P 211252Z DEC 99
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1724
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 005413 
 
PARIS FOR LEAF; LONDON FOR SUTPHIN; NICOSIA FOR ILMG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/09 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IR KISL IS LE
SUBJECT: THE SOUTH: HIZBALLAH STRATEGIC, TACTICAL 
DIVISIONS 
 
REF: A) BEIRUT 5373, B) BEIRUT 4669 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR DAVID M. SATTERFIELD. 
REASON 1.5 B AND D. 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  SPECULATION OVER A FUTURE ISRAELI 
WITHDRAWAL (UNILATERAL OR THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS) FROM 
SOUTH LEBANON HAS GIVEN RISE TO DIFFERENCES AMONG 
HIZBALLAH'S SENIOR LEADERS ABOUT THE PARTY'S FUTURE. 
THE PROSPECT OF CHANGE HAS COMPELLED THE PARTY TO 
BEGIN SPECIFIC PLANNING FOR THE ROLE IT WILL PLAY IN 
A POST-PEACE, POST-WITHDRAWAL LEBANON.  ITS CHOICE 
IS REALLY NO CHOICE AT ALL:  WHETHER TO ACCELERATE 
ITS DECADE-LONG TRANSFORMATION INTO A LEGITIMATE 
POLITICAL PARTY (YET ONE ALWAYS LIMITED BY ITS 
SECTARIAN IDENTIFICATION) OR TO REMAIN A FRINGE 
ELEMENT IN LEBANESE POLITICS (UNDER EITHER SCENARIO, 
WE EXPECT EFFORTS TO INSULATE AND PROTECT HIZBALLAH 
TERRORIST CELLS, FOR USE BY IRAN AND SYRIA AS 
TRAINERS AND AGENTS OUTSIDE LEBANON). 
 
¶2.  (C) THE RESUMPTION OF ISRAELI-SYRIAN 
NEGOTIATIONS HAS INTENSIFIED THE DEBATE WITHIN 
HIZBALLAH ABOUT IDENTIFYING AND SECURING ITS FUTURE 
ROLE IN LEBANON.  IN THIS UNCERTAIN ATMOSPHERE, 
HIZBALLAH SECRETARY-GENERAL HASSAN NASRALLAH HAS 
REMAINED THE LOCUS OF POWER FOR THE PARTY, AND LEADS 
THE MORE PRAGMATIC, POLITICAL WING.  HIS DEPUTY, 
NA'IM QASSIM, AND MILITARY OFFICIAL MUHAMMAD YAZBAK 
LEAD A MORE EXTREME WING TOUTING THE LIBERATION OF 
JERUSALEM AS A NEW GOAL TO RALLY THE TROOPS, AND 
RESIST ANY TYPE OF REGIONAL NORMALIZATION WITH 
ISRAEL. 
 
¶3.  (C) IF PRAGMATISM WINS OUT, AND THIS APPEARS 
LIKELY (EVEN WITHOUT SYRIAN URGING), HIZBALLAH FACES 
CHALLENGES IN BROADENING ITS BASE, FINDING A NEW 
MESSAGE TO INSPIRE SUPPORT, AND TRANSFORMING ITS 
PUBLIC IMAGE FROM RELIGIOUS ZEALOTS AND MILITIAMEN 
TO RESPONSIVE, LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PLAYERS. 
REMAINING TRUE TO ITS ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES WILL MEAN 
AVOIDING NEPOTISM, CORRUPTION, AND AUTHORITARIANISM 
-- TRADITIONAL FEATURES OF LEBANESE POLITICS.  CAN 
HIZBALLAH DEVELOP A COHERENT, CREDIBLE AND APPEALING 
MESSAGE -- ANTI-NORMALIZATION, SOCIAL GOOD DEEDS, 
ADVOCACY OF THE "DISPOSSESSED" -- WHILE MANEUVERING 
IN THE SNAKEPIT OF LEBANESE POLITICS?   CAN IT 
RETAIN ITS POPULARITY AS IT CUTS THE DEALS WITH 
LEBANESE POLITICIANS AND SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE 
OFFICERS THAT GET MPS ELECTED, WITH INEVITABLE 
COMPROMISES, AND  TARNISHED REPUTATIONS?  CAN ITS 
OFFICERS DELIVER ON HIGH-HOPES OF REVOLUTIONARY 
CHANGE SHOULD ANY ONE OF THEM GAIN A MINISTRY -- 
ASSUMING THAT INCLUSION IN GOVERNMENT IS DESIRED? 
 
