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AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
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PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

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Viewing cable 00HANOI1160, A VIETNAMESE JANUS: THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FACES OF THE POLITBURO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
00HANOI1160 2000-05-26 08:46 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

260846Z May 00

 2000HANOI01160 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0852

PAGE 01        HANOI  01160  01 OF 10  261123Z 
ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CEA-01   CIAE-00  CTME-00  
      DINT-00  DOEE-00  DOTE-00  ANHR-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    
      EXIM-01  OIGO-02  E-00     FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    FRB-00   
      H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    ITC-01   L-00     VCE-00   
      MOFM-04  MOF-03   AC-01    DCP-01   NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   
      OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    
      SSO-00   STR-00   USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-01   DRL-02   
      G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /022W
                  ------------------5BDCE2  261123Z /22    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9948
INFO NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5/FPA//
DIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 HANOI 001160 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  01160  01 OF 10  261123Z 
STATE ALSO FOR EAP A/S ROTH AND DAS BOYCE AND EAP/BCLTV 
STATE ALSO FOR DRL, EB, INR/EAP/SEA, INR/EAP/CM, INR/B 
STATE PASS USTR AMB FISHER/DAUSTR DAMOND 
NSC FOR KEN LIEBERTHAL AND RAVIC HUSO 
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP TED OSIUS 
WHITE HOUSE FOR DEP/ASST TO POTUS LBRAINARD 
OSD FOR ISA/EAP/LSTERN 
USDOC FOR 4431/MAC/AP/OKSA/HPPHO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/14/2010 
TAGS: PGOV PINR ECON PHUM VM DPOL
SUBJECT:  A VIETNAMESE JANUS: THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FACES OF THE POLITBURO 
 
REF: A) HANOI 839  B) HANOI 232 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING DCM JAMES BRUNO, 
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: VIETNAM'S KEY LEADERSHIP BODY -- THE 
CURRENTLY 18-MEMBER POLITBURO -- IS A LARGELY SHADOWY GROUP 
WHOSE MEETINGS, AND MANY OF ITS MEMBERS' ACTIVITIES, ARE 
HIDDEN FROM PUBLIC VIEW.  THE FIVE SEXAGENARIAN MEN IN THE 
STANDING COMMITTEE, THE INNER CIRCLE OF THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY'S POLITICAL BUREAU, HAVE HIGHLY VISIBLE PUBLIC 
PERSONAS.  BUT HALF OF THE POLITBURO MEMBERS VIRTUALLY NEVER 
APPEAR IN THE VIETNAMESE PRESS, ACCORDING TO A TWO-MONTH 
ANALYSIS BY THE EMBASSY.  LIKEWISE, THE PARTY'S THREE SENIOR 
ADVISORS, INCLUDING POWERFUL FORMER PRESIDENT LE DUC ANH, 
ARE FEATURED ONLY IRREGULARLY IN OFFICIAL MEDIA, AND USUALLY 
ONLY FOR CEREMONIAL OCCASIONS. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  01160  01 OF 10  261123Z 
 
2. (C) WITH SO LITTLE PUBLIC INTERACTION AND VISIBILITY -- 
MUCH LESS DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS -- THERE IS LITTLE PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE PARTY LEADERSHIP.  THIS IS A GROUP 
THAT EXERCISES ITS SUPREME POLITICAL POWER IN A CLOISTERED 
AND OPAQUE ENVIRONMENT, IN A HIGHLY PATERNALISTIC FASHION. 
AMONG THIS CONSENSUS-ORIENTED LEADERSHIP, SOME RISING STARS 
ARE APPARENT: ON THE MORE IDEOLOGICAL WING ARE HANOI PARTY 
CHIEF TRONG AND ARMY POLITICAL COMMISSAR NGAN, WHILE AMONG 
THE MORE TECHNOCRATIC REFORMERS ARE DEPUTY PM DUNG, PARTY 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION CHIEF SANG, AND HCMC PARTY LEADER TRIET. 
THE POLITBURO'S RELIANCE ON CONSENSUS IN ITS DECISION-MAKING 
CONTRIBUTES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT, 
BUT IT ALSO MEANS THAT REACHING AGREEMENT ON DRAMATIC 
REFORMS IS VERY DIFFICULT.  THIS IS THE QUANDARY OF THE 
MOMENT, WHEN THE MOST IDEOLOGICAL MEMBERS ARE PREVENTING 
MOVEMENT FORWARD ON THE ECONOMIC REFORMS VIETNAM SO BADLY 
NEEDS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
HOW THE POLITBURO IS PORTRAYED IN THE OFFICIAL PRESS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3. (SBU) THIS IS THE FIRST OF AN ONGOING SERIES OF CABLES 
ANALYZING THE PUBLIC PROFILE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE 
POLITBURO, AS WELL AS THE THREE SENIOR ADVISORS OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM (CPV).  IN LATE FEBRUARY THE 
EMBASSY BEGAN A TRACKING PROJECT TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES, 
MEETINGS, AND SPEECHES OF THESE KEY OFFICIALS IN LEADING 
OFFICIAL MEDIA -- PRINCIPALLY THE CPV MOUTHPIECE "NHAN DAN" 
(THE PEOPLE) AND VIETNAMESE NEWS SERVICE (VNS), BUT ALSO 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  01160  01 OF 10  261123Z 
"HANOI MOI" (NEW HANOI), "TUOI TRE" (YOUTH), AND "SAIGON 
GIAI PHONG" (SAIGON LIBERATION).  BY FOCUSING ON THESE 
LEADING PAPERS, POST IS TRACKING HOW VIETNAM'S CPV LEADERS 
ARE PRESENTED TO THE PUBLIC BY THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED 
PRESS.  SINCE THE POLITBURO IS SUCH A SECRETIVE, RECLUSIVE 
BODY, THIS ONGOING RESEARCH WILL HELP US TO ANALYZE BETTER 
ITS ACTIVITIES AND PROFILE.  OVER THE NEXT YEAR, IN THE RUN- 
UP TO THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS IN EARLY 2001, ROUGHLY EVERY 
TWO MONTHS WE PLAN TO ANALYZE THE TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES OF 
POLITBURO MEMBERS, AS A SUPPLEMENTAL TO OUR ONGOING SPOT 
REPORTS, ANALYSES, AND "PULSE OF THE PARTY" SERIES. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
GROUP LEADERSHIP BY "THE LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
4. (C) WHEN ANALYZING THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE 
VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP, ONE FIRST NEEDS TO RECOGNIZE THIS IS 
A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP THAT RULES BY BROAD CONSENSUS.  FOR 
EXAMPLE, IN THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS, GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU 
AND FORMER PRESIDENT ANH HAVE BEEN INFLUENTIAL IN SHAPING 
THE LEADERSHIP'S DECISION-MAKING IN A MORE IDEOLOGICAL 
MANNER.  BUT THEY HAVE ONLY BEEN ABLE TO DO THIS BY SHAPING 
CONSENSUS AMONG THEIR COLLEAGUES.  IN A SENSE, THE 
INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS AND FUNDAMENTAL CAUTION OF THE 
POLITBURO ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE SUM OF ITS CONSTITUENT 
PARTS. 
 
5. (C) AS IN ANY POLITICAL SYSTEM, INDIVIDUAL LEADERSHIP 
PERSONALITIES AND ABILITIES ARE IMPORTANT, BUT OVER THE PAST 
FOUR DECADES, THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN STRIKINGLY 
UNIFIED IN ITS FUNDAMENTAL GOALS AND COLLECTIVE INTERESTS. 
IN YEARS PAST, THERE HAVE BEEN A HANDFUL OF INTERNECINE 
BATTLES WHOSE RESULTS HAVE BEEN FLASHED BRIEFLY TO THE 
PUBLIC, AND OCCASIONALLY POLITBURO MEMBERS HAVE BEEN RETIRED 
IN DISGRACE OR PUT UNDER RESTRICTIONS AFTER BEING SACKED. 
BUT VIETNAM'S COMMUNIST HISTORY IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT 
OF CHINA, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH HAS LURCHED FROM THE VIOLENT 
EXCESSES OF THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD TO THE CULTURAL 
REVOLUTION TO THE TRIAL OF MAOISTS AND THE DRAMATIC 
BEGINNING OF MARKET REFORMS UNDER DENG XIAOPING.  BY 
CONTRAST, VIETNAM'S PERIOD OF COMMUNIST RULE IS STRIKING FOR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  01160  02 OF 10  261122Z 
THE GRADUALISM -- ONE COULD ARGUE STAGNATION -- OF ITS 
CONSENSUS-BASED LEADERSHIP.  SEVERAL CPV GENERAL 
SECRETARIES, SUCH AS LE DUAN AND NGUYEN VAN LINH, HAVE BEEN 
 
SIPDIS 
VERY POWERFUL, BUT THEIRS HAS NOT BEEN A PERSONAL MANDATE SO 
MUCH AS A COLLECTIVE ONE, AND NONE OF THEM ATTEMPTED TO MOVE 
TO ESTABLISH A PERSONALISTIC DICTATORSHIP.  BY SELF- 
DEFINITION, VIETNAM CLAIMS TO BE A DICTATORSHIP OF THE 
PROLETARIAT.  MORE ACCURATELY, IT IS A COLLECTIVE OLIGARCHIC 
DICTATORSHIP OF ONE PARTY. 
 
6. (C) THIS LEADERSHIP STYLE OF THE CPV -- EMPHASIZING 
CONSENSUS AND GRADUALISM IN DECISION-MAKING -- HAS A 
POWERFUL IMPACT ON POLICY.  VIETNAM'S MODERN HISTORY HAS 
SHOWN THAT ONLY WHEN THE CPV IS FACED WITH A PROFOUND 
DOMESTIC CRISIS WILL THE PARTY LEADERSHIP DECIDE FOR 
DRAMATIC CHANGE.  THE MOST PROMINENT EXAMPLE OF THIS WAS THE 
ADVENT OF "DOI MOI" (RENOVATION) ECONOMIC REFORMS IN 1985-86 
THAT FREED UP THE AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL SECTORS FROM THE 
DISASTER OF COLLECTIVIST FARMING THAT HAD PUSHED THE COUNTRY 
TO THE BRINK OF STARVATION.  IN THE MID-1980'S, A BROAD 
CONSENSUS FORMED AMONG CPV LEADERS, WHO CLEARLY RECOGNIZED 
THAT DRAMATIC CHANGES WERE NECESSARY TO PREVENT MASSIVE 
SOCIAL UNREST.  THE RESULTANT DECADE OF HIGH-LEVEL ECONOMIC 
GROWTH OWES IN LARGE PART TO THIS PERIOD OF REFORMS IN 
RESPONSE TO CRISIS.  THE PROBLEM TODAY, HOWEVER, IS THAT, IN 
THE ABSENCE OF SUCH DIRE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE CONSENSUS-BASED 
POLITBURO SEEMS TO BE INCAPABLE OF AGREEING ON DIFFICULT 
REFORM CHOICES.  FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLITBURO HAS BEEN UNABLE 
TO AGREE ON A PRACTICAL PLAN FOR THE PRIVATIZATION OF STATE 
ENTERPRISES, SINCE THOUSANDS OF POLITICALLY WELL-CONNECTED 
WORKERS (READ CPV MEMBERS) WOULD LOSE THEIR JOBS IN ORDER TO 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  01160  02 OF 10  261122Z 
CREATE FAR MORE JOBS THROUGH INCREASED FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
AND BETTER USE OF STATE MONIES.  THE PAROCHIAL INTERESTS OF 
A FEW -- WHO ARE POLITICALLY WELL REPRESENTED IN THE 
LEADERSHIP -- TRUMP THE PLANS OF MORE REFORM-MINDED LEADERS. 
 
7. (C) THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUTION AND GRADUALISM OF THE 
VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP'S DECISION-MAKING STYLE CAN BE TRACED 
IN PART TO THE COMMUNIST STRUGGLE AGAINST FRENCH COLONIAL 
RULE AND AGAINST THE U.S.-BACKED SOUTHERN GOVERNMENT IN 
VIETNAM'S CIVIL WAR.  THE INSURGENT MILITARY STRATEGIES 
ADOPTED BY HO CHI MINH AND HIS KEY MILITARY ADVISORS SUCH AS 
GEN. GIAP WERE FORGED BY A COLLEGIAL, COLLECTIVIST 
LEADERSHIP AND CARRIED OUT BY THE PATIENT, LONG-TERM PURSUIT 
OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES.  MANY SENIOR CPV LEADERS, WHOSE 
FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES WERE IN THE "NATIONAL LIBERATION 
STRUGGLE," BELIEVE THAT STAYING THE COURSE IN A MEASURED, 
"STEP BY STEP" MANNER IS AN IMPORTANT VIRTUE BORNE OUT BY 
THE SUCCESSES OF THOSE VIETNAMESE MILITARY VICTORIES. 
 
8. (C) THUS, IT IS VIRTUAL HOLY WRIT FOR MOST PARTY LEADERS 
THAT STABILITY, PATIENCE AND GRADUALISM WILL ULTIMATELY WIN 
THE DAY.  THE LEADERSHIP'S EXCESSIVE CAUTION, AS WELL AS 
CONTINUING SUSPICION ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF THE "NEW FACE 
OF IMPERIALISM," CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH PARALYSIS IS 
THE ORDER OF THE DAY.  THE LEADERSHIP MAKE DECISIONS BY 
LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR: CONSENSUS CAN BE BLOCKED BY THE 
OPPOSITION OF A HANDFUL OF MEMBERS, SOMETIMES EVEN ONE. 
WITHIN THE PARTY, THERE IS NO INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT TO 
FORCE THE LEADERSHIP TO MAKE TOUGH CHOICES, SUCH AS ON 
DIFFICULT BUDGET QUESTIONS.  IN PART THIS IS BECAUSE THERE 
IS NO MEANS FOR DIRECT PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, SINCE THE 
PARTY AND ITS SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENT ORGANS ARE NOT 
ULTIMATELY ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PUBLIC.  (COMMENT: WHILE 
ELECTIONS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ARE 
HELD, THE COMPLETE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE PROCESS GIVES 
LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THE RESULTS PRESENTED TO THE PUBLIC.) 
IN THIS CLIMATE, VIETNAM'S COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP EXERCISES 
ITS SUPREME POLITICAL POWER. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
PUBLIC ACTIVITIES OF THE POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  01160  03 OF 10  260849Z 
 
