This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

211945Z Apr 00


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3109

PAGE 01        HARARE  02198  01 OF 05  212004Z 
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                  ------------------4EC111  212007Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5809
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 002198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02198  01 OF 05  212004Z 
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG, 
USUN/W/BOBORR 
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND 
DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR TOM MCDONALD, REASONS 1.5 
(B), (D) 
 
REFS: A) HARARE 2102, B) HARARE 2103 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: ZIMBABWEAN JUSTICE MINISTER AND 
MUGABE CONFIDANT STATES THAT THE VICTORIA FALLS 
MEETING WAS CALLED IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANY OBSTACLES 
TO CONTINUED FORWARD PROGRESS THAT MIGHT HAVE 
RESULTED FROM CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS SINCE THE RECENT 
KAMPALA AGREEMENT.  ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, HE ASSERTS, 
ARE PARTICULARLY EAGER TO FIND A QUICK EXIT FROM THE 
DRC, BUT CAN DO SO ONLY IF IT IS CLEAR THAT UGANDA 
AND RWANDA ARE ALSO WITHDRAWING.  HE REPORTS THAT, 
AFTER BEING APPROACHED BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, ZIMBABWE 
HAD INITIATED CONVERSATIONS WITH THE EX- 
FAR/INTERAHAMWE ABOUT THEIR RESETTLEMENT IN THE 
INTERIOR OF THE DRC.  HOWEVER, THIS INITIATIVE WAS 
HALTED WHEN KABILA LEARNED OF IT AND POSED STRONG 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02198  01 OF 05  212004Z 
OBJECTIONS.  ZIMBABWE FEELS IT IS IMPORTANT TO AVOID 
A RUPTURE WITH KABILA, AND BELIEVES THAT DDRR ISSUES 
WILL BE EASIER TO ADDRESS ONCE MONUC IS DEPLOYED ON 
THE GROUND AND IF THERE IS BROADER INTERNATIONAL 
ENGAGEMENT.  HE ARGUES THAT THESE ISSUES ARE MORE 
EASILY PRESSED BY THIRD PARTIES, AND URGES THAT THE 
USG INTENSIFY ITS SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, PARTICULARLY 
BETWEEN KINSHASA AND HARARE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------- 
BACKGROUND OF THE VIC FALLS MEETING 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) : ON APRIL 21 S/E WOLPE, AMBASSADOR MCDONALD, 
LT. COL. GADDIS AND ECONOFF NOTETAKER MET WITH 
EMERSON MNANGAGWA, MINISTER OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND 
PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS AND A CLOSE CONFIDANT OF 
PRESIDENT MUGABE, TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE CONGO AND THE EXECUTION OF THE LUSAKA PEACE 
ACCORD.  IN A NEARLY 90 MINUTE-LONG MEETING, THE 
JUSTICE MINISTER COVERED CONSIDERABLE GROUND, AND 
OFFERED PARTICULARLY CANDID OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE 
EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE AND ZIMBABWE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH 
KABILA. 
 
¶3.  (C) MNANGAGWA SAID THAT ZIMBABWE HAD BECOME VERY 
ANXIOUS ABOUT THE INCIDENTS THAT HAD OCCURRED ON THE 
GROUND SINCE THE KAMPALA CEASE-FIRE/DISENGAGEMENT 
AGREEMENT.  THE VARIOUS PERSONNEL MOVEMENTS AND 
CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS HAD RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 
COMMITMENT BY THOSE INVOLVED, AND THERE WERE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02198  01 OF 05  212004Z 
SUSPICIONS THAT SOME SIDES STILL SOUGHT MILITARY 
GAINS.  ZIMBABWE FEARED THAT EVENTS MIGHT BE SPINNING 
OUT OF CONTROL. 
 
