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Viewing cable 00HARARE6677, ASSISTANT SECRETARY MEETS WITH ZIMBABWE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
00HARARE6677 2000-11-29 13:59 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

291359Z Nov 00


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1859

PAGE 01        HARARE  06677  01 OF 03  291400Z 
ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CEA-01   CIAE-00  COME-00  
      CTME-00  DINT-00  DODE-00  DOTE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    
      EUR-00   EXIM-01  E-00     FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    FRB-00   
      H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    ITC-01   LAB-01   L-00     
      VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   STR-00   TRSE-00  
      USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-02   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  
      SAS-00   SWCI-00    /012W
                  ------------------A54E38  291401Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7738
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
Wednesday, 29 November 2000, 13:59
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 006677 
SIPDIS 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH 
LONDON FOR CHARLES GURNEY 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
EO 12958 DECL: 11/29/10 
TAGS PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, ZI, SA 
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MEETS WITH ZIMBABWE 
 CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HARARE 06677 01 OF 03 291400Z OPPOSITION LEADER
REFTEL: HARARE 6584
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR TOM MCDONALD FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SUSAN E. RICE MET MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE (MDC) PRESIDENT MORGAN TSVANGIRAI ON NOVEMBER 16. TSVANGIRAI OFFERED FOUR
SIPDIS SCENARIOS UNDER WHICH THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS COULD UNFOLD. HE BELIEVES A TRANSITIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT IS THE BEST WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS PITTING THE PEOPLE AGAINST THEIR UNPOPULAR LEADER. MASS ACTION WILL BE CONSIDERED INITIALLY AT THE MDC’S NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING NOVEMBER 24. MASS ACTION WOULD BE INTENDED TO PRESSURE PRESIDENT MUGABE TO RESIGN. THE MDC UNDERSTANDS THE SERIOUS RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH MASS ACTION, TSVANGIRAI PROFESSED, AND RECOGNIZES THAT IT IS IN THE COUNTRY’S BEST INTEREST TO AVOID BLOODSHED. EVERYONE IS FOCUSED ON SEEING MUGABE GO, BUT IT WILL PROBABLY TAKE A CONVERGENCE OF OPPOSITION FROM ZANU-PF, THE MILITARY, AND REGIONAL LEADERS TO FORCE HIM OUT. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) ON NOVEMBER 16, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SUSAN E. RICE, HER DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR MCDONALD, DCM, AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER) HAD A BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MDC PRESIDENT MORGAN TSVANGIRAI. TSVANGIRAI WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MDC NATIONAL CHAIRMAN ISAAC MATONGO.
 CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HARARE 06677 01 OF 03 291400Z
-------------------------------------- 
TSVANGIRAI LOOKS INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL
SIPDIS
-------------------------------------- 

3. (C) TSVANGIRAI BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE SEES THREE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN ZIMBABWE: LAWLESSNESS, THE LAND QUESTION, AND THE ECONOMY, AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE ECONOMY IS THE MOST DIRE PROBLEM. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE (GOZ) IS TRYING TO POLARIZE THE POLITICAL PLAYERS IN THE COUNTRY. THE MDC LEADER SEES FOUR POTENTIAL SCENARIOS EMERGING FROM THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS: 1) THE PEOPLE WAIT 18 MONTHS TO VOTE MUGABE OUT--THIS IS THE MOST CONSTITUTIONAL, BUT LEAST LIKELY SCENARIO. 2) THERE IS AN ACCELERATED, BUT STILL CONSTITUTIONAL, PROCESS WHEREBY MUGABE RESIGNS OR IS EASED OUT AT THE DECEMBER ZANU-PF CONGRESS. THIS IS NOT VERY LIKELY EITHER SINCE MUGABE HAS OUSTED THE PROVINCIAL PARTY EXECUTIVES THAT MIGHT CHALLENGE HIS INTENTION TO RUN AGAIN IN 2002. 3) MASS ACTION IS UNDERTAKEN, FORCING MUGABE TO LEAVE THE SCENE EARLY. TSVANGIRAI STATED THAT THIS OPTION MUST BE CAREFULLY
SIPDIS CONSIDERED, AND HE ASKED RHETORICALLY: DO WE WANT TO PUSH OUT AN ELECTED PRESIDENT BEFORE HIS TERM IS UP? 4) AN ARMY COUP THAT REMOVES MUGABE, POSSIBLY WITH A GREAT DEAL OF BLOODSHED, FROM WHICH IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ZIMBABWE TO RECOVER.

