARED INTERESTS AND PERCEPTIONS FOR MODERNIZATION, 
EXPANDED EDUCATION AND PROSPERITY.  BUT THAT 
OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE MORE PROGRESS HAS SUDDENLY SLIPPED 
AWAY AND THERE ARE NOW MORE CLOSED WINDOWS TO 
COOPERATION AS THE RESULT OF HOSTILE PERCEPTIONS OF 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00762  03 OF 03  031014Z 
U.S. ACTIONS AND MOTIVES AS WELL AS HOSTILE 
PERCEPTIONS OF SOME OF VIETNAM'S ACTIVITIES. 
 
¶11.  (C) COMMENT: THE STILL FRAGILE NATURE OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN COMPLICATED BY POLITICAL 
TENSIONS INHERENT IN THE VIETNAMESE TRANSITION.  IT IS 
ALSO HAMPERED BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERCEPTIONS IN THE 
U.S. THAT CONTINUE TO TREAT VIETNAM AS AN ENEMY. SOME 
LEADERS IN VIETNAM NEED ONLY POINT TO ACTIONS BY 
VIETNAMESE-AMERICANS OR OTHERS SEEKING TO REVITALIZE 
PRE-1975 POSITIONS AGAINST THE HANOI AUTHORITIES TO 
MAKE THEIR CASE.  THEY ARGUE THESE ACTIONS REPRESENT 
THE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. 
FURTHERMORE, INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS BY THE USG OR ITS 
AGENCIES ARE TRANSLATED AS  REPRESENTING ONLY U.S. 
VIEWS OF "RIGHT AND WRONG." THE ACTIONS ARE OFTEN THEN 
CHARACTERIZED AS HOSTILE TO THE INTERESTS OF VIETNAM 
OR AS INTERFERENCE IN VIETNAM'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. 
 
¶12.  (C) THE COMBINATION OF THESE PERCEPTIONS HAS 
RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT FRICTIONS BETWEEN 
THE TWO COUNTRIES THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE NATIONAL 
PRIORITIES WE HAVE SET TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND TO 
MEET GLOBAL GOALS SUCH AS THE PROMOTION OF REGIONAL 
STABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE. THE SECOND 
MESSAGE ON THIS SUBJECT IDENTIFIES VIETNAM'S 
PERCEPTIONS OF THESE SENSITIVE AREAS. U.S. FAILURE TO 
PROCEED SENSITIVELY ON THESE ISSUES COULD JEOPARDIZE 
THE BENEFITS THAT WE HAVE SO RECENTLY ACHIEVED AS THE 
RESULT OF OUR NORMALIZATION EFFORTS. 
PPETERSON 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00762  03 OF 03  031014Z 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL