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Viewing cable 00HARARE4062, S/E WOLPE'S DISCUSSION WITH MNANGAGWA ON DRC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
00HARARE4062 2000-07-24 15:17 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

241517Z Jul 00


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1230

PAGE 01        HARARE  04062  01 OF 03  241524Z 
ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  EAP-00   EUR-00   
      VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   
      AC-01    NEA-00   NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00    
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  
      T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DRL-02   G-00     SAS-00     /007W
                  ------------------71C03B  241524Z /49    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6678
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RWANDA COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 004062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S RICE AND PDAS POWELL 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/10 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE'S DISCUSSION WITH MNANGAGWA ON DRC 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE. 
REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  04062  01 OF 03  241524Z 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  IN A JULY 17 MEETING WITH EMMERSON 
MNANGAGWA, MUGABE'S CONFIDANTE IN CHARGE OF SENSITIVE 
MISSIONS RELATING TO THE CONGO, GREAT LAKES SPECIAL 
ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT DRC PRESIDENT 
KABILA'S PUSH FOR THE REMOVAL OF SIR KETUMILE MASIRE AS 
FACILITATOR IN THE CONGOLESE CONFLICT.  MNANGAGWA 
INDICATED THAT PRESIDENT MUGABE BELIEVES KABILA IS 
INTRACTABLE ON THE ISSUE.  HOWEVER, HE ACCEPTED WOLPE'S 
ARGUMENT THAT KABILA'S OBJECTIONS TO MASIRE ARE A FIG 
LEAF FOR HIS DESIRE TO SEE THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE 
FAIL, AND APPEARED TO AGREE WITH WOLPE'S POINT THAT THE 
REMOVAL OF MASIRE WOULD KILL THE LUSAKA PROCESS. 
MNANGAGWA TOLD WOLPE THAT THE GOZ IS AS COMMITTED AS 
EVER TO A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DRC.  DESPITE THE GOZ'S 
OFFICIAL POSITION THAT ZIMBABWEAN TROOPS WILL RETREAT 
WHEN SECURITY CONDITIONS PERMIT, HE SAID, THEIR "REAL" 
POSITION IS THAT THEY WILL PULL OUT AS SOON AS MONUC IS 
DEPLOYED.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  GREAT LAKES SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE MET JULY 
17 WITH EMMERSON MNANGAGWA, A CLOSE CONFIDANTE OF 
PRESIDENT MUGABE WHO HAD JUST COMPLETED HIS TENURE AS 
MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND WAS SLATED TO BECOME SPEAKER OF 
THE PARLIAMENT THE FOLLOWING DAY.  MNANGAGWA IS WELL- 
BRIEFED ON ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE CONGO AS MUGABE USES 
HIM TO CONDUCT SENSITIVE MISSIONS THERE.  WOLPE WAS 
ACCOMPANIED BY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO A/S RICE PRENDERGAST 
AND POLOFF.  MNANGAGWA TOLD WOLPE THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN 
PRESENT AT THE PREVIOUS WEEK'S MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT 
MUGABE AND PRESIDENT KABILA IN LUBUMBASHI, BUT HE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  04062  01 OF 03  241524Z 
UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD DISCUSSED TWO MAIN ISSUES: 
MASIRE'S TENURE AS FACILITATOR AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN 
TROOPS. 
 
SHORING UP SUPPORT FOR MASIRE 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  WITH REGARD TO MASIRE, MNANGAGWA TOLD WOLPE 
KABILA HAD APPEARED INTRACTABLE AT LUBUMBASHI IN HIS 
OBJECTIONS TO MASIRE'S CONTINUED ROLE AS NATIONAL 
DIALOGUE FACILITATOR AND HAD PRESSED FOR THE OAU TO 
APPOINT ANOTHER FACILITATOR.  MUGABE, MNANGAGWA 
CONTINUED, HAD WARNED KABILA DURING THE JUNE 25 MINI- 
SUMMIT IN HARARE THAT HIS OBJECTIONS TO MASIRE DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR REMOVING HIM.  BY 
PRESSING FOR MASIRE'S REMOVAL, MUGABE TOLD KABILA, HE 
WAS CREATING A PERCEPTION THAT HE WAS MOVING AGAINST THE 
LUSAKA ACCORDS.  KABILA RESPONDED TO MUGABE THAT HE 
STILL RESPECTED AND HONORED THE LUSAKA ACCORD, BUT HIS 
POSITION, SUPPORTED BY HIS CABINET, IS THAT MASIRE 
CANNOT CONTINUE AS FACILITATOR.  MUGABE HIMSELF, 
MNANGAGWA TOLD WOLPE, HAS FOUND NO FAULT WITH THE WAY 
MASIRE HAS HANDLED HIS DUTIES. 
 
4.  (C)  WOLPE TOLD MNANGAGWA THAT, WHILE NO ONE CLAIMED 
MASIRE HAD CARRIED OUT HIS DIFFICULT JOB FLAWLESSLY, 
MANY OF KABILA'S ALLEGATIONS ABOUT MASIRE -- FOR 
EXAMPLE, THAT HE HAD NEGLECTED TO MEET WITH KABILA WHILE 
IN THE CONGO -- WERE FACTUALLY INCORRECT.  NOTHING COULD 
BE MORE DAMAGING TO THE REGION, HE STATED, THAN 
ACQUIESCING TO KABILA'S REJECTION OF MASIRE, BECAUSE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  04062  01 OF 03  241524Z 
"YOU KNOW AND I KNOW THAT THE REAL ISSUE FOR KABILA IS 
NOT MASIRE."  RATHER, IT IS HIS NERVOUSNESS ABOUT THE 
INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE.  ACQUIESCING TO KABILA ON 
MASIRE WOULD SEND A SIGNAL TO THE CONGOLESE THAT LUSAKA 
IS DEAD.  NO PARTY HAS BEEN CLEARER THAN THE 
ZIMBABWEANS, WOLPE NOTED, IN DESIRING THE FULL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LUSAKA ACCORDS.  WOLPE TOLD 
MNANGAGWA THAT HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT MUGABE HAD 
DISCUSSED MASIRE'S ROLE WITH KABILA, AND ASKED THAT 
MNANGAGWA CONVEY TO MUGABE THE US VIEW THAT THE SURVIVAL 
OF THE LUSAKA PROCESS DEPENDS ON RETAINING MASIRE. 
MNANGAGWA PLEDGED TO DO SO. 
 
5.  (C)  WOLPE THEN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN ABOUT A REPORT 
THAT NAMIBIAN PRESIDENT SAM NUJOMA HAD MET WITH SEVERAL 
INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS AND TOLD THEM 
THAT MASIRE NO LONGER HAS THE SUPPORT OF KABILA'S 
SOUTHERN ALLIES.  NUJOMA'S COMMENTS, IF ACCURATELY 
REPORTED, COULD HARDEN ALREADY SKEPTICAL MEMBERS OF 
CONGRESS AGAINST THE MONUC OPERATION.  WHY PAY FOR 
PEACEKEEPING, THEY ARE LIKELY TO ASK, WHEN THE POLITICAL 
ALTERNATIVE TO ARMED CONFLICT IS NO LONGER VIABLE?  ON 
THE OTHER HAND, WOLPE NOTED, THE OAU COUNCIL OF 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1231 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  04062  02 OF 03  241524Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  EAP-00   EUR-00 
      VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00 
      AC-01    NEA-00   NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00 
      T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DRL-02   G-00     SAS-00     /007W 
                  ------------------71C047  241524Z /49 
O 241517Z JUL 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6679 
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
RWANDA COLLECTIVE 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 HARARE 004062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S RICE AND PDAS POWELL 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/10 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE'S DISCUSSION WITH MNANGAGWA ON DRC 
 
MINISTERS RECENTLY ISSUED A STATEMENT TAKING A STRONG 
STANCE THAT MASIRE SHOULD REMAIN AS FACILITATOR AND THAT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  04062  02 OF 03  241524Z 
THE LUSAKA SIGNATORIES SHOULD COOPERATE WITH HIM. 
MNANGAGWA, WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A PRIVATE TRIP TO 
ENGLAND, SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF THE OAU 
STATEMENT. 
 
6.  (C)  WOLPE SUGGESTED THAT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO 
PRESERVE MASIRE'S ROLE BY IMPLEMENTING FACE-SAVING 
MEASURES.  HE NOTED THAT MASIRE HAS TWO BASIC PROBLEMS 
REGARDING THE CONGO: HE DOES NOT KNOW THE CONGO WELL AND 
HE DOES NOT SPEAK FRENCH.  SEVERAL PROMINENT FRENCH 
SPEAKERS, WOLPE TOLD MNANGAGWA, HAVE OFFERED TO MAKE 
THEMSELVES AVAILABLE TO ASSIST MASIRE.  WOLPE TOLD 
MNANGAGWA THAT HE WOULD BE PRESSING FOR ACCEPTANCE OF 
THIS "MASIRE-PLUS" IDEA DURING HIS OTHER TRAVEL IN THE 
REGION.  ONCE A CONSENSUS IS IN PLACE, THERE CAN BE A 
MULTILATERAL EFFORT TO PUSH THE IDEA WITH KABILA. 
MNANGAGWA EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT KABILA WILL ONLY 
SOFTEN ON HIS OPPOSITION TO MASIRE IF ANGOLA, NAMIBIA, 
AND ZIMBABWE TAKE A UNITED STAND.  IF THERE IS ANY SIGN 
OF WEAKNESS, HE WILL REMAIN OBDURATE.  WOLPE AGREED, AND 
ASKED MNANGAGWA WHETHER HE BELIEVED THE GOZ WOULD 
SUPPORT THE "MASIRE-PLUS" APPROACH.  MNANGAGWA DID NOT 
REPLY DIRECTLY, BUT REPEATED THAT MUGABE HAD "FOUND NO 
FAULT" WITH MASIRE'S PERFORMANCE. 
 
COMPLIANCE WITH LUSAKA 
---------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  WOLPE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT KABILA'S DECISION 
TO UNILATERALLY APPOINT A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, AND 
RECALLED THAT MUGABE HAD SAID SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THAT HE 
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PAGE 03        HARARE  04062  02 OF 03  241524Z 
BELIEVED HE HAD PERSUADED KABILA AGAINST TAKING SUCH A 
STEP.  MNANGAGWA CONCURRED THAT MUGABE HAD ADVISED 
KABILA AGAINST APPOINTING THE ASSEMBLY, WHICH HE WARNED 
WOULD BE SEEN AS A PREEMPTION OF THE LUSAKA PROCESS. 
KABILA HAD REPLIED THAT HE WOULD GO BACK TO THE CABINET 
ON THE ISSUE.  LATER, MNANGAGWA CONTINUED, THE CONGOLESE 
MINISTER OF JUSTICE HAD PHONED MNANGAGWA FROM KINSHASA 
AND SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED THAT IT WOULD 
PROCEED WITH THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, BUT THE JUSTICE 
MINISTER RATHER THAN THE PRESIDENT WOULD CONVENE IT. 
MNANGAGWA HAD REPLIED TO THE MINISTER THAT THE CONGO IS 
A SOVEREIGN STATE BUT THIS WAS NOT A GOOD MOVE 
DIPLOMATICALLY.  WOLPE NOTED THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF 
THE ASSEMBLY HAD HAD VERY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE 
PEACE PROCESS. 
 
CONTINUED FIGHTING IN CONGO 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  WOLPE NOTED THAT KABILA'S INTRANSIGENCE ON 
MASIRE AND OTHER ISSUES IS CREATING PROBLEMS WITH 
CONGOLESE REBEL GROUPS.  FOR EXAMPLE, MLC LEADER JEAN 
PIERRE BEMBA RECENTLY RESPONDED TO WARNINGS NOT TO MOVE 
ON MBANDAKA BY POINTING TO KABILA'S OFFENSIVE IN 
EQUATEUR AND HIS RESISTANCE TO MASIRE.  BEMBA HAS ASKED 
HOW LONG HE SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO HOLD BACK.  WOLPE TOLD 
MNANGAGWA THAT HE, AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE, AND SOUTH 
AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ZUMA HAVE POINTEDLY TOLD BEMBA 
TO LIMIT HIMSELF TO DEFENDING TERRITORY THAT HE 
CURRENTLY HOLDS RATHER THAN ADVANCING. 
 