¶4.  (C) UNTIL NOW, HIZBALLAH HAS HAD THE BEST OF TWO 
WORLDS:  IT IS A LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PARTY WITH A 
STRONG BLOC IN PARLIAMENT, YET IT IS ALSO AN ARMED 
MILITIA WHICH GAINS ENORMOUS, CROSS-CONFESSIONAL 
POPULARITY FOR FIGHTING OCCUPATION WHEN THE STATE 
DID NOT.  A LONG ERA, WHICH ALLOWED THE PARTY TO 
HAVE ONE FOOT IN THE SYSTEM AND ONE FOOT OUTSIDE 
CHALLENGING THAT SYSTEM, IS DRAWING TO A CLOSE.  AS 
IT UNDERGOES THE DEFLATING PROCESS OF MOVING FULLY 
INTO LEGITIMATE POLITICS AND -- MOST IMPORTANTLY -- 
A CRITICAL DECISION ON RETAINING ITS TERRORIST 
ACTIVITIES, THE PARTY MAY FIND IT HAD AN EASIER TIME 
FIGHTING THE IDF IN THE SOUTH.  THIS CABLE CONTINUES 
OUR SERIES ON SOUTH LEBANON ON THE EVE OF CHANGE. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
HIZBALLAH: UNITY IN PUBLIC, DEBATE IN PRIVATE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) THROUGHOUT THE LEBANESE MEDIA'S DAILY 
SPECULATION OVER THE FUTURE PROSPECT OF AN ISRAELI 
WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH LEBANON, HIZBALLAH HAS 
MAINTAINED A PUBLIC POSTURE OF UNANIMITY DECLARING 
THAT AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL NOT FUNDAMENTALLY 
CHANGE THE MOVEMENT'S STRATEGY AND TACTICS. 
HOWEVER, CONVERSATIONS WITH SEVERAL LEBANESE 
OFFICIALS AND ACADEMICS TELL A DIFFERENT STORY.  THE 
SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF HIZBALLAH (PRIMARILY THE SHURA 
COUNCIL, THE POLITICAL WING, THE MILITARY WING), HAS 
BEEN ENGAGED IN A "VIGOROUS DEBATE," IN THE WORDS OF 
ONE AUB POLITICAL SCIENTIST, OVER HOW TO RESPOND TO 
AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.  THE STRATEGIC DEBATE HAS 
FOCUSED ON HOW BEST TO REMAIN A VIABLE AND EFFECTIVE 
PART OF THE LEBANESE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN THE 
SOUTH, AS WELL AS KEY CONSTITUENCIES IN BEIRUT, 
SHOULD THE ACTIVE MILITARY RESISTANCE END. 
 
¶6.  (C) THE RESUMPTION OF THE ISRAEL-SYRIA TRACK OF 
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS IS LIKELY TO INTENSIFY 
THE DEBATE WITHIN HIZBALLAH'S SENIOR LEADERSHIP 
ABOUT ITS FUTURE ROLE IN LEBANON.  IN THIS DEBATE, 
SECRETARY-GENERAL HASSAN NASRALLAH CONTINUES TO 
MAINTAIN HIS DOMINANCE AS THE DE JURE AND DE FACTO 
HEAD OF THE PARTY.  HOWEVER, TWO CAMPS HAVE EMERGED 
OVER HOW TO DEAL WITH THE WITHDRAWAL.  NASRALLAH AND 
THE HIZBALLAH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT REPRESENT WHAT 
HAS BEEN TERMED THE "PRAGMATIC" WING OF THE PARTY 
THAT WISHES TO DEVOTE MORE RESOURCES TO HIZBALLAH'S 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AGENDA IN BEIRUT, THE BIQA', 
AND THE SOUTH ONCE THE IDF/SLA VACATE THEIR 
POSITIONS.  LEBANESE OBSERVERS DOUBT THAT NASRALLAH 
WISHES TO DISMANTLE THE MILITARY WING OF HIZBALLAH, 
BUT HE REALIZES HE MAY HAVE LITTLE CHOICE IF THERE 
IS A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA. 
 
