Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 00ANKARA8112, TURKEY: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #00ANKARA8112.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
00ANKARA8112 2000-12-11 11:47 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Ankara
P 111147Z DEC 00
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9745
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 
AMCONSUL ADANA
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 008112

S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/10
TAGS: PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 217248

(U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM JAMES F. JEFFREY FOR REASONS: 1.5
(B) AND (D).

--------
OVERVIEW
--------

1. (U) COMBATTING TERRORISM IS A MAJOR PRIORITY IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY. THE GOT APPROACHES THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISTS WITH AN OUTLOOK SIMILAR TO THE USG'S INTERNATIONAL, COORDINATED APPROACH. THE DANGER POSED TO TURKEY BY TERRORISM IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THE THREE POSTS OF THE U.S. MISSION TO TURKEY CONSTITUTE 50 PERCENT OF THE HIGH-THREAT POSTS IN THE EUROPEAN BUREAU (EUR). MOREOVER, THE NUMBER OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY EXCEEDS THE NUMBER IN THE REST OF THE HIGH-THREAT EUR COUNTRIES COMBINED. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY INCLUDE SEPARATIST, RADICAL ISLAMIST, LEFTIST, AND TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM, WHICH USED TO BE AN ISSUE FOR TURKEY, IS NOW LARGELY DEFUNCT. RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT EXISTS, OPERATES AT THE LEVEL OF CRIMINAL MAFIA GANGS.

U.S.-DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

2. (U) THE BEST-KNOWN TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY ARE THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK) AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT (DHKP/C, FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEV-SOL). ON OCTOBER 8, 1997, THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESIGNATED BOTH GROUPS AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SUBJECT TO THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996. ON OCTOBER 8, 1999, THE SECRETARY RENEWED THOSE DESIGNATIONS.

LEFTIST TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

3. (U) BEYOND THE PKK AND DHKP/C, THERE ARE SEVERAL LEFTIST AND ISLAMIST TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN TURKEY. MANY OF THESE GROUPS ARE SMALL AND RELATIVELY INACTIVE, THOUGH THEY HAVE TARGETED FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING AMERICANS, IN THE PAST. ONE OF THE MORE ACTIVE LEFTIST GROUPS IS THE TURKISH WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' LIBERATION ARMY (TIKKO). OTHER GROUPS INCLUDE THE TURKISH COMMUNIST LABORERS' PARTY/LENINIST (TKEP/L), THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY (TDKP), THE MARXIST LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY/LIBERATION (MLKP/K), AND THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISTS UNIT (TIKB).

ISLAMIST TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

4. (U) THE ACTIVE ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY ARE THE ISLAMIC GREAT EASTERN RAIDERS' FRONT (IBDA/C), TURKISH HIZBULLAH, AND THE "JERUSALEM WARRIORS." IN 2000, THE IBDA/C'S TEMPO OF OPERATIONS WAS LOW. HIZBULLAH, HOWEVER, WAS IN THE SPOTLIGHT BECAUSE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) RAIDS EXPOSED THE ALARMING REACH OF THE ORGANIZATION AND THE SURPRISING NUMBER OF COVERT MURDERS IT HAD STAGED. THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ALSO CAME TO PUBLIC ATTENTION IN 2000. THOUGH TURKISH HIZBULLAH AND THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ARE NOT RELATED TO EACH OTHER, THE TNP UNCOVERED EVIDENCE FROM ITS RAIDS ON TURKISH HIZBULLAH THAT EXPOSED SOME OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE ORGANIZATION IS ALLEGED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS OF SEVERAL PROMINENT TURKISH INTELLECTUALS, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, AND A U.S. SERVICE MEMBER.

5. (U) THE CAPITALIZED TITLES BELOW CORRESPOND TO REFTEL QUESTIONS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE "MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS" SECTION THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS, THEY ARE IN THE SAME ORDER AS THE QUESTIONS IN REFTEL.

----------------------------------
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS (E)
----------------------------------

INTERNATIONAL APPROACH

6. (U) DURING 2000, THE GOT CONTINUED TO SUPPORT EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, PROTOCOLS, AND AGREEMENTS ON TERRORISM. THE GOT IS A SIGNATORY TO ELEVEN OF TWELVE UN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CONVENTIONS. DURING 2000, THE "INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS," WHICH TURKEY HAS SIGNED, WAS UNDERGOING THE PROCESS REQUIRED TO SECURE PARLIAMENTARY RATIFICATION. TURKEY HAS NOT YET SIGNED THE "INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM." 

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX.]

7. (C) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS THE GOT HAS EXERCISED ITS RIGHT TO INSPECT THE CARGO OF IRANIAN FLIGHTS TRANSITING TURKISH AIRSPACE EN ROUTE TO LEBANON. IN LIGHT OF IRAN'S SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE HIZBULLAH, THIS WAS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WITH LIMITED SUCCESS, THE TURKS ALSO CONTINUALLY USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO URGE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE EUROPEAN FRONT ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PKK, DHKP/C AND OTHER GROUPS.

FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK

8. (U) ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT, THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES (TSK), JANDARMA (A PARAMILITARY POLICE FORCE), TNP, AND VILLAGE GUARDS (PARAMILITARY GUARD FORCES RECRUITED FROM AMONG SOUTHEASTERN VILLAGERS) CONTINUED VIGOROUS COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS TO SUPPRESS THE PKK THROUGHOUT EASTERN TURKEY AND IN NORTHERN IRAQ. CONTINUING GOT COUNTERINSURGENCY SUCCESSES AND THE PKK'S SELF-PROCLAIMED CEASE-FIRE LED TO A DECREASE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY COMPARED TO PREVIOUS YEARS. ACCORDING TO THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS), FOR THE FIRST ELEVEN MONTHS OF THIS YEAR THERE WERE 45 PKK-RELATED INCIDENTS, COMPARED TO 3,298 FOR THE FULL YEAR OF 1994. IN 2000, AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, MORE THAN 200,000 SECURITY PERSONNEL REMAINED DEDICATED TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN EASTERN TURKEY AND NORTHERN IRAQ. LARGE, MULTI-UNIT COMBINED-ARMS OPERATIONS WERE NOT NECESSARY; MOST COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY SMALLER UNITS ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

9. (U) TURKEY'S SOUTHEASTERN EFFORTS BORE FRUIT IN THE WAKE OF OCALAN'S 1999 CAPTURE. A MEASURE OF TURKEY'S SUCCESS WAS A STEEP DECREASE IN PKK-RELATED INCIDENTS IN 2000 AS COMPARED WITH 1999. AS A RESULT OF THE DECREASE, THE TSK WAS INCREASINGLY ABLE TO HAND OVER ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS TO THE JANDARMA AND TNP. ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE GOT'S PROGRESS AGAINST THE PKK WAS PARLIAMENT'S JUNE 2000 APPROVAL OF A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION CALLING FOR VAN PROVINCE TO BE REMOVED FROM THE STATE OF EMERGENCY REGION (OHAL). THE OHAL IS NOW REDUCED TO FOUR PROVINCES (DIYARBAKIR, HAKKARI, SIRNAK, AND TUNCELI).

10. (U) IN ADDITION TO CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, THE GOT CONTINUES ITS ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS ECONOMIC DISPARITIES IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY. THE GOT INTENDS FOR THESE EFFORTS, THE MOST PROMINENT OF WHICH IS THE SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA PROJECT (GAP), TO REDUCE THE POVERTY AND DESPERATION THAT IT BELIEVES ARE THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN THE REGION. UNFORTUNATELY, TURKEY'S ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS MEAN THAT MANY OF THESE EFFORTS ARE UNDER-FUNDED, IF FUNDED AT ALL. FROM A MORE POLITICAL APPROACH, THE GOT HAS NOT MOVED QUICKLY TO GRANT THE GREATER INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO ETHNIC KURDS THAT WOULD UNDERCUT THE SUPPORT ENJOYED IN THE REGION BY THE PKK. THE GOT AND TURKISH SOCIETY AS A WHOLE HAVE YET TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON HOW TO ACCOMMODATE THE DESIRE OF SOME TURKISH CITIZENS' TO EXPRESS THEIR KURDISH CULTURE.

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX.]

11. (C) DESPITE TURKEY'S MILITARY SUCCESS AGAINST KURDISH TERRORISM, THE PKK'S RELUCTANCE TO CHALLENGE THE GOT STEMS, TO SOME EXTENT, FROM ITS LOYALTY TO ABDULLAH OCALAN AND THE DESIRE TO AVOID CAUSING HIS EXECUTION. THE PKK'S PERSONALITY-CULT MINDSET MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION TO ABANDON OCALAN BY IGNORING HIS CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. HOWEVER, WITH APPROXIMATELY 5,000 PKK TERRORISTS UNDER ARMS OUTSIDE OF TURKEY, THE POSSIBILITY REMAINS THAT KURDISH TERRORISM WILL RETURN TO TURKEY, PERHAPS VIA A PKK FACTION OR SPLINTER GROUP. THIS BECOMES MORE LIKELY AS THE PKK CONTINUES TO SUFFER MILITARY DEFEATS FROM NORTHERN IRAQ'S KURDISH GROUPS, IN ADDITION TO THE TSK.

ON-GOING SUPPRESSION OF DHKP/C

12. (U) DURING 2000, TURKISH SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED THEIR ON-GOING AND EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN TO DISRUPT THE DHKP/C THROUGH RAIDS AND ARRESTS. THE TNP'S VIGILANCE CONTRIBUTED TO A YEAR IN WHICH DHKP/C INCIDENTS WERE RARE AND RELATIVELY MINOR. NOTABLE WAS THE TNP'S AUGUST ARREST OF SEVEN ALLEGED DHKP/C TERRORISTS WHO APPARENTLY WERE PLANNING AN ATTACK ON INCIRLIK AIRBASE, FROM WHICH U.S./UK/TURKISH COMBINED TASK FORCE ENFORCES THE "NO-FLY ZONE" OVER NORTHERN IRAQ.

MAJOR PUSH AGAINST HIZBULLAH

13. (U) TURKISH HIZBULLAH (HIZBULLAH), WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN THE 1980S IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY, IS A SUNNI-ISLAM KURDISH GROUP NOT RELATED TO LEBANESE HIZBULLAH. HIZBULLAH HAS GENERALLY TARGETED ETHNIC-KURDS, PARTICULARLY BUSINESS AND CULTURAL FIGURES WHO WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY ISLAMIST IN THE ORGANIZATION'S EYES. IT ALSO FOLLOWS A PATTERN OF TARGETING ITS OWN FORMER MEMBERS WHO HAVE BROKEN RANKS OR SIMPLY MOVED ON FROM THE ORGANIZATION.

14. (U) OVER THE COURSE OF 1999, HIZBULLAH INCREASED ITS OPERATIONS IN ISTANBUL, WHERE THE DISAPPEARANCES OF ETHNIC-KURDISH BUSINESSMEN EVENTUALLY ATTRACTED POLICE ATTENTION. INVESTIGATIONS LED TO THE JANUARY 17 TNP RAID ON A HIZBULLAH SAFEHOUSE THAT WAS FORTUITOUSLY ALSO SERVING AS HIZBULLAH'S HEADQUARTERS. IMMEDIATE RESULTS OF THE RAID WERE THE DEATH OF HIZBULLAH LEADER HUSEYIN VELIOGLU AND THE DISCOVERY ON THE PREMISES OF THE BODIES OF SOME OF THE MISSING BUSINESSMEN. IN THE WEEKS FOLLOWING, A TROVE OF EVIDENCE FROM THE RAID ALLOWED THE GOT TO CONDUCT A SERIES OF WIDE-RANGING RAIDS TO ROLL UP MUCH OF THE ORGANIZATION. THE TNP CAPTURED OR KILLED MUCH OF HIZBULLAH'S LEADERSHIP, SEIZED SEVERAL CACHES OF WEAPONS, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, DISCREDITED ITS EXTREMISM BY EXPOSING EVIDENCE OF 156 MURDERS.

15. (U) THOUGH SUCH RAIDS INFLICTED SEVERE DAMAGE ON HIZBULLAH, THE ORGANIZATION CONTINUES TO EXIST, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE GOT'S UNRELENTING PURSUIT OF ITS REMNANTS AND WITH WEEKLY REPORTS OF RAIDS AND ARRESTS. VIEWING STATISTICS FOR THE OHAL ONLY, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE GOT ACTIVITY AGAINST HIZBULLAH IS CLEAR, EVEN THOUGH FULL YEAR 2000 FIGURES WERE NOT YET AVAILABLE. FOR ALL OF 1999, THERE WERE 267 ANTI-HIZBULLAH OPERATIONS, WITH 420 SUSPECTS ARRESTED OUT OF A TOTAL OF 1366 TAKEN INTO TEMPORARY CUSTODY. FIGURES FOR 2000 UNTIL THE END OF OCTOBER SHOW 723 OPERATIONS, WITH 1744 SUSPECTS ARRESTED OUT OF 2712 TAKEN INTO TEMPORARY CUSTODY.

16. (U) TURKISH HIZBULLAH HAS NOT YET ACTED AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS, PERSONNEL, OR FACILITIES, OR AGAINST THE TURKISH STATE, EXCEPT IN REACTION TO POLICE RAIDS. NONETHELESS, HIZBULLAH HARBORS EXTREME ANTI-WESTERN VIEWS AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ORGANIZATION MAY SHIFT ITS ATTENTION TO FOREIGNERS, TO INCLUDE AMERICANS, IN THE FUTURE. DURING 2000, GOT OFFICIALS AND THE TURKISH MEDIA ALLEGED THAT HIZBULLAH HAD IRANIAN LINKS AND SUPPORT.

CAPTURE OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS

17. (U) THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, WHICH REPORTEDLY IS A SUB-GROUP OF A LARGER GROUP CALLED TEVHIT ("UNITY" OR "MONOTHEISM"), IS AN ETHNIC TURKISH, EXTREME ISLAMIST GROUP. ITS MEMBERS ARE SUNNI MOSLEMS WHO SEEK TO ESTABLISH ISLAMIST RULE IN TURKEY. AS NOTED ABOVE, HIZBULLAH AND THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ARE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED. NONETHELESS, THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS HAD SUFFICIENT CONTACT THAT THE TNP'S RAIDS AGAINST HIZBULLAH PRODUCED EVIDENCE THAT IDENTIFIED THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS AND RESULTED IN THEIR MAY CAPTURE. ACCORDING TO SOME GOT OFFICIALS AND THE SUSPECTS' MEDIA-REPORTED CONFESSIONS, THIS PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE HAD IRANIAN TRAINING, SUPPORT, AND DIRECTION. THE ORGANIZATION STANDS ACCUSED OF THE PREVIOUSLY UNSOLVED MURDERS OF SECULARIST INTELLECTUALS, THE MOST PROMINENT OF WHOM WHERE UGUR MUMCU, AHMET TANER KISLALI, MUAMMER AKSOY, AND BAHRIYE UCOK. THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ALLEGEDLY MURDERED FOREIGNERS AS WELL, INCLUDING USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK AND EGYPTIAN, INDIAN, ISRAELI, AND SAUDI DIPLOMATS.

------------------------------------------
JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO ACTS OF TERRORISM (A)
------------------------------------------

18. (U) TURKEY'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM TAKES A VIGOROUS APPROACH TO ENFORCING THE COUNTRY'S COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS. OF THE APPROXIMATELY 150-200 TERRORISM-RELATED CASES PROSECUTED IN TURKEY'S STATE SECURITY COURTS, THREE STOOD OUT THIS YEAR.

STATUS OF ABDULLAH OCALAN'S CASE

19. (U) ON JUNE 29, 1999, ANKARA STATE SECURITY COURT NO. 2 CONVICTED ABDULLAH OCALAN OF TREASON UNDER ARTICLE 125 OF THE TURKISH PENAL CODE AND SENTENCED HIM TO DEATH. ON NOVEMBER 25, 1999, THE NINTH COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD THE VERDICT. ON JANUARY 12, 2000, PRIME MINISTER BULENT ECEVIT ANNOUNCED HIS DECISION NOT TO FORWARD CONVICTED PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN'S DEATH PENALTY SENTENCE TO PARLIAMENT, WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO APPROVE HIS EXECUTION. THIS DECISION WAS MADE IN CONSIDERATION THE APPEAL OCALAN'S TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR). IN NOVEMBER 2000, THAT APPEAL WAS TAKEN UP BY THE ECHR AND IS EXPECTED TO REQUIRE AT LEAST A YEAR-AND- A-HALF TO RESOLVE.

MAIN HIZBULLAH TRIAL

20. (U) THOUGH THERE ARE MULTIPLE COURT ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE GOT'S SUCCESSES AGAINST HIZBULLAH, THE MAIN TRIAL FOR 156 MURDERS OPENED IN JULY IN DIYARBAKIR'S STATE SECURITY COURT AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF 2000, WITH A DECISION EXPECTED SOMETIME IN 2001. AMONG THE 15 ACCUSED WERE VELIOGLU DEPUTIES CEMAL TUTAR AND EDIP GUMUS, WHO ALLEGEDLY HANDLED THE ORGANIZATION'S "MILITARY" AND "POLITICAL" ACTIVITIES.

JERUSALEM WARRIORS TRIAL

21. (U) THE TRIAL OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS AND THEIR ACCOMPLICES OPENED IN ANKARA ON AUGUST 14. 17 SUSPECTS WERE CHARGED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF INVOLVEMENT IN 22 MURDERS OVER THE COURSE OF TEN YEARS. AS NOTED ABOVE, AMONG THE VICTIMS WHERE PROMINENT SECULARIST INTELLECTUALS AND JOURNALISTS, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, AND ONE U.S. SERVICE MEMBER, USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK.

--------------------------------------------- --
EXTRADITIONS INVOLVING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (B)
--------------------------------------------- --

22. (U) IN 2000 THERE WERE NO EXTRADITIONS ON TERRORISM- RELATED CHARGES FROM TURKEY TO THE UNITED STATES. LIKEWISE, THERE WERE NO SUCH EXTRADITIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO TURKEY, NOR WERE THERE ANY SUCH EXTRADITIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO TURKEY.

---------------------------------------------
IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION (C)
---------------------------------------------

23. (U) FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, TURKEY HAS LONG FACED DIFFICULTY IN THE EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. SYRIA, IRAQ, AND IRAN HAVE LONG HARBORED PKK TERRORISTS, WHICH THEY USE AS A TOOL IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH TURKEY. IN EUROPE THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR KURDISH POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. THE PKK HAS FOUND PROTECTION FROM PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION THERE DUE SOME GOVERNMENTS' INABILITY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN LEGITIMATE KURDISH POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS AND SUPPORT FOR PKK TERRORISM. THE DHKP/C AND OTHER LEFTIST TERROR GROUPS HAVE ALSO BEEN ABLE TO OPERATE IN EUROPE UNDER A SHIELD OF CONCERNS ABOUT TURKEY'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.

24. (U) A KEY IMPEDIMENT TO EXTRADITIONS OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS FROM EUROPE IS TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, EVEN THOUGH A DE FACTO MORATORIUM EXISTS. SINCE 1984, 28 TERRORISTS, MOST NOTABLY PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN, HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, BUT NO EXECUTION HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT SINCE THAT TIME. NONETHELESS, AND DESPITE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TERRORISM, SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO EXTRADITE SUSPECTS TO TURKEY. THROUGHOUT 2000, PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE EVENTUAL ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CONTINUED, WITH MOST OBSERVERS PREDICTING THAT TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY STATUS WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO ABOLITION.

25. (U) ONE HIGH-PROFILE EXAMPLE OF A EUROPEAN REFUSAL TO EXTRADITE A SUSPECT SOUGHT BY TURKEY WAS THE CASE OF FEHRIYE ERDAL. ERDAL, A MEMBER OF THE DHKP/C, WAS ACCUSED OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JANUARY 1996 MURDER OF A PROMINENT INDUSTRIALIST, OZDEMIR SABANCI, AND TWO OTHER INDIVIDUALS. THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CITED TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS AN OBSTACLE TO HER BEING RETURNED TO TURKEY, EVEN THOUGH TURKEY WAS WILLING TO PROMISE NOT TO EXECUTE HER. THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT ALSO CHARACTERIZED THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH THE GOT SOUGHT HER AS BEING "POLITICAL CRIMES." SHE REMAINS UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN BELGIUM PENDING A TRIAL ON MINOR WEAPONS CHARGES. BELGIAN (AND OTHER) AUTHORITIES HAVE ALSO COMPLAINED THAT TURKEY'S EXTRADITION REQUEST WAS NOT PRESENTED IN A MANNER TACTICALLY CALCULATED TO ACHIEVE EXTRADITION AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT A MORE SOPHISTICATED INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE EXTRADITION ISSUE MAY HAVE PRODUCED A MORE WELCOME RESULT.

26. (U) TURKISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS REPORT THAT THEY HAVE REQUESTED EXTRADITIONS OF SUSPECTED PKK, DHKP/C, AND OTHER TERRORISTS FROM FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, AND THE UK IN RECENT YEARS. ALL SUCH REQUESTS WERE REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SUSPECT MIGHT FACE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE CRIMES INVOLVED WERE POLITICAL, OR THE SUSPECTS MIGHT FACE PERSECUTION FOR POLITICAL BELIEFS.

------------------------------------
RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (D)
------------------------------------

27. (U) PRESIDENT SEZER, PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT, FOREIGN MINISTER CEM, CHIEF OF THE TGS GENERAL HUSEYIN KIVRIKOGLU, AND FORMER-PRESIDENT DEMIREL HAVE ALL MADE STRONG STATEMENTS DENOUNCING TERRORISM DURING 2000. THE GOT FREQUENTLY AND VIGOROUSLY MAKES PUBLIC CONDEMNATIONS OF ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM.

------------------------------------
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (F)
------------------------------------

28. (U) THE GOT CONSISTENTLY AND STRONGLY OPPOSES BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. TURKEY DOES NOT VIEW ITS MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, SUDAN, AND SYRIA AS CONSTITUTING SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

--------------------------------------------- -----------
STATEMENTS SUPPORTING TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRIES (G)
--------------------------------------------- -----------

29. (U) THE GOT MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN 2000 IN SUPPORT OF TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRIES ON TERRORISM ISSUES.

--------------------------------------------- -------
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM (H)
--------------------------------------------- -------

30. (U) TURKISH OFFICIALS, IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, CONTINUE TO LABEL THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AS ONE OF THE GOT'S TOP SECURITY PRIORITIES. WHILE THE TSK CONTINUES ITS OPERATIONS AGAINST PKK TERRORISTS IN THE SOUTHEAST OF THE COUNTRY, THE TNP CARRIES ON ITS DILIGENT AND VIGOROUS WORK IN SUPPRESSING THE DHKP/C AND HIZBULLAH, WHICH PRIMARILY OPERATE IN URBAN AREAS.

--------------------------------------------- ----
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES (I)
--------------------------------------------- ----

31. (U) CLOSE U.S.-TURKISH COOPERATION CONTINUES TO BE STRENGTHENED BY 14 YEARS OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE (ATA) PROGRAMS. ATA PROGRAMS INCLUDE MANDATORY HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENTS. GOT OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT THEY VIEW ATA PROGRAMS AS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARD BRINGING TURKISH POLICE STANDARDS INTO GREATER CONFORMITY WITH EU AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS.

32. (U) TURKEY COOPERATES WITH THE UNITED STATES IN ITS EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM IN CENTRAL ASIA. IN JUNE 2000, A GOT OBSERVER ATTENDED A CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON DESIGNED TO PROMOTE COUNTERTERRORISM DIALOGUE AMONG KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN. TURKISH OFFICIALS HAVE REGULARLY PARTICIPATED IN COUNTER-TERRORISM CONSULTATIONS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. SUCH CONSULTATIONS ARE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND COORDINATE STRATEGY.

--------------------------------------------- ----
COOPERATION - INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS (J)
--------------------------------------------- ----

33. (U) THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY, WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE IN JANUARY 1981, GOVERNS INVESTIGATIVE COOPERATION. THE GOT HAS EXPEDITIOUSLY PROCESSED REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATIVE ACCESS TO EVIDENCE UNDER THIS TREATY. HOWEVER, IN SOME CASES THE GOT HAS LEFT REQUESTS UNANSWERED FOR OVER THREE YEARS. THERE WERE NO REQUESTS MADE TO THE GOT IN 2000.

34. (U) IN 1999 THE USG REQUESTED AND RECEIVED INFORMATION RELATED TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTEMPTED DHKP/C ROCKET ATTACK ON THE U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN ISTANBUL. THIS YEAR THE THREE TNP OFFICERS WHO PREVENTED THE ATTACK WERE TRIED ON CHARGES OF HAVING EXTRA-JUDICIALLY MURDERED THE DHKP/C SUSPECTS. THE CASE REMAINS ON-GOING.

35. (U) OVERALL, IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THE GOT HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE USG IN THE APPREHENSION, CONVICTION, AND PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN TURKEY. THE MOST PROMINENT EXAMPLE OF THE GOT'S AGGRESSIVE EFFORTS TO BRING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE IS THE ARREST AND ON-GOING TRIAL OF FOUR SUSPECTS IN THE 1991 ASSASSINATION OF USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK IN ANKARA. THE TRIAL OF THE FOUR, WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY MEMBERS OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, AN ISLAMIST TERROR GROUP, BEGAN IN AUGUST 2000. THESE INDIVIDUALS, AND THEIR 13 COHORTS, STAND ACCUSED OF ALMOST A SCORE OF OTHER MURDERS AND ATTACKS, AS NOTED ABOVE.

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX]

36. (S) IN 2000 THERE WAS ONE EXTRADITION FROM TURKEY TO THE UNITED STATES INVOLVING AN INDIVIDUAL WITH SUSPECTED TERRORIST CONNECTIONS WHO HAD ALSO COMMITTED A VARIETY OF NON-TERROR RELATED CRIMES IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS EXTRADITION, WHICH WAS EFFECTED IN THE SPACE OF APPROXIMATELY FIVE MONTHS, WAS AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL U.S.-TURKISH COOPERATION. THE SMOOTH EXECUTION OF THE EXTRADITION WAS PARTICULARLY NOTABLE BECAUSE THE MOST RECENT PREVIOUS EXTRADITION, WHICH HAD NO TERRORISM ASPECT, WAS IN 1993.

----------------------------
COOPERATION - PREVENTION (K)
----------------------------

37. (U) THE GOT PROVIDES THE USG AND, IN PARTICULAR, U.S. SECURITY OFFICERS IN TURKEY WITH UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION REGARDING TERRORIST GROUP OPERATIONS. MOREOVER, THE GOT PROVIDES EXTENSIVE POLICE SUPPORT TO DETER AND PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN TURKEY. TURKEY PROVIDES DEDICATED TNP GUARDS WHO WORK IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH MISSION SECURITY PERSONNEL AT THE THREE DIPLOMATIC POSTS IN TURKEY (ANKARA, ISTANBUL, AND ADANA). TURKISH POLICE EXPEND LITERALLY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PERSON-HOURS PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF MANY OFFICIAL AMERICAN RESIDENCES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE TNP ALSO PROVIDES SECURITY MOTORCADE ESCORTS FOR MANY U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS EACH YEAR, INCLUDING FOR EVERY CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO VISIT TURKEY.

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX]

38. (S) IN THE LAST MONTHS OF 2000, U.S. FACILITIES IN TURKEY WERE SUBJECT TO ALMOST WEEKLY TERRORIST THREATS. IN PARTICULAR, INCIRLIK AIR BASE WAS SINGLED OUT AS THE SITE OF A POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACK. IN RESPONSE, THE TURKS UPGRADED THE THREAT LEVEL AT THE BASE, WHICH INCLUDED ERECTING BARRICADES AROUND THE AMERICAN SECTOR OF THE BASE, INCREASING VEHICLE SECURITY CHECKS, PERFORMING 100 PERCENT IDENTIFICATION CHECKS, AND INSTALLING MORE CHECK POINTS IN THE CITY OF ADANA OUTSIDE INCIRLIK. THE GOT ALSO PROVIDED ADDITIONAL PROTECTION IN DURING 6TH FLEET COMMANDER'S VISIT TO ANKARA AND DURING THE VISIT OF HIS FLAGSHIP, THE USS LASALLE, TO WESTERN TURKEY.

39. (S) IN OTHER ASPECTS OF COOPERATION AND PREVENTION, THE GOT'S COOPERATION HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING. THE GOT HAS RESPONDED IN A POSITIVE AND FORWARD-LEANING MANNER WHEN THE USG HAS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE REGARDING COUNTERTERRORISM. IN 2000, THE TURKISH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (TNIO), TGS, AND TNP ALL WORKED CLOSELY WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE TO RENDER, DISRUPT, TRACK, AND ARREST TERRORISTS WHO WERE TRANSITING TURKEY TO CONDUCT TERRORIST OPERATIONS OR WHO WERE BENT ON CAUSING HARM WITHIN TURKEY ITSELF. WHEN ASKED, THE GOT WATCH- LISTED INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT HAVE ARRIVED AT ONE OF TURKEY'S PORTS ENTRY. IT HAS PROVIDED THIS ASSISTANCE DESPITE, AT TIMES, VAGUELY-WORDED THREAT REPORTS THAT REQUIRED A SUBSTANTIAL PERSONNEL COMMITMENT TO DO A JOB THAT COULD HAVE BEEN PERFORMED WITH LESS EFFORT, HAD THE USG BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION.

40. (S) IN NOVEMBER 2000, THE TURKS PROVIDED EXCEPTIONAL ASSISTANCE TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE BY ARRESTING A USAMA BIN LADEN LIEUTENANT WHO ATTEMPTED TO TRANSIT TURKEY. AT THE REQUEST OF THE USG, THE TURKEY RENDERED HIM TO JUSTICE IN A THIRD COUNTRY. ALSO IN THE NOVEMBER/DECEMBER TIME FRAME, THE GOT AGGRESSIVELY PROVIDED COVERAGE OF THE MAJOR PORTS OF ENTRY IN AN ATTEMPT TO APPREHEND A SECOND AND EVEN MORE IMPORTANT PLAYER IN THE BIN LADIN ORGANIZATION.

PEARSON