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PAGE 04        HARARE  04062  02 OF 03  241524Z 
MONUC DEPLOYMENT 
---------------- 
 
9.  (C)  WOLPE TOLD MNANGAGWA THAT THE USG IS PUSHING 
THE UN TO GET READY FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF MONUC, SUBJECT 
TO THE FULFILLMENT OF SECURITY AND ACCESS CONDITIONS. 
MNANGAGWA SAID THAT THE GOZ HAS STRESSED TO KABILA THE 
NEED TO MAINTAIN AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE THERE IS NO REASON 
TO DELAY THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN TROOPS.  IF THERE ARE ANY 
VIOLATIONS, THE GOZ HAS WARNED KABILA, THEY MUST BE FROM 
THE OTHER SIDE.  ONCE MONUC HAS ARRIVED AND FOREIGN 
TROOPS HAVE WITHDRAWN, MNANGAGWA CONTINUED, THE GOZ 
BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NO MORE SECURITY THREAT.  WITHOUT 
UGANDA'S BACKING, BEMBA AND OTHER REBEL LEADERS WILL BE 
POWERLESS.  WOLPE AGREED, NOTING THAT THE EXTERNAL 
SIGNATORIES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MUCH MORE EAGER TO GET A UN 
PRESENCE ESTABLISHED THAN HAS KABILA.  MNANGAGWA 
COMMENTED THAT KABILA BELIEVES, INCORRECTLY, THAT HE 
BENEFITS FROM THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS. 
 
10.  (C)  WOLPE NOTED THAT, IRONICALLY, KISANGANI MAY BE 
THE FIRST PLACE WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE FOR MONUC TO 
DEPLOY.  HE SAID THERE WAS SOME CONSIDERATION BEING 
 
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                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1234 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  04062  03 OF 03  241525Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  EAP-00   EUR-00 
      VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00 
      AC-01    NEA-00   NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00 
      T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DRL-02   G-00     SAS-00     /007W 
                  ------------------71C052  241525Z /49 
O 241517Z JUL 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6680 
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
RWANDA COLLECTIVE 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 HARARE 004062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S RICE AND PDAS POWELL 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/10 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE'S DISCUSSION WITH MNANGAGWA ON DRC 
 
GIVEN TO SEPARATING DEPLOYMENT IN KISANGANI FROM THE 
REST OF THE DEPLOYMENT PROCESS, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE 
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PAGE 02        HARARE  04062  03 OF 03  241525Z 
ALTERING THE UN RESOLUTION ON MONUC.  MNANGAGWA WAS 
NONCOMMITTAL ON THIS IDEA. 
 
CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL 
------------------------- 
 
11.  (C)  WOLPE ASKED MNANGAGWA IF HE WAS CORRECT IN 
ASSUMING THAT ZIMBABWE IS AS COMMITTED AS EVER TO A 
WITHDRAWAL.  MNANGAGWA SAID THAT THIS IS TRUE.  "ONCE UN 
TROOPS ARE IN THE DRC, WE HAVE NO JUSTIFICATION TO 
REMAIN UNLESS ASKED BY THE UN," HE SAID.  MNANGAGWA 
NOTED THAT THE OFFICIAL GOZ POSITION IS THAT ITS TROOPS 
WILL WITHDRAW ONCE IT IS SATISFIED THAT THE CONDITIONS 
FOR SECURITY IN THE CONGO ARE IN PLACE.  HOWEVER, THE 
GOZ'S "REAL POSITION" IS THAT IT WILL WITHDRAW ONCE THE 
UN PEACEKEEPING TROOPS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED.  (COMMENT: 
HE DID NOT SPECIFY TO WHICH PHASE OF THE MONUC 
DEPLOYMENT HE WAS REFERRING.  END COMMENT.)  THE GOZ 
CANNOT SAY THIS PUBLICLY, HE CONTINUED, BECAUSE KABILA 
MIGHT THEN CREATE NEW OBSTACLES TO MONUC DEPLOYMENT. 
WOLPE ASKED WHETHER, IN THE SHORT TERM, THE GOZ WOULD BE 
AMENABLE TO NEGOTIATING A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL.  MNANGAGWA 
REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY.  WOLPE REPLIED THAT THE GOZ'S 
RECEPTIVITY TO THIS POSSIBILITY WAS HELPFUL. 
 
12.  (C)  WOLPE OUTLINED THE USG NON-PAPER ON 
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, RESETTLEMENT, AND 
REINTEGRATION (DDRR). WOLPE TOLD MNANGAGWA THAT HE IS 
CURRENTLY SEEKING COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL FROM THE 
EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES.  HE ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN 
ANY PROGRESS ON THE ISSUE OF VOLUNTARY DISARMAMENT AND 
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PAGE 03        HARARE  04062  03 OF 03  241525Z 
DEMOBILIZATION.  MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT THE GOZ HAD 
BACKED OFF OF THIS ENTIRE ISSUE AFTER KABILA REPLIED 
NEGATIVELY AND "WE BURNED OUR FINGERS."  WOLPE NOTED 
THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RESURRECTED AT VICTORIA FALLS, 
AND ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY MOVEMENT.  MNANGAGWA 
SAID THAT THERE HAD NOT.  PRENDERGAST SAID PART OF THEIR 
MISSION IS TO CONSULT THE SIGNATORIES ON THE FEASIBILITY 
OF A TECHNICAL MISSION TO ASSESS THE CONDITIONS AND 
RESOURCES NECESSARY FOR VOLUNTARY DEMOBILIZATION OF THE 
NON-STATE ACTORS.  THE USG HAS PRESENTED THE NON-PAPER 
TO THE OTHER SIGNATORIES AND WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR 
PROGRESS ON THE ISSUE.  MNANGAGWA INDICATED HIS SUPPORT 
FOR THE IDEAS, BUT SAID ZIMBABWE WOULD BE VERY CAREFUL 
ON THIS ISSUE BECAUSE OF ITS PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH 
KABILA. 
 
13.  (C)  AS THE MEETING CONCLUDED, MNANGAGWA SAID THAT 
PROGRESS TOWARD A WITHDRAWAL IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT 
TO THE GOZ NOW, BECAUSE THERE IS A NEW GOVERNMENT AND 
"WE DO NOT WANT IT BURDENED BY THE (PROBLEMS OF THE) 
PAST ONE." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
14.  (C) MNANGAGWA MADE A NUMBER OF POINTS THAT REVEALED 
WHERE THE GOZ MAY BE ON CERTAIN KEY ISSUES.  1) ZIMBABWE 
REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE FASTEST POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE LUSAKA PEACE PROCESS; 2) SIGNIFICANT WITHDRAWALS 
ARE IN THE GOZ'S POLITICAL INTEREST, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT 
KNOWN IF THE GOZ WILL SEEK TO RETAIN A RESIDUAL FORCE TO 
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PAGE 04        HARARE  04062  03 OF 03  241525Z 
PROTECT CORE ECONOMIC INTERESTS; 3) THE GOZ MAINTAINS A 
DIVERGENCE BETWEEN ITS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LINES ON ITS 
POSTURE IN CONGO BECAUSE THEY DO NOT WANT KABILA TO 
BELIEVE THAT MONUC DEPLOYMENT WILL LEAD TO THE GOZ'S 
WITHDRAWAL; 4) THE SIGNATORIES MUST NOT ACQUIESCE TO 
KABILA'S EFFORT TO OUST MASIRE.  BUT THE GOZ SEEKS TO 
CLARIFY THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE FACILITATION, TO 
GIVE THE SIGNATORIES MORE LEVERAGE WITH BOTH KABILA AND 
MASIRE. 
 
IRVING 
 
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