9. (C) DURING THE TEN-WEEK PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY 25 TO APRIL 
30, EIGHT OF THE 15 POLITBURO MEMBERS WERE FEATURED IN THE 
PRESS ON AT LEAST 10 DIFFERENT DATES.  INCLUDED AMONG THESE 
EIGHT ARE THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO STANDING 
COMMITTEE, WHO ARE AMONG THOSE WHO MOST FREQUENTLY PRESENT 
THE "PUBLIC FACE" OF THE LEADERSHIP.  THE FIVE -- CPV 
GENERAL SECRETARY LE KHA PHIEU, PRESIDENT TRAN DUC LUONG, 
PRIME MINISTER PHAN VAN KHAI, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER NONG 
DUC MANH, AND FATHERLAND FRONT LEADER PHAM THE DUYET -- WERE 
EACH FEATURED IN PROMINENT, SUBSTANTIVE COVERAGE AT LEAST 10 
DAYS OUT OF THE EIGHT-WEEK PERIOD.  (BY CONTRAST, ONLY THREE 
OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS WERE FEATURED THIS OFTEN -- DEPUTY 
PRIME MINISTER AND FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN MANH CAM, 
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN TAN DUNG, AND HO CHI MINH CITY 
PARTY CHIEF NGUYEN MINH TRIET.)  THE FIVE SENIOR LEADERS 
WERE FEATURED RECEIVING GUESTS, ATTENDING MEETINGS AND 
SEMINARS, AND GIVING SPEECHES.  SUCH PROMINENT COVERAGE IN 
THE OFFICIAL PRESS IS NOT SURPRISING, GIVEN THAT THESE FIVE 
FIGURES OCCUPY POSITIONS THAT HAVE MAJOR PROTOCOL FUNCTIONS 
AS THE RESPECTIVE HEADS OF THE FIVE MAIN LEADERSHIP POWER 
CENTERS ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL: PARTY, STATE, GOVERNMENT, 
ASSEMBLY, AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS. 
 
10. (C) GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU, RANKED FIRST IN THE CPV, 
WAS FEATURED IN THE CPV MOUTHPIECE "NHAN DAN" ON 13 
DIFFERENT DATES.  HE RECEIVED OFFICIAL VISITORS EIGHT TIMES, 
INCLUDING WORLD BANK PRESIDENT WOLFENSOHN; MADE VISITS 
AROUND VIETNAM FOUR TIMES, INCLUDING IN LATE FEBRUARY TO 
THAI BINH PROVINCE, SITE OF PROVINCIAL UNREST TWO YEARS AGO; 
ATTENDED COMMEMORATIONS OF THE "LIBERATION" OF HO CHI MINH 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  01160  03 OF 10  260849Z 
CITY; AND GAVE TWO PROMINENT SPEECHES, INCLUDING ONE OPENING 
THE CPV CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM APRIL 10.  (TWO OF THESE 
EVENTS TOOK PLACE THE SAME DAY.)  PHIEU'S APPEARANCES IN THE 
PRESS, LIKE THOSE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, TEND TO BE MORE 
"SUBSTANTIVE" THAN THOSE OF MOST POLITBURO MEMBERS.  (MANY 
OF THE MEDIA APPEARANCES OF LESS PROMINENT POLITBURO MEMBERS 
LIST THEM MERELY AS ATTENDING CONFERENCES OR CEREMONIAL 
EVENTS, WITHOUT FURTHER DETAIL.)  PHIEU'S HIGHLY VISIBLE 
TREATMENT HIGHLIGHTS HIS PROMINENCE IN THE POWER STRUCTURE. 
THE IMAGE PROJECTED BY THE OFFICIAL MEDIA IS OF A GENERAL 
SECRETARY WHO IS ACTIVE AND ENGAGED.  IN THE PAST EIGHT 
 
SIPDIS 
MONTHS, PHIEU APPEARS TO HAVE CONSOLIDATED HIS POSITION WITH 
THE SUPPORT OF HIS MENTOR, FORMER PRESIDENT LE DUC ANH. 
PHIEU AND ANH HAVE WORKED CLOSELY SINCE SERVING TOGETHER AS 
DEPUTY COMMANDER AND COMMANDER OF VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION 
FORCES IN CAMBODIA IN THE LATE 1980'S. 
 
11. (C) PRESIDENT LUONG, RANKED SECOND IN THE CPV, HAS A 
LARGELY CEREMONIAL POSITION HIGH ON PROTOCOL AND OFFICIAL 
VISITS.  HE WAS FEATURED ON 21 DIFFERENT DAYS DURING THE TWO 
MONTHS.  MOST OF HIS APPEARANCES WERE MAKING OFFICIAL VISITS 
ABROAD OR RECEIVING FOREIGN VISITORS IN HANOI.  FOR EXAMPLE, 
HE VISITED UKRAINE, MONGOLIA, AND CUBA, ATTENDING THE G-77 
SUMMIT IN HAVANA.  HE MET VISITING LEADERS FROM BELARUS, 
NORTH KOREA, LAOS, INDIA, CONGO, SINGAPORE, AND THE U.S., 
INCLUDING SECDEF COHEN.  HE ALSO ADDRESSED DOMESTIC 
CONFERENCES ON MILITARY MASS MOBILIZATION AND JOURNALISM. 
AN ANALYSIS OF LUONG'S ACTIVITIES REVEALS THAT WHILE HE HAS 
A HIGHLY VISIBLE POSITION, HIS ROLE IS LESS SUBSTANTIVE THAN 
THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S OR PRIME MINISTER'S.  (COMMENT: AS 
REPORTED REF A, GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU REPORTEDLY IS 
INTERESTED IN COMBINING THE ROLES OF GENERAL SECRETARY AND 
STATE PRESIDENT; IN SUCH A CASE, LUONG LIKELY WOULD ASSUME A 
POSITION OF EVEN LESS INFLUENCE AND BE DROPPED FROM THE 
STANDING COMMITTEE.  END COMMENT.) 
 
12. (C) PRIME MINISTER KHAI, HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT AND 
THIRD-RANKING IN THE CPV, HAD THE HIGHEST VISIBILITY OF ANY 
POLITBURO MEMBER IN THE PRESS DURING THE TWO-MONTH PERIOD; 
HE APPEARED IN THE PRESS ON 30 DIFFERENT DATES.  NINE TIMES 
HE RECEIVED OFFICIAL VISITORS, INCLUDING MANY OF THOSE SEEN 
BY LUONG; 13 TIMES HE LED GOVERNMENT MEETINGS OR SEMINARS, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  01160  04 OF 10  261123Z 
INCLUDING MEETINGS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, DRUG CONTROL, 
TRADE UNIONS, BUSINESS PROMOTION, AND A MEETING OF THE 
GOVERNMENT CABINET MINISTERS.  ON APRIL 29 HE GAVE THE 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS IN HANOI CELEBRATING THE "LIBERATION" OF 
SAIGON.  ON 11 DAYS HE WAS FEATURED TRAVELING AROUND THE 
COUNTRY, PRIMARILY TO SOUTHERN DELTA AND NORTHERN PROVINCES. 
AS PRIME MINISTER, KHAI OCCUPIES A POSITION OF BOTH HIGH 
VISIBILITY AND CLOUT WITHIN THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT 
LEADERSHIP, THOUGH IN RECENT MONTHS HIS MORE TECHNOCRATIC 
AND REFORMIST VIEWS HAVE LOST FAVOR TO THE MORE IDEOLOGICAL 
DIRECTION PUSHED BY PHIEU.  KHAI, WHO SEEMS DISCOURAGED BY 
THE RISE OF MORE IDEOLOGICAL THINKING, REPORTEDLY HAS 
OFFERED TO RESIGN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, AND MANY IN HANOI 
SPECULATE HE MAY BE REPLACED AS PRIME MINISTER, PERHAPS BY 
ANOTHER SOUTHERN REFORMER, BEFORE OR AT THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
CONGRESS IN MARCH 2001. 
 
13. (C) NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER MANH, FOURTH-RANKING IN 
THE PARTY, WAS FEATURED ON 22 DAYS.  ON SEVEN OCCASIONS HE 
RECEIVED FOREIGN LEGISLATORS, INCLUDING SEN. JOHN MCCAIN (R- 
AZ), REP. BILL ARCHER (R-TX), AND PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKERS 
FROM BELARUS AND NEW ZEALAND.  ON SEVEN DAYS HE WAS PICTURED 
ON INTERNATIONAL TRAVELS, INCLUDING AN APRIL 4-10 VISIT TO 
CHINA, WHERE HE MET JIANG ZEMIN AND LI PENG.  ON EIGHT DAYS 
HE TRAVELED INSIDE VIETNAM OR ATTENDED EVENTS IN HANOI.  AS 
THE ONLY ETHNIC MINORITY IN THE LEADERSHIP, MANH HAS A 
RELATIVELY HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE, THOUGH WE DO NOT PERCEIVE HE 
HAS MUCH CLOUT WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP.  NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
STAFF HAVE INFORMED US MANH SEEMS INTENT ON "NOT ROCKING THE 
BOAT."  (COMMENT: THIS TRAIT HELPS ACCOUNT FOR THE POLITICAL 
SURVIVAL OF MANY OF THE LOW-PROFILE MEMBERS OF THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  01160  04 OF 10  261123Z 
POLITBURO.  IN VIETNAM'S CONSENSUS-ORIENTED LEADERSHIP, 
STANDING OUT USUALLY IS NOT GOOD FOR HANGING ON.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
14. (C) FIFTH-RANKING MEMBER DUYET, WHO HEADS UP THE VIETNAM 
FATHERLAND FRONT (VFF), WAS FEATURED 15 TIMES IN THE 
OFFICIAL PRESS.  ON NINE DAYS HE ATTENDED MEETINGS OR 
CEREMONIAL EVENTS IN HANOI, INCLUDING WOMEN'S DAY 
CELEBRATIONS, ARTISTIC EXHIBITIONS, MEETINGS WITH MINORITIES 
AND COMMUNIST YOUTH, AND THE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION.  TWICE HE 
RECEIVED FOREIGN VISITORS FROM LAOS AND BURMA, AND FOUR 
TIMES HE WAS DEPICTED TRAVELING IN-COUNTRY TO CENTRAL AND 
NORTHERN PROVINCES.  DUYET'S PUBLIC PROFILE HAS BECOME 
HIGHER SINCE HE TOOK OVER THE VFF LAST YEAR.  THOUGH IT WILL 
NOT BECOME CLEAR UNTIL THE PARTY CONGRESS, IT APPEARS 
DUYET'S CLOUT AMONG THE LEADERSHIP HAS DROPPED DURING THE 
PAST YEAR.  REPORTEDLY HE IS NOT IN FAVOR WITH FORMER 
PRESIDENT LE DUC ANH, WHO HAS HELPED GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU 
CONSOLIDATE CONTROL WITHIN THE PARTY DURING THE PAST SIX 
MONTHS. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
A HANDFUL OF OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS FEATURED PROMINENTLY 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
 
15. (C) FOUR OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS ALSO HAVE RELATIVELY 
HIGH PROFILES, APPEARING IN THE OFFICIAL PRESS AT LEAST A 
DOZEN TIMES -- DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FORMER FOREIGN 
MINISTER NGUYEN MANH CAM, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN TAN 
DUNG, HO CHI MINH CITY PARTY CHIEF NGUYEN MINH TRIET, AND 
HANOI PARTY CHIEF NGUYEN PHU TRONG.  CAM AND DUNG HAVE HIGH- 
PROFILE POSITIONS AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS OVERSEEING 
FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMIC POLICY, RESPECTIVELY.  TRIET AND 
TRONG WERE RECENTLY NAMED TO HEAD THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN 
THE NATION'S TWO LARGEST CITIES AND CONSEQUENTLY ARE 
FEATURED FREQUENTLY IN THE NATIONAL MEDIA.  THEY ARE BOTH 
RISING STARS IN THE PARTY: TRIET AS A CHAMPION OF MORE 
TECHNOCRATIC/REFORMIST VIEWS, AND TRONG AS ONE OF THE MORE 
IDEOLOGICAL MEMBERS OF THE LEADERSHIP.  IN ADDITION, 
MINISTER OF DEFENSE PHAM VAN TRA AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC 
SECURITY LE MINH HUONG WERE FEATURED SIX AND FIVE TIMES, 
RESPECTIVELY, IN THE NATIONAL PRESS IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  01160  05 OF 10  260900Z 
MINISTERS.  (TRA AND HUONG APPEAR MORE FREQUENTLY IN OTHER 
MEDIA, SUCH AS NEWSPAPERS CONTROLLED BY THEIR MINISTRIES.) 
 
16. (C) DEPUTY PM CAM, WHO MOVED UP TO SIXTH IN THE 
POLITBURO FOLLOWING THE DEATH LAST YEAR OF FORMER DEFENSE 
MINISTER DOAN KHUE, APPEARED 19 TIMES IN THE OFFICIAL PRESS 
DURING THE TWO-MONTH PERIOD, DESPITE LOSING HIS TITLE AS 
FOREIGN MINISTER IN FEBRUARY.  CAM CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN A 
BUSY SCHEDULE OF HOSTING FOREIGN VISITORS, INCLUDING THOSE 
FROM THE U.S., JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, RUSSIA, THAILAND, CHINA, 
HUNGARY AND THE UNITED NATIONS.  HOWEVER, MOST OF THESE 
SESSIONS WERE IN THE FOUR WEEKS FOLLOWING HIS RETIREMENT AS 
FOREIGN MINISTER, WHICH SUGGESTS THESE PROTOCOL MEETINGS MAY 
BECOME LESS FREQUENT IN THE FUTURE. (NOTE: FROM A PROTOCOL 
POINT OF VIEW, HOWEVER, CAM MAY CONTINUE TO HAVE A 
RELATIVELY HIGH PROFILE, SINCE HE WILL BE A USEFUL 
INTERLOCUTOR FOR FOREIGN VISITORS WHO REQUIRE A MEETING OF 
DEPUTY PM RANK, BUT WHO DO NOT WARRANT TAKING THE TIME OF 
OTHER, BUSIER OFFICIALS.)  WE BELIEVE CAM MAY BE RETIRED AT 
THE PARTY CONGRESS. 
 
17. (C) FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DUNG, WHO PLAYS A KEY 
ROLE IN OVERSIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC POLICIES, 
APPEARED IN THE PRESS ON 14 DIFFERENT DATES.  DUNG MET WORLD 
BANK PRESIDENT WOLFENSOHN AND ECONOMIC AND BANKING 
DELEGATIONS FROM CUBA, LAOS, SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA.  HE 
ALSO WAS FEATURED EIGHT TIMES ATTENDING DOMESTIC MEETINGS OR 
SEMINARS, INCLUDING MEETINGS WITH BUSINESS GROUPS, THE 
VIETNAMESE INSURANCE COMPANY, ENGINEERING ASSOCIATIONS, AND 
GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC MEETINGS.  IN ADDITION, HE JOINED 
GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU ON A TRIP TO HAIPHONG MARCH 13. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  01160  05 OF 10  260900Z 
CURRENTLY RANKED 14TH IN THE POLITBURO, DUNG PREVIOUSLY WAS 
RANKED FIFTH UNTIL A SHAKE-UP IN 1997 LED TO HIS SLIPPING IN 
RANK.  ONE OF THE YOUNGEST POLITBURO MEMBERS AT 51, DUNG IS 
ONE OF THE SOUTHERNERS WHO IS A POSSIBLE CANDIDATE TO 
REPLACE KHAI, THOUGH FORMER PRESIDENT ANH REPORTEDLY OPPOSES 
HIS ELEVATION.  (COMMENT: ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT MAY BE AT 
WORK IN THE JOCKEYING TO REPLACE PM KHAI IS THAT 
CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGUES, SUCH AS PHIEU AND ANH, MAY NOT WANT 
A YOUNGER, MORE CAPABLE AND EFFECTIVE PRIME MINISTER, SUCH 
AS DUNG OR OTHER REFORMERS SANG OR TRIET.  THEY MAY PREFER 
TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND KEEP A RELATIVELY 
WEAKENED PRIME MINISTER AS NOMINAL HEAD OF THE "REFORM 
FACTION" OF THE CPV.  END COMMENT.) 
 
18. (C) NGUYEN MINH TRIET, RANKED 16TH, BECAME HEAD OF THE 
HO CHI MINH PARTY IN FEBRUARY, REPLACING TRUONG TAN SANG. 
TRIET PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN THE SHADOWS AS THE HEAD OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY'S COMMISSION ON MASS MOBILIZATION.  IN A 
DRAMATIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE DIVERGENT "JANUS FACES" OF THE 
PARTY, THE PUBLIC PROFILES OF THE TWO HAVE REVERSED 
THEMSELVES DRAMATICALLY.  DURING THESE TWO MONTHS, TRIET WAS 
FEATURED ON 15 DATES -- EIGHT TIMES HOSTING VISITORS, MANY 
OF THEM CONSUL GENERALS IN HCMC PAYING COURTESY CALLS, AND 
TEN TIMES ATTENDING MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES.  (ON THREE 
DATES TRIET WAS FEATURED TWICE IN THE PRESS FOR DIFFERENT 
EVENTS.  BY CONTRAST, SANG HAS VIRTUALLY DISAPPEARED FROM 
PUBLIC VIEW; HE DID NOT FEATURE IN ANY MAJOR PRESS STORIES 
IN "NHAN DAN" DURING THE TWO MONTHS DOCUMENTED.)  AS HCMC 
PARTY LEADER, TRIET HAS PRESENTED THE IMAGE OF AN ENGAGED 
LOCAL LEADER.  HE HAS MET WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS FIGHTING DRUG 
ABUSE IN THE CITY, ENCOURAGED YOUTH VOLUNTEERS, ADDRESSED A 
CONFERENCE ON POVERTY REDUCTION, AND ATTENDED TRADE FAIRS 
PROMOTING LOCALLY MADE GOODS.  TRIET, WHO PREVIOUSLY SERVED 
AS DEPUTY HEAD OF THE HCMC PARTY ORGANIZATION, IS POPULAR IN 
THE SOUTH AND SEEN BY THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AS ONE WHO IS 
SUPPORTIVE OF PRO-BUSINESS REFORMS.  LIKE DEPUTY PM DUNG AND 
FORMER SAIGON CHIEF SANG, TRIET IS ONE OF THE YOUNG "UP-AND- 
COMERS" AMONG SOUTHERN REFORMERS IN THE CPV.  (SINCE BOTH 
DUNG AND SANG APPEAR TO HAVE SOME OPPONENTS AMONG THE SENIOR 
LEADERSHIP, TRIET IS ANOTHER POSSIBILITY FOR PROMOTION TO 
MORE SENIOR POSITIONS, POSSIBLY INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER.) 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  01160  06 OF 10  260851Z 
19. (C) NGUYEN PHU TRONG, CHAIR OF THE HANOI CPV COMMITTEE, 
EMERGED FROM THE SHADOWS WHEN HE ASSUMED HIS CURRENT 
POSITION BY SWAPPING JOBS WITH CURRENT IDEOLOGY CHIEF LE 
XUAN TUNG.  TRONG RANKS LAST IN THE POLITBURO BY RANK, 
THOUGH THIS BELIES HIS GROWING INFLUENCE AND RISING 
PROMINENCE.  ONE OF THE MORE STRONGLY DOCTRINAIRE MEMBERS OF 
THE POLITBURO, TRONG PREVIOUSLY APPEARED IN PUBLIC VIEW 
PRIMARILY AS THE AUTHOR OF STRONGLY IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSES IN 
THE OFFICIAL COMMUNIST PARTY THEORETICAL REVIEW, SUCH AS HIS 
ESSAY ON THE CPV'S RELIANCE ON "DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM" IN 
LATE 1999.  AFTER BECOMING HANOI CHIEF, TRONG APPEARED IN 
THE PRESS 12 TIMES -- NINE TIMES CHAIRING AND ATTENDING 
MEETINGS AND THREE TIMES VISITING DISTRICTS OF HANOI.  FOR 
EXAMPLE, TRONG CHAIRED A PLANNING MEETING FOR THE 990TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE CITY, OPENED AND CHAIRED A CONFERENCE OF 
THE HANOI CPV COMMITTEE, AND OUTLINED THE CPV'S ROLE IN 
TEACHING MARXIST-LENINIST VALUES IN HANOI'S UNIVERSITIES. 
RECENT PRESS ARTICLES HAVE ALSO NOTED THAT TRONG HAS BEEN 
ASSISTING PHAM THE DUYET IN ORGANIZING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
FIVE-MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE.  BOTH A SENIOR COLONEL AT 
THE LEADING MILITARY NEWSPAPER AND THE CHINESE EMBASSY 
PREDICT TRONG WILL REPLACE DUYET ON THE STANDING COMMITTEE 
AT THE PARTY CONGRESS.  IN ANY EVENT, TRONG'S STAR IS 
RISING, AND HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY MOVE UP IN RANK.  TRONG'S 
TRENCHANT IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS ARE THE FLAVOR IN FAVOR AT THIS 
TIME, AND HE APPEARS TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF PHIEU. 
 
20. (C) MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PHAM VAN TRA (RANKED 
9TH) AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY LE MINH HUONG (13TH) 
BOTH COMMAND CLOUT IN THE POLITBURO BY VIRTUE OF THEIR 
IMPORTANT MINISTRIES.  (BOTH MINISTRIES, GIVEN THEIR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  01160  06 OF 10  260851Z 
NATIONAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY MANDATES, ARE AMONG THE 
INSTITUTIONS IN VIETNAM THAT ARE MOST SUSPICIOUS OF THE U.S. 
AND ITS INTENTIONS.  THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE AMONG THOSE 
LEADERS, SUCH AS TRA AND HUONG, WHO FOUGHT AGAINST THE U.S. 
DURING THE WAR, BUT THIS CONCERN IS MORE BROADLY REFLECTED 
IN THE MINISTRIES INSTITUTIONALLY AS WELL.)  THE PUBLIC 
PROFILES OF TRA AND HUONG ARE LOWER THAN CITY PARTY LEADERS 
AND STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS, THOUGH THEY APPEAR IN THE 
PRESS ON AVERAGE ABOUT EVERY TEN DAYS.  TRA APPEARED IN 
ARTICLES ON 10 DIFFERENT DATES.  IN FIVE STORIES HE RECEIVED 
FOREIGN VISITORS, INCLUDING SECDEF COHEN AND THE INDIAN 
DEFENSE MINISTER.  HE ATTENDED THE FUNERAL OF GENERAL NGUYEN 
BINH, AND HE CHAIRED MEETINGS REVIEWING THE TRAINING AND 
MASS MOBILIZATION TASKS OF THE ARMY.  MINISTER OF PUBLIC 
SECURITY HUONG, NOT SURPRISINGLY AS THE HEAD OF POLICE AND 
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES, APPEARED LESS FREQUENTLY.  HIS SEVEN 
APPEARANCES IN THE PRESS INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN 
VISITORS (THE UKRAINIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY AND LAO INTERIOR 
MINISTER), ATTENDING THE CPV PLENUM, VISITING A TEMPLE OF 
THE HUNG KINGS, AND CHAIRING A MEETING OF POLICE ON THE 
RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM.  BOTH TRA AND HUONG 
ARE AMONG THE OLDER POLITBURO MEMBERS, AND ACCORDING TO SOME 
REPORTS, HUONG IS NOT IN GOOD HEALTH.  RUMORS CIRCULATE THAT 
ONE OR BOTH OF THEM MAY BE RETIRED AT THE PARTY CONGRESS. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
MOST OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS ARE ALMOST INVISIBLE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
21. (C) IN A STRIKING ILLUSTRATION OF HOW HIDDEN IS MUCH OF 
THE PARTY'S INTERNAL WORK, MOST OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS 
RARELY, IF EVER, APPEAR IN THE PRESS.  DURING THE TWO MONTHS 
OF OUR TRACKING, FOUR MEMBERS -- THOSE IN CHARGE OF THE 
PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING, PERSONNEL ISSUES, 
INVESTIGATION OF PARTY INFRACTIONS, AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS -- 
EITHER NEVER APPEARED OR APPEARED ONLY ONCE IN PROMINENT 
MEDIA SUCH AS "NHAN DAN."  INCLUDED IN THIS GROUP IS FORMER 
HCMC PARTY CHIEF SANG, WHO DROPPED OFF THE SCREEN AFTER HE 
WAS NAMED HEAD OF THE PARTY'S ECONOMIC COMMISSION.  THIS IS 
A GRAPHIC EXAMPLE OF HOW SECRETIVE ARE THESE SUPREMELY 
POWERFUL OFFICIALS -- AND HOW SHELTERED FROM THE PUBLIC ARE 
THEIR ACTIVITIES AND VIEWS.  TO THE PUBLIC, MOST OF THEM ARE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  01160  07 OF 10  260851Z 
CIPHERS AT BEST, AND YET THESE LEADERS SHAPE VIETNAM'S 
NATIONAL POLICIES. 
 
22. (C) LONG-TIME HEAD OF THE HO CHI MINH POLITICAL ACADEMY 
NGUYEN DUC BINH, AT AGE 72 ONE OF THE OLDEST POLITBURO 
MEMBERS, NEVER APPEARED IN "NHAN DAN" OR OTHER PROMINENT 
OFFICIAL PRESS FOR THE EIGHT-WEEK PERIOD WE MONITORED.  THIS 
IS STRIKING, BECAUSE SOME SOURCES IN HANOI SUGGEST BINH, 
SEVENTH IN CPV RANKS, PLAYED A LARGE ROLE IN LEADING THE 
OPPOSITION TO SIGNING THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT (BTA) 
WITH THE U.S. AFTER THE BTA WAS INITIALED IN JULY 1999. 
BINH HAS CLOSE CONNECTIONS TO MANY OF THE POLITBURO, SINCE 
SENIOR CPV LEADERS PASS THROUGH THE ACADEMY FOR SENIOR 
TRAINING.  THUS, THOUGH VIRTUALLY INVISIBLE TO PUBLIC VIEW, 
BINH EXERCISES SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE THROUGH HIS LINKS TO 
HIS FORMER STUDENTS.  BECAUSE OF HIS AGE, WE BELIEVE BINH 
WILL RETIRE AT THE PARTY CONGRESS.  (SOME SOURCES SUGGEST 
ONE POSSIBLE CANDIDATE TO REPLACE BINH COULD BE PARTY 
SPOKESMAN DAO DUY QUAT, WHO HAS ASSUMED HIGHER A PROFILE IN 
THE CONFIDENT MANNER HE GIVES PUBLIC BRIEFINGS ON RECENT 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS.  QUAT, WHOSE LATE FATHER SERVED 
IN THE POLITBURO, MAY HAVE THE PATRONAGE OF LE DUC ANH, 
ACCORDING TO SOME SOURCES.) 
 
23. (C) NGUYEN VAN AN, HEAD OF THE PARTY'S ORGANIZATION 
DEPARTMENT, IS ANOTHER ENIGMA IN THE LEADERSHIP.  RANKED 
EIGHTH, AN APPEARED ONLY ONE TIME IN THE PRESS IN TWO 
MONTHS, WHEN HE RECEIVED A DELEGATION OF OFFICIALS FROM 
CHINA.  INTERESTINGLY, AN WAS THE LEADING ALTERNATIVE TO 
PHIEU IN THE DECEMBER 1997 VOTING AMONG THE POLITBURO FOR 
GENERAL SECRETARY.  IN A HIGHLY UNUSUAL, CLOSE SPLIT VOTE IN 
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PAGE 04        HANOI  01160  07 OF 10  260851Z 
THE POLITBURO, PHIEU WAS SELECTED AS GENERAL SECRETARY. 
SINCE THAT TIME, THE PUBLIC HAS HEARD OR SEEN VIRTUALLY 
NOTHING OF AN FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS.  PARTICULARLY BECAUSE 
OF HIS CHALLENGE TO PHIEU TWO YEARS AGO, HE IS A STRONG 
CANDIDATE TO BE REPLACED ON THE POLITBURO. 
 
24. (C) NGUYEN THI XUAN MY, CHAIRPERSON OF THE PARTY'S 
COMMISSION FOR INVESTIGATION AND RANKED 10TH, ALSO RARELY 
APPEARS IN PUBLIC OR IN THE PRESS.  DURING THE TWO-MONTH 
PERIOD SHE WAS FEATURED IN THE PRESS ONCE, LEADING A 
CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC COMPLAINTS IN HO CHI MINH CITY.  WE SEE 
NO INDICATION SHE HAS SIGNIFICANT CLOUT IN THE POLITBURO. 
THE FIRST FEMALE POLITBURO MEMBER, SHE WAS APPOINTED IN 
1996, AND SOME COMMENTATORS BELIEVE SHE WAS APPOINTED BY THE 
PARTY SO IT CAN CLAIM THERE IS NOT A "GLASS CEILING" IN THE 
LEADERSHIP RANKS.  (VIETNAM'S OTHER HIGHEST-RANKING WOMAN IS 
VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN THI BINH, A WAR HEROINE, WHO EVEN MORE 
THAN PRESIDENT LUONG HAS PRIMARILY CEREMONIAL DUTIES.) 
 
25. (C) TRUONG TAN SANG, CURRENTLY HEAD OF THE CPV'S 
COMMISSION FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND RANKED 11TH, WENT FROM 
HAVING A VERY HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE AS PARTY LEADER IN HO CHI 
MINH CITY TO BEING ALMOST INVISIBLE IN HIS CURRENT POSITION. 
DURING THE TWO-MONTH PERIOD SANG WAS NOT FEATURED AT ALL IN 
PROMINENT VIETNAMESE MEDIA SUCH AS "NHAN DAN."  AN ENGAGING 
AND GREGARIOUS POLITICIAN CUT IN A MORE WESTERN MODE, SANG 
WAS THOUGHT HIGHLY OF BY THE FOREIGN BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN 
HCMC DURING HIS TENURE THERE, AND HE HAS BEEN SEEN FOR SOME 
TIME AS A POTENTIAL RISING STAR AMONG THE MORE TECHNOCRATIC 
"REFORMERS" IN THE PARTY. SOME CONSIDER THE ECONOMIC 
COMMISSION AS A BACKWATER WITHOUT MAJOR CLOUT, ALTHOUGH 
OTHERS WHO HAVE HELD THIS POSITION, SUCH AS FIRST DEPUTY PM 
DUNG, HAVE EMERGED FROM THIS POSITION TO GREATER PROMINENCE. 
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IS THAT SANG IS IN A HOLDING PATTERN 
AND IS BEING WATCHED BY THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP IN HIS CURRENT 
POSITION, WITH AN EYE TO POSSIBLE FUTURE PROMOTION -- OR 
CAREER STAGNATION IF HE FALLS OUT OF FAVOR WITH MORE 
CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS OF THE LEADERSHIP. 
 
26. (C) LE XUAN TUNG, WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
IDEOLOGICAL, CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS 
AND RANKS 12TH, LIKEWISE MOVED INTO THE SHADOWS AFTER BEING 
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PAGE 03        HANOI  01160  08 OF 10  261124Z 
REPLACED AS CHAIRPERSON OF THE HANOI PARTY.  DURING THE TWO- 
MONTH PERIOD TUNG WAS FEATURED IN "NHAN DAN" SIX TIMES -- 
ATTENDING NATIONAL CONFERENCES FOR JOURNALISTS AND WRITERS 
AND A CONFERENCE ON IDEOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL WORK, CHAIRING 
A PLENUM BRIEFING AT THE HO CHI MINH POLITICAL ACADEMY, AND 
MEETING WITH CPV ETHNIC MINORITY CADRE.  WE HAVE REPORTS 
THAT TUNG IS IN ILL HEALTH, AND DURING HIS TENURE AS HANOI 
PARTY LEADER, THE CITY'S PARTY AND PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, 
PARTICULARLY THE LATTER, WERE CRITICIZED STRONGLY BY CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND IN THE PRESS FOR MISMANAGEMENT AND 
CORRUPTION.  (TUNG'S REPLACEMENT BY TRONG PUT A FIRM 
IDEOLOGICAL ADVOCATE AT THE HELM.)  WE EXPECT TUNG MAY BE 
DROPPED FROM THE POLITBURO NEXT YEAR. 
 
27. (C) PHAM THANH NGAN, DIRECTOR OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL 
DEPARTMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) AND RANKED 
15TH, APPEARS TO BE, WITH TRONG, ONE OF THE RISING 
IDEOLOGICAL STARS OF THE CPV.  LIKE PHIEU AND TRONG, NGAN 
APPEARS TO FAVOR A CAUTIOUS, INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO REFORM 
THAT EMPHASIZES POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY.  AS 
POLITICAL COMMISSAR FOR THE MILITARY, NGAN OCCUPIES THE 
POSITION PREVIOUSLY HELD BY PHIEU, WHO HAS RISEN TO THE TOP. 
HE PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS PHIEU'S DEPUTY.  NGAN WAS FEATURED 
FIVE TIMES DURING THE TWO MONTHS -- ATTENDING THE MILITARY 
FUNERAL OF GEN. NGUYEN BINH MARCH 12, PARTICIPATING IN AN 
ARMY MEETING ON MASS MOBILIZATION AND IN THE NATIONAL 
WRITERS' CONFERENCE, AND ATTENDING A TWO-DAY REVIEW MEETING 
OF THE ARMED FORCES' FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PLAN.  ACCORDING TO 
AN EDITOR AT THE "PEOPLE'S ARMY" NEWSPAPER, NGAN AT ONE TIME 
WAS PUSHED BY PHIEU TO REPLACE DUYET ON THE STANDING 
COMMITTEE, THOUGH A CONSENSUS WAS NOT REACHED AND NOW IT 
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PAGE 04        HANOI  01160  08 OF 10  261124Z 
APPEARS MORE LIKELY TRONG WILL MOVE INTO THAT POSITION. 
NONETHELESS, NGAN LIKELY WILL CONTINUE TO RISE IN PARTY 
RANKS, GIVEN HIS PERSONAL BACKING FROM PHIEU. 
 
28. (C) PHAN DIEN, CHAIRMAN OF THE CPV IN DANANG, WHO IS 
RANKED 17TH, PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS DIRECTOR OF THE ECONOMIC 
COMMISSION.  SINCE BECOMING HEAD OF THE DANANG PARTY, DIEN 
HAS BEEN FEATURED IN "NHAN DAN" ONLY TWICE -- FOR CEREMONIAL 
OCCASIONS RELATED TO THE "LIBERATION" OF DANANG IN 1975, 
SHORTLY BEFORE THE FALL OF SAIGON.  HOWEVER, WE MUST NOTE 
THAT FOR THIS PROJECT WE ARE NOT TRACKING THE LOCAL PAPERS 
IN DANANG; DIEN'S PROFILE NO DOUBT IS MUCH HIGHER IN THE 
CENTRAL REGION OF THE COUNTRY.  WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE 
DANANG PARTY POST HAS BEEN GIVEN ENHANCED RESPONSIBILITIES 
WITH OVERSIGHT OVER THE ENTIRE CENTRAL REGION, ESPECIALLY 
MANAGING THE RECOVERY OF THE SIX CENTRAL PROVINCES AROUND 
DANANG THAT WERE MOST DAMAGED BY THE HEAVY FLOODS OF 
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1999.  THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR NOTED HE 
WAS IMPRESSED WITH DIEN'S RELATIVE OPENNESS, CANDOR AND 
COMMAND OF HIS BRIEF WHEN HE MET HIM SHORTLY AFTER DIEN'S 
APPOINTMENT IN DANANG. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
SENIOR ADVISORS' PUBLIC PROFILES DO NOT MATCH PRIVATE POWER 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
 
29. (C) THE THREE SENIOR ADVISORS TO THE CPV -- FORMER 
GENERAL SECRETARY DO MUOI, FORMER PRESIDENT LE DUC ANH, AND 
FORMER PRIME MINISTER VO VAN KIET -- EACH CONTINUE TO BE 
FEATURED IN THE PRESS, WITH KIET AND MUOI PARTICULARLY 
KEEPING ACTIVE SCHEDULES OF PUBLIC EVENTS.  HOWEVER, IN A 
STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THE DIVERGENCE OF PUBLIC ROLES AND 
PRIVATE POWER AMONG THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP, AT THE 
PRESENT MOMENT THE LESS PROMINENT THE FIGURE, THE MORE 
INFLUENCE HE HAS.  THE LAST SIX MONTHS HAVE SEEN THE 
REEMERGENCE OF LE DUC ANH ON THE SCENE AS A STRONG POLITICAL 
FORCE.  DURING THE PAST MONTHS, ANH HAS WORKED WITH PHIEU, 
WHO PREVIOUSLY SERVED UNDER ANH IN THE CAMBODIAN MILITARY 
CAMPAIGN OF THE 1980'S, TO RESHUFFLE POLITBURO PORTFOLIOS, 
TO DISCIPLINE SEVERAL ALLIES OF PM KHAI, AND TO GENERALLY 
IMPOSE A MORE IDEOLOGICAL LINE ON CPV DECISION-MAKING.  YET 
ANH RARELY APPEARS IN THE PRESS, AND WHEN HE DOES, IT IS 
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PAGE 03        HANOI  01160  09 OF 10  261124Z 
USUALLY ONLY FOR CEREMONIAL OCCASIONS, WITHOUT A LOT OF 
SUBSTANCE ATTACHED.  MEANWHILE, KIET, WHO HAS THE HIGHEST 
PROFILE, APPEARS TO HAVE THE LEAST INFLUENCE ON THE 
POLITBURO. 
 
30. (C) DURING THE TWO-MONTH PERIOD ANALYZED, ANH WAS 
FEATURED ONLY THREE TIMES IN STATE-RUN PRINT MEDIA -- 
ATTENDING THE MARCH 25 JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE; 
BEING PICTURED, CUSTOMARILY, IN THE FRONT ROW FOR THE 
OPENING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM APRIL 10; AND 
ATTENDING ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS OF THE "LIBERATION" OF 
HCMC.  THESE BRIEF MENTIONS GIVE HARDLY ANY CLUE OF ANH'S 
INFLUENCE IN THE LEADERSHIP, SINCE WE HAVE CLEAR INDICATIONS 
HE EXERTS SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON THE POLITBURO FROM BEHIND 
THE SCENES.  (COMMENT: IN LARGE PART ANH'S LOWER PROFILE MAY 
REFLECT HIS RETICENCE FOR PUBLIC APPEARANCES AS WELL AS 
HEALTH CONCERNS.  A YEAR AGO ANH WAS REPORTED TO BE IN VERY 
POOR HEALTH, AND SOME HANOI OBSERVERS SPECULATED HE MIGHT 
NOT LIVE MUCH LONGER.  WHILE HE HAS RECOVERED ENOUGH TO 
PARTICIPATE IN A LIMITED SCHEDULE, WE SPECULATE HE MAY 
INTENTIONALLY BE LIMITING HIS SCHEDULE.  END COMMENT.) 
 
31. (C) CONTRAST, DO MUOI APPEARED 10 TIMES IN THE PRESS. 
HE ATTENDED THE SAME THREE EVENTS AS ANH, AND HE VISITED A 
MILITARY UNIT, A GARMENT COMPANY, AND A TRADE FAIR.  HE ALSO 
ATTENDED A CELEBRATION OF THE TRUNG SISTERS FROM VIETNAM'S 
MILLENNIUM-LONG STRUGGLE AGAINST THE CHINESE, AND MET WITH 
THE VISITING HEAD OF JAPAN-VIETNAM CULTURAL EXCHANGE 
ASSOCIATION.  LIKEWISE, FORMER PRIME MINISTER KIET ALSO 
MAINTAINED AN ACTIVE SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS, BEING FEATURED IN 
THE PRESS ON 11 DIFFERENT DAYS.  KIET HELD MEETINGS WITH 
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PAGE 04        HANOI  01160  09 OF 10  261124Z 
REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE YOUTH UNION, THE TRANSPORTATION 
MINISTRY, AND THE NATIONAL STEEL COMPANY.  UNLIKE ANH AND 
MUOI, KIET KEPT AN ACTIVE TRAVEL SCHEDULE, VISITING AT LEAST 
NINE SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL PROVINCES.  KIET VISITED NATURE 
PRESERVES IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES OF CA MAU, CAN THO, DONG 
THAP AND DONG NGAI; MET WITH REPS OF THE VIETNAM COAL 
COMPANY IN QUANG NINH; AND VISITED AN IRRIGATION PROJECT IN 
BEN TRE.  HE WAS THE ONLY ONE OF THE SENIOR ADVISORS TO 
ATTEND THE LIBERATION OF DANANG CELEBRATIONS, AND HE 
ATTENDED THE OPENING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM IN 
HANOI (THOUGH HE WAS NOT PICTURED IN "NHAN DAN," AS WERE 
MUOI AND ANH).  (COMMENT: AS ONE OF THE SOUTHERNERS MOST 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADVANCING "DOI MOI" ECONOMIC REFORMS IN 
VIETNAM OVER THE PAST DECADE, KIET TODAY SEEMS LIKE A SEMI- 
RETIRED POLITICIAN PREACHING HIS GOSPEL ON THE BANQUET 
CIRCUIT.  THOUGH HE HAS LESS CLOUT ON NATIONAL POLICY AT 
PRESENT BECAUSE OF THE CONSERVATIVE TILT OF THE LEADERSHIP, 
HE CONTINUES TO BE HIGHLY ESTEEMED IN THE SOUTH AND CENTER 
OF THE COUNTRY.  END COMMENT.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
WORKING IN THE SHADOWS, LARGELY HIDDEN FROM THE PUBLIC 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
32. (C) COMMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FACES 
OF THE POLITBURO REVEALS HOW HIDDEN ARE THE WORKINGS OF THIS 
SUPREME LEADERSHIP BODY.  NEARLY HALF OF THE LEADERS ARE 
VIRTUALLY INVISIBLE, AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE KNOWS LITTLE OF 
THEM FROM THE STATE-CONTROLLED MEDIA.  (AND EVEN FOR THOSE 
FEATURED MORE OFTEN IN THE OFFICIAL PRESS, THERE IS NARY A 
CRITICAL WORD ABOUT CURRENT POLITBURO MEMBERS.)  OTHERS IN 
THE POLITBURO, ESPECIALLY THE STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND 
THE PROVINCIAL PARTY CHIEFS, HAVE MANY MORE OPPORTUNITIES TO 
"RUB SHOULDERS" WITH VIETNAMESE PRIVATE CITIZENS, AND THEIR 
TRAVELS AND CONSTITUENT MEETINGS NO DOUBT PROVIDE SOME 
MEASURE OF "GROUNDING" FOR THEM TO LEARN OF POPULAR 
ATTITUDES AND CONCERNS.  HOWEVER, IN THE LENINIST POLITICAL 
STRUCTURE OF VIETNAM, THERE IS NO MEANS BY WHICH THE PARTY 
LEADERSHIP IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE.  WITHIN 
THIS CONSENSUS-ORIENTED BODY, THE DEBATE ON REFORM HAS BEEN 
GROUND TO A HALT BY ITS STYLE OF GOVERNANCE BASED ON THE 
LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR.  WESTERN OBSERVERS LOOKING AT 
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PAGE 03        HANOI  01160  10 OF 10  261125Z 
VIETNAM TODAY YEARN FOR ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S MORE PRAGMATIC, 
REFORM-MINDED YOUNGER LEADERS -- SUCH AS DUNG, SANG OR TRIET 
-- TO STEP FORWARD AND IMPLEMENT A NEW ROUND OF RE-ENERGIZED 
"DOI MOI" REFORMS.  HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL WINDS ARE NOT 
BLOWING THAT WAY IN HANOI TODAY, AND WE BELIEVE IT MORE 
LIKELY THIS CAUTIOUS, CONSENSUS-ORIENTED LEADERSHIP WILL OPT 
FOR MORE INCREMENTAL MUDDLING THROUGH.  ULTIMATELY, FOR MOST 
IF NOT ALL OF THE SENIOR LEADERS, THEIR PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVE 
IS MAINTAINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S MONOPOLY ON POLITICAL 
POWER FOR AS LONG AS THE GAME WILL PLAY.  END COMMENT. 
PETERSON 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL