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Viewing cable 00THEHAGUE1863, READOUT ON MTCR DUTCH CHAIR VISIT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
00THEHAGUE1863 2000-06-22 12:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 THE HAGUE 001863 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR NP DAS BARKER, NP/CBM (VAN DIEPEN/ROE), EAP 
STAE ALSO FOR NEA/NGA, EUR/UBI 
PARIS FOR EST DERRICKSON 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2010 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL HK MC MY SN IR NL MTCRE
SUBJECT: READOUT ON MTCR DUTCH CHAIR VISIT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
CLASSIFIED BY A/POLCOUNS ERIC LUNDBERG; REASONS 1.5 (B,D). 
 
 
1.(C) SUMMARY;  THE DUTCH MTCR CHAIR DEEMS ITS RECENT VISIT 
TO MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, HONG KONG AND MACAU A "SUCCESS" IN 
THAT IT DEEPENED UNDERSTANDING OF MTCR WITH ALL FOUR 
COUNTRIES, PAVED THE WAY FOR FURTHER MTCR CONTACT IN THE 
LATTER THREE DESTINATIONS AND REMOVED SOME MALAYSIAN 
"MISTRUST" OF THE MTCR.  STILL, THE DUTCH PREDICT HARD 
SLOGGING WITH KUALA LUMPUR IF BETTER NON-PROLIFERATION EXPORT 
CONTROLS ARE EVER TO BE REALIZED. THEY ARE MUCH MORE POSITIVE 
ABOUT THE PROSPECTS IN SINGAPORE, HONG KONG AND MACAU. 
FINALLY, THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER SEEMS TO HAVE SAID 
NOTHING MISSILE-SPECIFIC IN HIS BRIEF DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WMD 
ISSUES WHEN MEETING IRANIAN FM KHARAZZI IN TEHRAN. THE 
IRANIANS HAVE YET TO RESPOND TO THE DUTCH PROPOSAL, MADE TWO 
WEEKS AGO, FOR A MTCR VISIT TO TEHRAN ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 
ΒΆ1. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
TEXT OF DUTCH MTCR TRIP REPORT FOR FUTURE PARIS POC MTG 
(PROTECT UNTIL RELEASE AT NEXT MTCR POC MEETING) 
 
 
2.(C/REL MTCR - REL TO MTCR UPON LATE JUNE POC MTG CIRCLTN) 
 
 
BEGIN TEXT OF DUTCH MTCR TRIP REPORT: 
 
 
GENERAL 
 
 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE GIVEN BY THE NOORDWIJK 
PLENARY, A TEAM OF MTCR PARTNERS LED BY THE NETHERLANDS 
CHAIR, PAID A VISIT TO THE TRANSSHIPMENT CENTERS SINGAPORE, 
HONG KONG, AND MACAU. THE TEAM ALSO MADE USE OF THE 
OPPORTUNITY OF BEING IN ASIA TO VISIT MALAYSIA, IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE INTERSESSIONAL REQUEST TO THIS EFFECT, AS ORIGINALLY 
TABLED BY THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RF). 
 
 
IN ADDITION TO THE ACTING CHAIRMAN AND THE REPRESENTATIVES 
FROM THE NETHERLANDS CHAIR, THE MTCR TEAM INCLUDED 
REPRESENTATIVES FROM FINLAND (IN THE PERSON OF THE FUTURE 
CHAIRMAN HIMSELF) AND JAPAN, AND WAS JOINED AT A LOCAL LEVEL 
BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND 
MISSIONS IN THE FOUR CAPITALS. 
 
 
ASIDE FROM THE MORE GENERAL AIM OF DISCUSSING AND RAISING 
AWARENESS OF THE DANGERS OF MISSILE PROLIFERATION AND OF 
SUPPLYING INFORMATION ON THE WAYS THE MTCR ADDRESSES SUCH 
CONCERNS, THE VISITS TO SINGAPORE, HONG KONG AND MACAU WERE 
USED TO FOCUS SPECIFIC ATTENTION ON THE ROLE THAT 
TRANSSHIPMENT CENTERS CAN PLAY IN ACQUISITION EFFORTS BY 
PROLIFERATORS TO OBTAIN MISSILES AND/OR SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY 
THAT CAN BE USED FOR THEIR MISSILE PROGRAMS.  INTERLOCUTORS 
WERE ENCOURAGED TO ADHERE TO THE MTCR GUIDELINES, WITH A VIEW 
TO COUNTER THESE DANGERS, AND WERE OFFERED ASSISTANCE BY MTCR 
PARTNERS IN BUILDING UP AND FURTHER STRENGTHENING THEIR 
EXPORT AND  TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS.  IN THIS FRAMEWORK AN 
OVERVIEW WAS GIVEN OF THE NETHERLANDS EXPORT AND 
TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROL SYSTEM BY WAY OF AN EXAMPLE OF THE MTCR 
GUIDELINES, ALONG WITH SIMILAR UNDERTAKINGS OF A POLITICALLY 
BINDING NATURE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF OTHER EXPORT CONTROL 
REGIMES ARE INCORPORATED INTO NATIONAL LAW.  IT WAS STRESSED 
THAT THIS WAS BY NO MEANS A BLUEPRINT FOR THE IDEAL CONTROL 
SYSTEM, AND THAT IT WAS OF COURSE UP TO THE MTCR PARTNERS TO 
DECIDE HOW TO IMPLEMENT AND INCORPORATE THE MTCR UNDERTAKINGS 
 AT A NATIONAL LEVEL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR OWN 
LEGISLATION AND RESOURCES. 
 
 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERSESSIONAL MANDATE FOR THE VISIT 
TO MALAYSIA, THE TALKS WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN KUALA LUMPUR 
HAD A MORE GENERAL BEARING, AND NO SPECIAL FOCUS WAS GIVEN TO 
TRANSSHIPMENT ISSUES, ALTHOUGH THE SUBJECT WAS, UNAVOIDABLY, 
TOUCHED UPON IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS. 
 
 
SINGAPORE 
 
 
IN SINGAPORE THE MTCR MISSION WAS RECEIVED BY A DELEGATION 
LED BY MRS. KHENG HUA ISELI, DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
COMPRISING OFFICIALS FROM THE MFA, THE MINISTRY OF TRADE AND 
INDUSTRY, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE TRADE DEVELOPMENT 
BOARD, AND THE CUSTOMS AND EXCISE DEPARTMENT.  THE FULL 
DELEGATION LIST IS ANNEXED FOR PARTNERS' INFORMATION. 
 
 
THE SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES WELCOMED THE VISIT OF THE MTCR 
MISSION AND STRESSED THEIR COUNTRY'S GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE 
NON PROLIFERATION AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE MTCR.  THEY 
UNDERLINED THAT SINGAPORE FROM ITS PART HAD AN ADEQUATE 
SYSTEM OF CONTROLS, BASED ON ITS IMPORT CERTIFICATE AND 
DELIVERY VERIFICATION (IC/DV) SYSTEM, REQUIRING PERMITS FOR 
THE IM-AND EXPORT OF STRATEGIC GOODS TO AND FROM SINGAPORE. 
HOWEVER, AS A COUNTRY THAT IS ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON TRADE, 
SINGAPORE WAS FORCED TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN ITS 
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND ITS CONTROLS ON TRADE.  TOO RIGID A 
CONTROL SYSTEM COULD RUN COUNTER TO THOSE COMMERCIAL 
INTERESTS.  IN THIS FRAMEWORK IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT 
TRANSACTIONS ARE ONLY CONTROLLED WHEN A SINGAPOREAN ENTITY IS 
INVOLVED IN THE DEAL, AS A CONSIGNOR OR A CONSIGNEE.  AS A 
RULE, THEREFORE, TRANSSHIPMENT FLOWS FROM A FOREIGN CONSIGNOR 
TO A FOREIGN CONSIGNEE ARE NOT CONTROLLED, IRRESPECTIVE OF 
WHETHER THE GOODS REMAIN ON BOARD OR ARE DOWNLOADED AT THE 
SINGAPORE HARBOR/AIRPORT.  IN THE VIEW OF SINGAPORE IT WAS 
PRIMARILY THE EXPORTING COUNTRY'S RESPONSIBILITY (AND HENCE 
NOT THE TRANSSHIPMENT COUNTRIES') TO CONTROL THAT SENSITIVE 
GOODS WOULD NOT FALL INTO WRONG HANDS. 
 
 
 
 
THE CHAIR, FROM HIS SIDE, STRESSED THE VIEW THAT 
NON-PROLIFERATION IS A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL PARTIES 
CONCERNED; EXPORTING COUNTRIES COULD NOT DO IT ALONE, THE 
CO-OPERATION OF TRANSSHIPMENT CENTERS WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL.  A 
PEACEFUL AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT WAS A CONDITIO SINE QUA NON 
FOR TRADE.  THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF CHOOSING 
BETWEEN STRICT CONTROLS AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, THE TWO 
SHOULD GO HAND IN HAND. 
 
 
IN THIS CONTEXT THE QUESTION WAS PUT TO THE SINGAPORE 
AUTHORITIES WHETHER SINGAPORE WOULD BE WILLING AND ABLE TO 
CONTROL TRANSSHIPMENT CONSIGNMENTS ON REQUEST OF A FOREIGN 
GOVERNMENT IN CASE OF SUSPICION OF DEVIATION TO UNDESIRABLE 
DESTINATIONS, AND WOULD BE ABLE TO SEIZE SUCH SHIPMENTS, IF 
THE SUSPICIOUS PROVED JUSTIFIED.  THE REPLY WAS THAT THERE 
WAS NO LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR STOPPING SUCH TRANSSHIPMENT 
CONSIGNMENTS, BUT THAT IN SUCH CASES COOPERATION OF THE 
SHIPPING AGENCY COULD BE SOUGHT ON THE BASIS OF PERSUASION. 
IT WAS STATED THAT, IN PRACTICE, THIS APPROACH HAD BEEN 
SUCCESSFUL. 
 
 
WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES WERE PLANNING TO 
REVIEW THEIR EXPORT AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS AND WOULD, FOR 
INSTANCE, CONTEMPLATE INTRODUCING A CATCH-ALL OR AD-HOC 
MECHANISM FOR THE LICENSING OF TRANSSHIPMENT TRANSACTIONS, 
SIMILAR TO THE NETHERLANDS EXAMPLE, THE SINGAPORE 
INTERLOCUTORS AGAIN POINTED OUT THAT THEY BELIEVED THE 
CURRENT CONTROL SYSTEM WAS ADEQUATE AND ALLOWED SINGAPORE TO 
ENACT ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.  AT THE SAME TIME, 
HOWEVER, THEY DID EXPRESS AN INTEREST IN THE WORKING OF THE 
AD HOC LICENSING SYSTEM, AND WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE SOME 
FEEDBACK ON ITS FUNCTIONING IN PRACTICES. 
 
 
THE CHAIR INDICATED THE READINESS OF THE MTCR TO SUPPLY 
SINGAPORE WITH ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION AND SUPPORT, AND 
PROPOSED ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE CONTACTS ON A 
MORE REGULAR BASIS AND THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF A FIXED 
POINT OF CONTACT ON BOTH SIDES.  ALTHOUGH SINGAPORE DID NOT 
REJECT CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE, ITS RESPONSE TO THIS 
PROPOSAL WAS RATHER EVASIVE, INDICATING THAT DIPLOMATIC 
CHANNELS COULD BE USED IF AND WHEN THERE WAS ANY SPECIFIC 
NEED FOR FURTHER CONTACTS. 
 
 
THE VISIT OF THE MTCR TEAM LARGELY REAFFIRMED THE IMPRESSIONS 
OF THE JAPANESE COLLEAGUES AFTER THEIR BILATERAL DIALOGUE 
EARLIER THIS YEAR (POC DOC 19, OF FEBRUARY 2000):  SINGAPORE 
EXERCISES A LIMITED CONTROL ON EXPORTS OF STRATEGIC GOODS 
FORM ITS TERRITORY, ON THE BASIS OF A BY NO MEANS 
COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF SENSITIVE ITEMS.  TRANSSHIPMENT IS, AS 
A RULE, NOT CONTROLLED AT ALL.  BECAUSE ITS BASIC PERCEPTION 
STILL SEEMS TO BE THAT RIGOROUS CONTROLS WOULD HAMPER 
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, IT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE VERY WILLING TO 
IMPROVE ITS CONTROL SYSTEM.  HOWEVER, AS ALREADY INDICATED, 
THERE SEEMS TO BE AN INTEREST IN A CATCH-ALL, AD-HOC 
LICENSING MECHANISM, WHICH COULD BE EMPLOYED IN CASES WHERE 
INDICATIONS ARE RECEIVED OF EXPORT/TRANSSHIPMENT TO COUNTRIES 
OF CONCERN. 
HONG KONG 
 
 
IN HONG KONG THE MTCR MISSION WAS RECEIVED BY A DELEGATION 
LED BY MISS YVONNE CHOI, DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR TRADE AND 
INDUSTRY.  THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION INCLUDED MISS ELIZA 
LEE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE TRADE DEPARTMENT, AND 
MR. ANDREW WONG, HEAD OF TRADE CONTROLS, CUSTOMS AND EXCISE 
DEPARTMENT. 
 
 
MISS CHOI EXPRESSED HER GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THIS FIRST 
OFFICIAL MTCR VISIT TO HONG KONG, WHICH WOULD GIVE THE 
MEMBERS OF THE MISSION AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE FUNCTIONING 
OF THE HONG KONG CONTROL SYSTEM WITH THEIR OWN EYES.  HONG 
KONG GREATLY VALUED SUCH EXCHANGES OF VIEWS, AND WELCOMED A 
FURTHER ENHANCEMENT OF THE TIES WITH THE MTCR IN THE FUTURE. 
THE MTCR TEAM RECEIVED PRESENTATIONS OF THE - IMPRESSIVE - 
HONG KONG CONTROL SYSTEM ON IM-AND EXPORT, AND TRANSSHIPMENT 
OF STRATEGIC GOODS.  SERVICES, INCLUDING BROKERING, IN THE 
CONTEXT OF WMD PROGRAMS ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO LICENSING 
REQUIREMENTS. 
 
 
ON THE BASIS OF CONTROL LISTS, WHICH MIRROR THE LISTS OF THE 
EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES, AND WHICH ARE REGULARLY UPDATED, 
SHIPMENTS ARE STRINGENTLY CONTROLLED BY THE HONG KONG 
AUTHORITIES.  FOR EACH TRANSACTION AN INDIVIDUAL LICENSE IS 
REQUIRED.  FOR RE-EXPORT FROM HONG KONG, AT ALL TIMES AN END 
USE CERTIFICATE AND A RE-EXPORT AUTHORIZATION BY THE 
EXPORTING STATE ARE REQUIRED, TOGETHER WITH AN ACCEPTANCE OF 
THE POSSIBILITY OF END USE CHECKS.  IN THIS WAY THE HONG KONG 
CONTROLS COMPLEMENT THE EXPORT CONTROLS OF THE ORIGINAL 
EXPORTING COUNTRY.  BOTH THE CONSIGNOR, THE CONSIGNEE, AS 
WELL AS THE TRANSPORTER ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR UPHOLDING THE 
LAW:  "ANYBODY WHO HAS A HAND IN THE TRANSACTION CAN BE HELD 
ACCOUNTABLE."  IN ORDER TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE, THE HONG KONG 
AUTHORITIES HAVE EXTENSIVE POWERS OF ENFORCEMENT, TO THE 
POINT THAT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF DOMESTIC PREMISES, SEARCHES 
MAY BE EFFECTED WITHOUT CUSTOMS ORDER. 
 
 
VIS-A-VIS THE PRC, HONG KONG MAINTAINS STRICT AUTONOMY AS 
REGARDS ITS TRADE CONTROLS:  TRADE FLOWS ACROSS THE PRC-HONG 
KONG BORDER ARE SUBJECT TO THE SAME LICENSING REQUIREMENTS 
AND CONTROLS AS TRADE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.  EVEN PLA 
VEHICLES ARE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT ONE WEEK'S ADVANCE 
NOTIFICATION WITH PARTICULARS ON PERSONNEL AND GOODS. 
 
