This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 008532 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2010 
TAGS: CG PINS PREL ECON PGOV
SUBJECT: KISANGANI OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS 
 
 CLASSIFIED BY WILLIAM LACY SWING FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) (D) 
 
 
¶1. (C) The following two-part series reports on Embassy staff 
member's recent visit to Kisangani, capitol of Oriental 
Province.  Part one addresses the military and security 
situation, and Part two the political and economic issues 
facing Kisangani and the province. 
 
 
¶2. (C) Summary: During visit to Kisangani November 28 to 
December 1, Emboff spoke to local businessmen, 
representatives of international and local NGOs, and MONUC 
officers.  Although Kisangani has been calm for months, there 
has been fighting recently between RCD/Goma and MLC only 
sixty kilometers north of Kisangani.  Most viewed the 
situation as still inherently unstable and precarious, as 
access to diamond-rich areas appears to be a major objective 
of the different local military and political actors.  The 
"governor" of Oriental Province emphasized support of the 
Lusaka Peace Agreement, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and 
Congolese territorial integrity.  He urged the international 
community to pay more attention to Kisangani given its 
isolation and desperate economic situation, implying that 
there was a tendency to favor Goma and Bukavu.  The 
"governor" said that the USG could stop the war if it only 
wanted to.  Civil society reps say the "governor" has only 
very limited support in Goma. 
      Nearly all interlocutors in Kisangani had two 
complaints: (a) that the city had become completely isolated; 
and (b) that the province as a whole had been "balkanized" to 
a regrettably large extent. Travel around the province was 
virtually impossible, the province having become divided into 
many small "spheres of influence."  These divisions had 
resulted in Kisangani's trade and communications options 
being cut off eastward as well as westward.  Within the city, 
the problems of Hema-Lendu tension and NGO tax harassment 
were cited. 
     The economy of Kisangani is in fairly dire straits, as 
both eastern and western surface supply routes have been 
completely cut and diamond trading has moved northward out of 
the city.  What little goods Kisangani is able to import come 
only via small planes from the east, or, in the case of 
agricultural produce, by canoe and bicycle.  Most of the 
diamond producing areas remain in MLC territory, and now that 
the Ugandans have moved north of Kisangani, this trade 
bypasses Kisangani, passing to Kampala via more northern 
routes.  As the diamond trade has been the basis for 
Kisangani's economy for some time now, the city's economy has 
collapsed, and money is in extremely short supply. 
     Civil Society members expressed gratitude to the US 
Embassy in Kinshasa for having issued them documents which 
facilitated their return to rebel areas after attending a 
civil society conference in Kinshasa earlier in the year. 
They were also appreciative that someone from the American 
government had visited, and hoped that this was the beginning 
of a closer relationship.  Finally, they were extremely 
gratified to learn that the US Embassy was very actively 
supporting the idea of the establishment of a "humanitarian 
corridor" along the Congo River between Kisangani and 
Mbandaka.  People proposed that in addition, an extremely 
beneficial and possibly more practical interim measure would 
be to broker the opening up of Kisangani and Goma airports to 
commercial and humanitarian traffic, an initiative that could 
potentially be monitored by MONUC.  End Summary 
 