¶4.  (C) MNANGAGWA SAID THAT IT WAS MUSEVENI WHO HAD 
SUGGESTED THE VICTORIA FALLS MEETING, AND WHO HAD 
UNDERTAKEN TO DELIVER KAGAME.  MUGABE AND NUJOMA HAD 
PROMISED TO DELIVER DOS SANTOS, WITH KABILA ALSO 
INVITED.  THE IDEA WAS TO HAVE "AN INFORMAL, NON- 
BINDING SETTING" IN WHICH THE LEADERS MIGHT REMOVE 
ANY OBSTACLES THAT HAD EMERGED AS A RESULT OF THE 
INCIDENTS THAT HAD OCCURRED OVER THE PAST THREE TO 
FOUR WEEKS.  THE ZIMBABWEANS INTENDED TO PRESS FOR A 
RENEWED SENSE OF COMMITMENT TO DISENGAGEMENT AT THE 
HIGHEST LEVEL; TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH THE TWO SIDES 
COULD "VOLUNTARILY MOVE BACKWARD" IN THE SPIRIT OF 
COMMITMENT TO THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT; AND TO FIND A 
METHOD OF INSURING THAT AGREEMENTS MADE WERE HONORED. 
IF THE LEADERS "SEE LIGHT," THEY WILL THEN BRIEF 
CHILUBA.  MNANGAGWA ADDED THAT ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA 
WERE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS FOR A PULLBACK.  (ANGOLA, 
HE SAID, HAD VIRTUALLY NO TROOPS ON THE GROUND AND 
WAS NO LONGER A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR.)  HE BELIEVED 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3112 
 
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                  ------------------4EC11C  212008Z /38 
P 211945Z APR 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5810 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 HARARE 002198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02198  02 OF 05  212004Z 
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG, 
USUN/W/BOBORR 
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND 
DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT 
 
THAT UGANDA WOULD POSE NO FURTHER PROBLEMS IN MOVING 
TO DISENGAGE THE FORCES ON THE GROUND, BUT HE WAS 
LESS SANGUINE ABOUT RWANDA. 
 
¶5.  (C) ACCORDING TO THE JUSTICE MINISTER, MBEKI AND 
CHISSANO WERE COMING TO VIC FALLS FOR A DIFFERENT 
REASON: TO DISCUSS ZIMBABWE'S LAND QUESTION.  MBEKI, 
HE SAID, HAD SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT HE NOT BE 
INVOLVED IN THE INFORMAL CONGO DISCUSSIONS. 
 
-------------------------------- 
WHAT TO DO WITH NON-STATE ACTORS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) AFTER PRAISING ZIMBABWE'S LEADERSHIP IN 
SECURING THE RECENT KAMPALA AGREEMENTS, AND ASSURING 
THE JUSTICE MINISTER THAT THE USG WOULD CONTINUE TO 
INSIST ON THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA AND THE 
FULL RESTORATION OF CONGOLESE SOVEREIGNTY AND 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02198  02 OF 05  212004Z 
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, S/E WOLPE BROACHED THE KNOTTY 
PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE NON- 
STATE ACTORS.  HE ASKED THE JUSTICE MINISTER IF IT 
MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACCELERATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
LUSAKA BY BOLD MOVES ON BOTH SIDES: A DEEPER 
DISENGAGEMENT AND PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL BY RWANDA AND 
UGANDA, LINKED TO UNDERTAKINGS BY THE GDRC AND ITS 
ALLIES WITH RESPECT TO THE DISARMAMENT AND 
DEMOBILIZATION OF NON-SIGNATORY FORCES.  WHAT DID 
ZIMBABWE FEEL IT COULD DO THAT MIGHT ENCOURAGE RWANDA 
AND UGANDA TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING? 
 