 
IT WAS UNDERLINED THAT HONG KONG'S COMMITMENT OT STRINGENT 
LICENSING AND CONTROLS WAS BORN OUT OF SELF INTEREST.  IF 
HONG KONG WANTS TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION AS HIGH TECH HUB, IT 
NEEDS TO ENSURE THAT IT CAN ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY INFLOW OF 
TECHNOLOGY FROM ITS TRADING PARTNERS, AND THIS IS ONLY 
POSSIBLE IF THOSE PARTNERS CONTINUE TO HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE 
IN ITS EXPORT CONTROLS, SO AS TO BE SURE THAT THAT TECHNOLOGY 
IS NOT RE-EXPORTED T UNDUE DESTINATIONS.  SINCE ITS REVERSION 
TO CHINA, HONG KONG UNFORTUNATELY NO LONGER FORMED PART OF 
THE EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES, BUT IT WAS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE 
TO LIVE UP TO THE EXPORT REGIMES GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS. 
FORTUNATELY, IT RECEIVED ADEQUATE INFORMATION AND HELP FROM 
PARTNERS TO ENABLE IT TO DO SO. 
 
 
THE DISCUSSIONS WERE COMPLEMENTED WITH VISITS TO THE LOK MA 
CHAU BORDER CONTROL POINT WITH THE PRC, AND THE CUSTOMS AND 
EXCISE DEPARTMENT OF THE HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. 
 
 
IN CONCLUSION, THE MTCR TEAM RECEIVED A VERY FAVORABLE 
IMPRESSION OF THE HONG KONG TRADE CONTROL SYSTEM, WHICH CAN 
SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHER TRANSSHIPMENT CENTERS IN THE 
WORLD.  HONG KONG HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN ADVERTISING ITS 
CONTROL SYSTEM, INTER ALIA THROUGH NUMEROUS PRESENTATIONS AT 
EXPORT CONTROL SEMINARS, ETC.  FOR THE INFORMATION OF 
PARTNERS, A COPY OF AN OUTLINE OF THE SYSTEM IS ANNEXED. 
 
 
ONE POINT OF CONCERN WOULD SEEM TO BE THE FACT THAT NOT ALL 
IN-TRANSIT CONSIGNMENTS OF SENSITIVE GOODS CAN BE CONTROLLED 
AND SEIZED, EVEN IN CASE OF HARD EVIDENCE OF UNDUE GOINGS ON. 
 THIS IS ON ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT FOR IN TRANSIT CONTROLS 
A SHORT LIST OF VERY SENSITIVE ITEMS ("SCHEDULE 2") IS USED, 
AS OPPOSED TO THE COMPREHENSIVE LIST ("SCHEDULE 1") USED FOR 
IM AND EXPORT CONTROLS, AS WELL CONTROLS OF TRANSSHIPMENT 
INVOLVING UNLOADING OF THE GOODS.  IN THIS RESPECT, THE HONG 
KONG SHOWED AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN THE CATCH-ALL  AD HOC 
LICENSING MECHANISM AS INCORPORATED IN THE NETHERLANDS EXPORT 
AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROL SYSTEM. 
 
 
IT WAS AGREED THAT DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE MTCR AND HONG 
KONG WILL BE INTENSIFIED, AND TO THIS END FORMAL POINTS OF 
CONTACT WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON BOTH SIDES. 
 
 
MACAU 
 
 
IN MACAU, THE MTCR DELEGATION WAS RECEIVED BY A DELEGATION 
HEADED BY MR. ANTONIO PEDRO, ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY FOR 
ADMINISTRATION AND JUSTICE.  THE MACAU DELEGATION FURTHER 
INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF 
ECONOMY AND FINANCE, THE MARINE AND CUSTOMS POLICE, AND THE 
ECONOMIC SERVICES. 
 
 
IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE MACAU GOVERNMENT WAS IN THE PROCESS 
OF SETTING UP A NEW, SINGLE CUSTOMS ENTITY WHICH WOULD BE IN 
CHARGE OF TRADE CONTROLS.  FOR THE TIME BEING, MACAU RELIED 
ON A DUAL SYSTEM WHEREBY THE TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATION WAS 
CARRIED OUT BY THE ECONOMIC SERVICES AND THE CONTROLS ON 
TRADE WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE MARINE AND CUSTOMS POLICE. 
 
 
HAVING SAID THIS, WHAT FOLLOWED AS A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT 
SEEMS A RATHER WEAK LICENSING AND CONTROL SYSTEM.  WITHOUT 
GOING INTO DETAILS - THESE WERE NOT SUPPLIED - IT WOULD SEEM 
THAT THIS SYSTEM ONLY APPLIES TO THE IM AND EXPORT OF A SHORT 
LIST OF "CONVENTIONAL ARMS, MILITARY VEHICLES AND 
AMMUNITION."  CONTROL WAS DESCRIBED AS STRICT, AND EASILY 
ENFORCEABLE, DUE TO THE LIMITED VOLUMES OF GOODS INVOLVED. 
THE SYSTEM, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPLY TO DUAL USE GOODS, NOR TO 
TRANSSHIPMENT FLOWS.  THE AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE THAT THEY 
SYSTEM WAS FAR FROM PERFECT, BUT MENTIONED THAT MACAU ONLY 
HAD A SMALL HARBOR, WHICH WAS HARDLY SUITABLE FOR THE 
TRANSSHIPMENT OF LARGE CONSIGNMENTS OF ILLICIT GOODS.  UNTIL 
1995 THERE HAS ALSO NOT BEEN AN AIRPORT, AND AT THE MOMENT 
THE NEW AIRPORT WAS NOT USED TO CAPACITY. 
 
 
IN THE LIGHT OF THE REVERSION TO THE PRC, THE MACAU 
AUTHORITIES HAD HAD TO GIVE PRIORITY TO OTHER URGENT NEEDS. 
HOWEVER, THEY WERE CONSCIOUS OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FIELD OF NON PROLIFERATION, AND WERE 
WILLING TO IMPROVE THEIR CONTROLS.  FOR THIS, HOWEVER, THEY 
NEEDED ASSISTANCE AND INFORMATION FORM THE MTCR PARTNERS. 
 
 
THE MTCR TEAM, IN RESPONSE, URGED THE MACAU AUTHORITIES TO 
AFFORD AS MUCH PRIORITY AS POSSIBLE TO STRENGTHENING THEIR 
EXPORT CONTROLS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT TRADE VOLUMES COULD 
BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE OVER THE COMING YEARS, AND ALSO 
SEEING THE FACT THAT CERTAIN INDICATIONS HAD BEEN RECEIVED 
THAT NORTH KOREA WAS ALREADY USING MACAU AS A TRANSSHIPMENT 
CENTER.  THE MTCR OFFERED ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO MACAU 
IN THIS RESPECT.  IN PARTICULAR, JAPAN PROPOSED THAT THE 
JAPANESE EXPORT CONTROLS EXPERT, WHO WAS CURRENTLY ASSISTING 
THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES, WOULD PAY A VISIT TO MACAU AFTER 
THE COMPLETION OF HIS TASKS IN JULY.  THIS PROPOSAL WAS 
GRATEFULLY ACCEPTED.  IT WAS DECIDED TO APPOINT MR. NG KUOK 
HENG, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF THE MACAU MARINE AND CUSTOMS 
POLICE AS POINT OF CONTACT FOR FUTURE CONTACTS WITH THE MTCR. 
 
 
FOLLOWING THIS MEETING, THE MTCR DELEGATION WAS ALSO RECEIVED 
BY THE SECRETARY OF SECURITY OF THE MACAU SAR, MR. CHEONG 
KUOC VA, WHO EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE MTCR VISIT 
AND REAFFIRMED MACAU'S WILLINGNESS TO WORK TOGETHER WITH THE 
MTCR TO IMPROVE ITS CONTROLS. 
 
 
ALL IN ALL, THE MTCR TEAM ESTABLISHED THAT MACAU CURRENTLY 
DOES NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE EXPORT AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROL 
SYSTEM.  IT IS CONSCIOUS OF THIS FACT AND IS ALSO WILLING TO 
STRENGTHEN ITS CONTROLS IN COOPERATION WITH THE MTCR AND 
OTHER EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES.  IT HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN FORCED 
TO GIVE PRIORITY TO OTHER MATTERS FIRST.  HERE OBVIOUSLY LIES 
A TASK FOR MTCR PARTNERS.  AS STATED, A JAPANESE EXPORT 
CONTROLS EXPERT WILL VISIT MACAU SHORTLY. 
 
 
MALAYSIA 
 
 
AS STATED, THE MTCR TEAM MADE USE OF ITS PRESENCE IN ASIA TO 
ALSO VISIT KUALA LUMPUR.  THE DELEGATION WAS RECEIVED BY A 
DELEGATION OF OFFICIALS FROM THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE, HEADED BY MR. G. HUSSEIN BIN G. HANIFF, 
UNDER SECRETARY FOR MULTILATERAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF THE 
MFA. 
 