 
Military/Security Situation 
 
 
     ¶3. (C) Kisangani has not seen any combat in the city 
proper since the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan regular 
troops, after three violent confrontations between them in 
August 1999, and May and June 2000.  Notwithstanding, all 
agree that the security situation remains precarious and that 
a new round of fighting could break out again at any time--at 
least between MLC and RCD troops, if not by their respective 
Ugandan and Rwandan backers. (The population was seriously 
traumatized by the fighting earlier this year and remains 
very jumpy-ready to run into the forest with the first sound 
of gunshots.) 
     According to MONUC, both Rwandan and Ugandan armies have 
withdrawn to distances some 100 km from the city of 
Kisangani, in compliance with accords to this effect. 
However, as RCD/Goma-appointed authorities continue to 
administer Kisangani and the military force in and around the 
city are "RCD/Goma" troops, Rwanda maintains considerable 
influence in the city.  The local population, in fact, 
believes that many of the "RCD" troops are actually borrowed 
RPA soldiers.  They claim to see increasing numbers of 
obviously Tutsi soldiers, especially in the local drinking 
spots that used to be highly frequented by RPA soldiers when 
they were living openly in the town.  Kisangani residents 
have difficulty accepting that all these could possibly be 
"Banyamulenge" (or other Congolese Tutsis) as the RCD claims. 
 Uniforms are of little help in distinguishing soldiers of 
the different armies at this point, since many RCD troops 
have now been issued RPA-type uniforms.  Having no way of 
knowing who is Congolese and who isn't, MONUC officers say 
they have to accept the RCD's explanation that these Tutsi 
soldiers are Congolese and thus legitimate RCD regulars. 
     MONUC and local Civil Society groups assert that in many 
ways, the population was better off under foreign (Rwandan 
RPA and Ugandan UPDF) army control.  RPA and UPDF soldiers 
were regularly paid, relatively well disciplined, and 
supervised by a professional officer corps.  During that 
period, the unpaid, less-well supervised and relatively 
undisciplined RCD did not carry weapons.  The RCD troops 
were, however, issued arms by the RPA at the time of the 
RPA's withdrawal, and RCD soldiers now largely live off the 
population, confiscating food and other goods at will, 
especially in supply areas just outside the city. 
 
 
     4.(C) RCD and MLC Clash 
 
 
     In mid-November, RCD and MLC armies clashed north of 
Kisangani, on the road to Banalia and Buta.  There were 
reportedly three casualties and some wounded.  RCD forces 
captured approximately fourteen MLC policeman.  The 
skirmishes were apparently the result of an effort by RCD 
troops to extend RCD control to Bengamisa, a town 48 
kilometers from Kisangani and some 18 kilometers beyond the 
village of Lindi (which had hitherto served as the border 
areas of RCD control and MLC control).  According to MONUC, 
whoever controls the Bengamisa-Yangambi road is likely to be 
able to control diamond traffic from the diamond-rich area 
just north of Yangambi (approximately 100 kilometers west of 
Kisangani). 
     Some three hundred RCD troops, many of whom are Tutsi 
(and believed by the population to be RPA soldiers) suddenly 
moved considerably north of the city of Kisangani and crossed 
a river into the area north of Linda--normally territory 
controlled by MLC police.  Capturing MLC police on the other 
side of the river in a surprise attack, the RCD troops 
proceeded northward to capture Bengamisa, also protected only 
by MLC police and headed toward Balaia on the Aruwini River. 
At kilometer 62, however, they encountered the MLC army, 
which headed southward from Banalia upon learning of the 
invasion.  Some fighting ensued and went on intermittently 
for two days.  MONUC, which was able to reach the area of the 
fighting by the second day, had the impression that there had 
already been meetings between commanders on both sides and 
that some kind of a cease-fire/pull-back agreement had been 
reached.  This may have resulted from MONUC's earlier 
communications with RCD/Goma and MLC/Gbadolite alerting their 
respective leaders of the fighting and high potential for 
another catastrophic clash of rebel and supporting foreign 
armies.  RPA and UPDF troops reportedly remained at a 
considerable distance throughout the conflict and did not 
participate in these skirmishes.  In the pull-back agreement, 
however, RCD appears to have retained control of Benganisa, 
the town which may have been their original objective in the 
offensive.  MONUC and the population thus wonder whether the 
MLC might not as some point try to recover this territory and 
retaliate in an offensive. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Local Attitudes Toward MONUC 
 
 
     There is considerable concern among the international 
NGO community that MONUC will not be able to help them much 
if real trouble breaks out.  MONUC still has only thirty-five 
people in Kisangani, and they do not attempt to monitor the 
left bank of the river at all.  Some residents' perception of 
MONUC as doing little to free Kisangani from rebel occupation 
leads them to the false conclusion that MONUC favors the RCD 
and Rwanda.  MONUC troops were not very visible in October 
when the university students went on a rampage in the city 
over school fees (which included throwing rocks at some of 
the headquarters of international NGOs.)  The international 
NGO community found itself largely on its own to attempt to 
ascertain what was happening. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SWING