4. (C) IDEALLY, TSVANGIRAI CONTINUED, THE MDC WOULD LIKE TO SEE A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS WHERE ZANU-PF REMAINED IN CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT BUT BROUGHT IN MDC MINISTERS--ESSENTIALLY, A  CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 HARARE 06677 01 OF 03 291400Z COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE GOAL OF A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE TO ARREST THE ECONOMIC DECLINE, RESTORE INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN ZIMBABWE, AND ESTABLISH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. WHEN ASKED ABOUT AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION FIRST TO MAKE A COALITION GOVERNMENT MORE FEASIBLE, TSVANGIRAI STATED THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROCESS
SIPDIS SHOULD BE BROAD-BASED AND WELL-CONSIDERED. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO GO THROUGH THAT PROCESS NOW. HE SAID THE ECONOMY IS THE PRIORITY ISSUE BECAUSE CONFIDENCE MUST BE RESTORED IN IT BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 2002. IT DOESN’T MAKE SENSE TO TALK ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION WHILE THE PEOPLE ARE SUFFERING.

--------------------------- 
MASS ACTION IS ON THE TABLE
--------------------------- 

5. (C) THE OPPOSITION LEADER WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE COUNTRY CANNOT CONTINUE AS IT HAS FOR ANOTHER SIX MONTHS. WE KNOW THAT ZIMBABWE IS NOT LIKE YUGOSLAVIA, BUT THE PEOPLE ARE DEMANDING CHANGE BEFORE THE SITUATION GETS WORSE, HE PROFESSED. UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, THE MDC WOULD WAIT UNTIL 2002 FOR CHANGE, BUT THE ECONOMIC DECLINE IS SO STEEP THAT IF IT WAITS THAT LONG,
 CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1865
PAGE 01 HARARE 06677 02 OF 03 291401Z ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00  CTME-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00  EUR-00 EXIM-01 E-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 FRB-00  H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 LAB-01 L-00  VCE-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00  PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00  USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-02 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00  SAS-00 SWCI-00 /012W  ------------------A54E56 291401Z /38 O 291359Z NOV 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7739 INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 HARARE 006677
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR CHARLES GURNEY
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/10 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PINR ZI SA
PAGE 02 HARARE 06677 02 OF 03 291401Z OPPOSITION LEADER
THERE WILL BE “NOTHING TO VOTE FOR” BY THE TIME THE ELECTION ARRIVES. THE MDC’S NATIONAL COUNCIL , AT LEAST INITIALLY, WILL MEET NOVEMBER 24 TO CONSIDER MASS ACTION. IF THE EXECUTIVE DECIDES TO CONDUCT A MASS ACTION, IT WILL MOST LIKELY BE IN THE FORM OF GENERAL STRIKE TO BEGIN IN MID-DECEMBER WHEN CHILDREN ARE HOME FROM SCHOOL AND BUSINESSES BEGIN TO CLOSE ANYWAY FOR THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAY. THIS WOULD MINIMIZE THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE POPULATION, TSVANGIRAI BELIEVES. (NOTE: THE MDC’S NATIONAL COUNCIL CANCELLED PLANS FOR MASS ACTION AT ITS NOVEMBER 24 MEETING. SEE REFTEL. END NOTE.) HE SAID THE MDC UNDERSTANDS THE MAGNITUDE AND SERIOUSNESS OF MASS ACTION, AND IT HAS TRIED TO POSTPONE IT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, BUT THE POPULAR SENTIMENT IS TO DO IT. A GENERAL STAY-AWAY IS PREFERABLE TO CONFRONTATION SINCE IT IS NOT IN THE COUNTRY’S BEST INTEREST TO HAVE VIOLENCE OR BLOODSHED.