 
THE MALAYSIAN SIDE EXPRESSED ITS APPRECIATION FOR THIS FIRST 
OFFICIAL VISIT BY AN EXPORT CONTROL REGIME TO KUALA LUMPUR, 
AND WAS GRATEFUL TO HEAR ABOUT THE STEPS THAT WERE BEING 
TAKEN BY MTCR PARTNER STATES TO COUNTER PROLIFERATION OF 
MISSILES AN SENSITIVE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY.  FROM ITS SIDE, 
MALAYSIA AT THE MOMENT DID NOT HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE EXPORT 
CONTROL SYSTEM.  CERTAINLY, MALAYSIA WAS POLITICALLY 
COMMITTED TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND TO THE CREATION OF A WORLD 
FREE OF WMD.  BUT PUTTING IN PLACE AND IMPLEMENTING A 
COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL MECHANISM WAS SEEN AS A DIFFICULT TASK. 
 MALAYSIA DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITIES TO ACHIEVE SUCH A 
GOAL.  THERE WERE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLS FOR THE 
IMPORT AND EXPORT OF SOME SPECIFIC GOODS AND COMMODITIES, 
INCLUDING ARMS, BUT THE CONCEPT OF DUAL-USE GOODS, AS 
DESCRIBED BY THE MTCR TEAM, WAS NEW AND NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD 
BY MALAYSIA.  HOW COULD ONE ESTABLISH THAT CERTAIN CHEMICALS 
WERE INTENDED FOR USE IN WMD PROGRAMS, AND NOT FOR INSTANCE 
FOR LEGITIMATE FERTILIZER PROGRAMS AND SUCH? 
 
 
GENERALLY SPEAKING, IT WAS UNDERLINED THAT MALAYSIA WAS 
LARGELY DEPENDENT ON ITS TRADE, AND WAS AFRAID THAT A 
COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL SYSTEM WOULD RUN COUNTER TO ITS 
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, WHICH WERE MALAYSIA'S PRINCIPLE SOURCE 
OF INCOME. ITS MAIN PRIORITY WAS TO EXPAND ITS HARBOR 
FACILITIES, WHICH WERE STILL VERY MUCH SMALLER THAN 
SINGAPORE, AND IT FELT THAT TOO MANY CONTROLS WOULD RUN 
COUNTER TO THIS OBJECTIVE. 
 
 
FROM ITS SIDE, THE MTCR TEAM ONCE AGAIN UNDERLINED ITS VIEW 
THAT NON-PROLIFERATION IS A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL 
PEACELOVING NATIONS, AND THAT REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY 
ARE NECESSARY PREREQUISITES FOR ESTABLISHING FREE TRADE 
RELATIONS.  IN THAT SENSE, EXPORT CONTROLS DO NOT RUN COUNTER 
TO COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, THEY ARE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME 
MEDALLION. IT WAS UNDERLINED THAT THE DUTCH EXPORT CONTROL 
SYSTEM WAS ONLY ONE WAY TO IMPLEMENT NON-PROLIFERATION 
UNDERTAKINGS, AND THAT EVERY COUNTRY WAS ENTITLED TO 
INCORPORATE A SYSTEM OF CONTROLS IN SCALE WITH ITS OWN 
POSSIBILITIES AND RESOURCES.  AN EXAMPLE OF THIS WAS THE NEW 
ZEALAND SYSTEM, WHICH WORKED VERY WELL FOR THAT COUNTRY. 
 
 
IN CONCLUSION, THE CHAIR EXPRESSED ITS HOPE THAT IT HAD BEEN 
ABLE TO CONVINCE THE MALAYSIAN AUTHORITIES OF THE URGENT NEED 
TO WORK TOGETHER WITH THE AIM OF COUNTERING THE PROLIFERATION 
OF MISSILES AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY AND THAT THE VISIT WOULD 
INSPIRE THEM TO LOOK INTO THE IMPROVEMENT OF MALAYSIA'S 
EXPORT AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS. THE MTCR WAS READY TO 
PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE AND INFORMATION TO THIS END, 
AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT A FRAMEWORK COULD BE ESTABLISHED 
FOR FUTURE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE MTCR AND MALAYSIA, ESPECIALLY 
INCLUDING AT THE EXPERT LEVEL.  TO THIS END IT WAS AGREED 
THAT THE MULTILATERAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIVISION OF THE MFA 
COULD ACT AS THE POINT OF CONTACT ON THE MALAYSIAN SIDE. 
 
