P 030850Z DEC 00
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3148
INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 003360 
 
FOR S/CT REAP AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 217248 
 
¶1. THE FOLLOWING RESTATES AND RESPONDS TO QUESTIONS IN 
REFTEL: 
 
A)   DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF 
EACH COUNTRY TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR 
SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 2000, 
INCLUDING ANY HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTIONS RELATING TO 
TERRORISM.  PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO 
HOST COUNTRY ACTIONS REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM 
AGAINST OR AFFECTING U.S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES. 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG CONTINUES ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE 
KHOBAR TOWERS BOMB ATTACK OF JUNE 1996 THAT KILLED 19 
U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL.  THE SAG HAS PUBLICLY STATED 
THAT IT IS STILL LOOKING FOR THREE SAUDI SUSPECTS 
LINKED TO THE BOMBING.  THE THREE ARE WANTED FOR 
QUESTIONING AND ARE BELIEVED TO BE OUTSIDE OF THE 
KINGDOM.  THE SAG IS STILL HOLDING A NUMBER OF SAUDI 
CITIZENS IN DETENTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING, 
INCLUDING SAUDI CITIZEN HANI AL-SAYEGH.  CANADIAN 
AUTHORITIES ARRESTED AL-SAYEGH IN 1997 ON CHARGES OF 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING AND DEPORTED HIM TO THE 
UNITED STATES.  SAUDI AUTHORITIES THEN REQUESTED HIS 
RENDITION TO SAUDI ARABIA, AND AFTER A LENGTHY REVIEW 
THE UNITED STATES RETURNED HIM TO SAUDI ARABIA IN 
¶1999.  NO PROSECUTION OR ANY OTHER PUBLIC LEGAL ACTION 
BEGAN IN 2000 REGARDING THE BOMBING.  SAUDI 
AUTHORITIES ARE INVESTIGATING AN AUGUST SHOOTING BY A 
LONE SAUDI GUNMAN WHO FIRED AT CARS CARRYING AMERICAN 
AND BRITISH CITIZENS OUTSIDE OF THEIR RESIDENTIAL 
COMPOUND IN KHAMIS MUSHAYT.  A SAUDI GUARD WAS KILLED 
IN THE ATTACK, WHILE THE GUNMAN AND TWO SAUDI GUARDS 
WERE WOUNDED.  NONE OF THE AMERICANS OR BRITISH 
CITIZENS HAD SIGNIFICANT INJURIES.  SAUDI AUTHORITIES 
ALSO RESPONDED TO TWO HIJACKINGS.  IN SEPTEMBER, 
AUTHORITIES ARRESTED AN IRAQI MAN WHO HIJACKED A QATAR 
AIR FLIGHT FROM QATAR TO JORDAN AND FORCED IT TO LAND 
IN THE NORTHERN SAUDI TOWN OF HA'IL.  THE SAG RETURNED 
THE HIJACKER AND PASSENGERS TO QATAR.  IN OCTOBER, TWO 
SAUDI MEN FORCED A SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT FROM 
JEDDAH TO LONDON TO LAND IN IRAQ.  IRAQI AUTHORITIES 
DETAINED THE HIJACKERS AND RETURNED THE PASSENGERS AND 
AIRCRAFT TO JEDDAH.  IRAQ DENIED AN EXTRADITION 
REQUEST BY THE SAG.  NO ONE WAS HARMED IN EITHER 
HIJACKING.  SAUDI AUTHORITIES ARE ALSO INVESTIGATING 
TWO CAR BOMBINGS IN RIYADH IN NOVEMBER IN WHICH ONE 
BRITISH CITIZEN WAS KILLED AND SEVERAL WERE INJURED. 
AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT DETERMINED WHETHER THE MOTIVE OF 
THE BOMBINGS WAS CRIMINAL OR POLITICAL. 
 