¶7.  (C) MNANGAGWA RESPONDED FRANKLY THAT THE GOZ HAD 
NOT YET DEVELOPED CONCRETE POSITIONS ON DDRR, BUT 
ZIMBABWE DID RECOGNIZE THIS WAS THE CRUCIAL QUESTION. 
HE SAID THAT TWO MONTHS AGO, AFTER BEING QUIETLY 
APPROACHED BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, ZIMBABWE GAVE THE 
GREEN LIGHT TO ZIMBABWE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TO SEE 
WHAT COULD BE DONE.  HE HIMSELF HAD SPOKEN WITH THE 
EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE.  HE DISCOVERED THAT THE LARGEST 
PART OF THEM WANTED TO SETTLE IN THE DRC.  THE 
ZIMBABWEANS THEN ASKED THE HUTU FIGHTERS IF THEY 
WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT DISARMAMENT.  IN THE 
ZIMBABWEAN VIEW, A SOLUTION WAS IN SIGHT: IF THE EX- 
FAR/INTERAHAMWE ELEMENTS WERE TO SETTLE IN THE DRC, 
THEY WOULD NOT/NOT BE ON THE BORDER BUT IN THE 
INTERIOR; THEREFORE, THEY WOULD NO LONGER POSE A 
THREAT TO RWANDA OR BURUNDI. 
 
¶8.  (C) HOWEVER, THE JUSTICE MINISTER CONTINUED, THE 
DRC LEARNED OF THE ZIMBABWEAN INITIATIVE AND KABILA 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02198  02 OF 05  212004Z 
HAD REACTED VERY NEGATIVELY.  THE ZIMBABWEANS HAD 
THEREFORE TURNED OFF THIS ATTEMPT AT FINDING A 
SOLUTION TO THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE PROBLEM.  THE 
ZIMBABWEAN IMMEDIATE GOAL, HE SAID, WAS "TO MAXIMIZE 
ZIMBABWEAN INFLUENCE ON KABILA, RATHER THAN ON THESE 
FORCES."  "WE NEED TO PLAY A ROLE THAT IS APPRECIATED 
BY KABILA," HE SAID, "SO WE CAN PUSH HIM TO TAKE 
POSITIONS THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY."  ZIMBABWE HAD CONCLUDED 
THAT, GIVEN KABILA'S OPPOSITION TO ANY SUCH 
DISCUSSION, PUSHING THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE ISSUE AT 
THIS POINT WOULD BE VERY COSTLY IN TERMS OF THE 
BIGGER PICTURE.  (IN AN ASIDE, THE JUSTICE MINISTER 
OBLIQUELY REFERENCED SOME DISCUSSIONS THE DRC HAD HAD 
WITH THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE ABOUT HOW THEIR DEMANDS 
COULD BE ADDRESSED.  HOWEVER, HE DOUBTED THERE HAD 
BEEN ANY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THESE ELEMENTS AND 
EITHER UGANDA OR RWANDA.) 
 
¶9.  (C) MNANGAGWA AGREED THAT THE DISARMAMENT 
RESOLUTION HAD TO BE RESOLVED IF LUSAKA WERE TO BE 
FULLY IMPLEMENTED.  BUT, HE SAID, ZIMBABWE COULD NOT 
BE IN THE LEAD OR SEEN AS THE CHAMPION OF THIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3113 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  02198  03 OF 05  212004Z 
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                  ------------------4EC120  212008Z /38 
P 211945Z APR 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5811 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 HARARE 002198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02198  03 OF 05  212004Z 
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E, 
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG, 
USUN/W/BOBORR 
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND 
DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT 
 
INITIATIVE.  RATHER, ZIMBABWE WANTED TO SEE MORE 
INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS INVOLVED.  ONCE MONUC DEPLOYED, 
ZIMBABWE WOULD BE LESS SIGNIFICANT AND LESS VISIBLE, 
AND IT WOULD BE EASIER TO WORK THE DDRR ISSUES.  IT 
WOULD ALSO BE EASIER TO ADDRESS THE DIFFICULT DDRR 
ISSUES IF THEY WERE PRESSED BY THIRD PARTIES, HE 
SAID. 
 
¶10.  (C) WOLPE OBSERVED, WITH THE JUSTICE MINISTER'S 
CONCURRENCE, THAT KABILA DID IN FACT APPEAR TO 
RESPOND TO STRONG PRESSURE.  WHY, THEN, WAS ZIMBABWE 
RELUCTANT TO EXERT THE SAME PRESSURE ON KABILA ON THE 
DISARMAMENT ISSUE THAT IT HAD BROUGHT TO BEAR IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE KAMPALA CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT? 
MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A CORE ISSUE FOR 
KABILA, AND ZIMBABWEANS FEARED THE CONSEQUENCES IF 
THEY PUSHED KABILA TOO FAR.  KABILA WAS ALREADY 
SHOPPING AROUND FOR OTHERS TO FILL THE ZIMBABWEAN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02198  03 OF 05  212004Z 
ROLE, AND THAT HAD MADE THE GOZ EVEN MORE CAUTIOUS. 
WOLPE NOTED THAT ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT KABILA HAD 
PURCHASED HAD DONE LITTLE TO IMPROVE KABILA'S 
POSITION, AND THAT HE REMAINED DEPENDENT 0N THE 
ZIMBABWEAN ARMY.  MNANGAGWA SAID THAT, WHILE THIS 
MIGHT BE TRUE, KABILA COULD PROVIDE MORE SIGNIFICANT 
ARMS TO THE NON-SIGNATORY FORCES, AND CREATE HAVOC 
FOR THE CONGO AND THE REGION.  KABILA, HE SAID, HAD 
EARLIER PROVIDED SOME ARMS TO THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE, 
BUT THIS ARMS SUPPLY HAD BEEN LIMITED THANKS TO 
ZIMBABWEAN INTERVENTION. 
 
-------------------------------- 
HOW ABOUT RESUPPLY AND TRAINING? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) WOLPE ASKED IF ZIMBABWE AND THE ALLIES MIGHT 
BE ABLE, IN EXCHANGE FOR A DISENGAGEMENT INITIATIVE 
BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, TO AT LEAST INSURE THE 
CESSATION OF TRAINING AND RESUPPLY OF THE NON- 
SIGNATORY FORCES.  MNANGAGWA INITIALLY RESPONDED THAT 
THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES TO MANAGE, AND 
THAT ZIMBABWE HOPED THAT CHILUBA AND MASIRE COULD 
ASSIST THE PARTIES "IN TALKING ACROSS THE LINES." 
SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, MNANGAGWA SAID THAT HE 
BELIEVED A COMMITMENT TO TERMINATE TRAINING AND 
RESUPPLY COULD IN FACT BE MADE BY THE ALLIES TO 
UGANDA AND RWANDA. 
 
-------------------------------- 
MASIRE AND THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02198  03 OF 05  212004Z 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) WOLPE TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF MASIRE AND 
THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE, DESCRIBING THE EFFORTS 
THE USG HAD BEEN MAKING TO GET KABILA TO UNDERSTAND 
THAT HE COULD EMERGE IN A STRONGER POSITION BY FULLY 
EMBRACING LUSAKA AND ACCEPTING MASIRE'S FACILITATION. 
MNANGAGWA AGREED WITH WOLPE, AND SAID THAT ZIMBABWE 
HAD MADE THE SAME POINT WITH THE CONGOLESE PRESIDENT. 
HE SAID IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT MASIRE ESTABLISH A 
MORE PUBLIC PROFILE, AND THAT HE BE SEEN TO BE 
ACTIVELY CONSULTING WITH ALL OF THE REGIONAL 
CAPITALS. 
 
------------------------- 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) WHEN ASKED BY S/E WOLPE WHAT MESSAGE HE 
COULD CARRY FROM HARARE TO RWANDA AND UGANDA, THE 
JUSTICE MINISTER REPLIED: "THAT ZIMBABWE IS ANXIOUS 
TO SEE A CONCLUSION TO THIS WAR."  MNANGAGWA OBSERVED 
THAT RWANDA AND UGANDA WOULD NO DOUBT SAY THE SAME 
THING.  HOWEVER, THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE: "BECAUSE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3114 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  02198  04 OF 05  212004Z 
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                  ------------------4EC124  212008Z /38 
P 211945Z APR 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5812 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 HARARE 002198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02198  04 OF 05  212004Z 
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG, 
USUN/W/BOBORR 
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND 
DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT 
 
ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA ARE SERIOUSLY WORKING ON A WAY 
TO PULL OUT."  "BUT," HE CONTINUED, "ZIMBABWE CAN NOT 
GIVE AWAY THEIR GAME TO RWANDA AND UGANDA.  THEY HAVE 
TO BE PULLING OUT AS WELL, AND AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE 
IS NEEDED ON THE GROUND TO SHINE A BRIGHT LIGHT ON 
ALL THE PLAYERS' ACTIONS AND BE AN IMPARTIAL 
WITNESS."  HOW THE WITHDRAWAL IS STRUCTURED CAN BE 
WORKED OUT BY THE MILITARY LEADERSHIPS.  IN FACT, 
MNANGAGWA SAID, A ZIMBABWE MILITARY TEAM HAD BEEN 
DISPATCHED TO MBUJI-MAI TO BEGIN OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
FOR A PULLOUT FROM THE DRC.  WHILE THIS WOULD CLEARLY 
HAVE TO BE VETTED AND APPROVED BY THE TOP MILITARY 
AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, THEY HAD STARTED THE BALL 
ROLLING.  THE JUSTICE MINISTER CONCLUDED: IF THERE 
ARE PROBLEMS ONCE THE UN FORCES ARE ON THE GROUND, IT 
WILL BE FROM RWANDA AND UGANDA, NOT FROM ZIMBABWE. 
 
------------------------ 
THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02198  04 OF 05  212004Z 
------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (C) AS PART OF HIS OVER-ALL PROGNOSIS, THE 
JUSTICE MINISTER OBSERVED THAT SOUTH AFRICA MAY NOW 
BE IN A POSITION TO PLAY "A MORE NEUTRAL AND 
CONSTRUCTIVE" ROLE IN THE CONGOLESE CONFLICT. 
MNANGAGWA SAID THAT THE ZIMBABWEANS HAD BEEN PUSHING 
KABILA TO DISTINGUISH SOUTH AFRICA AND MBEKI FROM 
MANDELA, WHOM KABILA NEVER LIKED.  "WE WANT KABILA TO 
OPEN HIS HEART TO MBEKI," HE SAID.  MBEKI, HE ADDED, 
HAD SO FAR PLAYED IT VERY WELL WITH KABILA. 
 
------------------------ 
NO TO REGIONAL SANCTIONS 
------------------------ 
 
¶15.  (C) WOLPE ASKED THE JUSTICE MINISTER WHETHER THE 
LUSAKA SIGNATORIES HAD CONSIDERED THE IMPOSITION OF 
REGIONAL SANCTIONS ON CEASE-FIRE VIOLATORS. 
MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL. 
IT WAS FAR BETTER AT WORKING AT BUILDING CONFIDENCE 
AMONG THE PARTIES. 
 
------------------ 
IS THERE A PLAN B? 
------------------ 
 
¶16.  (C) WOLPE ASKED MNANGAGWA IF ZIMBABWE AND THE 
ALLIES HAD ANY PLAN B IN MIND, SHOULD KABILA IN THE 
END PROVE WHOLLY IMPERVIOUS TO THE PRESSURES THAT 
WERE BEING APPLIED?  THE JUSTICE MINISTER RESPONDED 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02198  04 OF 05  212004Z 
WITH A SMILE: "THIS IS A DANGEROUS QUESTION."  IN ANY 
EVENT, HE CONTINUED, KABILA APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD 
HEALTH, AND "WE EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH HIM." 
HOWEVER, "KABILA SEES ZIMBABWE AS AN ALLY THAT HAS 
TAKEN OVER A DANGEROUS PROPORTION OF THE DRC'S 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THIS MAKES HIM UNCOMFORTABLE." 
MNANGAGWA ADDED THAT RECENTLY THE ALLIES HAD INSISTED 
THAT KABILA AGREE THAT ALL FAC FORCES WOULD OPERATE 
ONLY UNDER CENTRAL COMMAND.  HOWEVER, KABILA REJECTED 
THE APPLICATION OF THIS RESTRICTION TO THE 
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, WHICH IS PRESENTLY DEPLOYED IN 
THREE PROVINCES; KINSHASA, ORIENTALE AND KATANGA. 
 
------------------------------------ 
MORE USG SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY IS NEEDED 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶17.  (C) WOLPE ASKED IF THE USG COULD BE HELPFUL IN 
STRENGTHENING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN ZIMBABWE, ON THE 
ONE HAND, AND RWANDA AND UGANDA, ON THE OTHER. 
MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT ZIMBABWE HAD GOOD LINES OF 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH BOTH RWANDA AND UGANDA, BUT THEY 
WERE INTENTIONALLY BEING KEPT TO A LOW LEVEL FOR THE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3116 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  02198  05 OF 05  212004Z 
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      FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-01    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00 
      L-00     AC-01    NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00 
      PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    TRSE-00  USIE-00 
      PMB-00   DSCC-00  DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00 
        /012W 
                  ------------------4EC127  212008Z /38 
P 211945Z APR 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5813 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 HARARE 002198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02198  05 OF 05  212004Z 
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E, 
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG, 
USUN/W/BOBORR 
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND 
DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT 
 
MOMENT.  HOWEVER, ONCE THE DECISION WAS TAKEN, THERE 
COULD BE AN EXPLOSION OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT AND 
COMMUNICATION.  THIS WAS NOT A REAL PROBLEM. 
HOWEVER, WHAT WOULD HELP NOW IS IF THE USG WOULD 
ENGAGE IN MUCH MORE FREQUENT SHUTTLING BETWEEN THE 
CAPITALS OF KINSHASA AND HARARE, BETWEEN KABILA AND 
MUGABE.. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶18.  (C) THE REMARKABLE CANDOR OF THE JUSTICE 
MINISTER -- NOTING THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO LUSAKA 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DDRR; ACKNOWLEDGING HIS OWN 
DISCUSSIONS WITH, AND REFLECTIONS ABOUT, THE EX- 
FAR/INTERHAMWE; AND DESCRIBING ZIMBABWE'S DIFFICULT 
RELATIONSHIP WITH KABILA -- IS TESTIMONY TO 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02198  05 OF 05  212004Z 
ZIMBABWE'S URGENT NEED TO FIND A QUICK WAY OUT OF THE 
DROC.  KABILA'S REJECTION OF ANY SUBSTANTIVE 
DISCUSSION ON DDRR REMAINS A MAJOR HURDLE TO LUSAKA 
IMPLEMENTATION.  IN THE VIEW OF MNANGAGWA, THIS COULD 
BEST BE ADDRESSED THROUGH BROADER INTERNATIONAL 
ENGAGEMENT ON THIS ISSUE.  THE ELEMENTS OF AN INITIAL 
DEAL COULD BE IN THE MAKING, THOUGH, IF THE 
ZIMBABWEANS WOULD BE WILLING AT SOME POINT TO COMMIT 
JOINTLY WITH THEIR ALLIES TO TERMINATE TRAINING AND 
RESUPPLY OF THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE. 
 
¶19.  (C) PARTICULARLY STRIKING WAS MNANGAGWA'S 
REQUEST THAT THE USG ENGAGE IN MORE ACTIVE AND 
CONTINUOUS SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, SPECIFICALLY  BETWEEN 
KABILA AND HIS OWN BOSS, MUGABE.  IT WOULD APPEAR 
ALSO THAT ZIMBABWE'S COMFORT LEVEL WITH SOUTH AFRICA 
HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY WITH MBEKI'S ASSUMPTION 
OF THE PRESIDENCY.  ZIMBABWE'S LEANING ON KABILA TO 
ACCEPT A SOUTH AFRICAN ROLE MAY ULTIMATELY MAKE IT 
POSSIBLE FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO PLAY A MORE SUBSTANTIVE 
ROLE IN DROC PEACEKEEPING.  END COMMENT. 
 
MCDONALD 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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