¶7. (C) A MORE EXTREMIST WING IS LED BY DEPUTY SECGEN 
NA'IM QASSIM AND MILITARY COMMANDER MUHAMMAD YAZBAK. 
THIS WING WISHES TO MAINTAIN A HARD-LINE AGAINST THE 
ISRAELIS BY TRUMPETING THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM AS ITS 
"CAUSE CELEBRE," AND AGITATING AGAINST ANY TYPE OF 
NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL SHOULD A FUTURE PEACE 
TREATY BE SIGNED.  THIS WAS EVIDENCED BY QASSIM'S 
NOVEMBER REMARKS TO HIZBALLAH SUPPORTERS IN 
BA'ALBACK-HERMEL.  IN CONTRAST TO NASRALLAH'S PARTY 
MAINSTREAM, THIS WING CONTINUES TO ENOUNCE THE GOALS 
OF THE 1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS EXPORT TO 
OTHER COUNTRIES -- ESPECIALLY LEBANON. 
 
¶8. (C) HIZBALLAH'S SPIRITUAL LEADER, MUHAMMAD HUSAYN 
FADLALLAH, REPRESENTS ANOTHER LEADERSHIP AXIS.  HIS 
AGENDA LIES IN HIS ASPIRATION TO BE REGARDED AS THE 
"MARJA'IYYA" (SPIRITUAL AUTHORITY) OF THE SHI'A OF 
LEBANON (AND IDEALLY, THE WORLD).  FADLALLAH AND 
NASRALLAH ARE OFTEN AT ODDS, AND FADLALLAH HAS OVER 
THE YEARS DRIFTED AWAY FROM ANY DIRECT INVOLVEMENT 
WITH THE PARTY -- YET RETAINS CONSIDERABLE MORAL 
AUTHORITY OVER ITS RANK-AND-FILE, AND THUS CANNOT BE 
IGNORED BY ITS LEADERSHIP.  HOWEVER, HE TOO MUST BE 
MINDFUL OF DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PARTY; HIS OWN 
AMBITION TO BE REGARDED AS A SPIRITUAL AUTHORITY 
REQUIRES THAT HE NOT TAKE SIDES BETWEEN PRAGMATISTS 
AND HARD-LINERS. 
 
¶9. (C) THE PRAGMATIC/HARD-LINE RIFT BECAME PUBLIC 
KNOWLEDGE WITH FORMER SECRETARY GENERAL SUBHI 
TUFAYLI'S "REVOLT OF THE HUNGRY" DURING 1996-1997. 
TUFAYLI'S REVOLT WAS A FORK IN THE ROAD FOR 
HIZBALLAH OVER ITS FUTURE ACTIVITIES.  TUFAYLI'S 
SCHOOL OF THOUGHT ARGUED FOR MORE MILITANT 
ENGAGEMENT IN LEBANESE AND REGIONAL POLITICS -- 
PRIMARILY INCREASED RESISTANCE ATTACKS IN THE SOUTH 
-- WHILE THE OTHER SCHOOL ENCOURAGED GREATER 
EMPHASIS ON HIZBALLAH SOCIAL AND CHARITABLE 
PROGRAMS, AND MORE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM.  QASSIM AND YAZBAK ARE 
THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN MORE SYMPATHETIC TO TUFAYLI'S 
OVERALL STAND REGARDING A MORE MILITANT POLITICAL 
AND MILITARY AGENDA, BUT WERE AWARE THAT OPENLY 
SIDING WITH THE FORMER SECRETARY-GENERAL MEANT 
POLITICAL SUICIDE.  THE SQUELCHING OF TUFAYLI'S 
REVOLT WITH SYRIAN SUPPORT IS EVIDENCE THAT 
HIZBALLAH'S EXTREME FACTIONS DID NOT, AND WILL NOT 
PREVAIL. 
 
HIZBALLAH CONSIDERING FUTURE SCENARIOS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) MUCH OF THE TACTICAL DISCUSSION OF THE 
FUTURE CENTERS ON THE TYPE OF WITHDRAWAL THE IDF 
WILL IMPLEMENT, HOW TO RESPOND TO IT, AND HOW TO 
MANEUVER IF A SYRIA-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY IS 
CONCLUDED.  THE ACTIVE MILITARY RESISTANCE HAS BEEN 
ONE OF THE KEY PILLARS OF HIZBALLAH'S LEGITIMACY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS THROUGHOUT LEBANON AND REMOVING IT IS 
LIKELY TO SAP PARTY STRENGTH.  AS A RESULT, 
HIZBALLAH'S LEADERS HAVE BEEN PONDERING WHAT SOUTH 
LEBANON WILL LOOK LIKE WITH AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL 
COUPLED WITH OVERT, OR COVERT, SYRIAN SECURITY 
GUARANTEES.  STUDY GROUPS HAVE BEEN FORMED TO 
DISCUSS FUTURE POSSIBILITIES.  IN PUBLIC, HASSAN 
NASRALLAH REMAINS SILENT OVER HOW HIZBALLAH WILL 
REACT TO A WITHDRAWAL, OR A FUTURE PEACE TREATY 
BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL.  HIZBALLAH'S REACTION TO 
THE RECENT SLA SHELLING OF A SCHOOL IN ARAB SALIM 
(REF A) MAY BE TELLING OF THE FINE LINE THAT 
HIZBALLAH WALKS IN LEBANESE POLITICS.  NASRALLAH WAS 
QUOTED ON NOVEMBER 17 AS SAYING THAT THE ATTACK 
"DESERVES RETALIATION BY THE RESISTANCE ON 
SETTLEMENTS IN NORTHERN PALESTINE...HOWEVER, FOR NOW 
WE WILL JUST SEND A CLEAR AND FIRM WARNING TO THE 
ENEMY."  THIS IS BUT THE LATEST EPISODE TO SHOW THAT 
THE MILITIA IS ON A TIGHT SYRIAN LEASH, AND WILL LAY 
DOWN ITS ARMS WHEN DOING SO SERVES SYRIAN INTERESTS. 
THE PARTY THEN FACES THE OBVIOUS CHALLENGE, BEGUN 
NINE YEARS AGO WHEN IT ENTERED PARLIAMENT, OF 
TRANSFORMING ITSELF INTO A LEGITIMATE AND APPEALING 
POLITICAL PLAYER, BUT WITHOUT THE UNIFYING FORCE OF 
ACTIVE RESISTANCE.  YET ENTERING THE FRAY MORE FULLY 
MEANS DEALING WITH THE SMALL COMPROMISES AND 
CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE LEBANESE POLITICS SUCH AN 
UNDIGNIFIED SPORT. 
 
CONTINUING THE POLITICAL COMPETITION WITH AMAL 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶11. (C) LIKE ALL OTHER POLITICAL FACTIONS HERE, 
HIZBALLAH IS PREPARING FOR THE Y2000 PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS.  NABIH BERRI'S AMAL MOVEMENT HAS CAPTURED 
THE SUPPORT OF MANY OF THE TRADITIONAL FAMILIES OF 
SOUTH LEBANON INCLUDING THE 'USAYRANS AND BAYDOUNS 
OF SIDON AND TYRE RESPECTIVELY.  THESE FAMILIES HAVE 
STRONG TIES TO BEIRUT'S RULING CLASS AND SYRIAN 
LEADERSHIP CIRCLES, AND SURPRISING RESILIENCE IN THE 
SOUTH AS DELIVERERS OF LARGE BLOCS OF WHOLESALE 
VOTES.  ONE OPTION FOR HIZBALLAH IS TO COURT THE 
NEWEST EMERGING ECONOMIC GROUP IN THE SOUTH -- THOSE 
POORER LEBANESE WHO LEFT THE SOUTH AFTER 1978 AND 
MADE THEIR FORTUNES IN ABIDJAN, CONAKRY, AND 
DETROIT.  SOME OF THESE FAMILIES HAVE RETURNED HOME, 
OR AT LEAST BUILT PALATIAL SUMMER VILLAS TO LET 
PEOPLE KNOW THAT THEY HAVE MADE IT.  MANY OF THESE 
CITIZENS PUT CASH INTO AMAL'S COFFERS.  HOWEVER, 
HIZBALLAH COULD WOO THIS CLASS -- ALREADY TAPPED FOR 
PARTY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE ORPHANS 
AND MARTYRS FUNDS -- TO HELP SUSTAIN A POLITICAL 
PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH.  THEY COULD BECOME AN 
IMPORTANT ALTERNATIVE FUNDING SOURCE SHOULD IRANIAN 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES DRY UP. 
 
¶12. (C) HIZBALLAH WILL HAVE CERTAIN ADVANTAGES IN 
COMPETING WITH AMAL.  WHILE NABIH BERRI HAS KEPT 
MANY OF THE LARGE, TRADITIONAL FAMILIES OF THE SOUTH 
IN HIS POCKET, MOST OF THAT SUPPORT IS BASED ON 
BERRI'S PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH FAMILY HEADS, 
BERRI'S "CULT OF PERSONALITY," AND FEAR OF BERRI'S 
WRATH.  HOWEVER, THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IS SYRIAN 
ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES.  THEY USUALLY 
ENCOURAGE FORMATION OF PRE-COOKED "GRAND ALLIANCES" 
AMONG ALL MAJOR, ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL FACTORS, 
HOWEVER UNNATURAL SUCH AN ALLIANCE MAY BE.  THUS THE 
WINNING SOUTHERN TICKET FOR Y2000 ELECTIONS 
UNDOUBTEDLY WILL INCLUDE A PRE-DETERMINED NUMBER OF 
CANDIDATES FROM BOTH AMAL AND HIZBALLAH, WITH A 
SPRINKLING OF TRADITIONAL FAMILY ELDERS, WHO CAN 
DELIVER VOTES AND MONEY. 
 
¶13. (C) HIZBALLAH HAS TRUE GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS 
THROUGHOUT THE SOUTH, THE BIQA', AND IN THE SOUTHERN 
SUBURBS.  BUT THE NUMBER OF SEATS IT WILL GAIN IN 
THE HOUSE WILL BE A PRODUCT OF THE PRE-BALLOT, BACK 
ROOM NEGOTIATIONS WITH BERRI AND SYRIAN MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE CHIEF FOR LEBANON, GHAZI KANAAN OVER 
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE "GRAND ALLIANCE." 
KANAAN IS EXPECTED TO RECOGNIZE THAT HIZBALLAH WILL 
HAVE EARNED A FEW ADDITIONAL SEATS THIS YEAR (THREE, 
SAYS CURRENT SPECULATION:  TWO IN THE BIQA' AND ONE 
IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS).  COMBINED WITH ANTICIPATED 
EFFORTS BY PRESIDENT LAHOUD TO CUT BERRI (A MAJOR 
OBSTACLE TO REFORMS) DOWN A NOTCH, Y2000 MAY BE A 
GOOD ELECTORAL YEAR FOR HIZBALLAH.  HOWEVER, THE 
RESULTS WILL HAVE ONLY A NOTIONAL CONNECTION WITH 
THE PARTY'S VOTE-GATHERING CAPACITY.  THEY WILL ALSO 
BE A HARBINGER OF THE COMPROMISES AND 
DISAPPOINTMENTS, WHICH THE PARTY WILL FEEL AS IT 
MORE FULLY ENGAGES ITS ENERGIES IN THE LEBANESE 
POLITICAL FRAY.  (NOTABLY, OUR AMAL CONTACTS 
INDICATE AN EXPECTATION THAT IF A PEACE WITH ISRAEL 
PRECEDES ELECTIONS, DAMASCUS WILL HAVE LESS NEED FOR 
HIZBALLAH, AND BE MORE INTERESTED IN PROMOTING 
BERRI, GIVEN HIS GREATER UTILITY TO SYRIA IN 
LEBANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS.) 
 
A CABINET SEAT TO SWEETEN TRANSITION? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) HIZBALLAH'S RELATIONS WITH THE GOL HAVE 
FURTHER FUELED DEBATE WITHIN ITS SENIOR LEADERSHIP 
ABOUT THE FUTURE.  HIZBALLAH FIRST BEGAN ITS LONG- 
TERM INVESTMENT IN LEGITIMACY WHEN IT ENTERED 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, AND PARLIAMENT, IN 1992. 
THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, NOT BEEN OFFERED A CABINET SEAT 
-- IN PART BECAUSE OF RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF THE 
HARIRI AND HOSS GOVERNMENTS TO BRING THEM IN AND IN 
PART DUE TO STRONGLY EXPRESSED U.S. OPPOSITION. 
PRESIDENT LAHOUD HAS COURTED THE PARTY (IN PART TO 
ANNOY NABIH BERRI, IN PART BECAUSE IT SEEMS POPULAR, 
AND IN PART BECAUSE HE THINKS IT WILL MAKE IT EASIER 
FOR HIM TO MANAGE THE PARTY LATER).  MUCH OF 
HIZBALLAH'S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AGENDA PARALLELS 
LAHOUD'S -- ANTI-CORRUPTION, ADDRESSING SOCIAL 
PROBLEMS, AND CREATING VIABLE STATE INSTITUTIONS. 
IN APRIL, LAHOUD SPOKE AT "THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE RESISTANCE" EMPHASIZING THAT THE 
RESISTANCE IS NOT LIMITED TO A SINGLE PARTY, BUT IS 
PART OF A MUCH LARGER NATIONAL MOVEMENT. 
 
¶15.  (C) THIS ONGOING DANCE WILL RAISE EXPECTATIONS 
THAT THE PARTY WILL BE OFFERED A CABINET SEAT, TO 
RECOGNIZE ITS ROLE IN LIBERATING THE SOUTH AND AS A 
SWEETENER AS THE MILITIA DISARMS (THIS WAS THE 
TACTIC USED IN 1991 WITH MOST OTHER LEBANESE 
MILITIAS, AT THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR).  BUT IT IS 
NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER NASRALLAH IS PREPARED TO TAKE 
THE PLUNGE OF ENTERING THE CABINET -- THEREBY ENDING 
HIZBALLAH'S ABILITY TO DISASSOCIATE ITSELF FROM 
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS IT MAY NOT APPROVE.  IN 
GOVERNMENT, HIZBALLAH WOULD FACE AN INEVITABLE 
PROCESS OF COOPTION.  IT WOULD BE DIRECTLY 
CHALLENGED TO PROVE THAT IT CAN DELIVER ON ITS 
PROMISES FOR SOCIAL WELFARE AND CHANGE, YET WOULD 
HAVE LITTLE REAL AUTHORITY, GIVEN THE CONSTRAINED 
NATURE OF LEBANON'S CABINET SYSTEM. 
 
¶16. (C) WITH RESISTANCE GONE, HIZBALLAH WILL HAVE TO 
ADAPT TO A DIFFERENT POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION IN 
THE SOUTH, AS WELL AS BEIRUT.  HIZBALLAH WILL DEVOTE 
MORE RESOURCES TO ITS POLITICAL WING (A TREND 
ALREADY UNDERWAY).  IT HAS DROPPED -- BUT NOT 
REPUDIATED -- ITS CALL FOR AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (A 
NON-STARTER IN A LAND OF MINORITIES).  HIZBALLAH HAS 
REACHED OUT TO CHRISTIAN PARTIES AND THE MARONITE 
PATRIARCH TO PROMOTE ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN LIKE 
ANTI-CORRUPTION AND TAX REFORM, AND POLITICAL 
DIALOGUE.  THIS PROCESS OF "DE-DEMONIZATION" OF THE 
PARTY AMONG CHRISTIANS IS WORKING, IF THE 
INFATUATION OF MANY OF THE MARONITE PATRIARCH'S 
ADVISOR WITH THE DIALOGUE IS ANY GUIDE. 
 
¶17. (C) BUT WHAT WILL BE THE NEW MAINSPRING FOR THE 
PARTY?  ABSENT THE UNITING FORCE OF MILITARY 
RESISTANCE OR OF A CREDIBLE AGENDA FOR ISLAMIC 
CHANGE IN THIS PLURALISTIC SOCIETY, WHAT WILL BE 
HIZBALLAH'S MESSAGE?  UNDOUBTEDLY, IT WILL FOCUS ON 
OPPOSING NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL, ON ANTI- 
CORRUPTION AND FAMILY VALUES, AND ON ADVOCACY OF THE 
POOR AND DISPOSSESSED SHI'A OF THE SOUTH, BIQA', AND 
BEIRUT'S SOUTHERN SUBURBS (THE ORIGINAL PLATFORM 
INSPIRING FORMATION OF AMAL MOVEMENT).  HIZBALLAH 
CAN MORE CREDIBLY PROMOTE THESE OBJECTIVES THAN ANY 
OTHER PARTY IN LEBANON.  HOWEVER, THE SECTARIAN 
NATURE OF LEBANESE POLITICS, REFEREED BY SYRIA, 
MEANS ANY SHI'A PARTY WILL HAVE ONLY ON A NARROW 
PIECE OF THE PLAYING FIELD.  UNDER THIS CONDITION, 
IT CANNOT ASPIRE TO NATIONAL LEADERSHIP. 
 
COMING TO TERMS WITH CHANGE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶18. (C) HIZBALLAH IS NOT LIKELY TO FADE ONCE ISRAEL 
WITHDRAWS, BUT IT WILL FACE THE SAME TYPES OF 
CHALLENGES THAT OTHER LEBANESE POLITICAL ENTITIES 
FACE, AND THE IN-BUILT INHIBITING FACTOR OF 
REPRESENTING ONLY ONE RELIGIOUS SECT AMONG 17 IN 
LEBANON.  CHALLENGES INCLUDE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL 
RIVALRIES WITHIN THE SHI'A COMMUNITY AND SYRIAN 
DOMINATION OF LEBANESE POLITICS.  BROADENING ITS 
BASE OF POLITICAL SUPPORT AND TRANSFORMING ITS 
PUBLIC IMAGE FROM RELIGIOUS ZEALOTS AND MILITIAMEN 
TO RESPONSIVE, LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PLAYERS WILL 
REMAIN THE PARTY'S KEY CHALLENGES FOLLOWING AN 
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.  OTHER ISLAMIC PARTIES IN THE 
REGION HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THIS TRANSFORMATION FROM 
EXTREMISM TO THE MAINSTREAM, IN EGYPT, JORDAN, AND 
TURKEY.  REMAINING TRUE TO ITS ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES 
WILL MEAN AVOIDING THE NEPOTISM, CORRUPTION, AND 
AUTHORITARIANISM OF TRADITIONAL LEBANESE POLITICAL 
PARTIES.  HIZBALLAH WILL HAVE TO MANEUVER MORE 
ACTIVELY IN THE SNAKE PIT OF LEBANESE POLITICS, AND 
MAY WELL FIND IT HAD AN EASIER TIME FIGHTING THE IDF 
IN THE SOUTH. 
 
¶19.  (C) THIS PROCESS IS LIKELY TO CREATE A PARTY 
THAT FINDS ITS SELF-INTEREST REQUIRES MODERATION, 
NOT EXTREMISM, AND INSULATION FROM PARTY TERRORIST 
CELLS AND TERRORIST ASSOCIATIONS WHICH IRAN AND THE 
HIZBALLAH LEADERSHIP ITSELF MAY SEEK TO PRESERVE IN 
LEBANON TO ADVANCE AIMS ABROAD.  SHOULD HIZBALLAH 
FIND A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. -- OR SIMPLY OUR 
RECOGNITION AS A LEGITIMATE POLITICAL/SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION -- IN ITS INTERESTS (AT PRESENT, ALL 
INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE GROUP HAS NO INTEREST IN 
CONTACT WITH THE USG, EVEN IF WE WERE WILLING), IT 
WILL HAVE TO ABANDON ALL INVOLVEMENT WITH TERRORIST 
ACTIVITIES HERE AND ELSEWHERE, ON ITS OWN PART AND 
THROUGH ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER GROUPS. 
 
¶20.  (C) AS WITH IRAN ITSELF, HIZBALLAH WILL SEEK TO 
MAINTAIN ITS DUALITY OF CONDUCT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. 
AND AS WITH IRAN, WE WILL NEED TO CONTINUE TO MAKE 
CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED -- INCLUDING THE GOL -- THAT 
THE U.S. WILL NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN AN 
"ACCEPTABLE" HIZBALLAH AND THE HIZBALLAH WHICH IS 
INVOLVED IN TERROR.  IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE 
CONCERNED AT GROWING EVIDENCE THAT HIZBALLAH'S 
INVOLVEMENT -- IN COORDINATION WITH IRAN -- WITH 
GROUPS SUCH AS HAMAS AND THE PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD 
IS INCREASING, NOT DIMINISHING AS A RESOLUTION OF 
SOUTH LEBANON AND AN END TO THE LEBANESE RESISTANCE 
RAISON D'ETRE APPROACHES. 
 
SATTERFIELD