B)   DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE 
EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION 
DURING THE YEAR? PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN 
TO HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO U.S. REQUESTS FOR 
EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES. 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG REQUESTED THAT IRAQ EXTRADITE TWO 
SAUDI MEN WHO HIJACKED A SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES PLANE 
FROM JEDDAH TO BAGHDAD.  IRAQ DENIED THE REQUEST. 
SAUDI AUTHORITIES RETURNED AN IRAQI MAN TO QATAR WHO 
HIJACKED A JORDAN-BOUND PLANE FROM QATAR TO HA'IL, 
SAUDI ARABIA.  THE SAUDIS HAVE REPEATEDLY CALLED ON 
THE TALEBAN TO EXPEL USAMA BIN LADEN FROM AFGHAN 
TERRITORY SO THAT HE MAY BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE IN 
ANOTHER COUNTRY. 
 
C)   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST 
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED 
TERRORISTS. 
 
RESPONSE: NO LEGAL OR POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS EXIST TO 
THE SAG'S PROSECUTION OF PEOPLE ALLEGED TO HAVE 
COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTS WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA. 
HOWEVER, THE SAG HAS FEW EXTRADITION TREATIES OUTSIDE 
OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE 
ISLAMIC COUNCIL (OIC) AND THE ARAB LEAGUE. THE 
LEAGUE'S ANTI-TERRORIST AGREEMENT, WHICH SAUDI ARABIA 
HAS RATIFIED, CONTAINS EXTRADITION ARTICLES. 
 
D)   DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN 
PROSECUTION. THESE WOULD INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED 
TO, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR 
OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A TERRORIST INCIDENT 
(IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) AND EFFORTS BY HOST 
GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR TO 
ASSIST WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS. 
 
RESPONSE: IN MAY THE SAG SIGNED A TREATY WITH MEMBER 
STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL 
(OIC) TO COOPERATE IN COMBATING TERRORISM.  AT A 
SIGNING CEREMONY, A SAG REPRESENTATIVE DECLARED THAT 
IT IS THE POLICY OF SAUDI ARABIA TO FIGHT ALL FORMS OF 
TERRORISM. THE KING, CROWN PRINCE, MINISTER OF 
DEFENSE, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, MINISTER OF 
INFORMATION, SENIOR ULAMA, AND OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA 
PUBLICLY AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMN TERRORISM IN 
UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS, INCLUDING BY REFUTING IDEOLOGICAL 
AND RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TERRORISM. 
 
E)   DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS 
UNDERTAKEN IN 2000 BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING 
STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. 
 
RESPONSE: INTERNALLY, THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE 
THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING.  IT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN 
NUMEROUS MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN PROTECTION OF U.S. 
MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. 
 
F)   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, OR TERRORIST 
GROUPS, INCLUDING (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES; 
DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION; 
MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC 
POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT 
TERRORISM; PROVISION OF SANCTUARY AND/OR THE PRESENCE 
OF OFFICES OF TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING 
OR TRAINING SITES; PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS 
TAKEN ON TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG DOES NOT POLITICALLY OR FINANCIALLY 
SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR 
ACTIVITIES.  ITS REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT NON- 
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY 
AGENCIES OBTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT 
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL CAUSES. 
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THESE REGULATIONS ARE 
CONSISTENTLY ENFORCED.  THERE CONTINUE TO BE 
ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT AND COLLECT FUNDS 
FROM PRIVATE CITIZENS IN SAUDI ARABIA. 
 
G)   HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC 
STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING 
COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE?  (THE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS 
DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY AS STATE SPONSORS OF 
TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, 
SYRIA, AND SUDAN.) 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTING 
ANY OF THE SEVEN COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S TERRORISM LIST 
REGARDING A TERRORIST ISSUE. 
 
H)   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1999, 
POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S 
ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC. 
WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE? 
 
RESPONSE:  THE ATTITUDE OF THE SAG TOWARD TERRORISM 
DID NOT CHANGE DURING 1999. 
 
I)   DESCRIBE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND 
INITIATIVES WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING, BUT 
NOT LIMITED TO, REQUESTS TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT FOR 
SPECIFIC COOPERATION AND EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES 
IN THE HOST COUNTRY TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY OR IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR ACTIVITIES. DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF 
THE HOST COUNTRY'S COOPERATION WITH THOSE EFFORTS AND 
INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST 
GOVERNMENT HAS SATISFIED THE SPECIFIC REQUESTS. 
 
RESPONSE: FOLLOWING A 1995 BOMBING THAT KILLED U.S. 
MILITARY PERSONNEL ADVISING THE SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL 
GUARD (OPM/SANG), A USG INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM 
TEAM VISITED SAUDI ARABIA TO BEGIN UNPRECEDENTED, 
COORDINATED, INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE USG 
AND SAG ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES.  THIS 
COOPERATION, WHICH ENGENDERED HIGH-LEVEL SAG INTEREST 
AND THE PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE SAG MINISTRIES, HAS 
CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 2000.  THE USG AND SAG CONTINUE 
TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND 
SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING AMERICAN AND SAUDI INTERESTS 
IN THE REGION.  CONSULTATIONS AND TRAINING FOR SAUDI 
COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED 
STATES ALSO OCCURRED.  U.S. AND SAUDI OFFICIALS HAVE 
MET IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO 
ELIMINATE TRANS-NATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO 
TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY.  COOPERATION 
BETWEEN THE USG AND SAG INCREASED FURTHER AFTER THE 
1998 EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS.  THE FBI COORDINATES ITS 
INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS WITH THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 
AND MAINTAINS A PERMANENTLY STAFFED LEGAL ATTACHE 
OFFICE IN THE U.S. EMBASSY. 
 
J)   IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL INFORMATION, IF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM 
THE HOST GOVERNMENT DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN 
THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN ACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 
CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON: 
 
     (I) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT IN 
2000 COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT IN APPREHENDING, CONVICTING, AND 
PUNISHING THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE ACT; AND 
 
     (II) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT IN 
2000 COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN PREVENTING 
FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES 
CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. 
 
RESPONSE: (I)  THE SAG HAS SOUGHT TO APPREHEND, 
CONVICT, AND PUNISH THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
BOTH THE OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBINGS AGAINST 
UNITED STATES CITIZENS, ALTHOUGH EARLY COOPERATION WAS 
NOT AT THE LEVEL EXPECTED BY USG OFFICIALS.  SAUDI 
OFFICIALS AND THE FBI CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY ON MANY 
INVESTIGATION ISSUES RELATED TO BOTH BOMBINGS AND 
CONSULT CLOSELY WITH EACH OTHER ON THE STATUS OF THE 
KHOBAR BOMBING INVESTIGATION. 
 
  (II) THE SAG CONTINUES TO DEVOTE CONSIDERABLE HUMAN 
AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO PROTECT USG PERSONNEL AND 
INTERESTS FOLLOWING THE OPM/SANG, KHOBAR TOWERS, EAST 
AFRICA BOMBINGS, AND THREATS TO THE U.S. EMBASSY, 
CONSULATES AND OTHER U.S. INTERESTS IN 2000.  IT MADE 
AVAILABLE TO COALITION FORCES THE PRINCE SULTAN 
AIRBASE AT AL KHARJ, WHERE MOST U.S. SERVICEMEN IN 
SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOW LOCATED, AND A RESIDENTIAL 
COMPOUND, KNOWN AS ESKAN VILLAGE, SOUTH OF RIYADH FOR 
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DOD PERSONNEL.  THE SAG SPENT 
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
IMPROVEMENTS TO ENHANCE SECURITY.  THE SAG ALSO WORKED 
WITH AMERICAN SECURITY PERSONNEL IN AN ONGOING EFFORT 
TO ENHANCE PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT ALL OTHER USG 
FACILITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING THE U.S. EMBASSY 
IN RIYADH AND THE CONSULATES IN JEDDAH AND DHAHRAN. 
USG AND SAG OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY TO 
REVIEW THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA. 
 
K)   IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT 
COOPERATION DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE 
PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE DESCRIBE 
THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT IN 2000 
COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN PREVENTING ACTS OF 
TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST 
GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. 
 
RESPONSE: THE SAG HAS PROVIDED TO THE USG INFORMATION 
ON THREATS DIRECTED AT U.S. INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA 
AND CONTINUES TO WORK CLOSELY WITH USG AGENCIES TO 
PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICANS IN THE 
KINGDOM.  REPORTED THREATS HAVE REGULARLY LED TO THE 
RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF EXTRA SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE 
PLACEMENT OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL BARRIERS, CHECKPOINTS, 
AND OTHER VISIBLE DETERRENTS. 
 
 
BRAYSHAW