 
IN GENERAL, THE MTCR TEAM FELT THAT THE MALAYSIAN AUTHORITIES 
WILL NEED A GOOD DEAL OF CONVINCING IN ORDER TO IMPROVE 
MALAYSIAN EXPORT AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS. IN THEIR HEARTS, 
THEY BELIEVE RIGID CONTROLS ARE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR 
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.  HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT SEEM TO BE 
UNWILLING TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER, AND IN THAT REGARD SEEMED 
GENUINELY INTERESTED IN THE AD HOC MECHANISM, AS DESCRIBED IN 
THE OVERVIEW OF THE DUTCH EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM.  FOLLOW UP 
TO THE MTCR VISIT BY MTCR PARTNERS IS CRUCIAL IN THIS RESPECT. 
 
 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
THE MTCR TEAM CONSIDERS THAT ITS OUTREACH MISSION TO ASIA CAN 
CERTAINLY BE DEEMED TO HAVE FULFILLED ITS PRINCIPLE OBJECTIVE 
OF INFORMING THESE COUNTRIES ABOUT THE MTCR AND ITS 
OBJECTIVES, AND TRYING TO INVOLVE THEM CLOSER IN THE REGIME'S 
NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS. 
 
 
OF COURSE THIS WAS HARDLY NECESSARY IN THE CASE OF HONG KONG, 
THE FACT THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME AN OFFICIAL MTCR MISSION 
MADE THE EFFORT TO TRAVEL TO THE HONG KONG SAR WAS OBVIOUSLY 
GREATLY APPRECIATED, AND CAN ONLY HELP TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN 
HONG KONG'S RESOLVE TO UPHOLD AND WHERE POSSIBLE STRENGTHEN 
ITS ALREADY IMPRESSIVE EXPORT AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS.  AS 
FOR MACAU, THE MTCR TEAM BELIEVES THAT THE MISSION WAS 
CERTAINLY APPRECIATED, AND IT HAS WITHOUT A DOUBT BEEN ABLE 
TO RAISE THE AWARENESS - AND WILLINGNESS - ON THE SIDE OF 
MACAU AUTHORITIES OF THE NEED TO IMPROVE ITS CONTROL SYSTEM. 
THE SINGAPOREAN AUTHORITIES ON THE WHOLE GAVE THE IMPRESSION 
THAT IT WOULD CERTAINLY TAKE SOME EFFORT TO CONVINCE THEM TO 
TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO IMPROVE THEIR CONTROL SYSTEM, 
ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE CONTROL OF TRANSSHIPMENT FLOWS 
THROUGH SINGAPORE.  HOWEVER, THE MTCR TEAM BELIEVES THAT IT 
CLEARLY CONVEYED THE MESSAGE THAT THE MTCR WANTS THEM TO 
ESTABLISH AND IMPLEMENT MORE STRINGENT EXPORT AND 
TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS.  FINALLY, THE MTCR TEAM BELIEVES THAT 
AS FAR AS MALAYSIA IS CONCERNED, THE MISSION SEEMS TO HAVE 
BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN TAKING AWAY SOME OF THE MISTRUST THAT MAY 
HAVE EXISTED VIS-A-VIS THE MTCR, AND HAS AT LEAST SUCCEEDED 
IN OPENING A CHANNEL FOR FUTURE DIALOGUE WITH THE MALAYSIAN 
AUTHORITIES. 
 
 
THE MTCR TEAM BELIEVES THAT ITS VISIT SHOULD BE GIVEN THE 
NECESSARY FOLLOW-UP IN THE (NEAR) FUTURE, ESPECIALLY IN WAY 
OF BILATERAL VISITS AT THE EXPERT LEVEL AND OF INVITING THEM 
TO PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE SEMINARS OR MEETINGS IN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF THE ROUND TABLE MECHANISM. 
 
 
END REPORT TEXT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCHNEIDER