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Viewing cable 00HARARE2222, S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DRC DISENGAGEMENT AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
00HARARE2222 2000-04-25 14:48 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

251448Z Apr 00


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0617

PAGE 01        HARARE  02222  01 OF 04  251443Z 
ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  SMEC-00  INL-01   DINT-00  
      DODE-00  DOEE-00  DOTE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    EUR-01   
      OIGO-02  FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-01    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   
      IO-00    L-00     AC-01    NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   OPIC-01  
      PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    TRSE-00  
      USIE-00  IIP-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  
      SAS-00   SWCI-00    /013W
                  ------------------4FAA06  251443Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5846
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 002222 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02222  01 OF 04  251443Z 
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL 
USUN FOR AMBASSADORS HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG 
USUN/W FOR ORR 
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR 
NSC FOR GAYLE SMITH AND ERIC SCHWARTZ 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/10 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DRC DISENGAGEMENT AND 
DISARMAMENT WITH ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENT 
 
REFS: A) HARARE 2198 
 
      B) HARARE 2200 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR TOM MCDONALD, REASONS 1.5 (B), (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENT ROBERT MUGABE HOSTED A 
TWO HOUR AND TWENTY MINUTE MEETING WITH THE USG DELEGATION AT 
HIS RESIDENCE IN HARARE ON 22 APRIL.  S/E WOLPE, AMB 
MCDONALD, SPECIAL ADVISOR PRENDERGAST, LT. COL. GADDIS, AND 
ECONOFF PROKOP ATTENDED.  S/E WOLPE REINFORCED THE USG 
CONCERN THAT THERE BE GOOD FAITH COMPLIANCE WITH THE KAMPALA 
CEASE-FIRE AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA, INCLUDING THE 
COMPLETE RESTORATION OF DRC SOVEREIGNTY. HE ALSO ASKED IF 
MUGABE WOULD CONSIDER, IN PRINCIPLE, A COMMITMENT TO CEASE 
THE RE-SUPPLY AND TRAINING OF NON-STATE ACTORS AS A 
CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE THAT COULD BE LINKED TO SPECIFIC 
COMMITMENTS MADE BY RWANDA AND UGANDA ON FURTHER OR 
ACCELERATED REDEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAWAL.  MUGABE SAID THAT HE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02222  01 OF 04  251443Z 
WOULD CONSIDER SUCH MEASURES IF HE COULD BE SURE THAT, IN 
RETURN, RWANDA AND UGANDA WOULD CEASE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THEIR 
REBEL CLIENTS.  END SUMMARY. 
PURPOSE OF THE DELEGATION'S VISIT 
 
2.  (C) S/E WOLPE INFORMED PRESIDENT MUGABE THAT HE HAD COME, AT 
THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT CLINTON, TO REINFORCE THE USG 
CONCERN THAT THERE BE GOOD FAITH COMPLIANCE WITH THE KAMPALA 
CEASE-FIRE BY ALL PARTIES AND TO EXPLORE WAYS OF ACCELERATING 
THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT WITH REGIONAL 
LEADERS. 
 
3.  (C) ONE OF THE DELEGATION'S GOALS IS TO GAIN AN UNDERSTANDING 
OF EACH PARTY'S BOTTOM LINE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN ORDER TO 
HELP CRAFT INITIATIVES THAT EACH SIDE COULD TAKE THAT WOULD 
INCREASE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE SHORT-TERM AND ENABLE 
THE SIGNATORIES TO ACCELERATE THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
LUSAKA AGREEMENT. 
 
4.  (C) S/E WOLPE ASSURED PRESIDENT MUGABE THAT THE USG'S 
DEDICATION TO LUSAKA INCLUDED THE FULL RESTORATION OF 
CONGOLESE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ADDING THAT 
"THIS IS THE MESSAGE I WILL BE CARRYING TO RWANDA AND UGANDA." 
 
5.  (C) S/W WOLPE FURTHER EXPLAINED THAT IT IS THE USG'S VIEW 
THAT THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES ARE LOOKING SERIOUSLY FOR A WAY 
OUT OF THE CONGO.  FROM THE USG PERSPECTIVE, THEREFORE, THE 
TIME IS RIPE TO ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS.  HE NOTED THAT THE 
DELEGATION WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE REPORT IT HAD RECEIVED FROM 
ZIMBABWE'S MINISTERS OF JUSTICE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
CONCERNING THE RECENT VICTORIA FALLS MEETING BUT WOULD 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02222  01 OF 04  251443Z 
PARTICULARLY WELCOME PRESIDENT MUGABE'S ACCOUNT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS. 
 
BACKGROUND OF THE VIC FALLS MEETING 
 
6. (C) ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT MUGABE, THE IDEA FOR THE MEETING 
CAME UP IN A CONVERSATION HE HAD IN CAIRO INVOLVING HIMSELF, 
CHISSANO, DOS SANTOS, AND MUSEVENI.   NOTE. EXPLAINING THE 
ORIGINS OF THIS DISCUSSION, MUGABE SAID HE HAD FORTUITOUSLY 
STUMBLED UPON WHAT WAS IN FACT AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN MUSEVENI 
AND DOS SANTOS THAT WAS BEING FACILITATED BY CHISSANO.  END 
NOTE.)  MUGABE SAID THAT HE ASKED "WHY CAN'T WE MAKE UP OUR 
OWN MINDS (TO GET OUT OF THE CONGO)?  WE ARE 'BIG PEOPLE'; 
WHY MUST WE WAIT FOR A STICK FROM THE UN TO DRIVE US 
FORWARD?"  CHISSANO AND MUSEVENI AGREED AND CHISSANO PROPOSED 
AN INFORMAL MEETING OF THE EXTERNAL LUSAKA SIGNATORIES.  THE 
PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WOULD BE TO FIND A WAY FOR THE 
REGIONAL ACTORS TO IMPLEMENT THE CEASE-FIRE PROCESS 
THEMSELVES IN THE EVENT THAT THE UN DEPLOYMENT WAS DELAYED. 
THE LEADERS SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO MEET IN VIC FALLS ON 21 
APRIL.  UNFORTUNATELY, THREE DAYS BEFORE THE MEETING DATE, 
DOS SANTOS BACKED OUT, ARGUING THAT ALL OF THE LEADERS HAD 
BEEN INVITED TO A MALARIA CONFERENCE IN ABUJA TWO DAYS LATER, 
AND IT WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT TO MAKE ABUJA THE VENUE OF THE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0620 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  02222  02 OF 04  251444Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  SMEC-00  INL-01   DINT-00 
      DODE-00  DOEE-00  DOTE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    EUR-01 
      OIGO-02  FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-01    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00 
      IO-00    L-00     AC-01    NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   OPIC-01 
      PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    TRSE-00 
      USIE-00  IIP-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00 
      SAS-00   SWCI-00    /013W 
                  ------------------4FAA16  251444Z /38 
P 251448Z APR 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5847 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 HARARE 002222 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02222  02 OF 04  251444Z 
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL 
USUN FOR AMBASSADORS HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG 
USUN/W FOR ORR 
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR 
NSC FOR GAYLE SMITH AND ERIC SCHWARTZ 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/10 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DRC DISENGAGEMENT AND 
DISARMAMENT WITH ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENT 
 
DRC DISCUSSION AS WELL.  PAUL KAGAME, TOO, WAS UNABLE TO COME 
BECAUSE OF HIS PENDING INAUGURATION; HOWEVER, HE SENT HIS FOREIGN 
MINISTER AND EMMANUEL GASANA. 
 
MUGABE'S ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING 
 
7.  (C) PRESIDENT MUGABE REPORTED THAT THE MEETING WAS "POSITIVE, 
STRAIGHTFORWARD, HONEST."  IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JMC/PC 
KAMPALA CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, THE LEADERS AGREED TO COMMIT 
THEMSELVES TO HONOR THE 30-KILOMETER DMZ.  THEY ALSO AGREED 
TO ESTABLISH A REGIONAL MONITORING MECHANISM COMPOSED OF 
JOINT TEAMS FROM EACH PARTY TO SUPERVISE THE CEASE-FIRE IN 
THE EVENT THAT THE UN DEPLOYMENT IS DELAYED.  THE MEANS TO 
IMPLEMENT THE SELF-MONITORING REGIME - TRANSPORTATION, 
FUNDING, ETC. -- ARE YET TO BE WORKED OUT. 
 
8.  (C) PRESIDENT MUGABE INSISTED THAT THE KEY TO MAINTAINING 
FAITH IN THE SELF-MONITORING APPROACH WOULD BE APPROPRIATE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02222  02 OF 04  251444Z 
ACTIONS ON THE GROUND. IN TIME, WITH CONCRETE PROGRESS IN THE 
DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES, CONFIDENCE WILL GROW. HOWEVER, HE 
ADDED A NOTE OF CAUTION: "WE WILL STILL NEED TO RESERVE A 
LITTLE OF OURSELVES IN CASE THE OTHER SIDE DOES WHAT WE FEAR 
THEY WILL DO.  IF THEY DO NOT (BREAK THEIR COMMITMENTS), THEN 
BOTH SIDES WILL BEGIN TO RELAX." 
 
9.  (C) THE PRESIDENT ENDED HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE CONGO PORTION 
OF THE VIC FALLS MEETING BY SAYING "NOW WE HAVE TO INFORM 
CHILUBA ABOUT THE MEETING THAT HAPPENED IN HIS BACK YARD." 
HE ADDED, JOKINGLY, THAT "CHILUBA WILL BE WONDERING WHAT IS 
GOING ON."  MUGABE THEN TURNED TO THE SECOND SUBJECT 
DISCUSSED AT VIC FALLS - ZIMBABWE'S LAND REFORM ISSUE AND 
POLITICAL CRISIS - AND LAUNCHED INTO A VERY LENGTHY AND 
DETAILED EXPOSITION OF GOZ VIEWS AND ACTIONS (REPORTED 
SEPTEL). 
 
BACK TO THE DRC 
 
10.  (C) RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE LUSAKA PROCESS, S/E 
WOLPE ASKED THE ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENT WHAT THF USG COULD DO AT 
THIS POINT TO ACCELERATE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LUSAKA 
AGREEMENT.  SPECIFICALLY, WOLPE ASKED, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE 
FOR THE DRC AND ITS ALLIES TO COMMIT TO ACTIONS THAT WOULD 
MITIGATE RWANDAN AND UGANDAN SECURITY CONCERNS, IN EXCHANGE 
FOR AN UGANDAN AND RWANDAN COMMITMENT TO A MORE RAPID 
REDEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES. 
 
11.  (C) PRESIDENT MUGABE REPLIED THAT, FOR THEIR PART, RWANDA AND 
UGANDA COULD BEST DEMONSTRATE THEIR COMMITMENT BY AN ACTUAL 
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DRC.  HE FURTHER SAID THAT RWANDA, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02222  02 OF 04  251444Z 
UGANDA, AND BURUNDI COULD BEST GUARANTEE THEIR SECURITY BY 
DEDICATING THEMSELVES TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS 
AND AMONG THEIR OWN POPULATIONS. 
 
12.  (C) AS FOR THE NON-STATE ACTORS, MUGABE INSISTED THAT 
HUNTING THEM DOWN WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL AND WOULD NOT RESULT 
IN THEIR ELIMINATION.  HE ADDED THAT THE NON-STATE ACTORS 
WERE RELATIVELY FEW IN COMPARISON TO THE "HUGE ARMIES" OF THE 
REBELS.  HE DID ACKNOWLEDGE THAT "BOTH GROUPS MUST BE MADE 
TOOTHLESS" AND POINTED OUT THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE 
REINTEGRATION PROGRAM. 
 
13.  (C) S/E WOLPE AGAIN RETURNED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE DRC 
AND ITS ALLIES AGREEING TO CEASE RE-SUPPLY AND TRAINING OF 
THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE IN RETURN FOR A RECIPROCAL COMMITMENT 
BY RWANDA AND UGANDA TO ACCELERATED REDFPLOYMENT AND 
WITHDRAWAL.  THIS TIME MUGABE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER 
MAKING SUCH A COMMITMENT IF IT WOULD CONVINCE RWANDA AND 
UGANDA TO WITHDRAW FROM THE DRC. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD ALSO 
WANT RWANDA AND UGANDA TO CEASE THEIR TRAINING AND RESUPPLY 
OF THEIR REBEL CLIENTS. 
 
MUGABE ON RELATIONS WITH RWANDA, UGANDA, BURUNDI 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0622 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  02222  03 OF 04  251444Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  SMEC-00  INL-01   DINT-00 
      DODE-00  DOEE-00  DOTE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    EUR-01 
      OIGO-02  FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-01    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00 
      IO-00    L-00     AC-01    NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   OPIC-01 
      PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    TRSE-00 
      USIE-00  IIP-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00 
      SAS-00   SWCI-00    /013W 
                  ------------------4FAA22  251444Z /38 
P 251448Z APR 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5848 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 HARARE 002222 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02222  03 OF 04  251444Z 
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL 
USUN FOR AMBASSADORS HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG 
USUN/W FOR ORR 
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR 
NSC FOR GAYLE SMITH AND ERIC SCHWARTZ 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/10 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DRC DISENGAGEMENT AND 
DISARMAMENT WITH ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENT 
 
14.  (C) PRESIDENT MUGABE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WHILE RELATIONS WITH 
UGANDA HAD IMPROVED, THEY WERE STILL DIFFICULT WITH RWANDA. HE 
SAID THAT THIS WAS PERHAPS DUE TO LACK OF SUFFICIENT 
CONTACT.  HE NOTED THAT THE RWANDAN FOREIGN MTNISTER INFORMED 
THOSE AT VIC FALLS THAT KAGAME, AS PRESIDENT, HAD COMMITTED 
HIMSELF TO BE BOUND BY ANY DECISION MADE BY THE LUSAKA 
SIGNATORIES.  MUGABE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT KAGAME APPEARED TO 
BE THE ONE WHO WANTS TO CONTINUE THE WAR. 
 
15.  (C) S/E WOLPE TOLD PRESIDENT MUGABE THAT HE HAS BEGUN TO 
SENSE AN EVOLUTION IN RWANDA'S THINKING.  THE RWANDANS NOW 
APPEAR WILLING TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS AND 
GROUPS WITH REGARD TO THE CULPABILITY OF EXFAR/INTERAHAMWE 
FORCES IN THE DRC FOR THE GENOCIDE.  THE RWANDANS, HE SAID, 
HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL 
MONITORING OF THE REINTEGRATION PROCESS.  S/E WOLPE ASSURED 
MUGABE THAT THE USG WOULD WORK WITH THE RWANDANS TO DETERMINE 
THEIR BOTTOM LINE AND TO ENSURE THAT IT IS REASONABLE. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02222  03 OF 04  251444Z 
 
16.  (C) MUGABE COMMENTED THAT IF THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN RWANDA 
AND BURUNDI COULD NOT ACCOMMODATE THE RETURN OF 
EX-COMBATANTS, AND IF THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS FOR 
REINTEGRATION, THEIR CITIZENS WILL NOT WANT TO RETURN. 
HOWEVER, IF A REHABILITATION MECHANISM EXISTS, THOSE WHO CAN 
RETURN WILL DO SO. 
 
DEALING WITH KABILA 
 
17.  (C) S/E WOLPE TOLD MUGABE OF USG EFFORTS TO CONVINCE KABILA 
THAT HE COULD BENEFIT POLITICALLY BY COOPERATING WITH THE 
NATIONAL DIALOGUE'S FACILITATOR AND ADHERING TO THE LUSAKA 
AGREEMENT.  HE ASKED MUGABE FOR HIS GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF 
KABILA'S WILLINGNESS TO NOW BE BOUND BY THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT. 
 
18.  (C) MUGABE REPLIED THAT KARILA WAS DOING HIS BEST TO ADHERE 
TO THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH HE IS DISAPPOINTED THAT IT 
DID NOT CONTAIN AN EXPLICIT DEMAND FOR THE IMMEDIATE 
WITHDRAWAL OF RWANDA AND UGANDA.  REGARDING THE NATIONAL 
DIALOGUE, MUGABE SAID THAT KABILA HAD COMPLAINED THAT LUSAKA 
WAS RESTRICTING HIM FROM ORGANIZING POIJTICAL SUPPORT AMONG 
HIS OWN PEOPLE.  MUGABE SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED TO KABILA THAT 
THERE WAS NO RESTRICTION ON HIS ABILITY TO CONSULT WITH 
OTHERS, BUT THAT HE SHOULD DO NOTHING THAT WOULD APPEAR TO BE 
AN EFFORT TO SUPPLANT PRESIDENT MASIRE'S ROLE AS THE 
FACILITATOR OF THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE.  HE SAID THAT HE HAD 
SUCCEEDED IN DISSUADING KABILA FROM PROCEEDING WITH HIS PLANS 
TO HOLD PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ADVANCE OF THE 
INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02222  03 OF 04  251444Z 
19.  (C) MUGABE CLAIMED THAT THE LACK OF COOPERATION MASIRE 
EXPERIENCED DURING HIS FIRST VISIT WAS PARTLY THE FAULT OF 
REGIONAL LEADERS WHO HAD PROVIDED NO SUPPORT TO MASIRE.  FROM 
KABILA'S OBSERVATIONS, IT APPEARED THAT THE IACK OF 
COOPERATION DURING HIS SECOND VISIT TO THE DRC WAS DUE TO 
LACK OF COORDINATION: KABILA CLAIMED NO ONE KNEW MASIRE WAS 
COMING OR WHAT HIS AGENDA WOULD BE.  MUGABE HIMSELF THOUGHT 
THAT MASIRE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS TAKING HIS 
INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE UN AS OPPOSED TO THE OAU AND HE FELT 
THAT THIS WAS INAPPROPRIATE. 
 
20.  (C) MUGABE ASKED WOLPE WHY MASIRE WAS SO DEPENDENT ON THE 
UN FOR STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT.  S/E WOLPE EXPLAINED 
THAT IT WAS THE OAU SECRETARY-GENERAL WHO HAD INDICATED THE 
OAU LACKED SUFFICIENT CAPACITY AND HAD URGED A SIGNIFICANT UN 
ROLE.  MUGABE OBJECTED SHARPLY - SAYING PERHAPS THERE WAS A 
PROBLEM AT THE OAU THAT NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED-  MUGABE THEN 
SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD, TO HIS CONSIDERABLE DISTRESS, THAT 
MASIRE HAD TAKEN ON A CANADIAN AS A TOP ADVLSOR.  THIS WAS 
WRONG, HE ASSERTED.  THIS IS SOMETHING THE OAU SHOULD BE 
HANDLING.  WOLPE THEN EXPLAINED - TO MUGA8E'S OBVIOUS 
ANNOYANCE -- THAT THE CANADIANS HAD PLAYED A ROLE IN HELPING 
MASIRE DEVELOP A PLAN AND BUDGET, AND THAT THE BRITS HAD 
RESPONDED TO MASIRE'S DESPERATE NEED FOR ASSISTANCE BY 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0623 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  02222  04 OF 04  251444Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  SMEC-00  INL-01   DINT-00 
      DODE-00  DOEE-00  DOTE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    EUR-01 
      OIGO-02  FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-01    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00 
      IO-00    L-00     AC-01    NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   OPIC-01 
      PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    TRSE-00 
      USIE-00  IIP-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00 
      SAS-00   SWCI-00    /013W 
                  ------------------4FAA2B  251444Z /38 
P 251448Z APR 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5849 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 HARARE 002222 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02222  04 OF 04  251444Z 
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL 
USUN FOR AMBASSADORS HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG 
USUN/W FOR ORR 
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR 
NSC FOR GAYLE SMITH AND ERIC SCHWARTZ 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/10 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DRC DISENGAGEMENT AND 
DISARMAMENT WITH ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENT 
 
SECONDING AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER TO SET UP HIS BOTSWANA 
OFFICE.   HOWEVER, EVEN NOW, WOLPE NOTED, MASIRE HAS 
VIRTUALLY NO ONE WITH THE APPROPRIATE EXPERTISE WORKING WITH 
HIM.  MASIRE WAS MAKING EVERY EFFORT, WORKING WITH THE OAU 
AND THE UN, TO RECRUIT APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY AFRICAN 
PERSONNEL.  AT THE END OF THE DAY, HOWEVER, WOLPE TOLD MUGABE, THE 
FACILITATION EFFORT WOULD REQUIRE ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT FROM MANY 
INTERNATIONAL SOURCES. 
 
MORE ON ACCELERATING IMPLEMENTATION 
 
21.  (C) IN A CONCLUDING COMMENT, SPECIAL ADVISOR PRENDERGAST 
OBSERVED THAT THE PURPOSE OF S/E WOLPE'S CURRENT MISSION 
APPEARED TO TRACK CLOSELY THAT OF THE VIC FALLS MEETING: TO 
BUILD ON THE MOMENTUM OF KAMPALA.  HE NOTED THAT WHILE THE 
DEVIL MAY BE IN THE DETAILS, IN THIS INSTANCE SALVATION COULD 
EXIST IN THE SPECIFICS.   SPECIFIC MECHANISMS COULD UNLOCK 
THE ABILITY OF THE SIGNATORY PARTIES TO MOVE FORWARD MORE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02222  04 OF 04  251444Z 
RAPIDLY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA.  FOR EXAMPLE, 
RECIPROCAL COMMITMENTS REGARDING REDEPLOYMENT AND THE 
DEMOBILIZATION OF ARMED-GROUPS COULD ACCELERATE PLANNING AND 
DEEPEN COMMITMENTS TO WITHDRAWAL BY KEY SIGNATORIES.  BROADER 
CONCEPTUAL AGREEMENTS THAT ARE IN EACH PARTY'S INTEREST WILL 
HELP CONSOLIDATE AGREEMENTS OF MORE IMMEDIATE CONCERN MADE IN 
KAMPALA.  THE USG HAD FURTHER IDEAS ON THESE ISSUES THAT WE 
LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH HIM, WITH ZIMBABWE'S 
REPRESENTATIVES ON THE JMC/PC, AND WITH THE OTHER LUSAKA 
SIGNATORIES. 
 
COMMENTS 
 
22.  (C) MUGABE HAS CLEARLY INTENSIFIED HIS SEARCH FOR A WAY OUT 
OF THE CONGO.  BUT HIS EXIT WILL NOT BE PAVED WITH 
COMPROMISES THAT WOULD CALL INTO QUESTION HIS GOVERNMENT'S 
REASONS FOR INTERVENING IN THE FIRST PLACE.  HE APPEARS 
INTERESTED IN THE NOTION OF PACKAGING MORE SPECIFIC 
COMMITMENTS REGARDING THE DISARMAMENT OF THE ARMED GROUPS 
WITH ACCELERATED REDEPLOYMENTS AND WITHDRAWALS.  WHILE HE 
REMAINS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS ABOUT KAGAME'S INTENTIONS, MUGABE 
RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF ADDRESSING RWANDAN SECURITY 
CONCERNS. 
 
23.  (C) MUGABE IS NOT READY TO ABANDON KABILA, OR TO EVEN BEGIN 
THE DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES - AT LEAST WITH THE USG. 
HOWEVER, HE, TOGETHER WITH HIS NAMIBIAN AND ANGOLAN ALLIES, 
WILL INCREASE THEIR PRESSURE ON KABILA TO IMPLEMENT THE 
LUSAKA AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY REGARDING CEASE-FIRE 
COMMITMENTS AND THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE.  HIS DESIRE TO MOVE 
FORWARD ON WITHDRAWAL WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY KEEP HIM FOCUSED 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02222  04 OF 04  251444Z 
ON THE NEED TO KEEP KABILA IN LINE, AND PROVIDES OPENINGS TO 
EXPLORE WITH RWANDA AND UGANDA WHAT THEY ARE WILLING TO DO TO 
EXPEDITE FINAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LUSAKA CEASEFIRE 
AGREEMENT.  END COMMENT. 
 
MCDONALD 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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