This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

311345Z Jan 01


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTO5884

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                  ------------------BE5889  311347Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8147
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 
USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000603 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X5 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  00603  01 OF 02  311347Z 
TAGS: PREL MOPS ZI CG
SUBJECT: AFTER MEETING MUGABE AND MUDENGE, AJELLO FINDS 
ZIMBABWEANS UNCLEAR ABOUT THE CONGO 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES EARL M. IRVING FOR 
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: EUROPEAN UNION SPECIAL ENVOY ALDO AJELLO 
MET WITH BOTH PRESIDENT MUGABE AND FOREIGN MINISTER 
MUDENGE DURING HIS THREE DAY STAY IN HARARE AND 
CONCLUDED THAT THE ZIMBABWEANS ARE NOT SURE WHAT THEY 
WANT IN TERMS OF A CONGOLESE LEADERSHIP.  THE 
ZIMBABWEANS POINT TO A NUMBER OF UPCOMING MEETINGS AS 
EVIDENCE OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO BRING THE PEACE PROCESS 
TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION.  MUDENGE ONCE AGAIN STRESSED THE 
NEED TO BRING HOME ZIMBABWE'S TROOPS BEFORE THE 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 2002.  CALLS FOR JOSEPH KABILA 
TO BE GIVEN MORE TIME, COUPLED WITH THE ABSENCE OF AN 
UNDERPINNING STRATEGY ON THE WAY FORWARD AND AN 
UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE NEW 
SITUATION IN KINSHASA SUGGEST TO US THE ZIMBABWEANS' 
PRESENCE IN THE CONGO WAS TIED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PERSON 
OF LAURENT KABILA.  AJELLO THINKS THE ZIMBABWEANS HAVE 
ABDICATED THE ROLE OF KEY OUTSIDE PLAYER IN THE CONGO TO 
THE ANGOLANS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) THE SWEDISH POLITICAL COUNSELOR IN HARARE, IRINA 
SCHOULGIN, PROVIDED POLOFF A BRIEF READOUT OF EUROPEAN 
UNION (EU) SPECIAL ENVOY ALDO AJELLO'S JANUARY 31 
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUGABE.  HER AMBASSADOR, LENNARTH 
HJELMAKER, REPRESENTED THE EU PRESIDENCY IN ACCOMPANYING 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  00603  01 OF 02  311347Z 
AJELLO TO THE MEETING.  AJELLO DESCRIBED THE TWO-HOUR 
TETE-A-TETE AS POSITIVE, AND REMARKED THAT THE DIALOGUE 
WITH MUGABE GETS BETTER EACH TIME HE MEETS HIM.  AJELLO 
CAME AWAY FROM THE MEETING WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT 
ZIMBABWE WOULD RESPECT THE LUSAKA ACCORDS IN THE DRC. 
MUGABE TOLD HIM THAT ZIMBABWE WANTS TO GIVE JOSEPH 
KABILA ENOUGH TIME TO ESTABLISH HIS GOVERNMENT AND ITS 
LEGITIMACY, ACCORDING TO SCHOULGIN.  AJELLO PRESENTED 
THE MAIN POINTS REACHED IN THE EU COUNCIL'S DECLARATION 
ON THE DRC, WHICH CONDEMNED THE ASSASSINATION OF LAURENT 
KABILA AND URGED ALL THE PARTIES IN THE DRC TO ABIDE BY 
THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT.  AJELLO IS TRAVELING TO SOUTH 
AFRICA JANUARY 31 TO EXPAND THE EU'S DIALOGUE WITH OTHER 
PLAYERS IN THE REGION, THE SWEDISH POLITICAL COUNSELOR 
STATED. 
 
¶3. (C) BRITISH DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER IAN HAY-CAMPBELL 
(PROTECT) GAVE CHARGE ON JANUARY 31 A READOUT OF 
AJELLO'S BRIEFING TO EU HEADS OF MISSION OF HIS MEETING 
WITH ZIMBABWEAN FOREIGN MINISTER STANISLAUS MUDENGE THE 
DAY BEFORE.  AJELLO KICKED OFF HIS PRESENTATION SAYING 
THAT AT THE END OF THE MEETING HE WAS NO WISER ON WHAT 
ZIMBABWE WANTS WITH RESPECT TO THE CONGO AND THAT THE 
FOREIGN MINISTER'S ACCOUNT WAS "MUDDLED AND FULL OF 
CONTRADICTIONS."  INDEED THE EU SPECIAL ENVOY OBSERVED, 
ZIMBABWE'S CURRENT POLICY WAS NEARLY IDENTICAL TO THE 
ONE IT HAD PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION. 
 
¶4. (C) MUDENGE SAID THAT INTERNAL DIALOGUE IN THE CONGO 
WAS ESSENTIAL, BUT THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE ARMED 
OPPOSITION WANTED POWER SHARING WITH THE UNARMED 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  00603  01 OF 02  311347Z 
OPPOSITION, AN ARRANGEMENT THE FOREIGN MINISTER RECKONED 
WOULD PRODUCE "TEN YEARS OF DICTATORSHIP."  THE 
ZIMBABWEAN POLITICO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT RWANDA WOULD 
GET OUT OF PWETO SOON OR "WE WILL HELP THEM OUT." 
AJELLO WARNED MUDENGE THAT IF ZIMBABWE WENT ON THE 
OFFENSIVE THEN RWANDA WOULD RESPOND BY MOVING ON 
LUBUMBASHI.  THE ZIMBABWEAN FOREIGN MINISTER THEN WENT 
ON TO LIST A NUMBER OF INITIATIVES IN PLAY, WHICH 
PRESIDENT MUGABE REITERATED TO AJELLO THE NEXT DAY.  HE 
CONFIRMED THAT THE THREE ALLIES AND KABILA WOULD MEET IN 
KINSHASA AT AN UNSPECIFIED DATE, BUT NOT BEFORE ANGOLAN 
PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS RETURNED FROM THE FAR EAST. 
ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT CHILUBA WOULD CHAIR A REGIONAL MEETING 
AT SOME UNSPECIFIED DATE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND SOUTH 
AFRICAN PRESIDENT MBEKI WOULD CONVENE A MAPUTO III 
SUMMIT, ALTHOUGH THE ZIMBABWEAN FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE NO 
DETAILS ABOUT IT.  MUDENGE SAID THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE 
WOULD MEET IN HARARE PRIOR TO THE FEBRUARY 21 UNSC 
MEETING IN NEW YORK.  AJELLO COMMENTED THAT THE SURFEIT 
OF MEETINGS AND INITIATIVES LACKED AN UNDERPINNING 
STRATEGY AND RECOMMENDED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS TAKE 
THE INITIATIVE TO DIRECT THE PEACE PROCESS. 
 
¶5. (C) RESPONDING TO A QUESTION POSED BY AN EU HEAD OF 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ5225 
 
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ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  SMEC-00  DODE-00  DOTE-00 
      SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    EUR-00   FAAE-00  VC-00    H-01 
      TEDE-00  INR-00   LAB-01   L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00 
      OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00 
      SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00 
      PRM-01   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /007W 
                  ------------------BE5890  311347Z /38 
O 311345Z JAN 01 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8148 
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 
USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HARARE 000603 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X5 
TAGS: PREL MOPS ZI CG
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  00603  02 OF 02  311347Z 
SUBJECT: AFTER MEETING MUGABE AND MUDENGE, AJELLO FINDS 
ZIMBABWEANS UNCLEAR ABOUT THE CONGO 
 
MISSION, AJELLO SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE 
ANGOLANS AND NOT THE ZIMBABWEANS WERE NOW THE KEY 
PLAYERS IN THE CONGO.  THEY APPEARED TO BE IN CHARGE IN 
KINSHASA WITH 5,000 ELITE TROOPS THERE PLUS TANKS AND 
HELICOPTERS.  THE EU SPECIAL ENVOY REPORTED THAT FOREIGN 
MINISTER MIRANDA TOLD HIM THAT THE PROBLEM WITH THE 
LEADERSHIP OF THE DRC WAS THAT IT DID NOT LISTEN TO WHAT 
OTHERS HAD TO SAY.  THE ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER 
BELIEVED THAT ANGOLA HAD THE GREATEST FREEDOM TO 
MANEUVER IN THE CONGO AS IT HAD NO ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
THERE, WHILE ZIMBABWE'S WERE "DEEP AND SERIOUS."  THE 
ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER RELATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS 
UNCLEAR AS TO ZIMBABWE'S REACTION TO THE RECENT EVENTS 
IN THE CONGO, POSSIBLY BECAUSE THE ZIMBABWEANS 
THEMSELVES WERE UNCLEAR ON IT.  THE ANGOLANS HAD IN THE 
PAST BEEN FED UP WITH ZIMBABWE, AS EVERY TIME THEY TRIED 
TO PRESSURE KABILA TO ADHERE TO THE LUSAKA PROCESS, 
ASSUMING ZIMBABWEAN SUPPORT, THE ZIMBABWEANS WOULD TAKE 
AN EXTREME POSITION SIDING WITH KABILA.  THE ANGOLAN 
FOREIGN MINISTER THOUGHT THE LATE CONGOLESE PRESIDENT 
HAD BOUGHT OFF THE ZIMBABWEANS AT THE LAST MOMENT. 
 
¶6. (C) AJELLO CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT ONE CANNOT IGNORE 
THE ECONOMIC INTEREST OF THE PARTIES AND HE THOUGHT THEY 
WERE MAKING ATTEMPTS TO GUARANTEE THOSE INTERESTS AFTER 
THE WAR.  MUDENGE CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY MAKING IT 
CLEAR TO AJELLO THAT ZIMBABWE'S TROOPS HAD TO BE OUT OF 
THE CONGO BEFORE THE 2002 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  00603  02 OF 02  311347Z 
 
¶7.  (C) COMMENT: PRESIDENT MUGABE'S REPORTED COMMENT TO 
AJELLO THAT ZIMBABWE WANTS TO GIVE JOSEPH KABILA TIME TO 
ESTABLISH HIS LEGITIMACY HAS BECOME A COMMON REFRAIN 
FROM ZIMBABWEAN OFFICIALS SINCE THE ASSASSINATION.  WE 
BELIEVE IT SUGGESTS A GENUINE UNCERTAINTY AND CONCERN 
ABOUT WHETHER THE NEW CONGOLESE PRESIDENT WILL 
SUFFICIENTLY PROTECT ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN 
THE DRC, AND IMPLIES THAT ZIMBABWE'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
DRC WAS TIED DIRECTLY TO THE PERSON OF LAURENT KABILA. 
AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A GROWING PERCEPTION WITHIN 
THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY HERE THAT THE GOZ HAS NOT MOVED 
AGGRESSIVELY TO TRY TO ENSURE A SYMPATHETIC SUCCESSOR TO 
THE ASSASSINATED PRESIDENT BECAUSE IT IS NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS WITHIN 
THE GDRC.  END COMMENT. 
 
IRVING 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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