6. (C) ON THE GOZ’S REACTION TO A MASS DEMONSTRATION IN HARARE, TSVANGIRAI BELIEVED THE ARMY WOULDN’T HESITATE TO SHOOT A LOT OF PEOPLE. HE THOUGHT ITS REACTION WOULD BE LESS SEVERE IN OTHER CITIES LIKE BULAWAYO AND MUTARE, WHERE THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IS MUCH FEWER AND THEIR LOYALTY TO MUGABE MORE QUESTIONABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SEES THE MILITARY AS DIVIDED. MUGABE HAS APPROPRIATED THE TOP BRASS FOR HIS OWN ENDS, AND THEY ARE LOYAL TO HIM. HOWEVER, THE BULK OF THE MILITARY’S LOWER RANKS DO NOT SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT, TSVANGIRAI CLAIMED.  CONFIDENTIAL
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HOW TO GET MUGABE OUT
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7. (C) THE MILITARY IS ONE OF THE THREE MAJOR INFLUENCES ON MUGABE, TSVANGIRAI CONTINUED. THE OTHER TWO ARE ZANU-PF AND REGIONAL LEADERS. IF MUGABE IS TO BE PRESSURED TO LEAVE THE SCENE, ALL THREE MUST TURN AGAINST HIM, THE OPPOSITION LEADER DECLARED. WHEN ASKED WHAT ELSE MIGHT INDUCE MUGABE TO STEP DOWN, TSVANGIRAI SAID THE PRESIDENT WILL DO SO ONLY AFTER HE HAS HAD HIS REVENGE AGAINST THE WHITES AND ONLY AFTER HE HAS REIGNED IN ZANU-PF DISSIDENTS AND UNIFIED HIS PARTY. MUGABE IS A VINDICTIVE PERSON, TSVANGIRAI PROFESSED. FOR ITS PART, THE MDC RECOGNIZES MUGABE AS THE NATION’S FIRST LEADER AND A VERY IMPORTANT ONE IN ITS HISTORY. THE MDC WON’T ENGAGE IN RETRIBUTION AGAINST MUGABE AND HIS SUPPORTERS, TSVANGIRAI HINTED, BECAUSE “WE CAN’T FOCUS ON THE PAST IF WE ARE TO MOVE FORWARD.” WHILE MUGABE IS PRESIDENT, THE MDC LEADERSHIP WON’T MAKE PERSONAL COMMENTS ABOUT HIM, AS THAT WOULD JUST INFLAME THE SITUATION.

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ROLE OF REGIONAL LEADERS
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8. (C) THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ASKED THE MDC LEADER ABOUT THE ROLE REGIONAL LEADERS COULD PLAY IN RESOLVING THE SITUATION. TSVANGIRAI STATED THAT AFTER INITIALLY  CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 HARARE 06677 02 OF 03 291401Z SHOWING AMBIVALENCE TOWARD ZIMBABWE, SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT MBEKI HAS RECENTLY STARTED TO TALK MORE FIRMLY AND IS SHOWING SIGNS HE WILL NO LONGER TOLERATE THE SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE. TSVANGIRAI MENTIONED THAT ON HIS LAST VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA, HE MET WITH FORMER PRESIDENT MANDELA--WHO STILL EXERTS GREAT INFLUENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA, HE STATED--AND URGED THE LEADER TO INTERVENE IN ZIMBABWE. HE DID NOT RECEIVE A FIRM COMMITMENT FROM MANDELA, HOWEVER, AND DID NOT SEE MBEKI. ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT CHILUBA HAS BEEN DISTANT WITH THE MDC..

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MDC’S VIEW ON LAND ISSUE
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9. (C) ON THE LAND ISSUE, TSVANGIRAI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LAND REFORM WAS “UNFINISHED” BUSINESS AND MUST BE ADDRESSED SERIOUSLY BY ANY GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE. HOWEVER, EQUITY, LEGALITY AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY MUST BE KEYSTONES TO ANY SUCCESSFUL LAND REFORM PROGRAM. THE MDC SUPPORTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LAND COMMISSION TO OVERSEE THE REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND. THE MDC ALSO SEES THE 1998 DONORS CONFERENCE AS THE STARTING POINT FOR LAND REFORM, AND IT WOULD SUPPORT THE UNDP LAND INITIATIVE, THE OPPOSITION LEADER STATED. TSVANGIRAI SAID THAT WHEN HE WAS IN THE UK RECENTLY, HE TOLD THE
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 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1866
PAGE 01 HARARE 06677 03 OF 03 291401Z ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00  CTME-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00  EUR-00 EXIM-01 E-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 FRB-00  H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 LAB-01 L-00  VCE-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00  PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00  USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-02 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00  SAS-00 SWCI-00 /012W  ------------------A54E5D 291401Z /38 O 291359Z NOV 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7740 INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 HARARE 006677
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR CHARLES GURNEY
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/10 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PINR ZI SA
PAGE 02 HARARE 06677 03 OF 03 291401Z OPPOSITION LEADER
BRITISH TO REFRAIN FROM MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE AND TO USE ITS INFLUENCE BEHIND THE SCENES TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

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ZIMBABWE NEEDS A PEACEFUL TRANSITION
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10. (C) THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A PEACEFUL POLITICAL TRANSITION TO THE OPPOSITION LEADER. THE USG SEES HUGE RISKS--WITH FEW, IF ANY, UPSIDES--TO MASS ACTION, AND URGED THE MDC TO MANAGE THE POLITICAL TRANSITION CAREFULLY. WE HAVE URGED THE GOZ NOT TO USE LETHAL FORCE ON DEMONSTRATORS, AND WE URGE THE OPPOSITION NOT TO GET IN A SITUATION WHERE LETHAL FORCE MIGHT BE USED, THE SECRETARY SAID. THE USG ALSO WANTS TO ENCOURAGE THE MDC TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE WITH MODERATES IN ZANU-PF, EVEN IF PRIVATELY. A/S RICE AFFIRMED THE USG’S WILLINGNESS TO FACILITATE SUCH CONTACTS, IF DESIRED. SHE ALSO PUSHED THE MDC TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF THE COUNTRY THROUGH ITS SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE IN PARLIAMENT, AND LAMENTED THE MDC FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN THE PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET, DESPITE THE FINANCE MINISTER’S SOLICITATION OF MDC INPUT. SUCH ENGAGEMENT, RICE ARGUED, WOULD SHOW THAT THE MDC IS A SERIOUS AND CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO ZANU- PF. TSVANGIRAI, WHEN PRESSED, RELUCTANTLY TOOK THIS POINT ON BOARD.
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PAGE 03 HARARE 06677 03 OF 03 291401Z 11. (C) COMMENT: TSVANGIRAI WAS FRANK, CONFIDENT AND RELAXED. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT CONVINCE US THAT THE MDC HAS A CLEAR OR WELL-THOUGHT-OUT PLAN FOR MASS ACTION OR WHAT IT WOULD ACCOMPLISH. HIS COMMENTS SUGGESTED THE MDC IS PINNING HOPE ON INTERNAL ZANU-PF MACHINATIONS TO FORCE MUGABE FROM POWER. HIS PUBLIC APPROVAL OF FINANCE MINISTER MAKONI’S BUDGET, AS REPORTED IN THE NOVEMBER 17 “THE DAILY NEWS,” MAY BE AN INDICATION OF HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE CREDIBLE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. TSVANGIRAI IS CLEARLY UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE PUBLIC TO LEAD A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. OTHER INTERLOCUTORS HAVE TOLD US THAT IF HE DOES NOT DO SO SOON, HE HIMSELF MAY BE FORCED FROM THE PARTY LEADERSHIP. NOW THAT THE QUESTION OF MASS ACTION IS MOOT FOR THE TIME-BEING, IT WILL BE UP TO TSVANGIRAI TO CHANNEL THE PEOPLE’S, AND HIS OWN PARTY MEMBERS’, FRUSTRATION INTO CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE. IF TSVANGIRAI CAN DO THAT, HIS POSITION WILL BE STRENGTHENED IMMEASURABLY, BOTH HERE AND ABROAD. END COMMENT.
12. (U) A/S RICE HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.
MCDONALD
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